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PETITIONER: SHATRUGHNA PRASAD SINHA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJBHAU SURAJMAL RATHI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       10/09/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. FAIZAN UDDIN (J) G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      Though the  respondents were  duly  served  and  on  an occasion appeared  in  person,  subsequently  they  did  not appear. Resultantly,  we requested  Shri Sushil  Kumar Jain, Advocate of the Bar to assist the Court as amicus curiae. We place on  record our  deep  appreciation  for  the  valuable assistance rendered by him.      This appeal  by special  leave arises from the judgment and order  of the  High Court  of Bombay made on January 21, 1991 in  Crl.Writ Petition  No.  1545  of  1990.  The  facts relevant for  the purpose of this case and we proceed on the basis  thereof   are  that  allegations  were  made  in  the complaint  filed   by  the  respondents  in  the  Courts  of Magistrate at Pune and Nasik; we deal with those allegations as  they   constitute  offence   for  which   the   Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, could take cognizance. In paragraph 2 it is  narrated that the complainant-respondent was a social activist belonging  to the  Marwari Community,  and that the respondent second  accused respectively  is the  editor  and publisher of  Stardust, Film  Magazine. An interview she had with the  appellant in  June 1989,  came to  be published at page  82   of  that  magazine.  During  the  course  of  the interview, the appellant was alleged to have made statements outraging the religious feeling of the Marwari community and also defamed the members of Marwari community as a class. In the complaint filed at Pune, what he has stated is as under:      "The Complainant  submits  that  in      June 89  the Accused  No.1 has with      deliberate and  malicious intention      of outraging the religious feelings      of Marwari  Community made the said      statement. By  the statement of the      Accused  No,1,   the  structure  of      National   Integrity    is    being      paralysed. The  feelings of Marwari

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    Community also  being hurt  by  the      Statement made by the Accused No.1.      The Statement  of Accused No.1 goes      to show  that Marwari  Community is      not a  Class belonging to India and      they  have   not  faith   and  love      towards India,  their mother  land.      It  is   implied  from   the   said      statement   that    Marwaris    are      traitors and  enemies of  India. So      also accused  No.2 has also printed      and published the said statement in      ’Star Dust’  Magazine of  1989 with      deliberate and  malicious intention      of outraging the religious feelings      of Marwari Community."      The rest  of the  paragraphs are only the consequential narration of  the allegations  in paragraph  3. According to the  respondents,   these  allegations   constitute  offence punishable under  Section 295-A  and Section  500 read  with Section 34  of the  India Penal  Code [IPC,  for short]. The Magistrate had  taken cognizance  and issued  notice to  the appellant for appearance. When it was challenged in the writ petition, the  learned single  Judge of  the High  Court had held that  on a  reading of  the complaint  as a  whole,  no offence under  Section 295A  could be made out; however, the allegations constitute  prima facie  offence triable  by the Magistrate under  Section 500,  IPC. Thus,  these appeals by special leave.      Section  295A   of  the  IPC  envisages  the  essential ingredients of  the punishment  and provides  that  whoever, with deliberate  and malicious  intention of  outraging  the religious feelings  of any  class of  citizens of  India, by words, either  spoken or  written, or by signs or by visible representations or  otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion  or the  religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished  with imprisonment  of either  description for a term which  may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. The  quoted para  does  not  contain  essential  facts constituting the offence.      Section 200  of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1908 [Cr.P.C., for short] in Chapter XV provides as under:      "A Magistrate  taking cognizance of      an  offence   on  complaint   shall      examine upon  path the  complainant      and the  witnesses present, if any,      and   the    substance   of    such      examination  shall  be  reduced  to      writing and  shall be signed by the      complainant and  the witnesses, and      also  by  the  Magistrate  provided      that when  the complaint is made in      writing, the  Magistrate  need  not      examine  the  complainant  and  the      witnesses."      The High Court may take cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)  (a) upon  receiving a  complaint  containing facts which  constitute such  offence. It  is  a  matter  of discretion.  Criminal   proceedings  are   initiated  by   a Magistrate  taking   cognizance  of   the  offence.   Taking cognizance of the offence would include the intention of the Magistrate of  initiating judicial  proceedings against  the offender in  respect of  that offence or taking steps to see whether  there   is  any   basis  for   initiating  judicial proceedings or for other purpose.

