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PETITIONER: SHAM LAL & ORS. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: AMAR NATH & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/09/1969

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1643            1970 SCR  (2) 489  1970 SCC  (1)  33

ACT:     Hindu  Law--Stridhana--Hindu widow leaving property  not shulka--Marriage  in approved form--Order of  succession  to property.

HEADNOTE:     The  rules  relating to succession to  Stridhana,  other than shulka, of a Hindu woman who was married in an approved form of marriage are stated in Yajnyawalkya’s text as:  ’her kinsmen  take it, if she die without issue’.  The  order  of succession  was  elaborated in the.  Mitakshara,  which  was translated  by Colebrooke as: (i) unmarried  daughter,  (ii) married  daughter  who  is  unprovided  for,  (iii)  married daughter who is provided for, (iv) daughter’s daughter,  (v) daughter’s  son,  (vi) son, (vii) son’s son, and  (viii)  if there  be  none  of these the srridhana  then  goes  to  her hugband, and if he is dead, to the husband’s heirs.     In the present case., a Hindu widow, who was married  in an  approved form of marriage died leaving  stridhana  which was  not shulka.  She did not leave behind any of the  heirs mentioned  in  items   (i) to (vii)  but there  was  a  pre- deceased  son’s  daughters.  On the question  of  preference between  the son’s daughters and her husband’s brothers  son (who was the husband’s nearest heir).     HELD: (i) Colebrooke’s translation has been accepted  by the  Judicial Committee and Hindu scholars as  bringing  out correctly  the  meaning  of the  relevant  passages  in  the Mitakshara,  and it is now well-settled that the’  stridhana of a Hindu woman governed by Mitakshara passes in the  order mentioned in the Mitakshara. [496 H; 497 A-C]     Bhirnacharya Bin  Venkappacharya v. Ramcharya Bin I.L.R. 33 Bom. 452, referred to. (2)  The contention that the expression ’without  issue’  in Yajnywalkya  was elaborated as ’leaving no progeny’  by  the Mitakshara and that therefore the heirs (i) to (vii)  should be  understood  as  only  illustrations  of  the  expression ’progeny’ and hence, son’s daughters are not excluded   from the  expression ’progeny’, is opposed to  the   commentaries of   Narada,  Gautama  and other commentators,  and  to  the decisions  of  the Judicial Committee and  the  High  Courts rendered for over a century. [497 E-H]

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   (3) In the matter of succession to stridhana propinquity is  neither  the sole nor a principal test as shown  by  the fact that daughter’s daughter and daughter’s son succeed  in preference to the son. [498 B-C] 490     (4)  The  rule  of  interpretation  that  the  masculine includes  the  feminine and therefore ’softs  son’  includes ’softs   daughter’, is inapplicable,   because,  ’daughter’s daughter’ is shown taking  precedence over ’daughter’s son’. [489 E]     (5)  The  Hindu Women’s Rights tO  Property  Act,  1937, applies  to the separate property left by a Hindu  male  and not to the property of a Hindu letoale. [500 C-D]     Kumar Raghava Surendra Sahi v. Babui Lachmi Kuer, (1939) 1. L.R. 18 Pat. 590 and Baj Kesserbai v. Huns Raj Morarji  & Anr. L.R. 33 I.A. 176, distinguished.     Annagouda  Nathgouda  Patil v. Court  of  Wards,  [1952] S.C.R.  208, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  1954  and 1955 of 1966.      Appeals from the judgment and decree dated May 30, 1963     the  Punjab High Court in Regular First Appeal No,.  105 of 1957.     A.K.  Sen and R.K. Aggarwal, for the appellant (in  C.A. No.  1954 of 1966). and respondents Nos. 5, 6, 8 and  9  (in C.A. No. 1955 of 1966).     Bishan Narain, B.P. Maheshwari  and R.K. Gupta, for  the appellants (in C.A. No. 1955 of 1966) and respondents Nos. 2 to 6 (in C.A. No. 1954 of 1966).     Sarjoo  Prasad, Rameshwar Prasad  and A.D.  Mathur,  for respondent No. 1 (in both the appeals).     S.M. Jain, for respondents Nos. 13(i) to 13(iv) (in C.A. No.  1954 of 1966) and respondents Nos. 12(i) to 12(iv)  (in C.A. No. 1955 of 1966).     Hegde,  J. The question of law that arises for  decision in these appeals by certificate is whether the daughters  of a pre-deceased son of a Hindu Woman are entitled to  succeed to her stridhana ? The trial court answered the question  in the  affirmative  but the High Court in appeal came  to  the conclusion  that  they are not fentitled to succeed  to  the estate in question.     The  material facts of this case are few.  For a  proper understanding  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  it  will   be convenient  to have ’before us the admitted pedigree of  the family.  It is as follows: 492     The finding of the trial court that the suit  properties are  the  stridhana properties of Barji was  not  contestect before the High Court.  In tins Court at one stage ’a feeble attempt was made on behalf of the appellants to contest that finding.  We did not permit that finding to be challenged as the  same  had not been challenged before  the  High  Court. Therefore we proceed  on  the basis of that finding.   Barji died   in  September  1950.   Her  husband  Patu   Ram   had predeceased her.  It appears that he died sometime in  1904. Patu Ram’s father Bool Chand as well as Patu Ram’s  brothers Tulsi  Ram, Behari Lal and Hira Lal had  predeceased  Barji. Patu Ram and Barji had a son  by  name Jugal Kishore wno had predeceased  Patu Ram  leaving  behind him his widow  Bindri wno  died in 1931.  They had no children. Radha Kishan,  the adopted  son  of  Patu Ram and Barji  died  about  20  years

