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PETITIONER: SHIVAJI DAYANU PATIL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. VATSCHALA UTTAM MORE

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1991

BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) BENCH: AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1769            1991 SCR  (3)  26  1991 SCC  (3) 530        JT 1991 (3)   133  1991 SCALE  (2)92

ACT:     Motor   Vehichles   Act,   1939:  Sections   2(18)   and 92A--‘Motor  Vehicle’--Petrol tanker used  for  transporting petrol--Overturned  due  to  collision  with  another  motor vehicle--Damaged    to   the   extent   that    it    became immobile--Whether ceases to be a ‘Motor Vehicle’--Death  due to  explosion  and  fire taking place few  hours  after  the collision--Both  connected and related events--Causal  rela- tionship between user of the vehicle and accident--Need  not be  direct  and  proximate--Death as a  result  of  accident arising   out   of   ‘use  of   Motor   Vehicle’--No   fault liability--Nature and scope of.     Bombay  Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989: Rules  291-A,  291-B, 297(2), 306-A to 306-D. Adjudication of claims under Section 92A  of the Act-Special Procedure to be followed  by  Claims Tribunal  for  expeditious disposal--Normal  procedure  pre- scribed in respect of claims under Section 110A--Need not be followed. Words & Phrases: ‘use’--‘Arising out off--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     Due  to  a  collision on the highway  between  a  Petrol tanker and a truck, the Petrol tanker went off the road  and fell  on  its side at some distance from the highway.  As  a result of it, petrol leaked out and collected nearby. Nearly four  hours after the collision an explosion     took  place in  the petrol tanker resulting in fire. A large  number  of persons  who had assembled near the petrol tanker  sustained burn  injuries; few of them succumbed to the  injuries.  Re- spondent’s son was of the persons who died as such.     Respondent  filed  a  claim before  the  Motor  Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles  Act for Rs.75,000 as compensation. She also claimed Rs.15,000 as compensation  under  Section 92A of the  Act.  The  Tribunal dismissed the claim under Section 92A on the ground that the explosion could not be said to be an accident arising out of the  use of the petrol tanker and so the provisions of  Sec- tion 92A were not attracted. It held that the explosion  and the  fire  which took place after about four  hours  of  the accident had no connec- 27

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tion with the accident and it was altogether a different and independent  accident, It also observed that  the  villagers took  benefit  of the earlier accident and while  they  were trying to pilfer petrol’ from the tanker there was  friction which caused the ignition and explosion and since an outside agency was responsible therefore the subsequent accident  of explosion  and  fire  could not be said to  be  an  accident arising out of the use of the tanker.     On  appeal, a Single Judge of the High  Court  disagreed with  the finding of the Tribunal that the explosion  was  a direct  consequence of the attempt to pilfer petrol from  it and further held that in view of Sub-Section (4) of  Section 92A  if there was a wrongful act, neglect or default on  the part of the deceased or injured, the claim under Section 92A for  compensation  for no liability cannot be  rejected.  He observed that the fact that at the material time, the tanker was  not driven on the highway but was lying turtle  on  the side of the highway, would not make any difference and  that the  tanker was a vehicle lying on the side of  the  highway and would be covered by the expression ’use’ in Section  92A of  the Act and so compensation would be payable  under  ’no fault liability’.     The  petitioners filed a Letters Patent  Appeal  against the  said  decision and a Division Bench of the  High  Court dismissed  the  same affirming the findings  of  the  Single Judge. The Bench held that the collision between the  tanker and the other vehicle which occurred earlier and the  escape of  petrol  from  the tanker which  ultimately  resulted  in explosion and fire were not unconnected but related  events. It  rejected  the claim of the petitioners  that  the  first information report recorded by the police and the  panchnama indicated that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had been caused by careless act of throwing away of a  match stick used for lighting a beedi or cigarette.     Aggrieved  by  the said decision, the  petitioners  pre- ferred the present petition for special leave to appeal.     On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that  the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle, as defined ln Section 2(18)  of the Act, at the time the explosion and  fire  took place  because  at  that time the petrol  tanker  was  lying turtle  and  was not capable of movement on the  road;  that since  before the explosion and fire the petrol  tanker  was lying  immobile it could not be said that the petrol  tanker was  in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the  explosion and  fire; that even if it is found that the  petrol  tanker was  in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the  explosion and fire, there was no causal relationship between the 28 collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the truck and the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker  which took  place about four-and-half hours later and  it  cannot, therefore, be said that the explosion and fire in the petrol tanker  was  an accident arising out of the use of  a  motor vehicle. Dismissing the petition, this Court,     HELD: 1. Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in the nature of beneficial legislation enacted with a  view to  confer  the benefit of expeditious  payment  of  limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an  accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a  bene- ficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt  a construction which advances the beneficient purpose underly- ing  the  enactment in preference to  a  construction  which tends to defeat that purpose. [39E-G]

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   Motor  Owners’  Insurance Co. Ltd. v.  Jadavji  Keshavji Modi & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 860; Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752, relied on.     Manjusri Raha & Ors. v.B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977]  2 SCR 944; State of Haryana v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979]  3 SCR 184; Bishan Devi & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [1980] 1  SCR 300; N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal  and  Ors. etc.,  [1980]  3 SCR 101 and Gujarat  State  Road  Transport Corporation  v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai & Anr., [1987]  3  SCR 404, referred to.     2. The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for  the purpose  of transporting petrol. It was a vehicle which  had been  adapted for such use and was suitable for use  on  the road  for transporting petrol. At the time when  the  petrol tanker  collided with the truck on the national highway,  it was  being used for the purpose of transporting  petrol.  It cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the said  collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined  in  section 2(18) of the Act.  Merely  because  the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the collision and  was lying at a short distance away from the road,  does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the  road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle. It  could be said that as a result of the collision with the truck the petrol  tanker was damaged to such an extent that there  was no reasonable prospect of the vehicle ever being made mobile again.  In  the circumstances, it cannot be  held  that  the petrol  tanker  which was a motor vehicle when  it  collided with the 29 truck had ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said colli- sion  and  it could not be regarded a motor  ’vehicle  under Section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion  and fire took place. [40H; 41A-C, 42D-E]     Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa. etc., [1975] 2 SCR  138; Newberry v. Simmonds, [1961] 2 Q.B. 345 and  Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291, referred to.     3. The word ’use’ has a wider connotationas to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary  and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the  vehi- cle having been rendered immobile on account of a break-down or  mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances,  it cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use  at the  time when it was lying on its side after the  collision with the truck. [44F-G]     Pushpa  Rani Chopra v. Anokha Singh & Ors.,  [1975]  ACJ 396; General Managar, K.S.R.T.C. v. S. Satalingappa &  Ors., [1979]  ACJ  452 and Oriental Fire & General  Insurance  Co. Ltd.  v. Suman Navnath Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ  243,  ap- proved.     Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B. 367 and Government Insur- ance  Office of New South Wales v. R.J. Green &  Lloyd  Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437, referred to.     4.1.  There is no ground for interfering with the  find- ings  recorded  by  the High Court that  those  persons  who sustained injuries as a result of the explosion and fire  in the  petrol tanker did not indulge in any unlawful  activity which  might have caused the explosion and fire. The  matter has,  therefore, to be examined in the light of the  meaning to be assigned to the words "arising out of" In the  expres- sion "accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" in Section 92A of the Act. [46D-E]     4.2.  The words "arising out of" have been used in  var- ious statutes in different contexts and have been  construed by  Courts widely as well as narrowly, keeping in  view  the

