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PETITIONER: SHIV SARUP GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR.  MAHESH CHAND GUPTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       30/07/1999

BENCH: V.N. Khare, R.C. Lahoti.

JUDGMENT:

R.C.  Lahoti, J.

       The   appellant,   a   tenant   in   a   residential accommodation has sought for special leave to appeal feeling aggrieved by an order of the High Court of Delhi  which  has in exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Section 25-B (8) of Delhi  Rent  Control  Act, 1958 allowed a civil revision and directed  the  appellant  tc  be  ejected  from   the   suit accommodation   reversing   an   order  of  Additional  Rent Controller, Delhi dismissing the landlord’s application  for recovery  of  possession  of the suit premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter  the Act, for short).

       Leave granted.

       The  suit  premises  are  situated at D-219, Defence Colony, New Delhi.   The  building  has  two  floors  and  a Barsati.   The  accommodation  in  each  of  the  two floors consists of two bathrooms, two bedrooms,  a  study  room,  a glazed  verandah,  a  drawing-cum-dining room and a kitchen. There is a garage on the ground floor and a servant room  on the Barsati  floor.    The  landlord is occupying the ground floor.  In July, 1978 the first floor and the  Barsati  were let  out  by  the  landlord  to  the  tenant  -appellant for residential purpose.  There was some controversy whether one room of the suit premises had formed part of the tenancy  or was illegally encroached upon and taken possession of by the tenant.   However,  that controversy is over and the parties before us have proceeded on assumption that the..   premises in occupation of the tenant are all included in the tenancy.

       The   landlord-respondent  is  a  practising  doctor presently about 78 years of age.  In January, 1988 when  the proceedings  for  eviction were initiated, the family of the landlord consisted of himself, his wife, a sqn Munish  (also a practising  doctor), daughter-in-law and a grand son.  The landlord has three other sons, namely, Dr.  Sunil Gupta, Dr. Anil Gupta and Shri Deepak Gupta.  Dr.  Anil Gupta  and  one more  -  two  sons  are non-resident Indians settled abroad. The  third  one  has  his  own  business  and  is   residing separately from  the  father.    The  need  pleaded  in  the application for eviction was that the accommodation  on  the ground   floor   in  possession  of  the  landlord  was  not sufficient  to  meet  his  and  his   family’s   residential

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requirement.   The  landlord  had a mother-in-law, suffering from various ailments and was practically a dependent on the son-in-law, a doctor by profession.  The two doctors in  the family   needed  some  accommodation  as  a  part  of  their residential unit for attending to the patients  who  visited them  either  in  emergency  or with previous appointment at timings other than the fixed hours of the clinic  which  was being  run  at  2544,  Sir  Syed Ahmed Road, Darya Ganj, New Delhi in a part of a house belonging to Joint  Hindu  Family of  the  landlord  which  had  many  other  members as well. Undisputedly,  the  joint  family  house  is  a   commercial property and the portions other than the one occupied by the landlord for clinic are in possession of the tenants,

       Admittedly,  there  is  a house property situated at C-217, Sarvodya Enclave, New Delhi.  The house there  stands on a plot belonging to the wife of the landlord and had come up some  time  in  the  year  1986.  Eversince the date of ’ construction and also at  the  time  of  initiation  of  the present  proceedings  it  was  in occupation of a tenant and hence not available to the landlord or his  wife  for  their residence.   Before  the Rent Controller, the plea taken and sought to be substantiated by some evidence by the  landlord was that the landlord’s wife had executed a will whereby the Sarvodya  Enclave  property was proposed to be bequeathed to Dr.  Anil Gupta, the NRI son and it is he who  had  invested his own funds in constructing the property.

       During the pendency of the  proceedings  before  the Rent  Controller, the mother-in-law of the landlord expired. The wife  of  the  landlord  also  died.    So  far  as  the requirement  of the landlord by reference to the need of the mother-in-law and of the wife as a member of the family,  is concerned, has come to an end.