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’before  the  death of Barji leaving behind him  his  widow, defendant No. 6.  Radha Kishan had live  children  including defendants  Nos.  1  to 3 through  another  wife.   His  son Roshanlal  had died a few months before the death of  Barji. His  daughter Balwanti had predeceased Barji leaving  behind her  children defendants 4 and 5.  Tulsi Ram’s  son  Prahlad Rai   had  also predeceased Barji leaving behind  his  widow defendant  No.  8  and son defendant No.  7.   By  the  time succession  to the  estate of Barji opened all the  children of  Behari  Lal and Hizalal had died but some  of  them  had children  and  grand children, as, seen from  the  pedigree. After  the  death  of  Barji, her  properties  came  to  the possession of defendant No. 6.  Defendant No. 1 sued for the possession of those properties on the ground that  she   and her  sisters are preferential heirs to the  deceased  Barji. To  that suit she did not make Amar Nath, the  plaintiff  in the  present  suit, a party.  Amar  Nath’s  application  for being impleaded as a party in that suit was opposed by the 1 st  defendant  and  the  said  application  was   ultimately rejected  by  the  court.  The dispute   in  that  suit  was referred  to arbitration.  The arbitrators upheld the  claim of defendants Nos. 1 to 3.  Thereafter the present suit  was brought.       the High Court as well as in the trial  court there was a triangular contest.  The plaintiff claimed  that he was exclusively entitled the suit properties,  defendants Nos.  1  to  3 claimed that they are the  nearest  heirs  to Barji;  some  of the other defendants  contended  that  they succeeded  to  the suit properties as  co-tenants  with  the plaintiff.  In this Court all the contesting defendants sail together.  As mentioned earlier, the trial  court  ’accepted the claim of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 but the High Court  held that  the  plaintiff was exclusively entitled  to  the  suit properties,  he  being  the  nearest heir to  the  deceased. That finding is contested both by defendants Nos. 1 to 3  as well  as by the other contesting defendants.  That.  is  how the aforementioned two appeals came to be filed.      In arriving at its finding the High Court relied on the rules  of  succession  found in  paragraph  147  of  Mulla’s Principles of Hindu 493 Law (13th Edn.).  It came to the conclusion that those rules are exhaustive.  On the basis of those rules, it ruled  that defendants  Nos. 1 to 3 were not entitled to succeed to  the estate  of  Barji.  So  far  as  the  other  defendants  are concerned  it  rejected their claim on the  ground  that  as between  the  plaintiff  and  themselves  the  former  is  a preferential heir as he is the nearest in degree to Barji.     It  is  the  admitted  case  of  the  parties  that  the properties  in  question are not shulka and that  Barji  was married  in  one  of the approved  forms.   Therefore  while pronouncing.  on the competing claims made in this case,  we must  be  guided by the order of  succession  prescribed  in paragraph  147,  if  the same  is  correct  and  exhaustive. Paragraph 147 says: "Stridhana other than shulka passes in the following  order: (1) unmarried daughter; (2) married daughter who is unprovided for; (3) married daughter who is provided for; (4) daughter’s daughter; (5) daughter’s son; (6) son; (7) son’s son. If there be none of these, in other words, if the woman dies without leaving any issue, her stridhana, if she was married in  an approved form, goes to her husband, and after him, to