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context in which they have been used in a particular  legis- lation. [46F]     4.3.  In the context of motor accidents the  expressions "caused by" and "arising out of" are often used in statutes. Although both these expressions imply a causal  relationship between the accident resulting in injury and the use of  the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of 30 proximity  of such relationship. As compared to the  expres- sion "caused by" the expression "arising out of" has a wider connotation  and the causal relationship is not required  to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate.  [47G; 48E]     4.4.  The  expression "caused by" was used  in  Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92A  of the Act, Parliament, however, chose to use  the  ex- pression  "arising  out  of" which indicates  that  for  the purpose  of  awarding compensation under  Section  92A,  the causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the  accident resulting in death or permanent  disablementis not  required to be direct and proximate and it can be  less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect- ed with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need  not be direct and immediate. This construction of  the expression  "arising out of the use of a motor  vehicle"  in section 92A enlarges the field of protection made  available to  the  victims of accident and is in consonance  with  the beneficial object underlying the enactment. [48D-E]     Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970] 1 SCR 869; Government Insurance Office of  New South Wales v. R.J. Green & Ltyoyd Pl. Ltd., [1965] 114  CLR 437; Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356; Union of India v. E.B. Aaby’s Rederi A/S, [1975] A.C. 797 and Samick  Lines Co.  Ltd.  v. Owners of the Antonis P. Lemos, [1985]  2  WLR 468, referred to.     5.  In the facts and circumstances of the present  case, the  accident  involving explosion and fire  in  the  petrol tanker  was  connected  with the use of tanker  as  a  motor vehicle. The High Court was right in holding that the colli- sion  between  the tanker and the other  vehicle  which  had occurred  earlier and the escape of petrol from  the  tanker which ultimately resulted in the explosion and fire were not unconnected but related events and merely because there  was interval  of about four to hour-and-half hours  between  the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker,  it cannot  be  necessarily inferred that there  was  no  causal relation  between explosion and fire. In the  circumstances, it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of the Respondent’s son  was due  to  an  accident arising out of the use  of  the  motor vehicle viz., the petrol tanker. [48G-H; 49A-B]     6. The object underlying the enactment of Section 92A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount to the extent of Rs.15,000 in case of death and Rs.7,500 in case of permanent disable- 31 ment as expeditiously as possible and the said award has  to be made before adjudication of the claim under Section  110A of  the  Act. This would be apparent from the  provision  of Section  92B  of  the Act which provides that  a  claim  for compensation under Section 92A in respect of death or perma- nent  disablement  of  any person shall be  disposed  of  as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is  claimed in  respect  of such death or  permanent  disablement  under Section 92A and also in pursuance of any right on the  prin-

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ciple of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 92A shall be disposed of in the first place. With a view to give effect to the said directive contained in Section 92B of the Act,  the Maharashtra Government has amended the  Rules  and has  inserted special provisions in respect of claims  under Section  92A in Rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A,  306B,  306C and 306D of the Rules. The object underlying the said provi- sions is to enable expeditious disposal of a claim  petition under  Section  92A  of the Act. The said  object  would  be defeated if the Claims Tribunal is required to hold a  regu- lar  trial  in the same manner as for adjudicating  a  claim petition under Section 110A of the Act. [52B-E]     7.  Rules 291A, 306A and 306B of the Bombay Motor  Vehi- cles  Rules,  1989 contain adequate provisions  which  would ennable the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect  of the  matters necessary for awarding compensation under  Sec- tion 92A of the Act and in view of these special  provisions the  Claims  Tribunal is not required to follow  the  normal procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard to adjudication of a claim under Section 110A of the Act for the  purpose  of making an order on a claim  petition  under Section 92A of the Act. [53B-D]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 14822 of 1990.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  16.8.1990  of  the Bombay High Court in L.P.A. No. 65 of 1990.     G.L.  Sanghi, K.S.V. Murthy, S.M. Puri and Pramod  Dayal for the Petitioners.     Ashok H. Desai, George Kurian, A.P. Vaze and G.B.  Sathe for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by 32     S.C. AGRAWAL, J. The questions raised for  consideration in  this  petition for special leave to appeal  involve  the interpretation of the expression "arising out of the use  of a  motor  vehicle"  contained in section 92A  of  the  Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’).     On October 29, 1987, at about 3 A.M., there was a colli- sion between  a petrol tanker bearing Registration No.  MKL- 7461  and a truck bearing Registration No. MEH-4197  on  the National  Highway  No. 4 near village Kavatha,  in  District Satara,  Maharashtra. The petrol tanker was proceeding  from Pune side to Bangalore whereas the truck was coming from the opposite  direction. As a result of the said collision,  the petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at a distance of about 20 feet from the highway. As a result of the  overturning of the petrol tanker, the petrol  contained in  it leaked out and collected nearby. At about 7.15  A.M., an explosion took place in the said petrol tanker  resulting in  fire.  A number of persons who had  assembled  near  the petrol  tanker  sustained burn injuries and a  few  of  them succumbed  to the said injuries. One of those who died as  a result of such injuries was Deepak Uttam More. The  respond- ent is the mother of Deepak Uttam More. Petitioner No. 1  is the  owner of the said petrol tanker and Petitioner  No.  2, the insurer of the same.     The  respondent,  as  the legal  representative  of  her deceased son, filed a claim petition before the Motor  Acci- dent  Claims  Tribunal,  Satara  (‘Claims  Tribunal’)  under section  110 of the Act claiming Rs.75,000  as  compensation from  the petitioners. She also made a claim for payment  of

