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PETITIONER: SHEIKH GULFAN AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SANAT KUMAR GANGULI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/03/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1965 AIR 1839            1965 SCR  (3) 364  CITATOR INFO :  D          1989 SC1834  (18)

ACT: Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (2 of 1949), s. 30(c)-If  applies to land in respect of which betterment fee is levied.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants were thika tenants under the  respondent  in respect  of the suit land.  Under the  Calcutta  Improvement Trust Act, 1911, a scheme had been framed for improvement of an area within which the suit land was situate and the  suit land  was  shown among the properties, in  regard  to  which betterment fees were proposed to be levied.  The  respondent accepted the betterment fee assessed and levied under s. 78A of the Act.  Thereafter, he filed suits for the ejectment of the   appellants.    The  suits  were   dismissed   as   not maintainable  because of s. 5 of the Calcutta Thika  Tenancy Act, 1949, under which an application for the ejectment of a thika tenant could be filed only before the Controller under that  Act.   On  appeal, it was held, that  the  suits  were governed by the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Thika  Tenancy Act,  under  which, nothing in the Act applied to  any  land which was required for carrying out any of the provisions of the  Improvement Trust Act, and therefore, the appeals  were allowed. In  the appeal to this Court by the tenants on the  question as to whether s. 30(c) applied to the suits; HELD:     Because the land was liable to pay betterment  fee and  the fee thus realised served the purpose of s.  122  of the  Improvement  Trust  Act by swelling the  funds  of  the Improvement  Trust Board and such fund could be utilised  by the  Board for the purposes of carrying out the  scheme,  it cannot  be  said  that  the land  itself  was  required  for carrying  out the provisions of the improvement  Trust  Act. The  requirement of s. 30(c) of the Thika Tenancy Act  could not  be said to be satisfied by such an indirect  connection between the land and the general purpose of the  Improvement Trust Act. [378 A-B] In  construing the words of a statute the context  in  which the  words  occur, the object of the statute  in  which  the provision is included and the policy underlying the  statute

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assume relevance and become material. [373 F] In the instant case, the object of the Thika Tenancy Act  to help  thika  tenants  is  writ large  in  all  the  material provisions  of the Act In construing s. 30,  which  provides for   an  exception  to  the  applicability  of   beneficent legislation,  if two constructions are reasonably  possible, the Court would be justified in preferring that construction which  helps to carry out the beneficent purpose of the  Act and  does  not unduly expand the area or the  scope  of  the exception,   that  is,  the  exception  must   be   strictly construed.  Under the section, it is the land which must  be required  and  not  any fee or charges that  may  be  levied against  it.   Further, there must be  a  direct  connection between  the  land  as  such and  the  requirements  of  the provisions  of the improvement Trust Act, and not  with  the policy  of  the  provisions or the  object  which  they  are intended  to  achieve.   In order that s.  30(c)  should  be applicable, the respondent must point 365 out  a specific provision of the Improvement Trust  Act  for the  carrying  out of which the land as such  was  required. Section of that Act would not help the respondent,  because, it  would not be possible to hold that for carrying out  its provisions the land was directly required. [376 F, 376 H-377 C, G; 378 H] Moreover,  when  s.  78A  of  the  Improvement  Trust   Act, expressly says that the land in respect of which  betterment fee  can  be levied, is, not required for  the  scheme,  the argument  that  such a land is, nevertheless,  required  for carrying  out the provision of s. 78A, cannot  be  accepted. [377 H] Betterment  fee is levied against a land, because its  value is  increased as a result of the improvement scheme and  the Board  is  justified  in recouping itself by  such  levy  in respect of the unearned increment in the value of the  land, and,  if the landholder pays the fee, he may apply under  s. 25  of the Improvement Trust Act for an enhancement  of  the rent payable by the tenants; but there is no reason why such a  landlord should get the additional benefit  of  exemption from the application of the provisions of the Thika  Tenancy Act.  Clauses (a) and (b) of s. 30 of that Act indicate that it  is  only  lands vested in Government  or  other  special bodies or authorities that are excepted from the application of  the Act.  The words used in cl. (c) do not  justify  the conclusion  that  a  private landholder is  intended  to  be equated with Government or with such other special bodies or authorities. [378 C, D, F] Though  lands  acquired by the Board may be  covered  by  s. 30(b)  (iv),  on the assumption that the Board  is  a  local authority,  s.  30(c) would not become redundant if  it  was held not to apply to the suit land, because, there may still be some other lands which are not acquired by the Board  but which  may. nevertheless, be required for carrying out  some provisions  of  the Improvement Trust Act,  as  for  example under ss. 35C and 42 of that Act.  Or, the legislature might have made, by way of abundant caution, a specific  provision in respect of lands which are acquired by the Board as  well as those which would be required for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Improvement Trust Act. [379 D-H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 48 to 53 of 1963.

