IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  2357      OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)NO.5995 of 2009)

Mrs. Shilpa Aggarwal  … Appellant Vs.

Mr. Aviral Mittal & Anr.     … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted.   

2. The question which we are called upon to decide in  

this case is whether a 3½ year old girl child, who was  

born  in England  of Indian  parents and  is a  British  

citizen by birth, can be kept in the custody of the  

mother who is now currently residing in India, despite  

an order passed on 26th November, 2008, by the High  

Court of Justice, Family Division, U.K., directing that  

the child be returned to the jurisdiction of the Courts  

of England and Wales.  

3. This is one of those cases where a minor child  

below 4 years of age is the victim of the acrimony of  

the two adults who were responsible for her birth. The  

appellant was married to the Respondent No.1 herein on  

4th November,  2003,  and  as  the  Respondent  No.1  was  

already working in the United Kingdom since November,  

2000, the parties set up their matrimonial home first  

in Scotland and then in England. A girl child, who is  

now 3½ years of age, was born of the said marriage.  

The appellant herein also obtained employment in U.K.  

and both the Respondent No.1 and the appellant acquired  

the status of permanent residents of U.K. in 2004 prior  

to the birth of the child on 20th February, 2006.  Being  

born in the United Kingdom, the child acquired British  

citizenship and was the holder of a British passport,  

although,  her  parents  continued  to  hold  Indian  

passports.

4. Soon  after  the  birth  of  the  child,  some  

disagreements seem to have developed between the couple  

but, in any event, the appellant along with the minor  

child  came  to  India  on  12th September,  2008.   The  

Respondent  No.1  also  came  to  India  on  10th October,  

2008,  and  returned  to  the  United  Kingdom  on  14th  

October, 2008.   According to the Respondent No.1, the

appellant herein was supposed to join him in his family  

house at New Delhi once he arrived in India, but it is  

his case that she chose not to do so.  According to the  

Respondent No.1, the appellant and the minor child were  

supposed to leave for U.K. on 9th November, 2008, but  

the  appellant  got  their  tickets  cancelled  on  7th  

November,  2008,  and  remained  behind  in  India.   The  

Respondent  No.1  thereupon  started  proceedings  before  

the High Court of Justice, Family Division, U.K., on  

25th November, 2008, praying for an order that the minor  

child be made a ward of the Court and for a direction  

upon the appellant to return the minor child to the  

jurisdiction  of  the  said  Court.   On  such  ex-parte  

application,  the  High  Court  of  Justice,  Family  

Division,  U.K.,  on  26th November,  2009,  directed  the  

appellant herein by an ex-parte order to return the  

minor child, Ms. Elina, to the jurisdiction of the said  

Court. A further direction was given for the passport  

and other international travel documents of the minor  

child  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Solicitors  of  the  

Respondent No.1 within 72 hours of the return of the  

child and the same were not to be released to either  

party without the permission of the High Court.

5. According  to  the  Respondent  No.1,  since  the

parties had set up their matrimonial home in Scotland,  

and, thereafter, in England, they were subject to the  

jurisdiction  of the  Courts in  U.K. since  2003.  In  

addition, the parties had worked for gain in U.K. and  

the minor child was also holding a British passport  

with  the  parents  having  acquired  permanent  resident  

status in U.K.  It was thus the case of the Respondent  

No.1 that the status of the minor child in India was  

that of an “illegal migrant” in view of the directions  

passed by the English Courts and the child should be  

returned to that jurisdiction.    

6. According to the appellant, the proceedings in the  

United Kingdom were taken behind her back and it is  

only on 1st December, 2008, that she received a copy of  

the proceedings filed before the High Court of Justice,  

Family Division, U.K.  Immediately thereafter, on 4th  

December, 2008, Writ Petition (Crl.) No.1553 of 2008  

was  filed  by  Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  (father  of  the  

Respondent  No.l),  allegedly  on  the  strength  of  a  

Special Power of Attorney executed by the Respondent  

No.1 in his favour, seeking protection of the minor  

child before the Delhi High Court and for a direction  

that custody of the minor child be handed over to him.  

Notice was issued on the said writ petition and on 16th

December, 2008, the appellant was represented before  

the  Delhi  High  Court  through  her  learned  counsel.  

