REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5896 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.7445 of 2009)

Shalini Shyam Shetty and another ..Appellant(s)

Versus  

Rajendra Shankar Patil ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  has  been  filed  by  the  original  

defendant  challenging  the  judgment  and  order  

dated  09.02.2009  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  

rendered  in  the  Writ  Petition  filed  under  

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Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The  

High Court dismissed the writ petition in view  

of concurrent finding of two lower courts and  

High  Court  thought  that  no  interference  in  

exercise of its writ jurisdiction is warranted.

3. The  facts  of  the  case  are  that  the  

respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction  

on the grounds of breach of terms of tenancy,  

damage  to  the  property  as  well  as  causing  

nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff and the  

other  occupants.  As  per  the  plaintiff  the  

original defendant was the tenant in respect of  

Room No.3 (hereinafter as suit premises) and was  

paying  monthly  rent  of  Rs.20/-  including  the  

water  charges  and  excluding  the  electricity  

charges. The case of the plaintiff is that only  

the  suit  premises  was  let  out  though  the  

original  tenant  was  allowed  to  use  a  covered  

space of 10’x 4’, but the same was for common  

usage and for access to W.C and water tap along  

with the other tenants.

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4. Plaintiff claims that somewhere in January 2000,  

the  defendant  had  requested  the  plaintiff  to  

give keys of the two doors to clean the ‘Sherry’  

portion.  But  the  said  keys  were  not  returned  

even  after  2-3  days  and  the  plaintiff  became  

suspicious  and  requested  the  defendant  for  

returning the keys, but in vain. Suspecting some  

foul play, the plaintiff entered the ‘sherry’ to  

find  that  the  defendant  had  placed  his  items  

over there and removed the drainage cover which  

was there in the Sherry. A police complaint was  

made with regard to the unauthorized possession  

but  nothing  happened.  The  plaintiff  then  

requested the defendant to remove those articles  

but the request of the plaintiff was not heeded.

5. The defendant/appellant’s father is said to have  

filed a suit for relief of declaration as tenant  

in  the  premises  and  to  further  restrain  the  

landlord  from  interfering  in  the  tenanted  

premises.  In  the  said  suit  injunction  was  

granted.  Thereafter,  the  plaintiff  had  

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demolished a wall that was there in the Sherry  

and put up a new door.

6. The  original  defendant  expired  during  the  

pendency of the suit and his LRs were brought on  

record  and  they,  in  their  written  statement,  

admitted the relationship between the parties,  

but  they  denied  all  the  allegations  against  

them. They made a claim that the space measuring  

about 10’x4’ abutting the entrance door of suit  

premises was in their exclusive use. As regards  

the suit filed by the appellant’s father it was  

submitted that the same was settled outside the  

court with the understanding that the defendant  

would withdraw his suit, whereas the plaintiff  

will  withdraw  his  suit  simultaneously.  An  

affidavit  dated  16.03.01  was  filed  to  that  

effect.

7. The  learned  Court  of  Small  Causes  at  Mumbai,  

Bandra Branch vide its judgment dated 30.10.07  

decreed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent and  

directed the defendantS to hand over the vacant  

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and peaceful possession of the suit premises to  

the  plaintiff  within  a  period  of  four  months  

from the date of the order. It was held that at  

the time of filing of the present suit, as per  

evidence  on  record,  the  defendants  were  in  

unlawful occupation of the sherry portion of the  

suit property, which was admittedly not let out.  

As regards the settlement outside court it was  

held that the affidavit, Exhibit ‘E’, relied on  

by the defendants merely speaks of withdrawal of  

the  suit  of  defendants  and  settlement  of  

dispute. There is no mention about the present  

suit being settled. It was noted that admittedly  

the  plaintiff  has  no  documentary  evidence  to  

prove  that  the  defendants  had  encroached  and  

occupied  the  sherry  portion  of  the  suit  

property.  But  it  was  observed  that  there  is  

corroborative  evidence  in  this  behalf  in  the  

form of NC Slip Exhibit ‘G’ which shows that the  

complaint  was  filed  immediately  after  the  

plaintiff learnt about this unlawful possession.  

Reliance was also placed on paragraph 10 of the  

examination-in-chief of the D.W.1 which supports  

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the plaintiff’s version.  

8. It was held that the defendants admit that at  

some point prior to the filing of the present  

suit the ‘sherry portion’ was in the occupation  

of the deceased defendant. This has to be read  

in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  the  aforesaid  

portion  was  never  let  out  to  the  deceased  

defendant.  As  such  the  occupation  of  the  

deceased  defendant  over  the  said  portion  was  

unlawful as he had no right to occupy the same.