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Appeals from the judgment and decrees dated May 3, 1960,  of the Calcutta High Court in Appeals Nos. 215, 67, 82 & 216 of 1958. W.   S.  Barlingay, S. S. Khanduja and Ganpat Rai,  for  the appellants     (in all the appeals). G.   S.  Pathak and D. N. Mukherjee, for the respondent  (in all the   appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar, C.J. The short question which these six  ap- peals raise relates to the construction of section 30(c)  of the  Calcutta  Thika Tenancy Act, 1949 (W.B. Act No.  11  of 1949) (hereinafter called ’the Act’).  This question  arises in  this  way.  The respondent Sanat Kumar  Ganguli  is  the owner of a plot of land being premises No. 12, Haldar  Lane, in  Central Calcutta This plot had been let out  in  several lots to the predecessors-in-title of the six appellants. 366 On  July 24, 1954, the respondent filed six suits Nos.  2240 to  2245 of 1954 against the six appellants respectively  on the  original  side  of the Calcutta  High  Court,  claiming decrees for ejectment against them and asking for arrears of ground rent and Municipal taxes. The  appellants  contested  the respondent’s  claim  on  the ground  that  the  lands in suits had been  taken  by  their predecessors-in-title from the owner as Thika tenants in  or about  the  year 1900, and they alleged that  they  were  in occupation of the said plots after having built  substantial structures  on  them.  The appellants further  claimed  that they  had themselves let out portions of such structures  to their  own  tenants.  On these  allegations,  a  preliminary objection  to the competence of the suits was raised by  the appellants  on the ground that under s. 5 of the Act,  claim for  ejectment of Thika tenants can be entertained  only  by the  Controller, and so, the learned Judge on  the  original side  of  the  Calcutta High Court had  no  jurisdiction  to entertain it. The  respondent  admitted  that the  appellants  were  Thika tenants  and  did  not dispute that normally,  a  claim  for ejecting  such  Thika  tenants could be tried  only  by  the Controller; but he urged that the present suits fell  within the  scope  of s. 30(c) of the Act and in  consequence,  the provisions   of  s.  5  and  indeed.,  all  other   relevant provisions  of the Act did not apply to them.  That  is  how the  respondent  sought to meet  the  preliminary  objection raised by the appellants. In appreciating the nature of the controversy thus raised by the  pleadings, it is necessary to mention some more  facts. On  February 9, 1940 a notice was issued by the Chairman  of the  Calcutta Improvement Trust under s. 43 of the  Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 (Bengal Act V of 191 1) as amended  up to 193 1. This Act will hereafter be called ’the Improvement Act’.   This notice shows that a scheme bearing No.  53  had been framed for the purpose of improvement of Calcutta by  a street  scheme in Ward No. 10 of the  Calcutta  Municipality for  an  area the boundaries whereof were described  in  the said notice.  This notice gave the particulars of the scheme and  was accompanied by a map of the area comprised  in  the scheme.   It also contained the statement of the land  which it  was  proposed  to  acquire as  well  as  land  on  which betterment fee was proposed to be levied.  These plans  were open  for  inspection at the office of the Trust at  No.  5, Clive  Street,  Calcutta.  Along with this  notice,  another notice  was  published  which  gave  a  list  of  properties proposed  to  be acquired under the scheme and  contained  a statement  of  the land in regard to which  betterment  fees

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were  proposed to be levied.  Premises No. 12, Haldar  Lane, were included in the latter category of lands. In  July  1952, proceedings were started  for  settling  the betterment  fee to be levied in respect of premises No.  12, Haldar Lane, and a letter was addressed by the Chief  Valuer of the Calcutta 367 Improvement  Trust to the respondent on November  19,  1952. This  letter shows that the Chief Valuer had not received  a reply from the respondent, though his advocate had  accepted the  assessment of betterment fee of Rs. 15,000 in the  Land Committee meeting which had been held on August 7, 1952  and confirmed by the Board on August 30, 1952.  On November  19, 1952,  however, the respondent recorded in writing  that  he accepted the said assessment. The  respondent’s  case before ’he learned trial  Judge  was that  since betterment fee had been levied by the  Board  in respect  of the suit premises and had been accepted by  him, s.  30(c) of the Act applied to the present suits.   Section 30(c)  provides that "nothing in the Act shall apply to  any land  which  is  required  for  carrying  out  any  of   the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 191 1." That  is how  the respondent sought to repel the application of s.  5 of the Act and the exclusive jurisdiction of the  Controller to  deal  with  ejectment proceedings in  respect  of  thika tenants’  holdings.  The learned trial Judge held  that  the plots constituting the land in the six respective suits  did not  attract the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Act, and  so, he upheld the preliminary objection raised by the appellants and  came  to  the conclusion that the suits  filed  by  the respondent  on the original side of the Calcutta High  Court were  incompetent  and  could not be  entertained.   In  the result,  the  said suits were ordered to be  dismissed  with costs. The  respondent challenged these decrees by  preferring  six appeals  before  a Division Bench of the  High  Court.   The learned  Judges  who  heard  these  appeals  have  delivered separate,  but  concurring, judgments and  have  upheld  the respondent’s  argument that the land in suits attracted  the provisions of s. 30(c) of the Act, with the result that  the preliminary  objection  raised by the  appellants  has  been rejected.   Once the preliminary objection was rejected,  it was  plain  that  no  other  point  survived,  because   the appellants  had  no  defence to make on the  merits  of  the respondent’s  claim.  That is why the appeals  were  allowed and  decrees,  for possession were passed in favour  of  the respondent.  The claim made by the respondent in respect  of arrears of -round rent and municipal taxes was also allowed. It is against these decrees that the appellants have come to this Court with certificates granted by the High Court;  and so,  the  only  question which arises for  our  decision  is whether  the  Division Bench was right in  holding  that  s. 30(c)  of the Act applied to the present suits.  The  answer to  this  Question  depends on a fair  construction  of  the provision prescribed by s. 30(c). Before dealing with this question, it is necessary to  refer to  the material provisions of the Act.  The Act was  passed in 1949 with the object of making better provision  relating to  the  law  of landlord and tenant  in  respect  of  thika tenancies in Calcutta.  Section 2(5) in Chapter 1 defines  a "thika  tenant"  as meaning any person  who  holds,  whether under  a  written  lease or otherwise,  land  under  another person, and is or but for a special contract would be liable 368 to  pay rent, at a monthly or at any other periodical  rate,

