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PETITIONER: SHETKARI SAHAKARI SAKHAR KARKHANA LTD., SANGLI, MAHARASHTRAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COLLECTOR OF SANGLI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/10/1979

BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. UNTWALIA, N.L. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1972            1980 SCR  (1) 882  1980 SCC  (1) 381

ACT:      Bombay Sugarcane  Cess Act,  1948, Ss.  4, 7  and  8  & Sugarcane Cess  (Validation )Act 1961, Ss. 2(a) and 3(1)(c)- State Act  levying sugarcane  cess found  to be ultra-vires- Central Act  enacted adopting  provisions of  State Act  and validating assessment  made thereunder-Central  Act  whether validates  or   re-enacts   the   state   Act-Cess   whether recoverable from owner of factory.

HEADNOTE:      The Bombay  Surgacane Cess  Act,1948 empowers the State Government to  specify any  factory the  area  comprised  in which shall  be a local area for the purposes of the Act and to levy cess on the entry of sugarcane into a local area for consumption or use therein. A duty is cast on every occupier to furnish  to the prescribed authority a return stating the total quantity  in tons  of sugarcane which enters the local area comprised in his factory for consumption or use therein during the preceding month.      In Diamond  Sugar  Mills  Limited  v.  State  of  Uttar Pradesh & another [1961] 3 S.C.R. 242 this Court struck down the U.P. Sugarcane Cess Act, 1956 which contained provisions similar to  those of  the Bombay  Act on the ground that the proper meaning  to be attached to the words local area under Entry  52  in  List  II  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution was  an area  administered by a local body such as municipality,  district board,  or the  like and that the premises of  a factory  were not  a local  area  within  the meaning of  the said  Entry. Since  prior to  this decision, several State  Legislatures had  passed similar  enactments, all of  which became  unconstitutional  by  reason  of  that decision, Parliament  passed the Sugarcane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961,  section 3  sub-section (1),  Clause (c)  whereof provides that  any cess  imposed or assessed under any State Act before  the commencement  of the  Central Act,  but  not collected before  such enactment  may  be  recovered  (after assessment of the cess where necessary).      The appellant’s petitions impugning the levy and demand of cess  imposed under  the Bombay  Act supplemented  by the

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Central Act were dismissed by the Bombay High Court.      In appeals  to this Court it was contended (1) that the Central Act  merely authorised  the  collection  of  amounts which had  already been  imposed, assessed  or collected and that no  assessment, recovery  or collection  could be  made under section  3 of  the Central  Act read with the relevant provisions of  the State  Act after  the enforcement  of the Central Act,  and (2)  that Parliament  could not pass a law retrospectively validating invalid assessments by converting their character  from assessments  under the  State Acts  to those under its on statute operating retrospectively. 983      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1(i)  In two  earlier decisions  this  Court  has repelled an  identical argument  on  the  ground  that  what Section 3  of the  Central Act provides is that by its order and force,  the respective  cesses would  be deemed  to have been recovered,  because the  provisions in  relation to the recovery of  this cess  have been  incorporate in  that  Act itself so  that the  command under which the cesses would be deemed to  have been  recovered  would  be  the  command  of Parliament because all the relevant sections, notifications, order and  rules  had  been  adopted  by  the  Parliamentary statute itself.  It is,  therefore, plain  that Section 3 of the Central  Act did  not merely  validate  what  the  State authorities had  already done  under the  Bombay Act but re- enacted the  provision of  the Bombay  Act by  virtue of the authority vested  in Parliament  under Entry 97 in List I of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution so that the Bombay Act became  fully alive  and operative  as an  enactment  of Parliament as  soon as  the Central  Act was promulgated and the authorities  named in  the Act  were invested  with full powers to  assess and  recover the cess not under the Bombay Act but  under the  Central Act into which the provisions of the  Bombay  Act  and  the  rules  framed  as  well  as  the notifications issued  thereunder became incorporate. [988 D. 989 B-C,990 B-C]      Jaora Sugar  Mills (P)  Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1966] 1  S.C.R. 523;  Bhopal Sugar  Industries v.  State of Madhya Pradesh and others [1979] 2 S.C.R. 605; referred to.      (ii) Clause  (c)  of  Section  3  of  the  Central  Act specifically authorises  both assessment and recovery of any cess imposed  under any State Act before the commencement of the Central Act. [998 A.C]      2. In  Jaora Sugar Mill’s case, this Court held that if collections were  made under statutory provisions which were invalid,  Parliament   could  pass   a  law  retrospectively validating the  collections by  converting  their  character from collections  made under  the State  statutes to that of collections   made   under   its   own   statute   operating retrospectively, because  to hold  otherwise would be to cut down the  width and  amplitude of the legislative competence conferred on Parliament by Article 248 read with Entry 97 in List I  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. [990 F- H]      3. It cannot be said that there is lack of authority in Parliament to  pass the  Central Act  incorporating into  it provisions of  the State  Act. Entry  97 in  List I  of  the Seventh  Schedule   to  the   Constitution,  provides   full legislative competence  to Parliament  in  relation  to  the Central Act  inasmuch as  it vests  all residuary  powers of legislation in Parliament. [991 B-C]      4. There  is no  substance in  the contention  that the managing agents  alone would  be liable  and that  the  cess

