http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  145 of 2002

PETITIONER: Shivanand Mallappa Koti

RESPONDENT: The State of Karnataka

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/06/2007

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & D.K. JAIN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M  E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT

1.      In the present appeal, challenge is to a judgment  rendered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court  holding the appellant guilty of offences punishable under  Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the  ’IPC’). The appellant faced trial along with two others, i.e. his  mother and brother for offences punishable under Sections  302, 498-A IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry  Prohibition Act, 1961 (in short the ’D.P. Act’). The trial Court  had acquitted the present appellant and his brother of the  charges under Section 302 IPC. Latter is described as A-3  while former is referred to as A-2.  Mother of the accused  (hereinafter referred to as A-1) was separately convicted under  Section 302 IPC. The State had also filed an appeal  questioning the acquittal, as noted above.  

2.      Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The appellant was married to one Shobha (hereinafter  referred to as the deceased). She was the daughter of PW-l, a  School Teacher. PW-2 was her mother, PW-17 her brother and  PW-15 her younger sister. PW-6 is the wife of PW-17.  According to the prosecution, PW-1 received information that  she caught fire and was at the hospital.  On his asking as to  how she received the injuries, she said that while she was  cooking, A-1 came behind her and lit fire to her saree. The  allegation was that for not fulfilling the demand of dowry, she  was killed by her mother-in-law and other accused persons.   To substantiate the plea of demand of dowry, three letters  were exhibited, which are Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4. The  occurrence took place on 25.9.1993.  As noted above, the  prosecution version rests primarily on the statement  purported to have been made by the deceased before her death  to her father in the presence of other relatives. The Trial Court  placed reliance on the evidence of PW-l and the letters and  accordingly directed conviction and imposed sentence, as  aforesaid. It, however, acquitted A-2 and A-3 of some charges.  

3.      Three appeals were filed before the High Court, two by  the accused persons and one by the State, as noted above.

4.      The High Court found that the evidence was insufficient  to substantiate the allegations levelled against A-1. It also  noted that there was no evidence to show any demand of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3  

dowry. Therefore, it directed acquittal of A-1 so far as charges  relating to Section 302 IPC and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the D.P.  Act are concerned, but placing reliance on the letters, Ex.P2 to  P-4, held the appellant guilty of offences punishable under  Section 498-A IPC. Interestingly, the conviction of A-1 and A-2  under Section 498-A was held to be not sustainable by the  High Court.

5.      In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that ingredients of Section 498-A IPC are  not established. In any event, after having directed acquittal  from the charges relatable to Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the D. P.  Act, on the self same evidence, the High Court should not have  held the appellant guilty under Section 498-A IPC. The letters  on which the Trial Court and the High Court placed reliance  do not, in any event, show demand of dowry or any valuable.  

6.      In response, learned counsel for the respondent- State  submitted that in the last letter of July, 1990, Ex.P-4 there  was a clear reference of the intention of appellant for  contacting a second marriage because the deceased had not  brought enough dowry. With reference to the evidence of PW-1  and other relatives, it was submitted that A-1 was making a  grievance that she could have got more dowry as her son,  meaning thereby, the appellant was in government service.  

7.      Undisputedly, the High Court has held so far as A-1 and  A-2 are concerned, that the accusations relatable to Sections  3, 4 and 6 of the D.P Act have not been established as no  demand of dowry has been proved. Section 498-A, IPC reads  as follows:

"Husband or relative of husband of a woman  subjecting her to cruelty \027 Whoever, being the  husband or the relative of the husband of a  woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall  be punished with imprisonment for a term  which may extend to three years and shall also  be liable to fine.

Explanation \027 For the purpose of this Section,   Section, "cruelty" means-

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a  nature as is likely to drive the woman to  commit suicide or to cause grave injury or  danger to life, limb or health (whether mental  or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such  harassment is with a view to coercing her or  any person related to her to meet any unlawful  demand for any property or valuable security  or is on account of failure by her or any person  related to her to meet such demand."

8.      Section 498-A does not specifically speak of a dowry  demand. It speaks of unlawful demand for property and  valuable articles.  

9.      Section 498-A IPC was enacted by the Criminal Law

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3  

(Second Amendment) 1983 with effect from 25.12.1983. The  word "cruelty" has been explained in Section 498-A; so also  harassment. "Cruelty" under the Explanation deals with two  types of circumstances. Clause (a) refers to wilful conduct  leading to suicide or grave injury or danger to life, limb or  health which can be either mental or physical of the woman.  Clause (b) relates to harassment with a view to coerce her or  any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for  any property or valuable or is on account of failure to meet  such demand.    10.     There is no evidence on record on this aspect of any such  demand. Even in the letters, on which prosecution placed  heavy reliance, there is no reference to any demand of dowry  or for that matter of any nature.  In fact in Ex. P-2, the  deceased had written to her mother that she had promised to  pay for some articles which the mother-in-law i.e. A-1 had  purchased.  She had stated that she was embarrassed that  her parents were not paying the money, though A-1 had never  asked for it.  This was not a case of any demand for property  or valuable security.  On the contrary, the deceased had  objected to her parents not paying for something which the A- 1 had spent the money.  To similar effect was letter Ex.P-3. It  is evident from the evidence on record that half of the marriage  expenses were borne by the accused-appellant and his family.  Even Ext. P-4 on which learned counsel for the State placed  strong reliance does not speak of any demand. It only speaks  of a apprehension of a second marriage. Though, he submitted  that the demand of dowry is in the background and has to be  inferred, the plea is clearly unacceptable in the absence of any  material to substantiate that plea. This letter was also written  three years prior to the occurrence.

11.     Above being the position, the inevitable conclusion is that  the prosecution has failed to establish its accusations so far as  Section 498-A IPC is concerned to hold the accused-appellant  guilty. The conviction is, accordingly, set aside. The appeal is  allowed. The bail bonds executed for release of the appellant  on bail shall stand discharged.