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Rs. 15,000 as compensation under section 92A of the Act.  It appears  that claim petitions were also filed by  the  legal representatives of other persons who had died as a result of the  burn  injuries sustained by them in the  explosion  and fire  in  the petrol tanker. The petitioners  contested  the claim petitions filed by the respondent and other  claimants under  section  92A  of the Act and  raised  objection  with regard to the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to  enter- tain  such petitions on the ground that explosion  and  fire resulting  in injuries to the deceased could not be said  to be  an accident arising out of the use of a  motor  vehicle. The  Claims Tribunal decided all the claim  petitions  filed under Section 92A of the Act by a common order dated  Decem- ber 2, 1989 whereby the said petitions were dismissed on the ground  that the explosion could not be said to be an  acci- dent  arising out of the use of the petrol tanker  and  that the provisions of section 92A of the Act were not attracted. The  Claims Tribunal was of the view that the explosion  and the fire which took place after about four 33 hours  had no connection whatsoever with the accident  which took place at 3 A.M. and that the explosion and the fire was altogether an independent accident. The Claims Tribunal also observed that the villagers tried to take the benefit of the earlier accident and tried to pilfer petrol from the  petrol tanker  and while thus pilfering the petrol there was  fric- tion  which caused ignition and explosion and since an  out- side agency was responsible for the explosion and fire which situation was created by the villagers themselves the explo- sion could not be said to be an accident arising out of  the use  of the tanker. The respondent filed an  appeal  against the said order of the Claims Tribunal before the High Court. The said appeal was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High  Court by judgment dated February 5, 1990. The  learned Single Judge disagreed with the finding of the Claims Tribu- nal  that  the  explosion was a direct  consequence  of  the attempt  to pilfer petrol from the tanker and observed  that the Tribunal was not justified in proceeding on the  assump- tion that all the injured persons and deceased were  engaged in  pilfering  the  petrol and the explosion  was  a  direct consequence of the same. The learned Single Judge also  held that in view of sub-section (4) of section 92A of the Act if there  is a wrongful act, neglect or default on the part  of the deceased or the injured, the claim under section 92A  of the  Act for compensation for no fault liability  cannot  be rejected. With regard to the applicability of section 92A of the  Act,  the learned Single Judge observed that  the  fact that at the material time the tanker was not being driven on the  Highway but was lying turtle on its side would make  no difference  and that it was a vehicle lying on the  side  of the Highway and would be covered by the expression ’use’  in section  92A  of the Act and compensation would  be  payable under  no  fault liability of section 92A of  the  Act.  He, therefore,  directed payment of Rs. 15,000  as  compensation under  section 92A of the Act to the respondent.  The  Peti- tioners  filed  a  Letters Patent Appeal  against  the  said decision of the learned Single Judge which was dismissed  by a Division Bench of the High Court by judgment dated  August 16, 1990. The Appellate Bench of the High Court has affirmed the  finding of the learned Single Judge that there  was  no evidence whatsoever that the person or persons in respect of whose deaths compensation had been claimed under section 92A were  themselves committing theft or pilferage of petrol  at the  time of their deaths and that these victims could  have only  been curious by-standers at the site of the  accident.

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The learned Judges have observed that the expression ’use of a  motor  vehicle’ covers a very wide field,  a  field  more extensive  than  which might be called traffic  use  of  the motor vehicle and that the use of a vehicle is not  confined to the periods when it Was in motion or was moving and  that a vehicle would still be is use 34 even  when it was stationary The learned Judges were of  the view  that merely’ because there Was interval of about  four and  half hours between the collision of the  petrol  tanker and  the  explosion  and fire in the tanker,  it  cannot  be necessarily  inferred  that  there was  no  causal  relation between  earlier event and the later incident  of  explosion and fire and that the earlier collision if not the cause was at  least  the main contributory factor for  the  subsequent explosion and fire in the tanker in question inasmuch as the tanker  was carrying petrol which was a  highly  combustible and  volatile  material and after the  collision-the  petrol tanker  had  fallen on one of its sides  on  sloping  ground resulting  in escape of highly inflammable petrol and  there was grave risk of explosion and fire from the petrol  coming out  of the tanker and the tanker was allowed to  remain  in such  a  dangerous condition for hours  without  any  effort being  made to prevent such great hazard of fire and  explo- sion from petrol escaping from the tanker. According to  the learned  Judges,  the collision between the tanker  and  the other  vehicle  which  occurred earlier and  the  escape  of petrol  from the tanker which ultimately resulted in  explo- sion  and fire were not unconnected but related events.  The learned Judges rejected the submission made on behalf of the petitioners  that in the instant case the first  information report  recorded by the police and the panchanama  indicated that the explosion and fire near the petrol tanker had  been caused  by  careless act of throwing away of a  match  stick used  for lighting a beedi or cigarette. The learned  Judges held  that the papers and documents filed before the  Claims Tribunal under rule 306B of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 did not establish that the fire was ignited by  someone carelessly throwing a match stick. Feeling aggrieved by  the said  decision  of the Appellate Bench of  the  Bombay  High Court,  the petitioner have filed this petition for  special leave  to appeal. A notice for final disposal was issued  on the  petition and the learned counsel for the  parties  have been heard at length.     Shri G.L. Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing for  the petitioners,  has urged that in the instant case, it  cannot be  said  that the explosion and fire in the  petrol  tanker which  occurred  at about 7.15 A.M., i.e., nearly  four  and half  hours after the collision involving the petrol  tanker and the other truck, was an accident arising out of the  use of  a motor vehicle and therefore, the claim petition  filed by  the  respondent could not be entertained  under  section 92-A  of the Act. Shri Sanghi has made a three-fold  submis- sion  in this regard. In the first place, he  has  submitted that the petrol tanker was not a motor vehicle as defined in section 2(18) of the Act at the time when the explosion  and fire took  place because at that time the petrol tanker  was lying turtle and was 35 not  capable of movement on the road. The second  submission of  Shri Sanghi is that since before the explosion and  fire the  petrol tanker was lying immobile it could not  be  said that the petrol tanker, even if it be assumed that it was  a motor vehicle, was in use as a motor vehicle at the time  of the  explosion and fire. Thirdly, it has been  submitted  by

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Shri Sanghi that even if it is found that the petrol  tanker was  in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the  explosion and  fire,  there  was no causal  relationship  between  the collision which took place between the petrol tanker and the truck  at  about 3 A.M. and the explosion and  fire  in  the petrol  tanker  which took place about four and  half  hours later  and it cannot, therefore, be said that explosion  and fire in the petrol tanker was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.     Before we proceed to deal with the aforesaid submissions of Shri Sanghi, it would be relevant to mention that section 92A of the Act forms part of Chapter VII-A which was  intro- duced  in  the Act by Motor Vehicles (Amendment)  Act,  1982 (Act  47 of 1982). The said Chapter bears the  heading  "LI- ABILITY  WITHOUT FAULT IN CERTAIN CASES" and  contains  sec- tions  92A to 92E. The purpose underlying the  enactment  of these  provisions, as indicated in the Statement of  Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill, was as follows:               "There  has been a rapid development  of  road               transport during the past few years and  large               increase  in the number of motor  vehicles  on               the  road. The incidence of road accidents  by               motor  vehicles  has reached  serious  propor-               tions. During the last three years, the number               of road accidents per year on the average  has               been around 1.45 lakhs and of these the number               of fatal accidents has been around 20,000  per               year.  The  victims  of  these  accidents  are               generally  pedestrians belonging to  the  less               affluent  sections of society. The  provisions               of  the Act as to compensation in  respect  of               accidents  can be availed of only in cases  of               accidents  which can be proved to  have  taken               place as a result of a wrongful act or  negli-               gence on the part of the owners or drivers  of               the  vehicles concerned. Having regard to  the               nature  of circumstances in which  road  acci-               dents take place, in a number of cases, it  is               difficult to secure adequate evidence to prove               negligence.  Further,  in what  are  known  as               "hit-and-run"  accidents,  by  reason  of  the               identity of the vehicle involved in the  acci-               dent  not  being known, the  persons  affected               cannot prefer any claims for compensation.  It               is,  therefore, considered necessary to  amend               the               36               Act  suitably to secure strict enforcement  of               road  safety measures and also to make,  as  a               measure of social justice, suitable provisions               first for compensation without proof of  fault               or  negligence  on the part of  the  owner  or               driver  of  the  vehicle  and,  secondly,  for               compensation  by way of solatium in  cases  in               which  the identity of the vehicle causing  an               accident is unknown.....  "     In  this context, it may be pointed out that before  the said  amendment  this  Court had highlighted  the  need  for legislation providing for no fault liability in motor  acci- dents claims in a number of decisions. (See: Manjusri Raha & Ors.  v. B.L. Gupta & Ors. etc., [1977] 2 SCR 944; State  of Haryana  v. Darshana Devi & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR  184;  Bishan Devi  & Ors. v. Sirbaksh Singh & Anr., [1980] 1 SCR 300  and N.K.V. Bros. Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors. etc.,  [1980] 3 SCR 10 1.

