REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.              OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 21108-21110 of 2007]

SHANTI BUDHIYA VESTA PATEL & ORS.        .... Appellants

Versus

NIRMALA JAYPRAKASH TIWARI & ORS.        .... Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.                    OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. D33349 of 2007]

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In the present appeals, the appellants have challenged the  

legality and validity of the order dated 12.10.2007 passed by  

the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  whereby  the  High  

Court dismissed all the three Civil Applications preferred by the

appellants  herein  seeking  recall  of  an  earlier  order  dated  

13.06.2006 passed by the High Court which was based on the  

consent terms duly signed by all the parties.

3. In  order  to  properly  appreciate  the  precise  nature  and  

scope of the controversy arising in the present appeals, it would  

be appropriate as well as expedient to set out a brief statement  

of pertinent facts. The original appellant, Budhiya Vesta Patel,  

was  the  predecessor–in-interest  of  the  present  appellants.  

Budhiya Vesta Patel was appointed as a watchman by one R.K.  

Tiwari,  who was  cultivating  grass  on the suit  property  since  

1954-55,  to  take  care  of  the  suit  property  and  for  this  a  

Kachcha shed on the suit property was provided to him. In due  

course  of  time,  Budhiya  Vesta  Patel  extended  the  shed  to  

construct a chawl known as Budhiya Patel Chawl consisting of  

38 rooms, which were let-out by him.

4. After the death of the real owner of the suit property, Mr.  

Anant  Mahadeo  Tambe,  husband  of  Leela  Anant  Tambe,  

respondent no. 7 herein, the suit property stood recorded in the  

name of respondent no. 7. By means of a consent decree passed  

in Suit No. 1230 of 1992 between respondent no. 7 and M/s.  

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Hitesh Enterprises, respondent no. 8 herein, the latter became  

the owner of the suit property.  

5. In the year 1999, Budhiya Vesta Patel filed a suit against  

respondent no. 7 and said R.K. Tiwari,  the predecessor-in-title  

of Respondent nos. 1 to 6 herein, before the Bombay City Civil  

Court,  Bombay  being  Suit  No. 5163  of  1999  seeking  a  

declaration that he is the owner of the suit property by adverse  

possession. Since said R.K. Tiwari also claimed title to the suit  

property, he also filed a suit.

6. Against this, a counter-claim being Counter Claim No. 11  

of 2002 seeking eviction of Budhiya Vesta Patel and his tenants  

from  the  suit  property  was  filed  by  respondent  no.  7  and  

respondent no. 8. The aforesaid suits were contested and on the  

basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed and  

evidence was led.     

7. The  trial  Court  by  its  judgment  and  order  dated  

10.02.2003 and 11.02.2003 dismissed the suit filed by Budhiya  

Vesta Patel and allowed the counter claim filed by respondent  

Nos. 7 and 8.  The trial Court negatived Budhiya Vesta Patel’s  

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claim of ownership of the suit property by adverse possession  

since his initial possession of the suit property was a permissive  

possession.

8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, several appeals  

came to  be  filed  before  the  High  Court  of  Bombay.  Budhiya  

Vesta Patel had filed two appeals, being F.A. No. 1388 of 2003  

and F.A. No. 1389 of 2003; the former against the dismissal of  

the suit filed by him and the latter against the decree passed  

against him in the counter claim. The third appeal being, F.A.  

No.  1390  of  2003,  was  preferred  by  one  Yusuf  Vali  Mohd.  

Bilikhiya  (respondent  no.  9  herein),  who  was  the  Power  of  

Attorney holder of Budhiya Vesta Patel. Respondent Nos. 1 to 6  

also filed an appeal against the judgment and order of the trial  

Court which was registered as F.A. No. 1523 of 2003. However,  

subsequently, the same was withdrawn.  

9. During  the  pendency  of  the  aforesaid  appeals,  Budhiya  

Vesta Patel died on 05.12.2004.  On 07.01.2005, each of the  

present appellants executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney in  

favour of respondent no. 9. On the basis of the said Powers of  

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Attorney,  respondent  no.  9  filed  three  separate  applications  

being Civil  Application Nos. 3180 of 2005, 3181 of 2005 and  

992 of 2005 in the aforesaid three appeals wherein he prayed  

that the legal representatives of Budhiya Vesta Patel, i.e., the  

appellants be brought on record in all the three appeals in place  

of Budhiya Vesta Patel.  