       The learned Additional Rent Controller held that the landlord  was  the  owner  of the suit premises and that the purpose of the letting was residential one.  However, on the solitary ground for ejectment, he held the alleged  need  of the landlord  to  be  not  bonafide.    He further held that consequent upon the death of the mother-in-law and the  wife of  the  landlord,  the  accommodation  in possession of the landlord was  sufficient  to  satisfy  his  requirement  and therefore  it  could  not  be  held  that  the  landlord was bonafidely in need of any  additional  accommodation.    The learned  Additional Rent Controller was also impressed by an admission of the landlord-respondent made in  his  statement that  the  Sarvodya  Enclave  property  if  available to the landlord would have been sufficient to meet his requirement. The death of the landlord’s wife in  whose  name  stood  the property  was  a  subsequent  event  having  impact  on  the availability of the said accommodation to the  landlord  for satisfying his  alleged need.  In view of these findings the Additional Rent Controller has  by  order  dated  24.8.1995, dismissed the application for eviction.

       The landlord preferred a revision to the High Court. The  landlord  also moved an application styled as one under Order 41 Rule 27 read with section 151 of the  CPC  inviting the  attention  of the High Court to the effect of the death of his wife Sushila Devi on 13th January, 1995 and  annexing with  the  application  copy of a registered will dated 13th June, 1994 executed by late Smt.  Sushila Devi.  By the said will Smt.  Sushila Devi has bequeathed  her  house  property no.   C-217,  Sarvodya  Enclave  in  favour of her four sons

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subject to Dr.  Anil Gupta being reimbursed by the sons  for Rs.   2  lacs,  the amount spent by him on construction over the said property.  The application proceeded to state  that it was a material evidence to decide the controversy between the  parties  and  so  the  evidence deserved to be taken on record and the petition disposed of after  taking  the  said evidence into  consideration.    Apart  from the copy of the registered will, the copies of the lease deed dated  12.7.78 of   the   plot   in   favour   of  the  deceased,  and  the letter-cum-order from the  DDA  dated  29.8.1996  intimating mutation  of  plot/property number C217, Sarvodya Enclave in favour of the four sons in place of  their  deceased  mother late Sushila  Devi  were  also  filed.   The application was opposed on behalf of the tenant.  It appears that  the  High Court heard  the  final’  arguments.  By the impugned order, the revision filed by the  landlord  has  been  allowed  and eviction  of  the  tenant ordered recording a finding of the premises in occupation of the tenant being  needed  bonafide for the  residence of the landlord and his family.  The will dated 30th June, 1994 executed by late  Sushila  Devi  filed before  the  High  Court  along  with  the  application  for additional evidence by the  landlord  has  been  taken  into consideration  by the High Court though the application does not appear to have been formally allowed and  the  documents annexed  therewith  were  not  formally  taken on record and admitted - muchless proved - in evidence.

       Before this Court, Ms.  Syamla  Pappu,  the  learned senior  counsel  for the tenant-appellant has submitted that the High Court  has  committed  a  jurisdictional  error  in reversing the findings of facts recorded by.  the Additional Rent Controller.   The jurisdiction so exercised by the High Court is not one vested in it by sub-section (8) of  Section 25B of   the  Act.    The  learned  senior  counsel  further submitted that the findings of act arrived at by the learned Additional  Rent  Controller  were  based  on  evidence  and reasonably  arrived  at;  there was no occasion to interfere with and reverse the same.  The learned senior counsel  also submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  committed  a serious jurisdictional irregularity by taking into consideration the documents filed for the first time by  the  landlord  before the  High  Court  without  formally  admitting  the  same in evidence  and  without  affording  the  tenantappellant   an opportunity of rebutting the additional evidence.