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   Section  92A which made provision for liability  to  pay compensation  in certain cases on the principle of no  fault read as under:               "92-A.  Liability to pay compensation in  cer-               tain  cases on the principle of no  fault--(1)               Where  the death or permanent  disablement  of               any  person  has  resulted  from  an  accident               arising  out of the use of a motor vehicle  or               motor  vehicles,  the  owner  of  the  vehicle               shall,  or, as the case may be, the owners  of               the vehicles shall, jointly and severally,  be               liable to pay compensation in respect of  such               death  or disablement in accordance  with  the               provisions of this section.               (2) The amount of compensation which shall  be               payable  under sub-section (1) in  respect  of               the  death of any person shall be a fixed  sum               of  fifteen thousand rupees and the amount  of               compensation payable under that sub-section in               respect  of the permanent disablement  of  any               person shall be a fixed sum of seven  thousand               five hundred rupees.               (3)  In any claim for compensation under  sub-               section  (1),  the claimant shall not  be  re-               quired  to plead and establish that the  death               or  permanent disablement in respect of  which               the claim has been made was due to any  wrong-               ful  act, neglect or default of the  owner  or               owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or               of any other person.               37               (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section               (1)  shall  not be defeated by reason  of  any               wrongful act, neglect or default of the person               in  respect of whose death or permanent  disa-               blement the claim has been made nor shall  the               quantum of compensation recoverable in respect               of  such  death or  permanent  disablement  be               reduced  on  the basis of the  share  of  such               person in the responsibility for such death or               permanent disablement."     Section 92-B preserved the right to pay compensation for death or permanent disablement under other provisions of the Act and it provided as follows:               "92-B.  Provisions as to other right to  claim               compensation  for death or permanent  disable-               ment (1) The right to claim compensation under               Section  92A in respect of death or  permanent               disablement of any person shall be in addition               to any other right (hereafter in this  section               referred  to as the right on the principle  of               fault) to claim compensation in respect there-               of under any other provision of this Act or of               any other law for the time being in force.                         (2)  A claim for compensation  under               Section  92A in respect of death or  permanent               disablement of any person shall be disposed of               as expeditiously as possible and where compen-               sation is claimed in respect of such death  or               permanent  disablement under Section  92A  and               also in pursuance of any right on the  princi-               ple of fault, the claim for Compensation under               Section 92A shall be disposed of as  aforesaid               in the first place.                         (3)  Notwithstanding  anything  con-

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             tained   in  subsection (1), where in  respect               of  the death or permanent disablement of  any               person, the person liable to pay  compensation               under  section 92A is also liable to pay  com-               pensation in accordance with the right on  the               principle of fault, the person so liable shall               pay the first-mentioned compensation and--                         (a)  if  the amount  of  the  first-               mentioned compensation is less than the amount               of the second-mentioned, he shall be liable to               pay (in addition the first-mentioned compensa-               tion)  only  so much of  the  second-mentioned               compen-               38               sation  as is equal to the amount by which  it               exceeds the first-mentioned compensation;                        (b)  if the amount of the  first-men-               tioned  compensation is equal to or legs  than               the  amount of the  secondmentioned  compensa-               tion,  he shall not be liable to pay the  sec-               ond-mentioned compensation."     In  section 92-C of the Act, the  expression  ’permanent disablement for the purpose of Chapter VII-A was  explained. Section 92-D made the provisions of Chapter VII-A applicable in  relation to any claim in respect of death  or  permanent disablement  of any person under the Workmen’s  Compensation Act,  1923  (8 of 1923) resulting from an  accident  of  the nature  referred  to  in sub-section (1)  of  section  92-A. Section 92-E of the Act gave overriding effect to the provi- sions of Chapter VII-A over any other provisions of the  Act or of any law for the time being in force.     In Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai  & Anr., [1987] 3 SCR 404 a reference  has  been made to the background in which Chapter VII A was introduced in the Act and it has been observed:               "When  the  Fatal  Accidents  Act,  1855’  was               enacted  there were no motor vehicles  on  the               roads  in India. Today, thanks to  the  modern               civilisation, thousands of motor vehicles  are               put  on  the road and the  largest  number  of               injuries  and deaths are taking place  on  the               roads  on account of the motor vehicles  acci-               dents.  In  view of the  fast  and  constantly               increasing volume of traffic, the motor  vehi-               cles  upon the roads may be regarded  to  some               extent  as  coming  within  the  principle  of               liability  defined  in  Rylands  v.  Fletcher,               [1968]  LR. 3 HL 330, 340. From the  point  of               view  of  the  pedestrian the  roads  of  this               country  have been rendered by the use of  the               motor vehicles highly dangerous. ‘Hit and run’               cases where the drivers of the motor  vehicles               who  have caused the accidents are  not  known               are  increasing in number. Where a  pedestrian               without  negligence on his part is injured  or               killed  by a motorist whether  negligently  or               not,  he or his legal representatives  as  the               case  may  be should be  entitled  to  recover               damages  if  the principle of  social  justice               should  have any meaning at all. In  order  to               meet to some extent the responsibility of  the               society to the               39               deaths  and injuries caused in road  accidents               there has been a continuous agitation  through

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             out  the world to make the liability for  dam-               ages  arising out of motor vehicles  accidents               as a liability without fault. In order to meet               the above social demand on the  recommendation               of the Indian Law Commission Chapter VIIA  was               introduced in the Act. (pp. 4 15-4 16)"     In that case, this Court after taking note of the provi- sions contained in section 92A has further observed:               "It  is  thus seen that to  a  limited  extent               relief has been granted under section 92-A  of               the  Act to the legal representatives  of  the               victims  who  have died on  account  of  motor               vehicles   accidents.  Now  they   can   claim               Rs.15,000  without proof of any negligence  on               the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any               other person. This part of the Act is  clearly               a departure from the usual common law  princi-               ple  that a claimant should  establish  negli-               gence  on the part of the owner or  driver  of               the motor vehicle before claiming any  compen-               sation for the death or permanent  disablement               caused on account of a motor vehicle accident.               To  that  extent the substantive  law  of  the               country stands modified."  (pp. 41.6-4 17)     It  is thus evident that section 92-A was in the  nature of  a beneficial legislation enacted with a view  to  confer the  benefit of expeditious payment of a limited  amount  by way  of compensation to the victims of an  accident  arising out  of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no  fault liability.  In the matter of interpretation of a  beneficial legislation  the approach of the courts is to adopt  a  con- struction which advances the beneficient purpose  underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat  that purpose. The same approach has been adopted  by this Court while construing the provisions of the Act.  See: Motor Owners’ Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi  & Ors.,  [1982]  1 SCR 860 and Skandia Insurance Co.  Ltd.  v. Kokilaben Chandravadan & Ors., [1987] 2 SCR 752.     The  expression ’arising out of the use Of  motor  vehi- cles"  was  also used by Parliament in  sub-section  (1)  of section  110 of the Act wherein provision was made for  con- stitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for speedy and expeditious  adjudication of claims of compensation  in  re- spect of accidents involving death or bodily injuries to 40 persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or  damages to  any property of a third party so arising or  both.  Fur- thermore,  by  subsection (1) of section 94 of  the  Act  an obligation was imposed that no person shall use  except as a passenger or cause or allow any other person to,use a  motor vehicle  in  a  public place, unless there is  in  force  in relation  to the use of the vehicle by that person  or  that other  person,  as the case may be, a  policy  of  insurance complying with the requirements of Chapter VIII of the  Act. Section  95  prescribed the requirements of  such  insurance policies  as well as limits of liability. In clause  (b)  of sub-section  (1)  of section 95, it was laid down  that  the policy of insurance required must be a policy which  insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy  to the  extent  specified in sub-section (2)  against  (i)  any liability  which  may be incurred by him in respect  of  the death  of  or bodily injury to any person or damage  to  any property  of a third party caused by or arising out  of  the use  of the vehicle in a public place and (ii) the death  of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service  vehi-