Incidentally, it may be indicated that 15th December,  

2008, was also said to have been fixed by the High  

Court in U.K. for hearing of the petition filed by the  

Respondent  No.1  and  also  for  the  appearance  of  the  

appellant herein.   

7. On  7th January,  2009,  the  Delhi  High  Court  

directed both the parties to appear before the Delhi  

High Court Mediation Centre on 9th January, 2009, to  

explore the possibility of a settlement and also gave  

visitation rights to the Respondent No.1 to see his  

minor  daughter.   It  further  appears  that  on  17th  

January, 2009, the minor child was admitted to Apeejay  

School,  Pitampura,  Delhi,  and  the  appellant  was  

appointed as the Computer Coordinator on 20th January,  

2009 in the said school.  It appears that the mediation  

proceedings  took  place  between  the  parties  on  25th  

February, 2009, but there was no positive outcome and,  

on  the other  hand, it  is the  appellant’s case  that  

while surfing through her Orkut Profile on 27th April,  

2009, she came to learn that the Respondent No.1 was  

claiming to be “single” as if his marriage with the  

appellant was not subsisting.

8. On 7th August, 2009, the Delhi High Court disposed  

of  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  father  of  the  

Respondent No.1 (Writ Petition (Crl.) No.1553 of 2008)  

by passing the following order :-

“At the first instance, a period of 14 days be granted  to  Respondent  No.2  (Petitioner  herein)  to  take  the  child of her own to England and join the proceedings  before the Courts of England and Wales, failing which  the child be handed over to the petitioner to be taken  to  England  as  a  measure  of  interim  custody  and  thereafter it is for the courts of England and Wales to  determine which parent would be best suited to have the  custody of the child.”               

The present appeal has been filed challenging the  

said order of the High Court.

1. Appearing  for  the  appellant,  Mr.  Pallav  

Shishodia,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  submitted  

that while passing the impugned order, the Delhi  

High Court appears to have lost sight of the fact  

that the interest of the minor is of paramount  

importance  in  matters  relating  to  custody  and  

particularly in this case where the minor was a  

girl child and was just about 3½ years old.  The  

learned  counsel  also  submitted  that  the

proceedings taken in the United Kingdom had been  

taken behind the back of the appellant, without  

notice to her, despite the fact that both she and  

child were in India where the child had already  

been admitted in a school and was being properly  

cared for and looked after by the appellant.  Mr.  

Shishodia submitted that in the interest of the  

minor child, the Delhi High Court ought not to  

have given such directions which had the effect  

of the minor child having to be handed over to  

the custody of her paternal grandparents who had  

not even maintained any contact with the child.  

10. Mr.  Shishodia  urged  that  having  regard  to  the  

provisions  of  Section  6  of  the  Hindu  Minority  and  

Guardianship  Act,  1956,  whereunder  the  mother  is  

entitled to retain custody of the minor child under the  

age of 5 years, the High Court erred in directing the  

appellant to submit herself and her minor daughter, who  

were  both  Hindus,  to  the  jurisdiction  of  a  foreign  

court  in  terms  of  an  interim  order  passed  in  

proceedings taken before the said court for the purpose  

of  deciding  the  question  of  custody.   He  also  

questioned the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue  

a  writ  in  the  nature  of  mandamus to  a  private

individual to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign  

court in a habeas corpus proceeding.

11. Mr.  Shishodia  submitted  that  an  almost  similar  

question had been considered and decided by this Court  

in Sarita Sharma vs. Sushil Sharma  (2003 (3) SCC 14],  

wherein it was held that even a decree passed by a  

foreign  court  could  not  override  the  consideration  

relating to the welfare of the minor child.  It was  

held  that  what  was  of  paramount  importance  was  the  

interest  of  the  minor  child,  a  principle  which  is  

universally recognized and accepted. It was submitted  

that  in  the  aforesaid  decision  this  Court  had  also  

observed  that  all  the  technicalities  involving  

jurisdiction and Comity of Courts would have to give  

way to the issue involving the welfare of the minor.  

Everything else pales into significance in deciding the  

matter of custody of a minor child and especially a  

minor child below the age of 5 years.