10. On  26.04.2006,  the  appellants  executed  a  Power  of  

Attorney in favour of one Narender M. Patel. It is alleged by the  

present  appellants  that  respondent  no.  9  colluded  with  

respondent no. 8 and, therefore, respondent no. 9 forced and  

coerced them to enter into a compromise with respondent nos.  

7 and 8, which was strongly objected to by the appellants. On  

this,  the  appellants  further  allege  that  they  were  threatened  

with  dire  consequences  by  the  aforesaid  respondents.  

Consequently,  the appellants got filed three complaints dated  

01.05.2006, 17.05.2006 and 23.05.2006 with the police against  

respondent  nos.  8  and 9.  However,  it  is  alleged that  despite  

this, respondent no. 9 for himself and for and on behalf of the  

appellants  as  their  Power  of  Attorney  holder  entered  into  

consent terms with respondent nos. 7 and 8 in F.A. No. 1389 of  

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2003 and thereby submitted to the decree of eviction. The High  

Court,  by  its  order  dated  13.06.2006,  allowed  the  aforesaid  

applications filed by respondent no. 9 and also disposed of the  

said appeals after taking on record the consent terms entered  

into  between  respondent  nos.  7  and  8  on  one  hand  and  

respondent  no.  9  on  the  other.  Subsequent  to  filing  of  the  

consent terms, the names of the tenants were deleted from the  

array  of  the  parties.  No  appeal  was,  however,  filed  by  any  

tenant.

11. The  appellants  filed,  before  the  High  Court,  three  civil  

applications being Civil Applications Nos. 3628 of 2006, 3629 of  

2006 and 3630 of  2009 praying  for  recall  of  aforesaid  order  

dated 13.06.2006 alleging that fraud had been played upon the  

High Court by filing the said consent terms. By a common order  

dated  12.10.2007,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  aforesaid  

applications. Hence the parties are, in appeal, before us.  

12. Before we proceed to give an account of the submissions  

made by the counsel appearing for the parties, we wish to make  

note of a development that took place after filing of this SLP by  

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the appellants. After this SLP was filed, respondent no. 9  filed a  

civil application before the High Court praying for setting aside  

the  consent  decree  dated  13.06.2006  on  the  ground  that  

respondent no. 8 had failed to perform his obligation under the  

consent terms, i.e., payment of Rs 1 crore and 15 lakhs to him.  

The High Court, by an order dated 06.07.2009, dismissed the  

said application.

13. We may now direct our attention to the rival submissions  

made before us by the parties.

14. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellants, submitted that the aforesaid consent terms were  

filed without the knowledge and consent of the appellants and  

as  such  the  consent  decree  was  passed  without  taking  the  

consent of the appellants who were necessary parties. It was  

also  submitted  that  the  purpose  behind executing a General  

Power  of  Attorney in  favour of  respondent  no.  9  by Budhiya  

Vesta  Patel  and,  upon  his  death,  by  the  appellants  was  to  

safeguard their property by issuing clear instructions to him. It  

was the stand of the Dr. Dhawan that the fraudulent act of the  

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respondent no. 9 in arriving at a settlement with the respondent  

nos. 7 and 8 and consequently filing the same in the High Court  

without obtaining the consent of the appellants amounted to a  

breach of the scope of the authority conferred on him by the  

appellants  and  thus  the  consent  decree  passed  by  the  High  

Court  was  a  nullity.  Dr.  Dhawan  tried  to  further  assail  the  

validity of the consent terms as also the consent decree on the  

ground  that  the  terms  of  the  compromise  arrived  at   were  

iniquitous.

 15. It was further submitted that since fraud had been played  

by respondent no. 9 on the appellants by trying to siphon off  

the  properties  belonging  to  the  appellants,  the  Court  has  a  

responsibility  to  protect  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  

appellants and therefore the consent decree is required to be set  

aside  and  quashed.  In  the  course  of  his  submissions,  Dr.  