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the husband’s heirs in order of their succession to him;  on failure  of  the  husband’s  heirs, it  goes  to  her  blood relations  in preference to the Government.  But if she  was married  in an unapproved form, it goes to her mother,  then to  her father, and then to the father’s heirs and then  to. the  husband’s heirs in preference to the Government".   The legal  position  is  stated in identical  terms  in  Mayne’s treatise on Hindu Law (Eleventh  Edn.--Paragrah  623,  pages 744 to 746) as well as in the other text books on Hindu  Law referred  to at the time of the hearing.  At this  stage  it may  be  mentioned  that the correctness  of  the  order  of succession  mentioned in paragraph 147 till we come to  item No.  7  (son’s son) was not challenged.  The  same  is  well settled  bY decided cases.  It is not necessary to refer  to those  cases.   The  only contention advanced on  behalf  of some  of the defendants is that after son’s sons come  sons’ daughters.    Alternatively  it  was  contended   that   the expression  "son’s son" includes "son’S daughter".  We  have to see whether these contentions are well founded. The rules relating to succession to stridhana enunciated  in the text books are based on Yajnyawalcya’s text "her kinsmen take  it,    if she die without issue".  This  statement  is elaborated  by  Vijnyaneswara in Mitakshara.   The  relevant portions thereof as transtated by H.T. Colebrooke are  found in  placita  8,  9,  10 and 11 in Section  XI  of  his  book "Mitacshara".  They read as follows: 494               "8.   A   woman’s  property  has   been   thus               described.               The author next propounds the distribution  of               it: ’Her  kinsmen take it, if she die  without               issue’.                   9. If a woman die ’without issue’ that  is               leaving no progeny; in other Words, having  no               daughter    nor   daughter’s   daughter    nor               daughter’s  son, nor son, nor son’s  son;  the               woman’s property, as above  described,   shall               be  taken by her kinsmen; namely  her  husband               ’and   the  rest,  as  will   be   (forthwith)               explained.                   10.   The  kinsmen  have   been   declared               generally  to be competent  to succeed   to  a               woman’s     property.     The    author    now               distinguishes  differec at heirs according  to               the diversity of the marriage ceremonies.  The               property of a childless woman, married in  the               form  denominated  Brahma, or in  any  of  the               four   (unblamed modes of marriage),  goes  to               her  husband:  but, if she leave  progeny,  it               will go to her (daughter’s) daughters: and, in               other  forms of marriage (as the Asura &  c.),               it goes to her father (and mother, on  failure               of  her own issue).                   11.  Of  a woman dying without  issue   as               before  stated, and who, had become a wife  by               any of the four modes of marriage  denominated               Brahma,  Daiva,  Arsha  and  Prajapatya,   the               (whole) property, as before described, belongs               in the first place to her husband.  On failure               of  him,  it  goes  to  his  nearest   kinsmen               (sapindas) allied by funeral oblations.   But,               in  the other forms of marriage called  Asura,               Gandharba, Racshasa and Paisacha; the property               of  ’a childless woman goes to   her  parents,               that  is,  to  her  father  and  mother.   The