12. Mr. Shishodia contended that the High Court had  

erroneously relied upon the judgment of this Court in  

Mrs. Surinder Kaur Sandhu vs.  Harbax Singh Sandhu &  

Anr. [(1984)3 SCC 698] which was based on the principle  

of Comity of Courts, which had been taken note of in

Sarita Sharma’s case (supra).

13. A further submission was made to the effect that  

the High Court had erred in holding that although the  

custody  of the  minor child  with the  mother was  not  

illegal  at  the  inception,  it  became  so  after  the  

directions given by the High Court of Justice, Family  

Division, U.K., on 26th November, 2008, to return the  

child to its jurisdiction within 14 days, failing which  

the appellant herein would be guilty of contempt of  

court and could also be sent to prison, fined or her  

assets could be seized.  It was contended that the High  

Court ought not to have ousted its own jurisdiction as  

well as the jurisdiction of the Indian courts to decide  

the  question  of  custody  of  the  minor  child  in  

accordance with the law of the land where the minor  

child  is  currently  resident,  particularly  in  the  

absence of any allegation of kidnapping or of bringing  

the minor into India in breach of any foreign decree or  

injunction. Yet another question which was raised was  

with regard to the psychological damage that could be  

caused on an impressionable mind which could ultimately  

destroy the mental orientation and moral fabric of a  

minor child.   

14. Mr. Shishodia laid special stress on the decision  

of this Court in Sarita Sharma’s case (supra), in which  

the question of custody of children in almost similar  

circumstances came up for consideration.  In the said  

case an American Court had put the children born out of  

the marriage in the care of the respondent-husband, but  

in  exercising  visitation  rights,  the  appellant-wife  

picked up the children from her husband’s residence and  

brought  them  to  India  despite  the  American  Court’s  

order.  A writ petition for issuance of a writ in the  

nature of habeas corpus was filed by the husband in the  

Delhi High Court and having regard to the conduct of  

the appellant-mother, the High Court directed her to  

hand over the custody of the children to her husband  

and permit him to take them to the U.S.A.  The said  

order being challenged in the Supreme Court, this Court  

held that although the appellant’s conduct of removing  

the children from the U.S.A. was a relevant fact, it  

could not override the various aspects relating to the  

welfare of the children.  This Court thereupon held  

that the High Court had erred in restoring the custody  

of the children to the husband on the sole ground of  

breach of the order of the American Court and that the  

High Court should have directed the respondent-husband  

to  initiate  proceedings  for  holding  a  full-fledged

inquiry as to what would be in the interest of the  

children having regard to the provisions of Section 6  

of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.   

15. Mr. Shishodia urged that even in the said case the  

question of lawful custody of the children cropped up.  

This Court observed that before she came to India with  

the children, the appellant-wife was in lawful custody  

of the children.  The question which had to be answered  

was whether custody became illegal as she had committed  

breach of the order of the American Courts directing  

her not to remove the children from the jurisdiction of  

that court without its permission.  In the said case,  

in  a  decree  of  divorce  an  order  of  the  custody  of  

children had already been passed, and the same was a  

further consideration for deciding the question as to  

whether  the  custody  of  the  children  became  illegal  

thereafter.   Mr.  Shishodia  pointed  out  that,  as  

indicated  hereinbefore,  Surinder  Kaur’s  case  (supra)  

had been considered in  Sarita Sharma’s case (supra),  

where a distinction having been made on the ground of  

the welfare of the minor child being paramount, this  

Court held that the interest of the minor child would  

be best served in allowing the mother to retain custody  

of the said children, notwithstanding the orders passed

by the American Courts.  The writ petition filed by the  

respondent-husband was, accordingly, dismissed by the  

Appeal Court on the basis of the circumstances relating  

to the welfare of the minor.   

16. To  further  strengthen  his  submissions,  Mr.  

Shishodia also referred to the decision of this Court  

in (i)  Rajesh K. Gupta vs.  Ram Gopal Agarwala & Ors.  