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for  that  land to that another person and  has  erected  or acquired by purchase or gift any structure on such land  for a   residential,  manufacturing  or  business  purpose   and includes  the successors in interest (if such person.   Sub- clauses (a), (b) and (c) of this definition exclude from its purview certain other categories of persons, but we are  not concerned  with these categories of persons in  the  present appeals.  It is common ground that the appellants are  thika tenants in respect of the plots in their possession. Chapter  11  of  the  Act  deals  with  incidents  of  thika tenancies.   Broadly  stated, the object of the  Act  is  to afford  special protection to the thika tenants and  several provisions  have been enacted by the Act to carry  out  this object.   Section 3 specifies the grounds on which  alone  a thika tenant may be evicted.  Section 4 prescribes a  notice before  ejectment proceedings can be taken against  a  thika tenant;  and  s. 5 provides for proceedings  for  ejectment. The important feature of the provisions contained in s. 5(1) is that the application for ejectment of a thika tenant  has to be made to the Controller in the prescribed manner.   The "controller"  is  defined by s. 2(2) as meaning  an  officer appointed  as  such by the State Government for an  area  to which  the  Act  extends and includes  officers  of  another category therein described.  The remaining provisions of Ch. 11  deal with the procedure which has to be followed by  the Controller  in  dealing with applications for  ejectment  of thika  tenants and make other incidental provisions in  that behalf.   The policy of the Act to afford protection to  the thika tenants is writ large in all these provisions. Chapter  III  contains  provisions  as  to  rent  of   thika tenancies.   Chapter  IV  deals  with  appeals  and  certain special  procedures.  Section 27(1), for instance,  provides for appeals to the Chief Judge of the Court of Small  Causes of  Calcutta and District Judge respectively  under  clauses (a)  and  (b).  Section 27(6) provides that  an  order  made under sub-s. (4) by the Chief Judge or the District Judge or a person appointed under sub-s. (2), as the case may be, or, subject  to  such  order,  if any,  an  order  made  by  the Controller  under this Act shall, subject to the  provisions of sub-s. (5) be final and may be executed by the Controller in  the manner provided in the Code of Civil  Procedure  for the execution of decrees.  It is thus clear that the Act has made  special provisions for the enforcement of  the  rights and  liabilities  of  the  thika  tenants,  has  constituted hierarchy of special authorities to deal with claims made by landlords  against their thika tenants, either in the  first instance or at the appellate stage.  The decisions of  these special  authorities which become final are  assimilated  to decrees passed under the Code of Civil Procedure and can  be executed  in  the  manner prescribed by 0.21  of  the  Code. Section 31 provides that restriction or exclusion of the Act by  agreement between a landlord and a thika tenant will  be invalid, 369 and  will  not  affect the rights  conferred  on  the  thika tenants by the provisions of the Act.  It is in the light of these provisions that we have to construe s. 30 of the Act. Section 30 reads thus:- "Nothing in this Act shall apply to- (a)  Government lands, (b)  any land vested in or in the possession of- (i)  the State Government, (ii) a port authority of a major port, or (iii) a railway administration, or (iv) a local authority, or

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(c)  any land which is required for carrying out any of  the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911." The  perusal of s. 301 clearly shows that the provisions  of the Act are excluded in regard to lands specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c), so that claims made for ejectment of thika tenants  from  these  lands  will not  be  governed  by  the provisions  of  the Act and can be made and  entertained  in ordinary  civil  courts  of  competent  jurisdiction.    The question which we have to consider in the present appeals is whether  the  land which is the subject-matter  of  the  six suits is land which is required for carrying out any of  the provisions of the Improvement Act. That takes us to the relevant provisions of the  Improvement Act itself.  The Improvement Act was passed in 1911 and  has been amended from time to time.  Let us consider broadly the material provisions of this Act, as they stood prior to  the amendment  of 1955, which would assist us in  construing  s. 30(c)  of  the  Act.  This Act was passed,  because  it  was thought expedient to make provision for the improvement  and expansion of Calcutta by opening up congested areas,  laying out or altering streets, providing open spaces for  purposes of  ventilation or recreation, demolishing  or  constructing buildings,  acquiring land for the said purposes  ,,]Id  for the  rehousing of persons of the poorer and working  classes displaced  by  the  execution of  improvement  schemes,  and otherwise as hereinafter appearing.  It was further  thought expedient  to constitute a Board of Trustees and  invest  it with  special  powers for carrying out the objects  of  this Act.   Section 2(1a) of this Act defines a "betterment  fee" as the fee prescribed by s. 78A in respect of an increase in value of land resulting from the execution of an improvement scheme.   Chapter  III of this Act  deals  with  improvement schemes  and re-housing schemes.  Section 36  provides  when general improvement schemes may be framed.  It is only where the  conditions specified by clauses (a) & (b) of s. 36  are satisfied  that general schemes can be framed.   Under  this section, the Board has to pass 370 a  resolution  to the effect that  the  general  improvement scheme  should  be  framed  on  the  ground  that  the  area comprised in the scheme is an unhealthy area and that it was necessary  to frame a general improvement scheme in  respect of  such area.  Section 40 deals with matters which have  to be   considered  while  framing  improvement  schemes.    It provides that when framing an improvement scheme in  respect of any area, regard shall be had to-               (a)   the   nature  and  the   conditions   of               neighboring areas and of Calcutta as a whole-,               (b)   the  several  directions  in  which  the               expansion  of Calcutta appears likely to               take place-, and               (c)   the  likelihood of  improvement  schemes               being required for other parts of Calcutta.               Section  41 deals with matters which  must  be               provided for in improvement schemes; it  reads               thus:-               "Every improvement scheme shall provide for-               (a)   the  acquisition  by the  Board  of  any               land,  in  the area comprised in  the  scheme,               which  will, in their opinion be required  for               the execution of the scheme,               (b)   the  laying out or re-laying out of  the               land in the said area;               (c)   such    demolition,    alteration     or               reconstruction of buildings, situated on  land