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cle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in  a public  place. While construing the expression "arising  out of the use of a motor vehicle" in sub-section (1) of section 92-A of the Act, regard will have to be had to the fact that expressions  to the same effect were also contained in  sec- tions 95 and 110 of the Act.     The  first  submission of Shri Sanghi is  based  on  the definition  of the expression "motor vehicle"  contained  in sub-section (18) of section 2 of the Act which was as under:               "2(18) "motor vehicle" means any  mechanically               propelled  vehicle adapted for use upon  roads               whether the power of propulsion is transmitted               thereto  from an external or  internal  source               and includes a chassis to which a body has not               been  attached  and a trailer,  but  does  not               include a vehicle running upon fixed rails  or               a  vehicle of a special type adapted  for  use               only  in  a factory or in any  other  enclosed               premises"     Shri  Sanghi  has urged that the word "adapted"  in  the aforesaid  provision  has been construed by  this  Court  in Bolani Ores Ltd. etc. v. State of Orissa etc., [1975] 2  SCR 138 to mean suitable or fit for use on the roads and that in the  instant case, it cannot be said that at the  time  when the  explosion and fire took place the petrol  tanker  which was lying turtle was suitable or fit for use on the road. We find  it  difficult to accept this  contention.  The  petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose of  trans- porting petrol. It was a vehicle which had been 41 adapted  for such use and was suitable for use on  the  road for transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol  tanker collided  with  the truck on the national  highway,  it  was being  used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It  can- not,  therefore,  be disputed that when the  said  collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined  in  section 2(18) of the Act. Did it  cease  to  be motor vehicle after the collision with the truck on  account of  its lying turtle on its side at some distance  from  the road  as a result of the said collision? In our  view,  this question  must be answered in the negative.  Merely  because the  petrol  tanker  had turned turtle as a  result  of  the collision  and was lying at a short distance away  from  the road, does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the road and it had ceased to be a motor vehicle. No  material  has  been placed on record to  show  that  the petrol  tanker  would not have been in a  position  to  move after it was put back on the wheels.     The  question whether a vehicle has ceased to be  a  me- chanically  propelled  vehicle has been  considered  by  the English  Courts in cases involving prosecution  for  offence under  Section 15 of the Vehicles (Excise) Act,  1949  which imposed  a  penalty on a person using on a public  road  any mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence under the said Act was not in force. In Newberry v. Simmonds, [1961] 2 Q.B. 345 the prosecution was in respect of a motor-car whose engine  had  been stolen some time prior to  the  period  in question.  It  was  contended by the owner  that  since  the engine of the motor-car had been stolen it had ceased to  be a  mechanically propelled vehicle. Negativing the said  con- tention, it was held.               "We  are, however, satisfied that a  motor-car               does not cease to be a mechanically  propelled               vehicle upon the mere removal of the engine if               the  evidence admits the possibility that  the

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             engine may shortly be replaced and the  motive               power restored." (p. 350)     In  Smart v. Allan & Anr., [1963] 1 Q.B. 291  a  similar question  arose.  Here the defendant had bought  a  car  for Pounds  2 and subsequently sold it as scrap for 30s. It  was found  that  the  engine was in a rusty  condition  and  was incomplete and it did not work, and there was no gear-box or electric  batteries;  and the car was  incapable  of  moving under  its own power, having been towed from place to  place and that it could only have been put in running order  again by  supplying a considerable number of spare parts  and  ef- fecting considerable repairs, the ’ cost of which would have been out of all proportion to its value. In 42 support  of the prosecution it was urged that every  vehicle which  starts its life as a mechanically  propelled  vehicle remains such until it is physically destroyed. Rejecting the said contention, Lord Parker, C.J. observed:               "   ......   it  seems to me as  a  matter  of               common sense that some limit must be put,  and               some stage must be reached, when one can  say:               "This is so immobile that "it has ceased to be               a  mechanically propelled vehicle." Where,  as               in  the present case, and unlike  Newberry  v.               Simmonds,  there is no reasonable prospect  of               the  vehicle ever being made mobile again,  it               seems to me that, at any rate at that stage, a               vehicle  has ceased to be a mechanically  pro-               pelled vehicle". (p. 298) We are inclined to agree with this formulation.     In  the instant case, it cannot be said that the  petrol tanker  as  a  result of the collision with  the  truck  was damaged to such an extent that was no reasonable prospect of the  vehicle  ever being made mobile again. In  the  circum- stances, it cannot be held that the petrol tanker which  was a  motor vehicle when it collided with the truck had  ceased to be a motor vehicle after the said collision and it  could not  be regarded a motor vehicle under Section 2(18) of  the Act at the time when the explosion and fire took place.     The second submission of Shri Sanghi was that even if it be assumed that at the time when the explosion and fire took place  in  the  petrol tanker it was a  motor  vehicle,  the tanker  was not being used as a motor vehicle at  that  time inasmuch as it was lying immobile on its side. It is, howev- er,  not disputed by Shri Sanghi that at the time  when  the petrol tanker had collided with the truck, it was being used as a motor vehicle but his submission was that the said user came  to  an end on such collision when  the  petrol  tanker turned  turtle  and was rendered immobile.  This  contention postulates  a restricted meaning for the word "use"  in  the expression  "use of the motor vehicle" by confining it to  a situation  when the vehicle is mobile. The learned  counsel, for the respondent has, on the other hand, suggested a wider connotation  for the word "use" so as to include the  period when the vehicle is stationary and has invited our attention to  the observations in Elliott v. Grey, [1960] 1 Q.B.  367; Government Insurance Office     South Wales v. R.J. Green  & Lloyd  Pty. Ltd., [1965] 114 CLR 437; Pushpa Rani Chopra  v. Anokha Singh & Ors., [1975] ACJ 396; 43 General  Manager,  K.S.R.T.C.  v. S.  Satalingappa  &  Ors., [1979]  ACJ  452 and Oriental Fire & General  Insurance  Co. Ltd. v. Suman Navnath Rajguru & Ors., [1985] ACJ 243.     Elliott  v. Grey, supra related to prosecution  for  of- fence under section 35(1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930  for