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could not be recovered from the owners of the factories. The definition of  occupier has  nothing to say about the person on whom  the cess  is to be imposed or from whom it is to be recovered.  The   relevant  provisions   indicate  that  the authorities assessing or recovering the tax should deal with the occupier  and were  enacted as  a matter  of convenience both for  the authorities  and the  assessees,  so  that  an absent owner  may not  be unduly  harassed  nor  proceedings delayed by  reason of  his absence,  and not for limiting to the occupier alone the liability to pay the cess. [991 F-992 A] 984

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2470 of 1968.      From the Judgment and Order dated 17-1-68 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 6/68.                             AND                CIVIL APPEAL NOS.39-40 OF 1969      From the Judgment and Order dated 17-1-68 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A.Nos. 4 and 5 of 1968.                             AND             CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1925-1926 OF 1972      From the  Judgement and  Order dated  7/8-3-1972 of the Bombay High  Court in  Civil Application  Nos.  3077/67  and 570/68.      A.K. Sen,  Shanti Bhusan,  B. Dutta, K. K.Manchanda and A. K.  Srivastava for  the Appellants  in CA  2470/68 and CA Nos. 39-40/69.      D. V.  Patel, P.  H. Parakh,  C. B. Singh, Miss Vineeta Caprihan and  B. L.  Verma for  the Appellants  in CA  1925- 1926/72.      J. L.  Nain, S.  P. Nayar  and M.  N.  Shroff  for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      Koshal, J.  By this  Judgment we  shall dispose of five civil appeals  in each  one of  which the appellant who is a registered co-operative  society, challenges  a judgment  of the High  Court of  Bombay dismissing  its petition  for the issuance of  an appropriate  writ striking down the levy and demand of  the cess imposed on it under the Bombay Sugarcane Cess Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Bombay Act’) supplemented by  the Sugarcane  Cess (Validation)  Act, 1961 (for short, the ’Central Act’).      2. The  following  table  indicates  the  name  of  the appellant and  the amount  of cess  impugned in  each of the appeals as also other relevant particulars: ____________________________________________________________ No.of   Name of    Amount of   Period to  Date of  Authority appeal appellant  Cess          which the  the order passing                   (Rs.)       amount     of assess the order                              relates    ment ____________________________________________________________    1     2         3            4         5          6 Civil    The Shetkari          1-7-1959            Sugarcane Appeal   Sahakari                     to                Cess No. 39   Sakhar  Kar- 370072.50 30-6-1960 21-12-60  Officer, of 1969  khana Ltd.                                  Sangli.         Sangli. ____________________________________________________________ 985 ____________________________________________________________