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             succession devolves first (and the reason  has               been be,fore explained) on the mother, who  is               virtually( exhibited (first) in the elliptical               pitrigami  implying ’goes (gachhati)  to  both                             parents  (pitarau;), that is to the mo ther  and               to  the  father’.  On failure of  them,  their               next of kin take the succession."     These passages have received interpretation at the hands of  the  Judicial Committee as well as the  High  Courts  in India  and  the  law  is  now settled  as  to  the  mode  of succession  to  stridhana under Mitakshara  until  we  reach son’s  son. The controversy now is as to who should  succeed to  such an estate if none of the heirs mentioned  in  items Nos.  1 to. 7 in paragraph  147  of Mullas Hindu Law  is  in existence at the time of the death of the woman concerned. 495     Mr. A.K. Sen, learned Counsel for some of the defendants contested  the  correctness of Colebrooke’s  translation  in certain respects. He wanted us to examine the original  text to  find out whether the translation found in placita  9  is correct  ?   The parties did not place before us  either  an admitted  translation  of  the  original  text  or  even  an official   translation.   Colebrooke  is   a   distinguished oriental  scholar.   The Judicial Committee as well  as  the various  High  Courts  in this country have  relied  on  his translation  of Mitakshara in dealing with the  question  of inheritance.   Jogendra Nath Bhattacharya in his  commentary on  Hindu Law( 2nd Edn ) deals with the order of  succession under Mitakshara to stridhana property in Chapter VI of that book.  His translation of the  relevant commentaries accords with  those made by Colebrooke.   To the same effect is  the opinion expressed by Justice Chandavarkar in Bhimacharya Bin Venkappacharya v. Ramcharya Bin Bhimacharya(1). Hence we are unable  to agree with Mr. Sen that Colebrooke’s  translation does  not bring out accurately the meaning of  the  relevant passages in Mitakshara.  Colebrooke in his book ’Mitakshara’ published  in  1869 sets out the order of succession   to  a woman’s  stridhana properties at page 15 8 thus:     Maiden daughter                           ..     1     Unendowed married daughter                ..     2     Endowed married daughter                  ..     3     Daughter’s daughter                       ..     4     Daughter’s son                            ..     5     Son                                       ..     6     Grandson                                  ..     7     Husband                                   ..     8 If  the  contention  of defendants  is  correct  then  son’s daughter  and  not  husband  should  have  come  after   the grandson.  But that is not the case.     Mr. Bishan Narain, learned Counsel for defendants Nos. 1 to  3  contended that the list given in  Mitakshra  is  only illustrative and not exhaustive. He urged that  Yajnyawalcya had  stated  that "a woman’s property would devolve  on  her kinsmen if she died without issue" which means that it would devolve  on   her  progeny which expression  includes  son’s daughter  as  well.  In this connection he  also  relied  on Vijnyaneswara’s  commentary  stating  that  the   expression ’without issue’ found in  Yajnyawalcya  text means  "leaving no progeny".  On the basis of these statements he  contended that  even according to Vijnyaneswara, the deceased  woman’s progeny  would  take  her stridhana  in  preference  to  her kinsmen including her husband.  On the basis of this premise he proceeded to argue that the other words used in placita 9 viz.:

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(1)I.L.R 33 Born. 452 496 "having  no daughter nor daughter’s daughter nor  daughter’s son  nor son nor son’s son" should be understood  as  merely being illustrations of the word "progeny".  This  contention is  opposed to the commentaries by Narada, Gautama  and  the later  commentators.  More than that it runs counter to  the decisions rendered by the Judicial Committee and the various High Courts during the last over a century.  It is now  well settled  that  stridhana   of  a  Hindu  woman  governed  by Mitakshra passes in the order mentioned in Mitakshra and the children  of  the deceased woman do not take the same  as  a body either jointly or as tenants in common.  Only the heirs belonging  to  a  class take the properties  as  tenants  in common.     Mr.  Bishan Narain next contended that  under  Mitakshra propinquity is the test of inheritance.  Therefore there  is no  reason why the deceased woman’s husband’s brother’s  son should  take  the  properties in  preference  to  her  son’s daughters.  We do not think that in the matter of succession to stridhana  propinquity  was considered by the law  givers as  the sole or even the principal test, otherwise there  is no  justification for a daughter’s daughter or a  daughter’s son to succeed to the estate of a woman in preference to her son.  It is true that it is not easy to find out the  reason behind  the rules relating to succession to stridhana.   But that  is equally true of many other branches of  our  family laws.   These  contradictions  are  inevitable  in  society- religious  matters  particularly when our social  laws  were controlled by our religious beliefs and our law givers  were our religious preceptorS.  It is for the legislature to step in ’and bring about harmony between the society and the laws governing  it.  That is why our Parliament  enacted  several statutes in 1955 to amend the Hindu Law in various respects.     We  are  unable to accept the contention of  Mr.  Bishan Narain that the expression son’s son includes son’s daughter as  according to the rules of interpretation  the  masculine includes  the  feminine.  That  rule  of  interpretation  is inapplicable  in  the present case  as  daughter’s  daughter succeeds to the stridhana in preference  to daughter’s  son. The  order  of succession prescribed clearly rules  out  the application of that rule of interpretation.     Mr.  Sen  in support of his contention that  on  a  true interpretation  of  the relevant  passages  in  ’Mitakshra’, defendants  Nos. 1 to. 3 are preferential heirs to  deceased Barji,  relied  on certain passages in some of  the  decided cases.  First he referred to the decision of the Patna  High Court  in  Kumar  Raghava Surendra  Sahi  v..  Babui  Lachmi Kuer(1).  Therein the dispute related to the succession.  to the properties left by a maiden ’and not by a married (1) 1939 I.L.R. 18 Pat. Sqo (2) L.R. 33 I.A. 176. 497 woman.   The  rules  relating  to  the  succession  to   the stridhana  of  a deceased maiden are wholly  different  from those  relating to succession to the stridhana of a  married woman.   Therefore the observations made in regard to  those rules  have no relevance for our present purpose.   He  next invited our attention  to  certain passages in the  decision of  the  Judicial  Committee in Bali  Kesserbai  v.  Hunsraj Morarji  and anr.(1).  Therein the dispute was  between  Bai Kesserbai the surviving co-widow of the deceased  Bachubai’s husband  Koreji  Haridass,  Hunsraj  Morarji  the  separated nephew  of Koreji, being the son of his eldest brother,  who predeceased  Bachubai  and Bai Monghibai, the  widow  of  ’a