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using  a motor car on road without there being in  force  in relation  to  such user an insurance policy  in  respect  of third-party risks complying with the requirements of Part  2 of the said Act. The motor car of the appellant was standing on  the road outside the appellant’s house for the past  few months, after it broke down and in the meanwhile the  insur- ance  cover  of the motor car had terminated. While  it  was thus parked, another motor vehicle had collided with  appel- lant’s  motor car. On that date, the appellant  had  cleaned the  car, sent the battery to be recharged and had  replaced the  old  carburettor with a new one. The car could  not  be mechanically propelled because the engine would not work. On behalf  of the appellant it was urged that the ordinary  use of  the  words "to use" in relation to a motor  car  contem- plates  some  active movement, either driving it  or  taking part  in a journey in it or moving it and the word "use"  is quite inapt in relation to a motor car which cannot be  used because it is out of action. The said contention was reject- ed. The word "use"was construed in a wider sense to mean "to have  the  advantage of a vehicle as a  means  of  transport including  for  any  period or time  between  journeys".  In taking  this  view,  Lord Parker, C.J. stated  that  he  was influenced  by the fact that section 35. appeared in Part  2 of  the  Road  Traffic Act  under  the  heading  "Provisions against  third party risks arising out of the use  of  motor vehicles" which is intended for protection of third parties.     Similarly  in Government Insurance Office of  New  South Wales  v. R.J. Green & Lloyd Pty. Ltd., supra  Barwick,  CJ, while  construing  the word ’use’ in Motor  Vehicles  (Third Party  Insurance) Act, 1942-1951 (N.S.W.) has observed  that the  said  Act indicated an intention to cover a  very  wide field, a field more extensive than what might be called  the traffic use of the motor vehicle. The learned Chief  Justice has  further observed: "In my opinion, the relevant  use  of the  vehicle  cannot  be confined to the periods  it  is  in motion, or its parts moving in some operation. It may be  in use though stationary".     In  Pushpa  Rani Chopra & Ors. v. Anokha Singh  &  Ors., supra  a learned Judge of the Delhi High Court,  while  con- struing  the word ’use’ in section 110 of the Act, has  held that  the  said word has been used in a wider sense  and  it covers all employments of the motor vehicle on the 44 public  places including its driving, parking, keeping  sta- tionarys repairing, or leaving unattended on the road or for any  other purpose. In that case, the truck in question  was stationary as its axle had broken down and it was parked  on the road at the time of the accident.     In  General Manager, K.S.R.T.C. v. S.  Satalingappa  and Ors.,’  supra  the vehicle in question was a  transport  bus which was stationed by its driver on a slope unattended. The bus  suddenly started moving and dashed against a tea  shop. It was held by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High  Court that the bus was in use at that time.     In  Oriental Fire & General Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Suman  Nav- nath  Rajguru  and Ors., supra a petrol  tanker  was  parked near’ the footpath on the road in front of a petrol pump and it burst and explOded causing fatal injuries to a  passerby. A  Division  Bench  of the Bombay High  Court  rejected  the contention that at the material time, the petrol tanker  was not in ’use’.     These  decisions  indicate that the word "use",  in  the context  of  motor vehicles, has been construed in  a  wider sense  to include the period when the vehicle is not  moving and is stationary, being either parked on the road and  when

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it  is not in a position to move due to some  break-down  or mechanical defect. Relying on the abovementioned  decisions, the  Appellate  Bench of the High Court had  held  that  the expression  "use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A  covers accidents which occur both when the vehicle is in motion and when  it is stationary. With reference to the facts  of  the present.  case  the learned Judges have  observed  that  the tanker  in question’while proceeding along National  Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in use) after colliding with a motor lorry was  lying  on the side and that it cannot be  claimed  that after  the collision the use of the tanker had  ceased  only because  it was disabled. We are in agreement with the  said approach  of the High Court. In our opinion, the word  "use" has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is  not  moving and is stationary and the use of  a  vehicle does  not cease on account of the vehicle having  been  ren- dered  immobile  on account of a  break-down  or  mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it cannot be  said that  the petrol tanker was not in the use at the time  when it was lying on its side after the collision with the truck.     The  only other question which remains to be  considered is  whether the explosion and fire which caused injuries  to the deceased son of the respondent can be said to have taken place due to an 45 accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle viz.  the petrol  tanker.  Shri Sanghi has urged that  the  expression ’arising out of the use of a motor vehicle’ implies a causal relationship  between the user of the motor vehicle and  the accident which has resulted in death or disablement and that in the present case it cannot be said that the explosion and fire  which  took place in the petrol tanker four  and  half hours  after’ the collision and after the tanker had  turned turtle was an accident arising out of the use of the  petrol tanker. In this regard, Shri Sanghi has emphasised that  the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the  explosion and  fire in the-petrol tanker were pilfering  petrol  which had leaked out from the petrol tanker and the explosion  and fire  was the result of the said unlawful activity of  those persons  and that it was not on account of the user  of  the petrol tanker. Shri Sanghi, in this ’connection, has  placed reliance on the decision in Mackinnon Machkenzie & Co.  Pvt. Ltd.  v.  Ibrahim Mahommed Issak, [1970] 1 SCR  869  wherein this  Court  has construed the expression  ’arising  out  of employment’ appearing in section 3 of the Workmen’s  Compen- sation  Act,  1923 and has laid down that there  must  be  a causal relationship between the accident and the employment. Shri Sanghi has urged that similarly there must be a  causal relationship between the accident and the user of the  motor vehicle for the purpose of maintainability of a claim  under section 92A of the Act.     With  regard to the submission of Shri Sanghi  that  the persons who sustained injuries as a result of the  explosion and  fire in the’ petrol tanker were pilfering petrol  which had  leaked out from the tanker and that the  explosion  and fire  was  the  result of this unlawful  activity  of  those persons, we find that Claims Tribunal has recorded a finding that  persons  from the village Kavatha  had  gathered  with their  tins and barrels with the intention to pilfer  petrol from  the  tanker and while pilfering  the  petrol  probably ignition was caused by friction, but the said finding of the Claims  Tribunal has not been upheld by the High Court.  The learned Single Judge has observed:               "The learned member was influenced by the fact               that  certain villagers were trying to  pilfer