       Shri  Arun  Jaitley,  the learned senior counsel for the landlord-respondent has supported the order of the  High Court.   He  submitted  that the documents placed before the High court by the landlord along with his application merely intended a subsequent event to be brought to the  notice  of the High  Court.   The documents were of undoubted veracity. He further submitted that the ultimate finding arrived at by the High Court would not be dislodged even if the  documents accompanying    the    application    were   excluded   from consideration.  At ’ the end submitted Shri Jaitley that the finding arrived at by the High Court was  the  only  finding that co^ld have been reasonably arrived at from the material available  on  record and hence the conclusion arrived at by the Additional Rent Controller being not one  ’according  to law’  within the meaning of Section 25-B (8) was rightly set aside by the High court, in any case the present one was not a fit case for the exercise of  jurisdiction  under  Article 136  of  the Constitution, persuasively appealed the learned senior counsel.

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       Section 25-B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 finding its place in Chapter III-A of the Act was inserted into  the body  of the main Act by Act No .18 of 1976 with effect from 1.12.1975.  It  provides  for  a  special  procedure  to  be followed  for  the  disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide need.  Obviously,  this  ground  for eviction  of  the  tenant  has  been  treated  on  a footing different from the one on which other grounds  for  eviction of the  tenant  stand.    Section  25-B  is a self-contained provision in the sense that remedy against an  order  passed by  the  Rent Controller thereunder is also provided by that provision itself.  Sub-section (8) provides that  no  appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of  possession  of  any  premises  made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure  specified  in  Section  25-B, provided  that  the  High  Court  may,  for  the  purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law  (or  not),  call  for  the records  of  the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit’.  The  phraseology  of  the  provision  as reproduced  hereinbefore  provides  an  interesting  reading placed in juxtaposition with the phraseology employed by the Legislature in drafting Section 115 of  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure.   Under  the  latter  provision  the  exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court  is  circumscribed by  the  subordinate court having committed one of the three errors, namely (i) having exercised jurisdiction not  vested in   it  by  law,  or  (ii)  having  failed  to  exercise  a jurisdiction  so  vested,  or  (iii)  having  exercised  its jurisdiction   with  illegality  or  material  irregularity. Onder the proviso to sub-section (8) of  Section  25-B,  the expression governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by  the  High  Court is ’for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is  according  to  law’.    The revisional  jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 25-B (8) is not so limited as is under  Section  115 CPC nor  so  wide  as  that of an Appellate Court.  The High Court cannot enter into appreciation or  re-appreciation  of evidence  merely  because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a court of facts.   However, the  High  Court  is  obliged  to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according  to law’.    For   that   limited  purpose  it  may  enter  into re-appraisal of  evidence,  that  is,  for  the  purpose  of ascertaining  whether  the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller  is  wholly  unreasonable  or  is  one  that   no reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached that conclusion  on  the  material  available.  Ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on wrong premise  of  law  or deriving  such  conclusion  from  the  established  facts as betray the lack of reason and/or  objectivity  would  render the finding of the Controller ’not according to law’ calling for  an  interference  under  proviso  to sub-Section (8) of Section 25-B of the Act.  A judgment leading to  miscarriage of justice  is not a judgment according to law.  [See; Sarla Ahuja Vs.  United India Insurance Co .Ltd.   -(1998)  8  SCC 119 and Ram Narain Arora Vs.  Asha Rani and Ors.  - (1999) I SCC 141.]

       A  perusal  of  Section 14 of the Act shows that the law has imposed restrictions on the recovery of  possession. of  any  premises  by landlord from a tenant notwithstanding any law or contract to the contrary.  However, an order  for recovery  of possession is permissible on one or more of the specified ground^.  One such ground is the premises let  for

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residential   purposes  being  required  bona  fide  by  the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for  any member of his family dependent on him.  What is a bofta fide requirement is not defined in the Act.  The words ’need’ and "require’ both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding   fulfilment.     ’Need’  or  ’requirement’ qualified by word ’bonafide’ or ’genuine’  preceding  as  an adjective  -  is  an  expression  often used in Rent Control Laws.  ’Bonafide or genuine need’ of the  landlord  or  that the  landlord ’genuinely requires’ or "requires bonafide" an accommodation for occupation by or use  for  himself  is  an accepted  ground  for  eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation  draftsman.    The  two expressions  are  interchangeable  in practise and carry the same meaning.

       Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bonafide to mean ’in good faith :  genuine’.  The word  ’genuine’  means ’natural; not spurious; real:    pure:    sincere’.   In Law Dictionary, Mozley and Whit  ley  define  bonafide  to  mean ’good faith,  without  fraud  or  deceit’.    Thus  the term bonafide  or  genuinely  refers  to   a   state   of   mind. Requirement is  not  a mere desire.  The degree of intensity contemplated by ’requires’ is much more higher than in  mere desire.   The  phrase  ’required  bonafide’ is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which  is  outcome  of whim  or  fancy  is  not  taken  note of by the Rent Control Legislation.  A requirement in the sense of felt need  which is   an   outcome   of   a   sincere,   honest   desire,  in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to ev.ict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the  family  would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant.  Looked at from this  angle,  any  setting  of  the  facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides  would  be capable  of  successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court.  The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and  then  ask  the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by  the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest.  If the answer  be  in the positive, the need is bonafide.  The failure on the part of  the  landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive  material  brought  on  record  by  the tenant  enabling  the  court  drawing  an inference that the reality was to the contrary  and  the  landlord  was  merely attempting  at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough  to  persuade  the  Court certainly  to  deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need  of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying objective  standards  then  in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to  the  landlord  his subjective choice  shall  be  respected  by  the court.  The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the  proven  need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited .for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice Of the landlord by holding  that  not one.  but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such  need.    In short,  the  concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of  life. An  approach  either  too  liberal  or  two  conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.

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       The availability of an alternate accommodation  with the landlord  i.e.    an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the  tenant  wherefrom  he  is  sought  to  be evicted has  a dual relevancy.  Firstly, the availability of another  accommodation,  suitable  and  convenient  in   all respects  as  the  suit  accommodation,  may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy  the  available  premises  to satisfy his alleged need.  Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was  not  honest,  sincere, and natural.  Secondly, another principal ingredient of clause  (e)  of  sub-section (1)  of  Section  14, which speaks of nonavailability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation  to  the landlord, would   not   be   satisfied.    Wherever  another residential accommodation is shown  to  exist  as  available than  the  court  has  to  ask  the  landlord  why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy  his need.    The  landlord  may  convince  the  court  that  the alternate  residential  accommodation  though  available  is still  of  no  consequence  as  the  same  is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need  which  the  landlord  has succeeded in  demonstrating  objectively to exist.  Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial  of the  claim  of  the  landlord,  must be reasonably suitable, obviously  in  comparison  with   the   suit   accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction.  Convenience and safety  of  the  landlord  and  his  family members would be relevant factors.  While considering  the  totality  of  the circumstances,  the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the  background  wherefrom  they come.

       A  few  decided  cases  apposite to the point may be referred.  A Division Bench of Madhya Bharat High  Court  in Motilal Vs.   Badrilal  - ILR 1954 MB 1.  interpreted clause (g) of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat, 2006 where-under a landlord was entitled to eject a tenant if  he "really  needs a house for himself and he possesses no other accommodation belonging to him elsewhere".  It was held that the  landlord  was  made  the  sole  arbiter  of   his   own requirements  but  he  must  prove that he in fact wants and genuinely intended to occupy-the premises.  His claim  would no  doubt  fail if the Court came to the conclusion that the evidence of "want" was unreliable and that the landlord  did not genuinely   intend  to  occupy  the  premises.    As  to alternative accommodation disentitling the landlord  to  the relief  of possession it was held that it must be reasonably equivalent  as  regards  suitability  in  respect   to   the accommodation he  was  claiming.   This statement of law was cited with approval before a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Damodar  Sharma  &  Anr.    Vs.    Nandram Deviram - AIR  1960  MP  345.    Pandey,J.    recording  the majority opinion  emphasised  the  distinction  between  the expressions    ’genuinely    requires’    and    ’reasonably requires’and said:-