Dhawan  also  referred  to  the  three  complaints  filed  by  the  

appellants with the police against harassment and threats given  

to them by respondent nos. 8 and 9. Dr. Dhawan pointed out  

before us that coercion and goon tactics, in addition to fraud,  

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had been employed by respondent nos.  8 and 9 to force the  

appellants to sign the consent terms.  

16. It  was  further  submitted  that  the  High  Court  erred  in  

dismissing the applications filed by the appellants seeking recall  

of  its earlier order.  The High Court failed to see through the  

monstrous  designs  of  respondent  no.  9  even  though  ample  

material  was placed on record  and allegations  of  fraud were  

clearly made before the High Court.  

17. On the other  hand,  Mr.  Ashok H.  Desai,  Mr.  Dushyant  

Dave and Mr. Jaydeep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing  

for  the  respondent  Nos.  7  and  8  as  also  respondent  No.  9  

strongly refuted the aforesaid submissions while bringing to the  

notice  of  the  Court  that,  in  fact,  Budhiya  Vesta  Patel  had  

himself  entered  into  a  Development  Agreement  dated  

12.01.1994  with  respondent  no.  9  whereby  the  former  

transferred his rights, title and interest in the suit property to  

the latter for a consideration of Rs. 2,00,000/- which was fully  

paid  by  respondent  no.  9  to  the  Budhiya  Vesta  Patel  and  

accepted by him prior to the execution of the said agreement. It  

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was further submitted that the irrevocable Powers of Attorney  

which were executed in favour of respondent no. 9 by Budhiya  

Vesta Patel and, upon his death, by the appellants made the  

acts, which were carried out by respondent no. 9 in the best  

interest of the appellants, binding on the appellants and that  

there existed no valid ground for setting aside the compromise  

arrived at between the parties and the consent decree passed by  

the High Court.    

18. It was also submitted that as the appellants had failed to  

establish that under the terms of the Power of Attorney which  

had executed in his favour by the appellants, respondent No. 9  

was not authorized to enter into a settlement of the kind he had  

entered, it could not be said that there was a conflict of interest  

between  the  appellants  and  respondent  No.  9  who  was  the  

agent of the appellants.  

19. In the light of the rival submissions made by the counsel  

appearing for  the  parties,  we have  perused the entire  record  

before us. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that a  

Development  Agreement  dated  12.01.1994  had  been  entered  

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into  between  Budhiya  Vesta  Patel  and  respondent  no.  9  

whereby and whereunder Budhiya Vesta Patel transferred his  

rights,  title  and  interest  in  the  suit  premises  in  favour  of  

respondent  no.  1  for  a  consideration  of  Rs  2,00,000/-.  The  

records show that the said amount was fully paid and also that  

the said agreement was registered with the office of the Sub-

Registrar.  Thus,  by  entering  into  the  said  agreement  and  

accepting the said consideration in full and final satisfaction for  

the transfer of the suit property in favour of the respondent no.  

9, Budhiya Vesta Patel divested himself of his right, title and  

interest in the suit property. Pursuant to the said agreement,  

Budhiya Vesta Patel executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney  

dated 17.02.1994 in favour of respondent no. 9 for a period of  

15 years.  

20. We may here refer to some of the relevant portions of the  

aforesaid agreement, which are being reproduced hereinbelow:

“AND WHEREAS it is hereby further agreed by  and  between  the  parties  hereto  that  the   Developer  shall  be  at  full  liberty  to  assign,   transfer the benefit of the Agreement in respect  of  the  aid  property  to  party  or  parties  of  his  choice at such terms and conditions as to be or  he may deem fit and proper without any further  

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consultation  or  consent  of  the  Owner  in  that   behalf

4. The consideration payable by the developer  to the Owner for his share right,  title,  interest   has been fixed at Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two   lakhs  only)  and  the  said  consideration  has  been paid by the Developer to the Owner on or  before  the  execution  of  these  presents  (the   receipt  and payment  whereof  the  Owner  doth  hereby  admit  and  acknowledge  and  of  and  from the same do hereby forever discharge the  Developer ”