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             which  it is proposed to acquire in  the  said               area, as the Board may think necessary;               (d)   the construction of any buildings  which               the  Board may consider it necessary to  erect               for any purpose other than sale or hire;               (e)   the laying out or alteration of  streets               (including  bridges, causeways and  culverts),               if required; and               (f)   the    leveling,   paving,    metalling,               flagging,  channelling, sewering and  draining               of the said streets, and the provision therein               of   water,   lighting  and   other   sanitary               conveniences   ordinarily   provided   in    a               Municipality."               Section  42  deals with matters which  may  be               provided  for  in  dealing  with   improvement               schemes.  It is necessary to read this section               as well: -               "Any improvement scheme may provide for-               (a)   the  acquisition  by the  Board  of  any               land,  in  the area comprised  in  the  scheme               which  will, in their opinion, be affected  by               the execution of the scheme-,               (b)   raising,  lowering or leveling any  land               in the area comprised in the scheme;               371               (c)   the  formation  or  retention  of   open               spaces-. and               (d)   any other matters, consistent with  this               Act, which the Board may think fit." Under  s. 47, the Board is required to consider  objections, representations and statements of dissent received under the relevant  provisions  of  sections 43, 44  and  45;  and  it provides  that  as  a consequence of  considering  the  said objections,  representations and statements of dissent,  the Board  may either abandon the scheme or apply to  the  State Government   for   sanction  to  the   scheme,   with   such modifications, if any, as the Board may consider  necessary. Section 47(2)(e) lays down that every application  submitted under sub-s. (1) shall be accompanied by a list of the names of  all  persons, if any, who have dissented, under  s.  45, clause  (b), from the proposed acquisition of their land  or from  the  proposed  recovery of a  betterment  fee,  and  a statement  of the reasons given for such dissent.  The  rest of  the  Chapter  deals with the subsequent  stages  of  the framing   of  the  improvement  schemes  to  which   it   is unnecessary to refer. Chapter  IV  deals with acquisition and  disposal  of  land. Three  sections  out of this Chapter are  relevant  for  our purpose.    Section  78  deals  with  the   abandonment   of acquisition  in consideration of special  payment.   Section 78(1) is relevant; it reads thus:-               "In any case in which the State Government has               sanctioned  the  acquisition of land,  in  any               area comprised in an improvement scheme, which               is  not  required  for the  execution  of  the               scheme,  the owner of the land, or any  person               having  an  interest  therein,  may  make   an               application to the Board, requesting that  the               acquisition of the land should be abandoned in               consideration  of the payment by him of a  sum               to be fixed by the Board in that behalf." The  other  sub-sections of s. 78 lay down a  procedure  for dealing  with applications made under sub-s. (1).  With  the details of these provisions we are not concerned.  The  only

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point  which  is  relevant  for  our  purpose  is  that   an application  for abandonment can be made in respect of  land which  is not required for the execution of the scheme.   In other  words, if it appears that the piece of land which  is comprised in the scheme already sanctioned by the Government is in fact not required for the execution of the scheme,  an application  may be made for abandonment of  acquisition  in respect  of  such  a land.  The basis  for  making  such  an application  is  that though the land was comprised  in  the scheme,  it  is  found  that it  is  not  required  for  the execution of the scheme,, That  takes  us  to  s.  78A which  has  a  bearing  on  the construction  of  s. 30(c) of the Act.   Section  78A(1)  is material for our purpose; it reads thus - -               "When by the making of any improvement scheme,               any  land in the area comprised in the  scheme               which is not               B(N)3SCI-11               372               required  for the execution thereof  will,  in               the  opinion  of the Board,  be  increased  in               value,  the Board, in framing the scheme,  may               in  lieu of providing for the  acquisition  of               such land, declare that a betterment fee shall               be  payable  by the owner of the land  or  any               person  having an interest therein in  respect               of the increase in value of the land resulting               from the execution of the scheme." Section   78A(2)   provides  for   the   determination   and calculation of the betterment fee. The last section in this Chapter is s. 81.  It confers power on  the  Board to dispose of land vested in or  acquired  by their  under  this Act.  Section 81(1) lays  down  that  the Board may retain, or may let on hire, lease, sell,  exchange or  otherwise dispose of any land vested in or  acquired  by them  under  this Act.  How this power can be  exercised  is specified by sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 81 Before we part with the Improvement Act, it would be  useful to  mention that sections 120 to 126 which occur in Ch.   VI of  this Act deal with the accounts of the  Board.   Section 122  provides for credits to capital account and lays  down, inter alia, that all sums, except interest, received by  way of  special  payments for betterment fees  in  pursuance  of sections  78,  78A or 79, shall be credited to  the  capital account.   Section  123  deals  with  the  question  of  the application  of the capital account, and it proceeds on  the basis that the moneys credited to the capital account  shall be held by the Board in trust, and by clauses (a) to (h), it specifies the objects or purposes for which the said  amount can  be applied.  Section 124 refers to items which have  to be included in the revenue account; and s. 125 requires that like  the  moneys  credited to the  capital  account,  those credited  to  the revenue account must also be held  by  the Board  in  trust,  and the same shall  be  applied  for  the purposes specified in clauses (a) to (g) of s. 125(1). Let us now revert to the question about the construction of s.   30(c)  of the Act.  Before answering this question,  we would like to  recall  the material facts which are  not  in dispute.   The  land if question has been  included  in  the boundaries  of the area comprised in the scheme.  After  the Board framed scheme No. 53, it has issued a notice under  s. 43(1)  of  the  Improvement  Act,  and  as  required  by  s. 43(7)(b),  while mentioning the boundaries of the area  com- prised  in  the scheme, it has clearly been shown  that  the laid  in  question  is comprised in  the  said  scheme.   In