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             from the tanker to indicate that the explosion               was  a  direct consequence of the  attempt  of               pilfering  the petrol from the tanker.  In  my               view, the learned member was not justified  in               proceeding  on  the assumption  that  all  the               injured  and  the  deceased  were  engaged  in               pilfering  the petrol and the explosion was  a               direct consequence of the  same...............               It  would  not be just to hold  that  all  the               injured as also the deceased               46               who met their fate on account of the explosion               were all engaged in the crime of pilfering  of               the petrol."     The  Appellate Bench affirming the said finding  of  the learned Single Judge has laid down:               "The  learned  Single Judge has  also  rightly               pointed  out that there was also  no  evidence               whatsoever  that  the  person  or  persons  in               respect of whose deaths compensation had  been               claimed  under  section 92-A  were  themselves               actually  committing  theft  or  pilferage  of               petrol  at  the time of  their  deaths.  These               victims could have been only curious  bystand-               ers  at the site of the accident....  We  find               that in the instant case the papers and  docu-               ments  including the F.I.R. and the  panchnama               produced before the Tribunal did not establish               that the fire was ignited by someone careless-               ly throwing a match stick."     We  find no ground for interfering with  these  findings recorded by the High Court and we must proceed on the  basis that  the persons who sustained injuries as a result of  the explosion  and fire in the petrol tanker were not  indulging in  any  unlawful activity which may have  caused  the  said explosion  and fire. The matter has, therefore, to be  exam- ined in the light of the meaning to be assigned to the words "arising out of" in the expression "accident arising out  of the use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A.     The  words  "arising out of" have been used  in  various statutes  in different contexts and have been  construed  by Courts  widely  as  well as narrowly, keeping  in  view  the context in which they have been used in a particular  legis- lation.     In  Heyman v. Darwins Ltd., [1942] A.C. 356  while  con- struing  the arbitration clause in a contract,  Lord  Porter expressed the view that as compared to the word "under", the expression "arising out of" has a wider meaning. In Union of India  v. E.B. Aaby’s Rederi A/S, [1975] A.C.  797  Viscount Discount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon stated that they could not discover any difference between the expression "arising  out of" and "arising under" and they equated "arising out of" in the  arbitration  clause in a Charter  Party  with  "arising under".     In  Samick  Lines Co. Ltd. v. Owners of the  Antonis  P. Lemos,  [1985] 2 WLR 468 the House of Lords was  considering the question 47 whether  a  claim for damages based on  negligence  in  tort could  be  regarded as a claim arising out of  an  agreement under section 20(2)(1)(h) of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 and fell  within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the  High  Court. The  words "any claim arising out of any agreement  relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire  of a  ship" in section 20(2)(i)(h) were held to be wide  enough

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to cover claims, whether in contract or tort arising out  of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a  vessel and  it  was also held that for such an  agreement  to  come within paragraph (h), it was not necessary that the claim in question  be directly connected with some agreement  of  the kinds referred to in it. The words "arising out of were  not construed  to mean "arising under" as in Union of  India  v. E.B. Aaby’s A/S, supra which decision was held  inapplicable to  the construction of section 20(2)(1)(h) and it  was  ob- served by Lord Brandon:               "With  regard  to  the first  point,  I  would               readily  accept that in certain  contexts  the               expression "arising out of" may, on the  ordi-               nary and natural meaning of the words use,  be               the  equivalent  of  the  expression  "arising               under",  and not that of the wider  expression               "connected  with".  In my view  however;  the’               expression  "arising out of’ is, on the  ordi-               nary  and natural meaning of the  words  used,               capable,  in  other  contexts;  of  being  the               equivalent of the Wider expression  "connected               with". Whether the expression "arising out  of               has  the narrower or the wider meaning in  any               particular ease must depend on the context  in               which it is used". keeping in view the context in Which the expression was used in  the statute it was construed to have the  wider  meaning viz. "connected With".     In  the  context  of  motor  accidents  the  expressions "caused by" and "arising out of" are often used in statutes. Although  both these expression’s imply a  causal  relation- ship:  between the accident resulting in injury and the  use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree of  prox- imity of such relationship. This distinction has been lucid- ly brought out in the decision of the High Court of  Austra- lia  in  Government  Insurance Office of  N.  S.W.  v.  R.J. Green’s, case supra wherein Lord Barwick, CJ has stated:               "Bearing  in mind the general purpose  of  the               Act  I  think the expression ’arising  out  of               must be taken to require a less               48               proxionship of the injury to the relevant  use               of the vehicle than is required to satisfy the               words ‘caused by’. It may be that an  associa-               tion of the injury with the use of the vehicle               while  it  cannot be said that  that  use  was               causally  related  to the injury  may  yet  be               enough  to satisfy the expression  ’arise  out               of’ as used in the Act and in the policy." (p.               433) In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as under:               "The words ’injury caused by or arising out of               the  use  of the vehicle’ postulate  a  causal               relationship  between the use of  the  vehicle               and  the injury. ‘Caused by’ connotes  a  ‘di-               rect’ or ’proximate’ relationship of cause and               effect.  ’Arising  out of’ extends this  to  a               result  that is less immediate; but  it  still               carries a sense of consequence." (p. 447)     This  would  show  that as compared  to  the  expression "caused  by",  the expression "arising out of" has  a  wider connotation. The expression "caused by" was used in sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In section 92-A,  Parliament,  however,  chose to  use  the  expression "arising  out  of" which indicates that for the  purpose  of

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awarding  compensation under section 92-A, the causal  rela- tionship between the use of the motor vehicle and the  acci- dent  resulting  in death or permanent  disablement  is  not required  to  be  direct and proximate and it  can  be  less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connect- ed with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need  not be direct and immediate. This construction of  the expression  "arising out of the use of a motor  vehicle"  in section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with  the beneficial object underlying the enactment.     Was  the  accident involving explosion and fire  in  the petrol  tanker connected with the use of tanker as  a  motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts and circumstances of  the present case, this question must be answered in the affirma- tive.  The High Court has found that the tanker in  question was carrying petrol which is a highly combustible and  vola- tile  material and after the collision with the other  motor vehicle the tanker had fallen on one of its sides on sloping ground resulting in escape of highly inflammable petrol  and that  there  was grave risk of explosion and fire  from  the petrol coming out of the tanker. In the 49 light  of the aforesaid circumstances the  learnedJudges  of the  High  Court have rightly concluded that  the  collision between the tanker and the other vehicle which had  occurred earlier  and  the  escape of petrol from  the  tanker  which ultimately  resulted  in  the explosion and  fire  were  not unconnected but related events and merely because there  was interval  of about four to four and half hours  between  the said collision and the explosion and fire in the tanker,  it cannot  be  necessarily inferred that there  was  no  Causal relation  between explosion and fire. In the  circumstances, it must be held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death of Deepak Uttam More was due to  an accident arising out of the use of the motor  vehicle viz. the petrol tanker No. MKL 7461.     Shri Sanghi has also raised a question as to the  proce- dure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal  while/adjudicat- ing  claims under section 92A of the Act and  has  submitted that  such  claims have to be adjudicated  upon  like  other claims under section 110A of the Act and that claimant  must first adduce evidence to establish his/her case and that the owner as well as the insurer of the vehicle in question must have  a right to adduce evidence to rebut the same. In  this context, it may be mentioned that procedure for adjudication of  a  claim petition under Section 110A of the Act  by  the Accident Claims Tribunal is contained in Rules 291 to 311 of the Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, (hereinafter referred to  as  ’the Rules’). The said Rules prescribe  a  form  for filing a claim petition and the documents to be filed along- with it (Rule 291), examination of the applicant (Rule 293), issue of notice to the opposite party (Rule 297), filing  of written statement by the opposite party (Rule 298),  framing of  issues (Rule 299), recording of evidence (Rules 300  and 301), local inspection (Rule 302) and judgment and award  of compensation (Rule 306).     After  the  enactment of section 92-A,  amendments  have been made in the Rules in 1984.     In Rule 291A which has been inserted by such amendments, it has been provided that:               "Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  rule               291,  every  application, for a:  claim  under               section  92A shall be filed before the  Claims               Tribunal in triplicate and shall be signed  by