21. Further,  a  Deed of  Confirmation dated 15.12.1995 duly  

registered  on  the  same  date  was  executed  between  Budhiya  

Vesta Patel and respondent no. 9 by which Budhiya Vesta Patel  

confirmed  that  the  aforesaid  Development  Agreement  was  

subsisting, valid and in full force and would be binding on the  

heirs,  executors, administrators and assigns of the parties to  

the  said  Development  Agreement.  This  was  followed  by  a  

Declaration dated 23.08.2001 by Budhiya Vesta Patel wherein  

he acknowledged the rights, title and interest of the respondent  

no. 9 over the suit property, the receipt of consideration of Rs  

2,00,000/-  and  extended  the  period  of  the  said  Power  of  

Attorney indefinitely  and undertook to ratify and confirm the  

acts done by respondent no. 9.

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22. The appellants have challenged the consent decree passed  

by the High Court praying that the same should be set aside as  

it was obtained by playing a fraud upon them. We do not feel  

persuaded to hold so for a number of reasons which are being  

set out in the paragraphs below.

23. It is interesting to see the appellants challenge the consent  

decree passed by the High Court, particularly when each one of  

them had, upon the death of Budhiya Vesta Patel, executed an  

Affidavit-cum-Declaration  as  well  as  separate  Powers  of  

Attorney dated 07.01.2005 in favour of the respondent no. 9. All  

the said Powers of Attorney were irrevocable and duly registered  

for valuable consideration. A bare perusal of the said Affidavits-

cum-declarations would reveal  that  the  appellants  knew that  

respondent  no.  9  was  the  constituted  attorney  of  their  

predecessor-in–interest  and  that  the  suit  property  had  been  

transferred  to  respondent  no.  9  for  a  consideration  of  Rs  

2,00,000/-.  It is pertinent to note that in the said Affidavits-

cum-Declarations each of the appellants had undertaken to be  

bound by all  the deeds and documents entered into between  

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their predecessor-in-interest and respondent no. 9 and they had  

also  confirmed  and  ratified  the  said  deeds  and  documents  

thereby conferring right on respondent no. 9 to enforce those at  

all  times  in  the  future.  In  fact,  in  the  said  affidavits,  the  

appellants  categorically  admitted  the  right  of  ownership  of  

respondent no. 9 over the suit property.  

24. By executing the said Powers of Attorney in favour of the  

respondent no. 9, the appellants had consciously and willingly  

appointed,  nominated,  constituted and authorized respondent  

no.  9  as  their  lawful  Power  of  Attorney  to  do certain  deeds,  

things and matters.  The relevant clauses are being extracted  

hereinbelow: -

“6.  To  sign  Petition  or  present  Petitions  or   Petition,  to  file  suit  and  to  sign  and  verify  claims,  written  statements,  pleadings,   applications, returns, and to appear, act in any  Court-  Civil,  Criminal,  Court  Receiver  and  /or  Revenue, original  or appellate  or Revisional or  before  any  competent  authority,  Officer,  or   Officer for in respect of or in connection with the  aforesaid  and  with  buildings  etc.  thereon  and/or any other proceedings, suit or appeal in  connection  with  the  management  and  superintendence  of  my  said  lands  for  any  purpose whatsoever necessary.

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7. To  compromise,  compound  and/or  negotiate  and  settle  any  dispute  or  disputes  and refer the same to Arbitration.”

25. It  is thus crystal  clear that the appellants had not only  

confirmed and ratified the deeds and documents entered into  

between their predecessor-in-interest and respondent no. 9 but  

also  constituted  respondent  no.  9  as  their  lawful  attorney  

authorizing him,  inter alia, to sign petitions, appear before the  

Courts and also to compromise or compound disputes. In fact,  

the appellants are estopped from questioning the acts done by  

respondent no. 9.   

26. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 7 placed  

reliance on a decision of this Court in Jineshwardas (D) by LRs.  

And Ors. Vs. Jagrani (Smt.) and Another reported in (2003) 11  

SCC  372 to  argue  that  the  party  executing  the  Power  of  

Attorney is bound by the acts of the Power of Attorney holder  

and that the Court could accept a compromise terms entered  

into by the Power of Attorney holder on behalf of the parties and  

that such a compromise would be a valid compromise.  