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respect  of this land, proceedings have been taken under  s. 78A  of  the  Improvement Act and betterment  fee  has  been levied and accepted. Mr. Pathak for the respondent contends that as soon as it is shown that the land in question was comprised in the  scheme and  in  respect of it betterment fee has  been  levied  and accepted, s. 30(c) of the Act is attracted.  His argument is that such a land is required for carrying out the provisions of the Improvement Act.  On the 373 other  hand, Dr. Barlinge contends that the land in  respect of which betterment fee has been levied cannot be said to be required for carrying out any provisions of the  Improvement Act,  though it may be that the betterment fee would  assist the Board in discharging its functions under the Improvement Act.   In deciding the merits of these competing claims,  it is  necessary  to remember that the dispute in  the  present proceedings is not between the Board on the one hand and the landlord  or the thika tenant on the other’, the dispute  is between  the  landlord  and the thika tenants,  and  in  the decision  of  this  dispute, the Board  is  not  interested. Whatever be the decision of the Court in the present dispute will not affect the Board in the discharge of its duties and functions and will have no impact on the scheme as such. The  words  used  in s. 30(c) of the Act are,  in  a  sense, simple  enough; but it must be conceded that the problem  of their  construction  is  not very easy,  and  so,  we  might attempt  to  resolve this problem by  considering  what  our approach  should  be in construing the  relevant  provision. Normally,  the words used in a statute have to be  construed in  their  ordinary  meaning; but in  many  cases,  judicial approach  finds  that  the simple  device  of  adopting  the ordinary  meaning of words does not meet the ends or a  fair and  a reasonable construction.  Exclusive reliance  on  the bare dictionary meaning of words may not necessarily  assist a  proper construction of the statutory provision  in  which the words occur.  Often enough, in interpreting a  statutory provision,  it  becomes  necessary to  have  regard  to  the subject-matter  of  the statute and the object which  it  is intended to achieve.  That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant words in any statutory provision, the  context  in which the words occur, the  object  of  the statute  in which the provision is included, and the  policy underlying the statute assume relevance and become material. As Halsbury has observed, the words "should be construed  in the  light of their context rather than what may  be  either strict  etymological  sense or their popular  meaning  apart from that context(1)".  This position is not disputed before us by either party. There  has, however, been a sharp controversy before  us  on the  question  as to what is the context to  which  recourse should  be  had in interpreting section 30(c).   Mr.  Pathak contends  that  in construing s. 30(c) of the Act,  the  key words  are "required for carrying out any of the  provisions of  the Improvement Act", and he has urged that the task  of interpretation  of  this key clause should he  attempted  by having re.-lard to the context, the object and the policy of the Improvement Act.  In interpreting this clause, the court should ask itself: what is the purpose of the provisions  of the  Improvement  Act which the land is required  to  serve, before  s. 30(c) of the Act can be invoked?  And in  finding an answer to this question, the court must bear in mind  the historical evolution of the legal (1)  Halabury’s Laws of England Vol. 36, p. 394, para 593. 374