       "It is wrong to say that "genuinely requires" is the same as "reasonably  requires".    There  is  a  distinction between the  two  phrases.    The  former phrase refers to a state  of  mind;  the  latter  to  an  objective   standard. "Genuine   requirement"   would   vary   according   to  the idiosyncrasy  of   the   individual   and   the   time   and

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circumstances in  which  he  lives  and  thinks.  Reasonable requirement belongs to the "knowledge of the law" and  means reasonable  not  in  the  mind  of  the person requiring the accommodation but reasonable according to the actual  facts. In  my  opinion,  in  this part of Sec.4(g), the landlord is made the sole arbiter of his own requirements  but  he  must prove  that  he,  in  fact,  wants  and genuinely intends to occupy the premises.  His claim would no doubt fail  if  the Court came to the conclusion that the evidence of "want" was unreliable and that the landlord did not genuinely intend to occupy the premises".

       As to  impact  of  availability  of  another  vacant accommodation  with  the  landlord  it was held in Damodar’s case (supra) that it must satisfy the  test  of  suitability for satisfying the need of the plandlord.

       The  abovesaid Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was cited with approval before this  Court in Saryats TJ3.  Vs.  Nerai Chand 1965 JLJ 973 (SC).

       In M.  M.  Quasim Vs.  Manohar Lal Sharma - AIR 1981 SC 1113 this Court has held (vide para 18) that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that  the  landlord  has  some  other  vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the  landlord’s  claim  if  the  vacant  premises  were  not suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. This Court cautioned that  the  Court  must  understand  and appreciate  the  relationship  between  the  legal rules and necessities of life.

       In Ram  Pass  Vs.  Ishwar Chander and Ors - AIP 1988 SC 1422 this Court has held that:-

"       the need of  the  landlord  should  be  genuine  and honest,  conceived  in  good  faith;  and that, further, the court must also consider it reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord’s desire for possession, however  honest  it  might otherwise  be, has inevitably a subjective element in it and that, that desire to become a "requirement" in law must have the objective element of a "need".  It  must  also  be  su^h that  the  court  considers  it  reasonable  and, therefore, eligible to be gratified.  In doing so, the court must  take all  relevant  circumstances  into consideration so that the protection afforded by law to the  tenant  is  not  rendered merely illusory or whittled down".

       In Sarla Ahuja Vs.  United India  Insurance  Co.Ltd. -  1998  (8)  SCC  119  this  Court  has  held that the Rent Controller should not proceed on  the  assumption  that  the landlord’s requirement  is  not bonafide.  When t^e landlord shows a prima facie case a presumption that the  requirement of the landlord is bonafide is available to be drawn.  It is not  for  the  tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without giving possession  of the tenanted  premises.    While  deciding  the  question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord, it  is  ’quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.

       In Prativa Devi  (Smt) Vs.  T.V.  Krishnan, 1996 (5) SCC  353  this  court  has  held  that  in  considering  the availability  of alternative accommodation, not availability merely but also whether the landlord has the legal right  to

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such accommodation has to be considered.