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27. We  are  of  the  considered  view  that  in  the  aforesaid  

circumstances,  the appellants could not  be said to have any  

right to assail the consent decree passed by the High Court. We  

do  not  think  it  proper  for  the  appellants  to  question  and  

challenge  the  consent  terms  signed  and  submitted  by  

respondent no. 9 on their behalf which were duly accepted and  

acted upon by the High Court and which we also find to be just  

and  reasonable.  The  fact  that  under  the  consent  terms  the  

appellants were paid a sum of Rs 10,00,000/- when they were  

not entitled to the same also reinforces our conviction that the  

consent terms arrived at were just.  

28. As noted by us in one of the preceding paragraphs, the  

predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had nothing remaining  

in the suit property after he had transferred the same under the  

said development agreement to respondent no. 9 for a full and  

final consideration of Rs 2,00,000/-. Thus, the predecessor-in  

interest  of  the  appellants  had  no  right,  title  or  interest  

subsisting  in  the  suit  property.  The  appellants  are  the  legal  

heirs of Budhiya Vesta Patel and as such they could not have  

claimed a  title  better  than that  of  Budhiya  Vesta  Patel.  The  

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predecessor-in interest of the appellants had relinquished his  

title,  right  or  interest  over/in  the  suit  property  in  favour  of  

respondent no. 9. A general proposition of law is that no person  

can  confer  on  another  a  better  title  than  he  himself  has.  

[Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions of this  

Court  in  Mahabir  Gope  v.  Harbans  NArain  Singh 1952 SCR  

775; Asaram v. Mst. Ram Kali 1958 SCR 986 and All India Film  

Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyan Nath (1969) 3 SCC 79.]

29. It is also the case of the appellants that there was no due  

compliance with the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3. The counsel  

appearing for the appellants submitted that responsibility of the  

Court is to see that the consent terms have been arrived at in  

satisfaction of all the parties and that injustice is not caused to  

any party. The counsel further submitted that one of the modes  

by which Order 23 Rule 3 ensured this was by requiring the  

compromise  agreement  to  be  in  writing  and  signed  by  the  

parties.   

30. This was strongly refuted by the counsel appearing for the  

respondents stating that it is well settled that under Order 23  

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Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, a compromise may  

be  signed  by  the  counsel  or  the  Power  of  Attorney  holder.  

Counsel  for  the  respondents  referred  to  and relied  upon the  

judgment of this Court in  Byram Pestonji Gariwala Vs.  Union  

Bank of India and Others (1992) 1 SCC 31 where it was held  

thus:

“39. To insist upon the party himself personally  signing  the  agreement  or  compromise  would  often  cause  undue  delay,  loss  and  inconvenience,  especially  in  the  case  of  non- resident  persons.  It  has  always  been  universally understood that a party can always   act by his duly authorised representative.  If a   power-of-attorney  holder  can  enter  into  an  agreement  or  compromise  on  behalf  of  his  principal,  so  can  counsel,  possessed  of  the   requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on  behalf  of  his  client.  Not  to  recognise  such  capacity  is  not  only  to  cause  much  inconvenience  and  loss  to  the  parties   personally,  but  also  to  delay  the  progress  of  proceedings  in  court.  If  the  legislature  had  intended to make such a fundamental change,   even  at  the  risk  of  delay,  inconvenience  and  needless expenditure, it  would have expressly  so stated.”

31. It is settled position of law that the burden to prove that a  

compromise arrived at under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of  

Civil Procedure was tainted by coercion or fraud lies upon the  

party  who  alleges  the  same.  However,  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case, the appellants, on whom the burden  

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lay, have failed to do so.  Although, the application for recall did  

allege  some  coercion,  it  could  not  be  said  to  be  a  case  of  

established coercion. Three criminal complaints were filed, but  

the appellants did not pursue the said criminal complaints to  

their logical end.   