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principles   relating  to  the  powers  and   functions   of Improvement  Boards.   In  this connection  Mr.  Pathak  has relied  on  the  decision of the House of  Lords  in  R.  H. Galloway v. The Mayor and Commonality of London(1).  In that case  a  contrast  was  drawn  between  the  special  powers conferred   on  persons  by  Parliament  for   effecting   a particular  purpose,  and those conferred on the  Mayor  and Commonality  of  the City of London to make  certain  public improvements in the City.  It was held that where a  company was authorised to take compulsorily the lands of any  person for a definite object, it would be restrained by  injunction from any attempt to take them for any other object.  On  the other  hand, where the Mayor and Commonalty of the  City  of London had been entrusted with powers to make certain public improvements  in  the City, and for that  purpose  had  been authorised compulsorily to take land, to raise money on  the credit  of it, and to sell superfleous land to pay  off  the debt, the Act which gave them those powers did not expressly center  on  the authorities to acquire more  land  than  was absolutely  necessary  to effect the  desired  improvements; nevertheless  the material provisions of the said Act  ought to  be  construed  favorably  to  them,  and  ought  to   be interpreted  to confer on them the power to take lands  "for the purposes of the Act", even though they may not be  abso- lutely  necessary  for the improvement scheme as  such.   In other  words,  this decision shows that where the  Board  is entrusted  with  the  work  of improving  the  City  and  is constituted  for  that purpose by a statute,  its  power  to acquire  lands  for the purpose of  the  improvement  scheme would include the power to acquire a land which is comprised in the scheme, though it may not be absolutely necessary for the  scheme as such; and in such a case, it would be  compe- tent  to  the Board first to acquire the land  and  then  to dispose  of it, thereby putting itself in possession of  the necessary funds to discharge its functions and obligations. The same principle has been emphasised by the Privy  Council in  the Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta v.  Chandra Kanta Ghosh (2).  We have already referred to ss. 41 and  42 of the Improvement Act.  Section 41 enumerates matters which must be provided for in the improvement schemes, whereas  s. 42  deals  with  matters which may be provided  for  in  the improvement  schemes.   Section  42(a) lays  down  that  any improvement  scheme may provide for the acquisition  by  the Board  of  any land, in the area comprised  in  the  scheme, which  will, in their opinion, be affected by the  execution of  the scheme.  The question which arose before  the  Privy Council  in the case of the Trustees for the Improvement  of Calcutta(1) was whether under s. 42(a), it was competent  to the  Board to acquire, for the purpose of  recoupment,  land which  is not required for the execution of the scheme,  but the  trustees  are of opinion that the said land  would,  by virtue of the scheme, be increased in value.  The (1)  [1866] 1 Eng & Ir A.C. 34. (2) [1919] L.R. 47 I.A. 45. 375 decision  of  this  question depended, inter  alia,  on  the meaning  of  the  word "affected" used  in  s.  42(a).   The argument  which was urged before the Privy Council was  that in  order  that land can be acquired by the Board  under  s. 42(a),  it  must  appear that the land  falls  in  the  area comprised  in  the  scheme  and would  be  affected  by  the execution of the scheme.  If the land does not become a part of  the  scheme itself but remains outside  the  scheme,  it cannot  be  said to be affected by the scheme; and  so,  the Board  may  have  no power to acquire it  avowedly  for  the

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purpose  of  securing recoupment money.  The  Privy  Council rejected  this  contention  and  held  that  the  Board  was empowered  to acquire land which is comprised in the  scheme and would be competent to sell it and thereby raise funds if it is satisfied that the value of the land will be  enhanced by  virtue  of  the  scheme.   "There  would  appear  to  be nothing", said Lord Parmoor speaking for the Board,  "either in  the general scheme of the Act or in the special  context which  is inconsistent with giving the word  "affected"  its ordinary  and  normal  sense; but it was  suggested  in  the argument  on behalf of the respondent that the Act  did  not authorise  the  Board to acquire land unless it  was  either physically  affected  by  the execution of  the  scheme,  or injuriously affected, whether by severance or in some  other manner"  (p. 54).  In rejecting this argument, Lord  Parmoor observed  that "in the opinion of their Lordships,  none  of the suggested limitations to the usual and normal meaning of the word "affected" in s. 42 are admissible, and that  there is  no reason, either in the general purpose of the  Act  or the  special context, that the word should not be  construed in  its  ordinary sense, and that, as so  construed,  s.  42 authorises  the acquisition of the land of  the  respondent, which was inserted in the scheme, because in the opinion  of the Board, it would be enhanced in value by its  execution". Section  78  and  s.  78A which has  been  inserted  in  the Improvement  Act  in  19  3 1, in  a  sense  give  statutory recognition  to the principle evolved by the  Privy  Council while interpreting s. 42 of the Improvement Act. Basing himself on this aspect of the matter, Mr. Pathak con- tends  that  where a land is comprised  in  the  improvement scheme  originally  notified and betterment  fee  is  levied later in respect of it under s. 78A, the Board can be deemed to  have  taken two steps,, it may be said  that  the  Board acquired  the  land and later, sold it to the owner  on  the terms and conditions authorised by s. 78A.  In other  words, the  argument is that the levy of betterment fee is  another way  of  bringing  the  land  within  the  purview  of   the improvement scheme and it is, in fact, an alternative way of acquiring  it.   If  that is so, s.  30(c)  which  obviously includes  lands  acquired for the purposes  of  the  scheme, cannot  be  said  to  exclude land  which  is  not  directly acquired,  but is indirectly placed in the same category  of lands, because recovery of the recoupment fee is one way  of acquiring the land.  It is on these grounds that Mr.  Pathak has  strenuously contended that the key clause in  s.  30(c) should receive a liberal 376 construction  and  the  land  in  question  in  the  present proceedings  should be held to be required for carrying  out the relevant provisions of the Improvement Act. On the other hand, Dr. Balinge has emphasised the fact  that the  section  which we are construing occurs  in  the  Thika Tenancy Act and it is the context of this Act as well as the object  which  it  seeks to achieve that  are  relevant  and material.  There is no doubt that the provisions of the  Act are  intended to serve the purpose of social  justice.   The Legislature realised that the relations between the landlord and  the  tenants in respect of holdings let  out  to  thika tenants under the Act needed to be regulated by statute  and it   thought  that  thika  tenants  deserved  some   special protection.   The  Act  is  thus  a  measure  which  can  be described as social welfare measure, and so, the argument is that  s. 30 which provides for an exception to the  material provisions of the Act, should be strictly construed, so that the  beneficent  purpose  of the Act should  not  be  unduly