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1        2          3        4             5         6 ____________________________________________________________ Civil   The Shetkari          1-7-1960             Sugarcane appeal  Sahakari    801131.24   to                 Cess No.40   Sakhar Kar-           30-6-1961   24-5-66  Officer of 1969 khana Ltd.                                 Sangli.         Sangli Civil                          1-7-1961 Appeal                           to No. 2470 Do.         324610.35 31-12-1961 24-5-66    DO. of 1968 Civil    Ashok Saha-            1-7-1961           Sugarcane Appeal   kari Sakhar  373640.56   to       12-4-62 Cess No.1925  Karkhana               31-12-61           Officer, of 1972. Ltd.Ashok-                                Ahmed-                                                    nagar. Civil    Girna     (i)577329.65 1-7-1960   18-7-62 Sugarcane Appeal   Sahakari                 to               Cess Offi No.1926  Sakhar                 30-6-1961          cer,Nasik of 1972  Karkhana  (ii)191409.53 1-7-1961   18-7-62   Do.          Ltd.Dabhadi.              to                                 31-12-1961 ____________________________________________________________      3. It  may  be  of  advantage  to  reproduce  here  the relevant provisions  of the Bombay Act, Clause (1), (2), (3) and (4) of section 2 thereof read thus:      ’2. In  this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,-           (1)  "factory" means  any premises  including  the                precincts thereof,  wherein  twenty  or  more                workers are  working or  were working  on any                day of the preceding twelve months and in any                part  of   which  any  manufacturing  process                connected with  the production  of  sugar  by                means of  vacuum pans is being carried on, or                is ordinarily  carried on,  with the  aid  of                power;           (2)  "local area" means any area comprised in such                factories  as   may  be   specified  in   the                notification under section 3;           (3)  "notified factory"  means a factory specified                in the notification under section 3;           (4)  "occupier" means  the person who has ultimate                control  over   the  affairs  of  a  notified                factory; provided  that where  the affairs of                such factory are entrusted to a 986                managing agent, such agent shall be deemed to                be the occupier;      Section 3  empowers the State Government to specify, by notification in  the official  gazette, any factory the area comprised in which shall be a local area for the purposes of the Act. Section 4 minus the proviso states:           "4. A  cess at  such rate not exceeding ten rupees      per ton  as may be specified by the State Government in      a notification  in the Official Gazette shall be levied      on the  entry  of  sugarcane  into  a  local  area  for      consumption or use therein :"      Section 5  provides for  licences to  be taken  out  by consumers or  users of sugarcane in notified factories while section 6 lays down that every occupier shall furnish to the prescribed authority  before the seventh day of each month a return in  the prescribed form stating the total quantity in tons of  sugarcane which entered the local area comprised in his factory  for consumption  of or  use therein  during the