32. It is a plain and basic rule of pleadings that in order to  

make  out  a  case  of  fraud  or  coercion  there  must  be  a)  an  

express allegation of coercion or fraud and b) all the material  

facts in support of such allegations must be laid out in full and  

with a high degree of precision. In other words, if coercion or  

fraud  is  alleged,  it  must  be  set  out  with  full  particulars.  In  

Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai reported in 1951 SCR 548 it  

was held thus:  

“27.  We  turn  next  to  the  questions  of  undue  influence and coercion. Now it is to be observed  that these have not been separately pleaded. It   is true they may overlap in part in some cases  but they are separate and separable categories  in law and must be separately pleaded.    

28.  It  is  also  to  be  observed  that  no  proper  particulars have been furnished. Now if there is  one rule which is better  established than any  other,  it  is  that  in  cases  of  fraud,  undue  influence and coercion,  the  parties  pleading  it   must set forth full particulars and the case can  only  be  decided  on  the  particulars  as  laid.   There  can  be  no  departure  from  them  in  evidence.  General  allegations  are  insufficient  

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even  to  amount  to  an  averment  of  fraud  of   which any court ought to take notice  however  strong the language in which they are couched  may  be,  and  the  same  applies  to  undue  influence and coercion. See Order 6 Rule 4 of   the Civil Procedure Code.”

33. In the present case, the appellants have, however, failed to  

furnish  the  full  and  precise  particulars  with  regard  to  the  

alleged fraud. Since the particulars in support of the allegation  

of fraud or coercion have not been properly pleaded as required  

by  law,  the  same  must  fail.   Rather  the  Affidavits-cum-

Declarations  executed  by  the  appellants  indicate  that  no  

coercion  or  fraud  was  exercised  upon  the  appellants  by  

respondent no. 8 or 9 at any point of time and thus the consent  

decree cannot be said to be anything but valid.  

34. In this regard,  we wish to refer to the judgment of  this  

Court in the case of  Shankar Sitaram Sontakke v. Balkrishna  

Sitaram Sontakke reported in AIR 1954 SC 352 wherein this  

Court while dealing with the nature of a consent decree held in  

para 9 as under:

“9. The obvious effect of this finding is that the  plaintiff  is  barred  by  the  principle  of  res  judicata  from  reagitating  the  question  in  the   present  suit.  It  is  well  settled  that  a  consent  decree is as binding upon the parties thereto as   

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a decree  passed  by invitum.  The compromise   having been found not to be vitiated by fraud,  misrepresentation,  misunderstanding  or  mistake,  the  decree  passed  thereon  has  the  binding force of res judicata.

35. We  may  also  refer  to  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  

Loonkaran v. State Bank, Jaipur reported in (1969) 1 SCR 122  

where interpreting Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, this  

Court held thus:

“Section 202 of the Contract  Act provides that   where the agent has himself an interest in the   property which forms the subject matter of the  agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an  express contract, be terminated to the prejudice   of such agent.  It is settled law that where the   agency  is  created  for  valuable  consideration  and authority is given to effectuate a security or   to  secure  interest  of  the  agent,  the  authority   cannot be revoked.”

36. The  appellants  also  alleged  that  they  had  revoked  the  

Powers  of  Attorney  executed  by  them  in  favour  of  the  

respondent no. 9 by filing complaints with the police. We are of  

the considered opinion that this contention of the appellants is  

devoid of merit. Although there is no denying the fact that three  

police complaints had been filed on three different dates with  

the  police  against  the  alleged  harassment  and  threats  by  

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respondent nos. 8 and 9, it is difficult to understand how the  

Powers  of  Attorney  executed  by  the  appellants  or  their  

predecessor-in-interest  stood revoked.  The record of  the  case  

reveals  that  each  of  the  complaints  was  filed  by  a  separate  

person  -  the  first  complaint  was  filed  by  the  appellants  

themselves, the second by an Advocate and the third by one  

Narendra M. Patel, who is himself a builder. It is significant to  

note  that  all  these  complaints  came  to  be  filed  when  said  

Narender  M.  Patel  came  into  the  picture.  Further,  it  is  

important to take note of the fact that all the Powers of Attorney  

executed in favour of respondent no. 9 as also all the deeds and  

documents entered into between the predecessor-in-interest of  

the appellants and respondent no. 9 were duly registered with  

the office of the Sub-Registrar. Neither any document nor any of  

the Powers of Attorney was ever got cancelled by the appellants.  