[(2005) 5 SCC 359]; and (ii) Dhanwanti Joshi vs. Madhav  

Unde [(1998) 1 SCC 112].  In  Rajesh K. Gupta’s case  

(supra) in relation to a matrimonial and child custody  

dispute the husband, an Advocate-on-Record practising  

in the Supreme Court, filed a writ petition for a writ  

in the nature of habeas corpus for custody of his minor  

daughter.   There  also  this  Court  held  that  in  an  

application for a writ of habeas corpus for custody of  

a minor child the principal consideration for the court  

would be to ascertain whether the custody of the child  

can be said to be lawful or illegal and whether the  

welfare of the child required that the child should be  

left in the care and custody of someone else. It was  

also noted that in case of disputes between the mother  

and father regarding the custody of their child, the  

paramount consideration is the welfare of the child and  

not  the  legal  right  of  either  of  the  parties.  Mr.

Shishodia  submitted  that  notwithstanding  the  

allegations regarding the wife’s mental condition, the  

court thought it fit to allow her to remain in custody  

of the minor child.   

17. In the other decision in  Dhanwanti Joshi’s case  

(supra), the claim of the father for custody of the  

child on the ground of his having superior financial  

capacity  to  give  his  child  immediate  American  

education,  was  negated  and  it  was  held  that  having  

superior  financial  capacity  cannot  be  the  sole  

consideration  for  change  of  custody  from  mother  to  

father.  This Court held that while the child in his  

mother’s custody was getting good education and doing  

well in studies, the proposal of an immediate American  

education, which the father was prepared to finance,  

could not be a sufficient ground for shifting the child  

to the father’s custody.  It was also observed that the  

child, who was a citizen of U.S.A. by birth, could go  

to U.S.A. in his own right in future, whenever it was  

so decided.

18. Mr. Shishodia submitted that the reasoning of the  

High Court based solely on the doctrine of the Comity  

of  Courts,  without  giving  proper  importance  to  the

welfare of the minor, could not be sustained and was  

required to be set aside.   

19. On the other hand, Mr. Debal Banerjee, learned  

Senior  Advocate,  appearing  for  the  Respondent  No.1,  

contended that the decision of the High Court to apply  

the  principle  of  the  Comity  of  Courts  was  wholly  

justified, inasmuch as, there was an existence of an  

order,  even  if  interim  in  nature,  directing  the  

appellant within a period of 14 days to voluntarily  

take the child to England and to join the proceedings  

before the Court of England and Wales, failing which  

the child was to be handed over to the  respondent to  

be taken to England as a measure of interim custody,  

and, thereafter, it would be for the Courts of England  

and Wales to determine which of the parents would be  

best suited to the custody of the child.

20. Mr.  Banerjee  submitted  that  although  in  Sarita  

Sharma’s case (supra) the decision in  Surinder Kaur’s  

case was noticed and a passage from the said judgment  

was also extracted, in the ultimate analysis the Court  

felt that the minor children should be handed over to  

the mother as it would be in the best interest of the  

children to be with the mother since they too expressed

the desire to stay with her.  Mr. Banerjee submitted  

that in the said case also the Court had to resort to a  

chance  that  the  dispute  would  ultimately  be  settled  

and, on such consideration, the writ petition filed by  

the respondent-husband was dismissed.  

21. Reliance  was  also  placed  on  the  oft-repeated  

decision of this Court in the case of  Mrs. Elizabeth  

Dinshaw  vs. Arvand  M.  Dinshaw  & Anr.  [(1987) 1 SCC 42].  The facts of the said case have a  

good deal of similarity with the facts of the instance  

case,  where  also,  in  view  of  the  father  secretly  

bringing the child to India against the express orders  

of the American Court, the mother filed a habeas corpus  

petition before the Supreme Court for restoration of  

the child’s custody.  In the background of the said  

facts, this Court held that the mother was entitled to  

the child’s custody, with liberty to take the child to  

the  U.S.A.  and  the  father  could  pursue  the  matter  

before the U.S. Court for restoration of the visitation  

rights which had earlier been granted in his favour.

22. Mr.  Banerjee  contended  that  when  there  was  an  

existing  order  of  a  foreign  court,  the  prayer  for  

deciding the matter for the same relief ought not to be

granted.  The learned counsel submitted that there was  

no ground whatsoever, for this Court to interfere with  

the order of the High Court which had been passed in  

the interest of the minor girl child.          

• From the materials disclosed in this case,  

we  find  ourselves  placed  between  two  

contrasting principles of law which we are  

required  to  balance  keeping  in  mind  the  

interests of a minor 3½ year old girl child.  