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preceding month. Section 7 and 8 provide for the assessment, recovery and  collection of  the sugarcane cess. The rest of the Act  consists of miscellaneous provisions which need not be referred to here.      4. Now  we may  detail the  circumstances in  which the Central Act  was made  part of the statute book. In 1956 the U.P.  legislature   passed  the   U.P.  Sugarcane  Cess  Act (hereinafter referred  to as  the ’U.P. Act’) the provisions of which  were similar  to that of the Bombay Act. Section 3 of the  U.P. Act  authorised the State Government to impose, by  notification   in  the  official  gazette,  a  cess  not exceeding four  annas per  maund on  the entry  of sugarcane into the  premises of a factory for use, consumption or sale therein. The  constitutional validity  of that  section  was challenged in  Diamond Sugar  Mills Ltd.  & Another  v.  The State of  Uttar Pradesh & Another. Reliance on behalf of the State was  placed on Entry 52 in List II forming part of the Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution of India in support of the argument  that the  cess was  validly levied. That Entry reads thus:           "52. Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area      for consumption, use or sale therein." The counsel for the appellant in that case however contended that the  premises of a factory were not a local area within the meaning  of the  Entry and  that the  Act was  therefore beyond the  competence of  the State legislature. Out of the five Judges of this Court who decided 987 the case, four (Jafar Imam, J. L. Kapur, K. C. Das Gupta and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.) accepted the contention and struck down the Act  as a  whole, being  of the  opinion that the proper meaning to be attached to the words ’local area’ in Entry 52 was  an   area  administered   by  a   local  body   like  a municipality, a  district board,  a  local  board,  a  union board, a  Panchayat or  the like  and that the premises of a factory were therefore not a ’local area’ within the meaning of the Entry.      By the  time the Diamond Sugar Mills’ case was decided, enactments similar  in content  and effect to the Bombay Act had been  passed  by  legislatures  of  various  States  and Parliament considered  it advisable to make the cess imposed by these  enactments a  constitutionally valid cess and that was the reason for the passage of the Central Act.      Clause (a)  of section  2 of  the Central  Act  defined ’cess’ thus:           "’cess’ means the cess payable under any State Act      and includes  any sum recoverable under any such Act by      way of interest or penalty;" Clause (b)  of the section defined ’State Act’ as any of the Acts mentioned  in the  latter portion  of the  clause as in force in  any State  from time  to time.  The Acts mentioned included the Bombay Act.      Sub-section (1)  of section 3 of the Central Act may be set out  in extenso as it is mainly that provision which has been attacked before us on behalf of the appellants :           "3. (1)  Notwithstanding any  judgment, decree  or      order of  any court,  all cesses  imposed, assessed  or      collected or  purporting to have been imposed, assessed      or  collected   under  any   State   Act   before   the      commencement of  this Act  shall be deemed to have been      validity imposed,  assessed or  collected in accordance      with law, as if the provisions of the State Acts and of      all notifications,  orders and  rules  issued  or  made      thereunder, in  so far as such provisions relate to the      imposition, assessment  and collection of such cess had

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    been included  in and  formed part  of this section and      this section  had been  in force  at all material times      when such  cess was imposed, assessed or collected; and      accordingly,-      (a)  no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or           continued in  any court for the refund of any cess           paid under any State Act;      (b)  no court shall enforce a decree or order directing           the refund  of any  cess paid under any State Act;           and 988      (c)  any cess  imposed or  assessed under any State Act           before  the  commencement  of  this  Act  but  not           collected  before   such   commencement   may   be           recovered (after  assessment of  the  cess,  where           necessary) in the manner provided under that Act."      5. We may now take up for consideration the contentions raised at  the hearing before us. Mr. A. K. Sen representing the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2470 of 1968 argued in the first instance  that the  Central Act  merely authorized the collection  of  amounts  which  had  already  been  imposed, assessed or  collected and  that no  assessment, recovery or collection could  be made under section 3 of the Central Act read with  the relevant  provisions of  the Bombay Act after the enforcement  of  the  Central  Act.  The  contention  is without force and in this connection we need do no more than refer to  the language  of clause  (c) above extracted which specifically authorizes  both assessment and recovery of the cess after  the commencement  of the Central Act, and to two earlier decisions  of  this  Court  in  which  an  identical argument was made and repelled. The first of those decisions is reported as Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and  Others. The following observations made therein by Gajendragadkar,  C.J., who  delivered the judgment of the Court, are pertinent :           "Section  3  does  not  purport  to  validate  the      invalid State  statutes. What  Parliament has  done  by      enacting the  said  section  is  not  to  validate  the      invalid State  statutes, but  to make  a law concerning      the cess  covered by  the said  statutes and to provide      that  the   said  law   shall   come   into   operation      retrospectively. There  is a radical difference between      the two  positions.  Where  the  legislature  wants  to      validate an  earlier Act  which has been declared to be      invalid for  one reason  or  another,  it  proceeds  to      remove the  infirmity from  the said  Act and validates      its provisions  which are free from any infirmity. That      is not what Parliament has done in enacting the present      Act. Parliament  knew that the relevant State Acts were      invalid, because the State Legislatures did not possess      legislative competence  to enact  them. Parliament also      knew that  it was  fully competent  to make  an Act  in      respect of  the  subject-matter  covered  by  the  said      invalid State  statutes. Parliament,  however,  decided      that rather  than make elaborate and long provisions in      respect of  the recovery  of cess,  it  would  be  more      convenient to make a 989      compendious provision such as is contained in s. 3. The      plain meaning of s. 3 is that the material and relevant      provisions of  the State Acts as well as the provisions      of notifications,  orders  and  rules  issued  or  made      thereunder are  included in s. 3 and shall be deemed to      have been  included at  all material  times in  it.  In      other words,  what s.  3 provides  is that by its order