       Reverting back to the case at hand, the landlord has been  living  on  the  ground  floor  of the Defence .Colony house.  It was conceded at the Bar that as on  the  day  the family  of  the landlord consists of the landlord himself (a practising doctor), his son (again a practising doctor), the daughter-in-law and two grand  children  who  are  gradually growing in  their  age.   Looking at the size of the family, availability of three bed rooms in the  premises  .in  which the landlord may live, is a requirement which is natural and consistent  with  the  sense  of  decency  -  not to talk of comfort and convenience.  There is nothing unreasonable in a family  with  two  practising  doctors  as  members  thereof needing a room or two or a room with a veranda to be used as a  residentialclinic  divided into a consultation room and a waiting place for the patients.  A drawing room, a  kitchen, a  living  room  and  a  garage  are  bare necessities for a comfortable living.  The landlord has been living in Defence Colony locality for more than 35 years.    The  first  floor which was let out to the tenant in the year 1978 as being an accommodation  surplus  with the landlord has with the lapse of time become a necessity for occupation  by  the  landlord and his  family  members.    More than ten years by now have been lost in litigation.  The  death  of  the  wife  of  the landlord, and the death of the landlord’s mother-in-law, are events  which  have  hardly  any bearing on the case of felt need of the landlord.  The need as pleadad and proved by the landlord is undoubtedly natural,.  sincere  and  honest  and hence a  bonafide  need.   There is no material available on record to doubt the genuineness of such need.  It  continues to subsist  in  spite of the two deaths.  It is not the case of the tenant - appellant that while seeking eviction of the tenant the landlord is moved by any ulterior  motive  or  is guided by  some  other  thing  in his mind.  It will be most unreasonable to suggest that the landlord  may  continue  to live  on  the  ground  floor of the Defence Colony house and some members of the family may  move  to  Sarvodaya  Enclave House  if  the  whole  family  cannot  be  conveniently  and comfortably accommodated as one unit in the  Defence  Colony house.  It would be equally unreasonable to suggest that the entire family must shift to Sarvodaya Enclave house which is admittedly  situated  at  a distance of about 7-8 kilometers from Defence Colony.  The landlord and his family  are  used to  living  in  Defence  Colony  where  they  have developed friends  and  acquaintances,  also  familiarity   with   the neighbourhood- and  .the  environment.  The patients usually visiting or likely to  visit  the  residential  clinic  know where their  doctor  would be available.  Shri Arun Jaitley, learned senior counsel for the respondent, has very  rightly submitted  that it could not have been the intendment of the Rent Control Law to compel the landlord in  such  facts  and circumstances  to shift to a different house and locality so as to permit the tenant to continue to live in the  tenanted premises.   If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him  to squeeze  himself tightly into lesser premises protecting the tenant’s occupancy.  In addition, we find that on  the  date of  the  initiation  of  the  proceedings, Sarvodaya Enclave property was belonging to the wife of the landlord or to one of his sons resident abroad and was in actual occupation  of a tenant.    On the death of the wife of the landlord if any one of the two wills (one which was in existence at the time of initiation of the proceedings or the one,  which  appears to  have  been  subsequently executed by the landlords’ wife

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and filed before the High Court) was to be given  effect  to then  the ownership in the property has passed on to one son or jointly to four sons of the landlord.  If the will itself is excluded from consideration as not proved then  also  the ownership  in  the  property  has passed on to the four sons jointly.  Sarvodaya Enclave property does not belong to  the landlord  and  is  not  available  for  his occupation as an owner.  To these facts the applicability of law laid down in Prativa Devi’s case (Supra) is squarely attracted.   In  our opinion,  the  availability of Sarvodaya Enclave property is not of any relevance or germane to determining the need  and the bonafides  of  the  need  of  the  landlord.  We are not therefore inclined to attach any weight to  the  application for  additional  evidence  filed  by the landlord before the High Court though we agree with the learned counsel for  the tenant  - appellant that the High Court was not justified in taking into consideration the contents of the  will  without formally  admitting  the  same in evidence and affording the parties  opportunity  of  adducing  evidence  in  proof  and dis-proof thereof.

       For the forgoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the  High  Court  did not commit any jurisdictional error in reversing the order of the Rent Controller and upholding the landlord’s claim for eviction.  Inspite  of  excluding  from consideration, the documents’ which wereproposed to be filed by  the  landlord  on  the  record  of  the  High Court, the ultimate finding of the High Court is liable to  be  upheld. On  the  material  available  on record, the only conclusion which could have been drawn is the one  drawn  by  the  High Court.   The  order of the Rent Controller was not according to law and was, therefore, rightly set aside.

       The appeal is dismissed.  The  tenant  appellant  is however  granted  six  months  time  to  vacate the premises subject to filing usual undertaking within a period  of  one month  on  the  affidavit of the appellant to deliver vacant and peaceful possession over the premises to the landlord at the end of the extended time and in between regularly paying the rent.  Costs as incurred.