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narrowed  down  or restricted.  In construing s.  30(e),  it would,  therefore, be relevant to remember whether it  could not  have been the intention of the Legislature to permit  a private  land-holder  whose land has not been  acquired  and does  not  form  part of the improvement  scheme,  to  claim immunity from the application of the relevant provisions  of the Act which give protection to the thika tenants; and  so, Dr.  Barlinge’s contention is that it would be  unreasonable to  introduce  a liberal approach in construing  the  clause "required  for  carrying out any of the  provisions  of  the Improvement Act" as suggested by Mr. Pathak. In  our  opinion,  while construing s.  30(c)  it  would  be necessary  to bear in mind the context of the Act  in  which the  section  occurs.   We have already  noticed  the  broad features of the Act, -and the object of the Act to help  the thika tenants is writ large in all the material  provisions. In the case of such a statute, if an exception is  provided, the  provision prescribing the exception and creating a  bar to  the  application of the Act to certain  cases  must,  we think, be strictly construed.  Take the other clauses of  s. 30:  they clearly indicate that it is only lands  vested  in Government  or other special bodies or authorities that  are excepted  from the application of the Act.  Prima facie,  it is  not easy to assume that a private land]-,older like  the respondent would be within the protection of s. 30,  because there  is  no consideration in his case. as in the  case  of other  authorities or bodies covered by clauses (a) and  (b) of  s. 30, which would justify the exclusion of the  Act  to ’his case.  That is one aspect of the matter which we cannot ignore. That  takes us to the crux of the problem: can the  land  in question be said to be required for carrying out any of  the provisions  of the Improvement Act?  It is significant  that it  is the land which must be required, and not any  fee  or charges that may be levied against it.  What s. 30(c) of the Act seems to require is direct 377 connection between the land as such and the requirements  of the provisions of the Improvement Act.  The other ingredient of  s. 30(c) is that the land must be required for  carrying out the provisions of the Improvement Act.  In the  context, this second ingredient of the section seems to suggest  that the  land must be necessary for carrying out the  provisions as such of the Improvement Act; in other words, we should be able to say about the land in question that it was necessary for  carrying out a particular provision of the  Improvement Act.  The third and the last ingredient of s.30(c)  is  that the  necessity  must  be established for  carrying  out  the provisions of the Improvement Act and not the policy of  the said  provisions  or the object which they are  intended  to achieve. Having regard to these ingredients of s. 30(c), the question which calls for an answer is it shown that the land in question is necessary to carry out any specific provision of  the  Improvement Act’?  It is difficult to  answer  this question in favour of the respondent. It  is true that the betterment fee which is levied goes  to constitute an important item in the capital account under s. 122 of the Improvement Act.  It is also true that the  Board ’has  the  power  to levy betterment fee in  order  that  it should  secure  enough funds to carry  out  its  obligations under  the Improvement Act.  Such a power has always  vested in the Board and has now been statutorily conferred on it by s.  78A.  Under s. 81, the Board can acquire more land  than is  absolutely  necessary for the purpose of the  scheme  as such,  and  may  later dispose  of  superfluous  land.   The

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existence of these powers cannot be disputed.  But would  it be consistent with the fair construction of s. 30(c) to hold that because the land in question can be made liable to  pay betterment fee and the betterment fee thus realised from the land  serves the purpose of s. 122 of the  Improvement  Act, the land itself is required for carrying, out the provisions of s. 122?  In order that s. 30(c) should be applicable, the respondent  must  point  out a  specific  provision  of  the Improvement  Act for the carrying out of which the  land  as such  is  required.   The  provisions  of  s.  122  of   the Improvement Act do not he help the respondent, because it is not possible to bold that for carrying out the provisions of s. 122, the land in question is directly required. There is another aspect of the question to which we ought to refer  Section  78A, like s. 78, deals with lands  which  in terms  are  not required for the execution  of  the  scheme. These two sections provide for two categories of lands, both of  which were originally comprised in the scheme,  but  are later found to be not required for the scheme.  Now, when s. 78A  expressly  says  that  the  and  in  respect  of  which betterment  fee  can  be levied, is  not  required  for  the scheme,  it is not easy to accept the argument that  such  a land   is  nevertheless  required  for  carrying   out   the provisions  of  s.  78A.   In construing  s.  30(c),  it  is necessary  to  distinguish between the  carrying,,  out  the provisions of the Improvement Act, and the achieve- 378 ment  or  the  accomplishment of the  objects  of  the  said provisions.   In one sense, the land in question does  serve the   purpose  of  the  Improvement  scheme,   because   the betterment fee which is levied on it swells the funds of the Board  and  the  funds are utilised by  the  Board  for  the purposes of carrying out the scheme; but the requirement  of the land for carrying out the provisions of the  Improvement Act  which alone can invoke s. 30(c), cannot be said  to  be satisfied  by this indirect connection between the land  and the general purpose of the Improvement Act. There  is  one  more aspect of this  problem  which  is  not irrelevant.   Betterment  fee  is  levied  against  a  land, because   its  value  is  increased  as  a  result  of   the improvement  scheme, and so, s. 78A authorises the Board  to levy betterment fee presumably on the ground that the  Board is justified in recouping itself by such levy in respect  of unearned  increment  in the value of the land of  which  the land-holder  gets  a  benefit.   If  the  land-holder   pays betterment  fee for such unearned increment in the value  of the land, he may apply under s. 25 of the Act for  enhancing the  rent  payable by the thika tenants to him.   But  there appears  to be no reason why a landlord, the value of  whose land  has increased by the improvement scheme introduced  in the  area  in  which his land is situated,  should  get  the additional benefit of exemption from the application of  the provisions of the Act which give protection to the tenants. Having  carefully  considered  the  question  of  construing s.30(c), we have come to the conclusion that the words  used in  s.  30(c) do not justify the conclusion that  a  private landholder is intended to be equated with Government or with the  other  special bodies or authorities  whose  lands  are exempted from the operation of the Act by s. 30.  We do  not think  that the Legislature intended that the provisions  of the  Act  should  cease  to apply to  all  lands  which  ore comprised  in  the scheme, because such  a  provision  would appear  to  be  inconsistent with the  categories  of  cases covered by clauses (a) & (b) of s. 30.  Besides, if that was the  intention of the Legislature in enacting s.  30(c),  it