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    and force, the respective cesses will be deemed to have      been recovered,  because the  provisions in relation to      the recovery  of the said cesses have been incorporated      in the  Act itself.  The command under which the cesses      would  be   deemed  to   have  been   recovered  would,      therefore, be  the command  of Parliament,  because all      the relevant sections, notifications, orders, and rules      have been  adopted by the Parliamentary statute itself.      We are,  therefore satisfied  that the  sole  basis  on      which Mr.  Pathak’s argument  rests is invalid, because      the said basis is inconsistent with the plain and clear      meaning of  s. 3.  As we  have already  indicated,  Mr.      Pathak  does   not  dispute-and   rightly-that  it   is      competent to Parliament to make a law in respect of the      cesses in  question, to  apply the  provision of such a      law  to   the  different   States,  and  to  make  them      retrospective in operation...."      The second  case on  the point  is reported  as  Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others in which  Shinghal and  Desai, JJ., followed the Jaora Sugar Mills’ case  and Shinghal, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court spoke thus in connection therewith :           The decision  in Diamond Sugar Mills’ case came up      for consideration  in this  Court in  Jaora Sugar Mills      (P) Ltd.  v. State  of Madhya Pradesh and Others with a      specific reference  to the provisions of the State Act,      and it  was once  again held,  following that decision,      that  the  imposition  of  the  cess  was  outside  the      legislative competence  of the  State. While  examining      that aspect  of the  controversy, this  Court  made  it      clear that what Parliament had done by enacting section      3 of the Validation Act was not to validate the invalid      State statutes,  but to  make a law concerning the cess      covered by  the said  statutes and  to provide that the      said law  shall come  into  operation  retrospectively.      This Court clarified that by virtue of section 3 of the      Validation Act,  the command under which the cess would      be deemed  to have  been recovered would be the command      of the Parliament, because 990      the relevant  sections, notifications, orders and rules      had been adopted by the Parliamentary statute itself."      With  respect,  we  also  fully  agree  with  the  view expressed in  Jaora Sugar  Mills’ case  (supra). It  is thus plain that  section 3  of the  Central Act  did  not  merely validate what  the State  authorities had already done under the Bombay Act but actually re-enacted the provisions of the Bombay Act  by virtue  of the authority vested in Parliament under Entry  97 in  List I  of the  Seventh Schedule  to the Constitution of  India so  that the  Bombay Act became fully alive and operative as an enactment of Parliament as soon as the Central Act was promulgated and the authorities named in the Act  were invested with full power to assess and recover the cess  not under the Bombay Act but under the Central Act into which  the provisions  of the  Bombay Act and the rules framed as well as the notifications issued thereunder became incorporated.      6. The  only other  contention put  forward by  Mr. Sen (which was reiterated by Mr. Shanti Bhushan on behalf of the appellant in  Civil Appeal  No. 39  of 1969)  was  that  the assessments having  been  made  under  statutory  provisions which were invalid because of lack of legislative competence on the  part of the Bombay Legislature, Parliament could not pass a  law retrospectively  validating those assessments by converting their  character from assessments under the State