37. The appellants also further contended before us that they  

had  revoked  the  Powers  of  Attorney  executed  in  favour  of  

respondent  no.  1  by  executing  a  fresh  Power  of  Attorney  in  

favour of said Narendra M. Patel. It is significant to note that  

despite filing of the complaints with the police nothing was done  

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by the appellants to bring the allegations contained in the said  

complaints  to  the  notice  and  knowledge  of  the  High  Court  

although  that  could  have  been  comfortably  done  had  the  

appellants wished to do so. The Power of Attorney in favour of  

said  Narendra  M.  Patel  was  executed  by  the  appellants  on  

26.04.2006 whereas the first complaint was filed with the police  

on  01.05.2006  and  the  consent  terms  were  entered  into  on  

22.05.2006.  The  consent  decree  was  actually  passed  by  the  

High Court on 13.06.2006.  

38. The  appellants,  thus,  had  ample  time  and  opportunity  

with  them  to  bring  the  said  allegations  to  the  notice  and  

knowledge of the High Court at any time between 26.04.2006  

and  13.06.2006.  The  appellants  had  considerable  amount  of  

time available with them. As noted earlier, with regard to the  

complaints  filed,  the  appellants  did  not  take  any  follow  up  

action to bring them their logical end.

39. It is crystal clear that the appellants chose not to avail an  

opportunity  which  was  available  to  them.  In  such  

circumstances, it will not be appropriate to say that the deeds  

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and documents as well as the Powers of Attorney executed in  

favour  of  respondent  no.  9  stood  revoked  merely  by  filing  

complaints with the police. We cannot lose sight of the fact that  

a registered document has a lot of sanctity attached to it and  

this sanctity cannot be allowed to be lost without following the  

proper procedure.  

40. In any event, if we direct our attention to the contents of  

the Power of Attorney executed by the appellants in favour of  

said Narender M. Patel,  we find that the stand taken by the  

appellants throughout that they had, by executing a Power of  

Attorney in favour of Narender M. Patel, revoked the Powers of  

Attorney executed in favour of respondent no. 9 to be baseless.  

In fact, a look at the terms of the Power of Attorney executed in  

favour of Narender M. Patel  would show to the contrary. The  

relevant portion of the said Power of Attorney is being extracted  

hereinbelow: -

“6. To correspond with  all  the body cooperate   for otherwise  including government and  semi-   government  bodies  and  Municipal  Corporation   of Greater Bombay and make applications etc.   in respect of any of the matters pertaining to the  said the property and the said premises.

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AND  FURTHER  that  these  presents  and  the   powers hereby given shall in no wise extend or   be  deemed  or  continued  to  extend  to  repeal,  revoke,  determine  or  make  void  any  other  power  or  powers  of  attorney  at  any  time  heretobefore or hereafter given or executed by  us  to  or  in  favour  of  any  other  person  or   persons for the  same or  any distinct  or  other  purpose or purposes but such power or powers   shall  remain  and  be  of  the  same  authority,   validity and power, force and effect as if these  presents had not been made.”

(emphasis supplied)

41.   Before we part with the discussion, we wish to make note  

of the fact that respondent no. 9 has, in the counter-affidavit  

filed in this Court, prayed for declaring the consent terms to be  

cancelled and annulled on the ground that the consent terms  

have been rendered infructuous due to the failure of respondent  

no. 8 to perform his obligations as per the consent terms. We  

have a strong feeling that a money game is being played. Since  

the stakes are high, each party before us is trying to draw the  

maximum advantage. To us, there seems to be no other reason  

for respondent no. 9 having adopted such a course of action.

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42. In  view  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  are  of  the  

considered view that entering into the compromise as also filing  

of the same in the High court of Bombay by respondent no. 9 on  

behalf of the appellants was without any fraud and well within  

the scope of his authority. Accordingly, we find no merit in the  

present appeals and the same are hereby dismissed. There will  

be no order as to costs.  

 .......................………………J.                                                       [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

   .................…………… …...J.

                                                      [R.M. Lodha]

New Delhi April 21, 2010.

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