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younger  brother of Koreji named Ranchordass Haridass.   The question for consideration by the Judicial Committee was  as to  the  true scope of the latter part of the placing  9  in Colebrooke’s  Mitakshara which says "if a woman die  without issue,   that  is,  leaving  no  progeny   ....the   woman’s property   ............   shall   be taken  by  her  kinsmen namely  her  husband  and  the rest  as  will  be  forthwith explained".  Their Lordships observed that there can  be  no reasonable doubt that according to Mitakshara definition  of sapinda, husband and wife are sapindas to each other and the co-widow  of  the husband of the deceased  was  the  nearest sapinda  of the deceased woman’s husband and hence  entitled to  succeed to the estate in question. This  decision  again does not bear on the point under consideration.     Lastly  Mr.  Sen  contended that in view  of  the  Hindu Woman’s  Rights to Property Act (XVIII of 1937), it must  be held   that  defendants  1  to 3 are  nearer  heirs  to  the deceased  than the plaintiff. This contention was  negatived by  the  High Court on the basis of the rule laid  down  ’by this  Court in Annagouda Nathgouda Patil v. Court  of  Wards and anr. (2) wherein this Court dealing with Act 11 of  1929 observed:                     "The question is whether the  provisions               of this Act can at all be invoked to determine               the heirs of a Hindu female in respect of  her               stridhan  property.  The object of the Act  as               stated  in the preamble is to alter the  order               in  which certain heirs of a Hindu male  dying               intestate  are  entitled  to  succeed  to  his               estate; and section 1 (2) expressly lays  down               that ’the Act applies only to persons who  but               for  the passing of this Act would  have  been               subject  to the Law of Mitakshara  in  respect               of   the  provisions herein  enacted,  and  it               applies to such persons in respect only of the               property of males not held in coparcenary  and               not disposed of by will.’   Thus the scope  of               the  Act  is limited.  It  governs  succession               only to the separate property of a Hindu  male               who  dies intestate.  It does  not  alter  the               law as regards the               (2) [1952] S.C.R. 208.               498               devolution of any other kind of property owned               by  a  Hindu  male and  does  not  purport  to               regulate succession to the property of a Hindu               female  at  all.  It is to be noted  that  the               Act’  does  not  make  these  four   relations               statutory  heirs  under  the  Mitakshara   Law               under    all   circumstances  and   for   ’all               purposes;  it makes them heirs only  when  the               proportion  is  a  male and  the  property  in               respect to which it is sought to be applied is               his separate property."                   Similar  would be the position  under  the               Hindu  Woman’s  Right to Property  Act,  1937.               Section  3(1) of that Act which  provides               for the devolution of the property reads thus:                   "When  a Hindu governed by  the  Dayabhaga               School of Hindu Law dies intestate leaving any               property  and  when a Hindu  governed  by  any               other school of Hindu law or by customary  law               dies  intestate leaving separate property  his               widow  or if there is more than one widow  all               his  widows  together shall,  subject  to  the

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             provisions of sub-section (3) be entitled  i,n               respect  of  property in respect of  which  he               dies   intestate  to  the  same  share  as   a               son  ......  "     From this provision it is clear that Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 applies only to the separate  property left  by  a  Hindu male. It does not  apply  either  to  the coparcenary property or to the property of a Hindu female.     For  the reasons mentioned above these appeals fail  and they are dismissed with costs--advocates’ fee one set. V.P.S. Appeals dismissed. L2Sup.CI/70 499