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statutes to  those made  under  its  own  statute  operating retrospectively. This  contention also  was repelled by this Court in  Jaora Sugar Mills’ case (supra) with the following observations :           "So, the  crucial question is : if collections are      made  under  statutory  provisions  which  are  invalid      because they  deal with a topic outside the legislative      competence of  the State  legislatures, can Parliament,      in exercise  of its  undoubted legislative  competence,      pass  a   law  retrospectively   validating  the   said      collections  by   converting   their   character   from      collections made  under the  State statutes  to that of      collections  made   under  its  own  statute  operating      retrospectively ?  In our  opinion, the  answer to this      question has  to be in the affirmative, because to hold      otherwise would  be to cut down the width and amplitude      of the  legislative competence  conferred on Parliament      by Art. 248 read with Entry 97 in List I of the Seventh      Schedule. Whether  or not  retrospective  operation  of      such a  law is reasonable, may fall to be considered in      certain cases;  but that  consideration  has  not  been      raised before us and in the circumstances of this case,      it cannot 991      validity be  raised either.  We must,  therefore,  hold      that  the   High  Court  was  right  in  rejecting  the      appellant’s case that the Act was invalid, and hence no      demands could be made under its provisions either for a      cess or for commission." With the  greatest respect,  we find  no reason  at  all  to differ.      7. Article 265 of the Constitution of India was pressed into service  by  Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan  in  support  of  the proposition that  no tax could be levied or collected except by authority  of law. The proposition is unexceptionable but we  fail  to  see  in  what  manner  Parliament  lacked  the authority  of   law  while  enacting  the  Central  Act  and incorporating into  it the  provisions of the Bombay Act. As pointed out  above, Entry  97  in  List  I  of  the  Seventh Schedule  to   the  Constitution   of  India  provides  full legislative competence  to Parliament  in  relation  to  the Central Act  inasmuch as  it vests  all residuary  powers of legislation in  Parliament. The  contention based on alleged lack  of   authority  of  law  in  Parliament  is  therefore repelled.      8. The  submissions made by Mr. Patel appearing for the appellants in  Civil Appeals No. 1925 and 1926 of 1972 alone now remain  to be considered. He put forward two points. The first  one  was  that  section  4  of  the  Bombay  Act  was discriminatory, that  the power conferred by it was unguided and uncanalised  and that therefore it was hit by article 14 of the  Constitution of  India. When asked as to whether the point had  been raised  before the  High Court,  Mr. Patel’s answer was  in  the  negative  and  it  transpired  that  no foundation for the point had been laid even in the pleadings submitted to the High Court. It was therefore not allowed to be raised by us at this late stage.      Mr. Patel’s  second point  was  that  in  view  of  the proviso to  clause (4)  of section  2 of the Bombay Act, the managing agents  of the factories in question would alone be liable and  that the  assessed cess  could not  be recovered from his clients who were owners of the concerned factories. The point  is wholly  without substance  and  that  for  two reasons. For one thing, no managing agent is involved in the two appeals  in which  Mr.  Patel  has  put  in  appearance.

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Secondly, clause  (4) of  section 2  merely defines the term ’occupier’ and  has nothing  to say about the person on whom the cess  is to  be  imposed  or  from  whom  it  is  to  be recovered. There are no doubt other provisions in the Bombay Act [section  6, sub-section (1) of section 7 and section 8] which indicate  that the authorities assessing or recovering the tax  are primarily  to deal  with the occupier but those provisions have  obviously  been  enacted  as  a  matter  of convenience 992 both for  the said  authorities and the assessees so that an absent owner  may not  be unduly  harassed  nor  proceedings delayed by reason of his absence and not for limiting to the occupier alone  the liability  to pay the cess. In fact sub- section (2)  of section  7 which  is in  the following terms would indicate  that the  liability  of  the  owner  of  the concerned factory is not excluded :      "7.  (1)........................      (2)  If the  occupier fails  to furnish in due time the           return referred  to in  section 6  or furnishes  a           return which  in the  opinion  of  the  prescribed           authority   is   incorrect   or   defective,   the           prescribed  authority   shall  assess  the  amount           payable by him in such manner as may be prescribed           and the  provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply           as if  such assessment  has been made on the basis           of a return furnished by the owner...." Both  the  submissions  made  by  Mr.  Patel  are  therefore repelled.      9. In  the result  all the  five appeals  fail and  are dismissed with costs, one set. N.V.K.    Appeals dismissed. 993