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             the  appellant and the following documents  be               appended to every such application, namely,               50               (i) Panchnama of the accident;               (ii) First information report;               (iii) Injury CertifiCate or in case of  death,               postmortem report or death certificate and;               (iv)  a  certificate regarding  ownership  and               insurance  particulars of vehicle involved  in               the  accident  from  the  Regional   Transport               Officer or the Police". Rule 297 was substituted by the fallowing,  provision:               "297.  Notice  to opposite party  (1)  If  the               application is not               dismissed under rule 296, the Claims  Tribunal               shall, on an application in writing made to it               by  the  applicant, sent to the owner  or  the               driver  of the vehicle or both from  whom  the               applicant  claims  relief (here in  after  re-               ferred  to  as "the opposite party")  and  the               insurer,  a copy of the application,  together               with  a  notice of the date on which  it  will               dispose of the application, and may call  Upon               the  parties to produce on that date any  evi-               dence which they may wish to tender.                        (2) Where the applicant makes a claim               for compensation under section 92A, the Claims               Tribunal  shall give notice to the  owner  and               insurer,  if any, of the vehicle  involved  in               the  accident  directing them to appeal  on  a               date not later than ten days from the date  of               issue  of  such notice The date so  fixed  for               such  appearance shall also be not later  than               fifteen  days from the receipt of  the  claims               application filed by the claimant. The  Claims               Tribunal  shall state in such notice  that  in               case  they  fail to appear on  such  appointed               date  the Tribunal will, proceed ex  parte  on               the  presumption that they have no  contention               to make against the award of compensation."     Rule 306 A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain  what- ever  supplementary information and documents which  may  be found necessary from the police, medical and other  authori- ties and proceed to award the claim whether the parties  who were given notice to appear or not on the appointed date. Rule 306B lays down: 51               "(1)  The  Claims Tribunal  shall  proceed  to               award the claim of compensation under  section               92A on the basis of (i) registration  certifi-               cate  of  the motor vehicle  involved  in  the               accident;               (ii) insurance certificate or policy  relating               to the insurance of the vehicle against  third               party risks;               (iii) panchnama and first information report;               (iv) post-mortem certificate or death certifi-               cate; or certificate of injury from the  medi-               cal officer; and               (v)  the nature of the treatment given by  the               medical officer who has examined the victim.                         (2)  The Claims Tribunal in  passing               orders, shall make an award of compensation of               fifteen  thousand  rupees in  respect  of  the               death  and  of  seven  thousand  five  hundred

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             rupees in respect of the permanent disablement               to be paid by insurer or owner of the  vehicle               involved in the accident.                        (3) Where compensation is awarded  to               two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall               also  specify  the amount payable to  each  of               them.                         (4)  The Claims Tribunal in  passing               order  under  subrule  (2)  shall  direct  the               insurer  or owner of the vehicle  involved  in               the accident to pay the amount of compensation               to the claimant within two weeks from the date               of the said order.                        (5) The Claims Tribunal shall as  far               as  possible  dispose of the  application  for               compensation  within forty-five days from  the               date of receipt of such application".     Rule  306C prescribes the procedure of  disbursement  of compensation under Section 92A to the legal heirs in case of death. The submission of Shri Sanghi is that in spite of the aforesaid amendments which have been introduced in the Rules after  the enactment of section 92A, the Claims Tribunal  is required  to  follow the procedure contained  in  the  other rules before awarding compensation under section 92A of  the Act. In other words, it must proceed to adjudicate the claim 52 after the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to  file the  written  submission under Rule 298, by  framing  issues under  Rule 299 and after recording evidence  in  accordance with  rules 300 and 301 and that it is not  permissible  for the Claims Tribunal to make an order purely on the basis  of the documents referred to in Rules 29 IA, 306A and 306B.  In our  opinion, the said submission of Shri Sanghi  cannot  be accepted. The object underlying the enactment of section 92A is to make available to the claimant compensation amount  to the  extent of Rs. 15,000 in case of death and  Rs.7,500  in case  of permanent disablement as expeditiously as  possible and the said award has to be made before adjudication of the claim under section 110A of the Act. This would be  apparent from  the  provisions  of section 92B of  the  Act.  Section 92B(2)  of  the Act provides that a claim  for  compensation under section 92A in respect of death or permanent  disable- ment of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously  as possible  and  where compensation is claimed in  respect  of such  death or permanent disablement under section  92A  and also  in pursuance of any right on the principle  of  fault, the  claim for compensation under section 92A shall be  dis- posed  of’as  aforesaid in the first place. With a  view  to give  effect to the said directive contained in section  92B of the Act, the Maharashtra Government has amended the Rules and  has  inserted special provisions in respect  of  claims under  section 92A in rules 291A, 291B, 297(2), 306A,  306B, 306C  and 306D of the Rules. The object underlying the  said provisions  is  to enable expeditious disposal  of  a  claim petition under Section 92A of the Act. The said object would be  defeated  if the Claims Tribunal is required to  hold  a regular trial in the same manner as for adjudicating a claim petition under section 110 A of the Act. Morever, for award- ing  compensation under section 92A of the Act,  the  Claims Tribunal  is  required to satisfy itself in respect  of  the following matters:               (i) an accident has arisen out of the use of a               motor vehicle;                      (ii) the said accident has resulted  in               permanent  disablement  of the person  who  is

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             making the claim or death of the person  whose               legal representative is making the claim;                      (iii)  the  claim is made  against  the               owner  and  the insurer of the  motor  vehicle               involved in the accident;     The  documents referred to in Rules 291A and  306B  will enable the Claims Tribunal to ascertain the necessary  facts in  regard  to these matters. The panchnama  and  the  First information Report will show 53 whether the accident had arisen out of the use of the  motor vehicle  in  question. The Injury Certificate or  the  post- mortem report will show the nature of injuries and the cause of death. The Registration Certificate and Insurance Certif- icate  of the motor vehicle will indicate who is  the  owner and  insurer  of  the vehicle. In the event  of  the  Claims Tribunal feeling doubtful about the correctness or  genuine- ness of any of these documents or if it considers it  neces- sary to obtain supplementary information or documents, Rules 306A empowers the Claims Tribunal to obtain such  supplemen- tary  information or documents from the Police,  medical  or other authorities. This would show that Rules 291A, 306A and 306B  contain  adequate provisions which  would  enable  the Claims Tribunal to satisfy itself in respect of the  matters necessary for awarding compensation under section 92A of the Act  and  in  view of these special  provisions  which  were introduced  in  the  Rules by the amendments  in  1984,  the Claims Tribunal is not required to follow the normal  proce- dure  prescribed under the Act and the Rules with regard  to adjudication  of a claim under section 110A of the  Act  for the  purpose  of making an order on a claim  petition  under section 92A of the Act.     In  the result, we find no merit in this  special  leave petition  which  is accordingly dismissed.  By  order  dated January  7,  1991, while directing issue of  notice  on  the special leave petition, it was ordered that the issue of the said      notice shall be subject to the condition that  the petitioners shall deposit a sum of Rs.5,000 in the  Registry of  this Court towards cost of the respondent and  that  the notice  shall  be issued only after the amount of  cost  has been deposited and the said amount shall be paid over to the respondent  on her putting in appearance in this  Court  and the payment of the amount of cost to the respondent shall be irrespective of the result of the special leave petition. In view of the said order, no further direction with regard  to costs is necessary. G.N.                              Petition dismissed. 54