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would  have been easy for the Legislature to say that  lands comprised in the improvement schemes should be exempted from the  application  of  the Act.  Section 30,  as  we  already emphasised, provides for an exception to the application  of the  beneficent  provisions  of the Act, and  it  would,  we think. not be unreasonable to bold that even if s. 30(c)  is reasonably capable of the construction for which Mr.  Pathak contends,  we  should prefer  the  alternative  construction which  is  also  reasonably  possible.   In  construing  the provisions which provide for exceptions to the applicability of   beneficent  legislation,  if  two   constructions   are reasonably  possible,  the  Court  would  be  justified   in preferring  that construction which helps to carry  out  the beneficent purpose of the Act and does not unduly expand the area  or  the  scope of the exception.   Therefore,  we  are satisfied that the Court of Appeal was in error in 379 reversing the conclusion of the trial Judge that the present suits filed on the original side of the Calcutta High  Court were incompetent. There is, however, one more point to which we ought to refer before we part with these appeals.  Both the learned  Judges in  the  Court of Appeal have observed that if s.  30(c)  is held not to apply to the land in question on the ground that it is not required for carrying out any of the provisions of the  Improvement Act, s. 30(c) would, in  substance,  become redundant.   The  argument which was thus urged  before  the Court  of Appeal and has been accepted by it.  assumes  that the  Board  is  a  local authority  within  the  meaning  of 30(b)(iv)  and  as such, the land which has  vested  in  the Board  is already excepted from the operation of the Act  by the  said provision; and that means that the lands  acquired by  the  Board under the provisions of the  Improvement  Act have already been provided for by s. 30(b)(iv).  If that  is so, there would be no cases to which s. 30(c)   can   apply. Since this point arises incidentally in construing S.  30(c), we  do not propose to decide in the present appeals  whether the  Board  is a local authority within the  meaning  of  s. 30(b)(iv).   In  dealing  with  this  particular   argument, however, we are prepared to assume that the Board is such  a local  authority.  Even so, it is possible to hold  that  s. 30(c) does not become redundant, because though s. 30(b)(iv) may include lands acquired by the Board, there may still  be some  other  lands which are not acquired by the  Board  but which,  nevertheless, may be required for carrying out  some provisions  of the Improvement Act.  Take, for instance,  s. 42 of the Improvement Act.  Section 42(b) lays down that any improvement  scheme  may provide for raising,  lowering,  or levelling  any  land in the area comprised  in  the  scheme. Section  42(c) provides for the formation and  retention  of open  spaces.  Similar provisions are made by  s.  35C(1)(i) and (j) as introduced by the Amending Act 32 of 1955.  It is possible  to take the view that the lands required  for  the purposes specified in these provisions of s. 42 or s. 35C of the  Improvement Act are required within the meaning  of  s. 30(c)  of the Act, though they may not have  been  acquired. But  apart  from this consideration, the  argument  that  s. 30(c) would become redundant cannot, we think, be treated as decisive,  because  it is not unknown that  the  Legislature sometimes makes provisions out of abundant caution.  When s. 30(c) was enacted in 1949, the Legislature may have  thought that  in order to avoid any doubt, dispute or difficulty  in regard  to the question as to whether the Board would  be  a local,  authority  or  not, it would be  better  to  make  a specific provision in respect of lands which are acquired by

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the  Board as well as those which would be required for  the purpose  of carrying out the provisions of  the  Improvement Act.   It is true that the lands which are  required  within the  meaning  of  s. 30(c) would  include  lands  which  are actually acquired as well as those which might not have been acquired  but are, nevertheless, required for  carrying  out the provisions of the Improvement Act.  But having specified respective 380 authorities  or  bodies in clause (a) & (b) of  s.  30,  the Legislature  may  have thought that it would  be  better  to refer to the Improvement Act and lands required for carrying out  its  provisions, specifically  and  expressly.   Having regard to the considerations on which our interpretation  of s.  30(c)  is  based, we are not prepared  to  attach  undue significance  to the argument based on the  assumption  that the  Board  is a local authority within the  meaning  of  s. 30(b)(iv)  and  that would make the provisions of  s.  30(c) either  superfluous or would deprive the said  provision  of any significance or importance. The  result is, the appeals are allowed, the decrees  passed by  the Division Bench are set aside and those of the  trial Judge restored with costs throughout. Appeals allowed. 381