Of the two principles, the High Court has  

placed greater reliance upon the theory of  

Comity of Nations and Comity of Judgments of  

the  Courts  of  two  different  countries  in  

deciding  the  matter.  Having  held  that  the  

High  Court  of  Justice,  Family  Division,  

U.K., was already in seisin of the matter  

and had passed an interim order of restraint  

and having further regard to the fact that  

the interests of a 3½ year old minor girl  

child  was  involved,  the  Delhi  High  Court  

directed that the custody of the child be  

made over to the father in England and in  

the  alternative  to  the  grand-parents  in  

India  who  would  return  the  child  to  the

jurisdiction of the U.K. Courts. Even while  

considering  the  interests  of  the  minor  

child, the High Court felt that due respect  

had to be given to the orders of the U.K.  

Court as the U.K. Court was closest to the  

issue  involving  the  custody  of  the  minor  

child who was a British citizen.   

24. There is yet another aspect of the matter on which  

the  High  Court  has  stressed.   The  High  Court  has  

noticed the fact that both the appellant wife and the  

respondent husband had set up their matrimonial home in  

Scotland and thereafter in England since 2003.  Both  

the parents had been working for gain in the U.K. and  

while the minor child was holding a British Passport,  

the parents had acquired permanent resident status in  

the U.K.   

25. It is not as if the High Court was oblivious of  

the fact that it was the paramount duty of the Court to  

look after the interests of the minor child.  It has  

referred to the celebrated decision of this Court in  

Elizabeth  Dinshaw’s  case  (supra),  wherein  it  was  

emphasized  that  in  matters  of  custody  of  minor  

children,  the  sole  and  predominant  criterion  is  the

interest and welfare of the minor.   Further, while  

relying  upon  the  judgment  in  Sarita  Sharma’s  case  

(supra), the High Court did consider the decision in  

Surinder Kaur’s case (supra), where the facts were very  

similar.   Yet, the High Court, relying on the decision  

of this Court in Sarita Sharma’s case (supra) came to  

the conclusion that the Courts in this country cannot  

be guided entirely by the fact that one of the parents  

had violated the order passed by a competent foreign  

Court. Choosing to rely on the doctrine of Comity of  

Courts, the High Court directed the appellant to return  

the minor child to the jurisdiction of the U.K. Court  

as the said Court was closest to the issue involving  

the custody of the child and would thoroughly examine  

the claim of the appellant and the Respondent No.1 to  

be entrusted with the custody of the child.   

26. Although,  Mr.  Shishodia  relied  heavily  on  the  

decision in Surinder Kaur’s case, it cannot be ignored  

that the said case has duly considered the principle  

that the interest of the minor is  paramount in any  

decision relating to custody. It is but natural that in  

a matrimonial tussle both the parents would want the  

custody of the minor child. In this tussle, we have to  

decide who would be more suited to have custody of the

child.  In our  view, the  High Court  appears to  have  

taken  the  correct  approach  in  a  matter  like  this.  

Although, on first impression, it would appear that the  

interests of the minor child would best be served if  

she is allowed to remain with the appellant, we cannot  

lose  sight  of  the  order  dated  26th November,  2008,  

passed by the High Court of Justice, Family Division,  

U.K., which admittedly is an ex-parte order and, inter  

alia, reads as follows :-

“IT IS ORDERED THAT :-

1. The  minor,  Elina  Mittal  (date  of  birth  20th  February,  2006),  shall  remain  a  ward  of  court  during her minority or until further order,

 2.The Defendant mother, Shilpa Agarwal, do within 14  

days of service of this order upon her cause the  said minor to be returned to the jurisdiction of  England and Wales,          

3.Following the return of the said minor to England  and Wales, the Defendant mother shall thereafter be  forbidden (whether by herself or by instructing or  encouraging  any  other  person)  from  causing  or  permitting  the  minor  to  be  removed  from  the  jurisdiction  of  England  and  Wales  without  the  permission of a High Court judge.  