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    It would  thus be seen that when a private complaint is made  to   the  Magistrate,   before  the  Magistrate  takes cognizance of the offence on the complaint so as to take the other steps,  the complaint  shall contain all the necessary facts constituting  the offence  for which the complaint was laid, so  that the  Magistrate can proceed further in taking further steps  after cognizance  of the  offence is taken by issuing the  process etc.  It is seen from reading of para 3 of  the   complaint,  which  is  the  foundation  to  taking cognizance of  the offence,  that the complainant-respondent has concentrated  mainly on  the  offence  punishable  under Section 295A  of IPC;  the High  Court had  quashed the said complaint and no appeal has been filed in this Court.      The next  question is:  whether the  learned Judge  was right  in  holding  that  the  complaint  discloses  offence punishable  under  Section  500  IPC?  Section  499  defines ’defamation’ thus:      "Whoever by  words either spoken or      intended to be read, or by signs or      by visible  representations,  makes      or   publishes    any    imputation      concerning any persons intending to      harm, or  knowing or  having reason      to  believe  that  such  imputation      will harm,  the reputation  of such      person,  is  said,  except  in  the      cases  hereinafter   excepted,   to      defame that person".      Explanation 2 to the said section envisages that it may amount to  defamation to  make an  imputation  concerning  a company or an association or collection of persons as such.      Explanation 4  provides that  no imputation  is said to harm a  person’s reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual  character of  that person,  or  lowers  the character of  that person  in respect of his caste or of his calling, or  lowers the  credit of that person, or causes it to be  believed that  the  body  of  that  person  is  in  a loathsome state,  or in  a  state  generally  considered  as disgraceful.      A reading  of the complaint does not contain any of the allegations   constituting   the   offence   of   defamation punishable under  Section 500,  IPC.  The  contents  of  the magazine are  alleged to  be defamatory  against the Marwari community, lowering  them in  the estimate  of the public or their reputation  is lowered  in the  society. But we do not find any  allegation made  in the complaint. Accordingly, we hold that  the complaint  filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First  Class in  Court No.4  at  Pune  does  not contain any  of the  allegations so  as  to  constitute  the offence of  defamation defined in Section 499 and punishable under Section  500.   Consequently, the  Magistrate was  not justified in  issuing the process against the appellant. The complaint is accordingly quashed.      As regards  the allegations  made against the appellant in the  complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, at Nasik, on a reading of the complaint we do not think that  we will be justified at this state to quash that complaint.  It   is  not  the  province  of  this  Court  to appreciate at  this stage  the  evidence  or  scope  of  and meaning of  the statement.  Certain allegations  came to  be made but  whether these allegations do constitute defamation of the Marwari community as a business class and whether the appellant had  intention to  cite as  an instance of general feeling among the community and whether the context in which

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the said  statement came  to be  made, as  is sought  to  be argued by  the learned senior counsel for the appellant, are all matters  to be considered by the learned Magistrate at a later stage.  At this  stage, we cannot embark upon weighing the evidence  and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or not the  allegations made  in the  complaint  constitute  an offence punishable  under Section  500. It  is  the  settled legal position  that a  Court has to read the complaint as a whole and  find out whether allegations disclosed constitute an offence  under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The Magistrate prima  facie came  to  the  conclusion  that  the allegations might come within the definition of ’defamation’ under Section  499 IPC and could be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial. The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or other  steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known  to law. Prima facie we think that at this state it is  not a case warranting quashing of the complaint filed in the  Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class at Nasik. To that extent,  the High  Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under Section 500, IPC.      The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.