4. Within 72 hours of the return of the said minor to

England  and  Wales,  the  Defendant  mother  must  deliver up to the Plaintiff father’s solicitors,  Messrs  Lyons  Davidson  of  Victoria  House,  51  Victoria Street, Bristol BS1 6AD all passports and  international travel documents for the child on the  basis that those documents will be held by that  firm to the order of the court and will not be  released to either party without the permission of  a High Court Judge;  

5.Within 72 hours of the return of the said minor to  England  and  Wales,  the  Defendant  mother  must  provide the Plaintiff father’s solicitors, Messrs  Lyons  Davidson  of  Victoria  House,  51  Victoria  Street,  Bristol  BS1  6AD  with  full  details  in  writing  of  any  address  at  which  she  intends  to  reside  with  the  child  and  a  contact  telephone  number for herself; she must also provide to the  father’s solicitors in writing full details of any  new address to which she intends to move with the  child prior to such move taking place.  

6.There be liberty to the Defendant mother to apply  to vary or discharge any provision of this order  upon  giving  24  hours’  notice  to  the  Plaintiff  father’s  solicitors,  Messrs  Lyons  Davidson  of  Victoria House, 51 Victoria Street, Bristol BS1 6AD  (of  PMM/CLP;  telephone  number  01179046000);  any  such  application  shall  be  supported  by  a  sworn  affidavit.

7.The application shall be adjourned and listed at  risk  for  further  directions  before  a  High  Court

Judge  sitting  at  the  Royal  Courts  of  Justice,  Strand London at 10.30 am on 15 December 2009 (time  estimate ½ hour).

8.The costs of this application be reserved:

AND NOW THEREFORE this Court respectfully invites all  judicial and administrative bodies in the Republic of  India to render assistance in ensuring that the minor  Elina Mittal is returned as soon as possible to the  jurisdiction of England and Wales.”

27. It is evident from the aforesaid order that except  

for  insisting  that  the  minor  be  returned  to  its  

jurisdiction,  the  English  Court  did  not  intend  to  

separate the child from the appellant until a final  

decision was taken with regard to the custody of the  

child.  The ultimate decision in that regard has to be  

left  to  the  English  Courts  having  regard  to  the  

nationality of the child and the fact that both the  

parents had worked for gain in the U.K. and had also  

acquired permanent resident status in the U.K.   The  

High Court has taken note of the fact that the English  

Court has not directed that the custody of the child  

should be handed over to the respondent father but that  

the child should be returned to the jurisdiction of the  

Courts  in  the  U.K.  which  would  then  proceed  to  

determine as to who would be best suited to have the

custody of the child. In our view, the approach of the  

High Court takes into consideration both the questions  

relating  to  the  Comity  of  Courts  as  well  as  the  

interest of the minor child, which, no doubt, is one of  

the most important considerations in matters relating  

to  custody  of  a  minor  child.   It  has  been  rightly  

observed by the High Court following the decision in  

Surinder Kaur’s case (supra) that it was the English  

Courts which had the most intimate contact with the  

issue in question to decide the same.   

28. The fact that the minor child has been declared a  

ward of the English Court till she attains majority, is  

also a matter of considerable importance in considering  

whether the impugned order of the High Court should be  

interfered with or not.

29. We  are  satisfied  from  the  materials  produced  

before us and the submissions made on behalf of the  

parties that the High Court did not commit any error in  

relying on the doctrine of Comity of Courts since the  

question of what is in the interest of the minor still  

has to be considered by the U.K. Court and the interim  

order  passed  in  the  proceedings  initiated  by  the  

Respondent No.1 is only of an interim nature with a

view to return the child to the jurisdiction of the  

said Court.  

30. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the  

order of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly,  

dismissed.   However,  in  order  to  implement  the  

directions of the High Court, the Respondent husband  

shall provide the initial expenses of the appellant and  

the minor child for travelling to and staying at the  

U.K. for at least a month to attend and contest the  

proceedings initiated by the Respondent No.1 before the  

High Court of Justice, Family Division, U.K.   

31.  Let this matter be listed for further orders on  

15th December, 2009, to enable the respondent-husband to  

submit a proposal as to how the travel arrangements and  

the  arrangements  for  the  appellant  and  her  minor  

daughter to stay in the U.K., at least for a month, is  

to be made. Till then the interim order passed in the  

appeal shall continue to be operative.

32. There will be no order as to costs.

…………………………………………J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

……………………………………………J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated :  December 9, 2009