9. Further reference was made to the suit filed by  

the  appellant’s  father  wherein  an  injunction  

order was passed in his favour. It was after the  

said injunction order that the defendants had  

demolished  the  wall  in  the  sherry  and  

constructed  a  door.  They  had  also  removed  

chamber covers and replaced it with tiles. As  

such  it  was  held  that  the  conduct  of  the  

defendants resulted in unhygienic conditions as  

it was impossible to clean the drains. On behalf  

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of  the  defendants  there  was  no  whisper  or  

challenge to the entire testimony on this point  

anywhere in the cross-examination. The result of  

this was nuisance and annoyance to the plaintiff  

as  well  as  to  other  occupants  of  the  suit  

property and this testimony has also not been  

challenged.

10. An  appeal  was  filed  against  this  order.  The  

First  Appellate  Court  vide  its  order  dated  

11.09.08 partly allowed the appeal. The trial  

Court’s judgment was confirmed on the ground of  

causing waste and damage as contemplated under  

Section  16  (1)  (a)  of  the  Maharashtra  Rent  

Control Act, but the findings of the trial Court  

on the ground of nuisance and annoyance were set  

aside.

11. The  Appellate  Court  noticed  that  in  the  suit  

filed by the defendants against the plaintiff,  

the defendants have specifically come out with  

the case that the dispute between the deceased  

defendant and the plaintiff with regard to the  

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alleged  Sherry  premises,  was  settled  and  an  

affidavit  to  this  effect  dated  16.03.01  was  

executed by the defendant. The Appellate Court  

thought it would be just and proper to take on  

record  the  certified  copy  of  the  order  of  

dismissal of suit filed by the defendants dated  

03.03.07 under provisions of Order 41 Rule 27  

(b) CPC. On perusal of the same it was found  

that the same was dismissed for default.

12. The Appellate Court placing reliance on para 10  

of the affidavit of examination-in-chief of the  

defendants  came  to  a  conclusion  that  it  was  

mentioned  therein  that  the  possession  of  the  

Sherry  was  with  him  and  the  said  defendants  

handed over the possession to the plaintiff, as  

per affidavit dated 16.03.01. As such it was for  

the  defendants  to  explain  how  they  were  

occupying the said premises, to which there has  

been no reasonable explanation offered. It was  

concluded  that  the  defendants  had  encroached  

upon the Sherry premises which was not let out  

to them and the said act definitely amounted to  

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causing  waste  and  damage  to  plaintiff’s  

property.

13. With respect to the finding of nuisance it was  

observed by the Appellate Court that admittedly,  

none of the neighbouring occupier was examined  

by the plaintiff, which was necessary. As such  

under such circumstances, just because version  

of  plaintiff  is  not  challenged  seriously  it  

cannot  be  concluded  that  the  plaintiff  has  

established his case. The Appellate Court set  

aside the finding of the trial Court on this  

ground only but confirmed the finding on other  

grounds of eviction.

14. The appellants then moved to the High Court with  

a prayer to issue a writ of certiorari and/or  

any other writ, order or command and call for  

the  papers  and  proceedings  from  the  lower  

courts.  The  High  Court  dismissed  the  Writ  

Petition  only  on  the  ground  that  against  

concurrent finding of facts by the Courts below  

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the  exercise  of  writ  jurisdiction  is  not  

warranted.

15. The facts of the case have been discussed in  

detail in order to show that in a pure dispute  

of landlord and tenant between private parties,  

a  writ  petition  was  entertained  by  the  High  

Court. It did not pass any order on the writ  

petition, inter alia, on the ground that there  

are concurrent findings of fact. If the findings  

have not been concurrent, the High Court might  

have interfered. In any event High Court did not  

hold that a writ petition is not maintainable in  

a dispute between landlord and tenant in which  

both are private parties and the dispute is of  

civil nature.

16. It was urged before this Court that petitions  

under Article 227 of the Constitution are filed  

against  orders  of  Civil  Court  and  even  in  

disputes between landlord and tenant. Under the  

Bombay  High  Court  Rules,  such  petitions  are  

called writ petitions.

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17. This  Court  is  unable  to  appreciate  this  

submission. First of all this Court finds that  

the  petition  which  was  filed  before  the  High  

Court was a pure and simple writ petition. It  

was  labeled  as  Writ  Petition  No.7926  of  2008  

(page 75 of the SLP paper book).  

18. In paragraph 6 of the writ petition it had been  

categorically stated:

“That no efficacious remedy is available  to  the  petitioners  than  the  present  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  (page  89  of  SLP  paper book)”

19.   In  the  prayer  portion  also  a  writ  of  

certiorari has been prayed for in the following  

terms:

“(a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased  to issue a writ of certiorari and/or any  other writ, order or command and call upon  the  papers  and  proceedings  of  Appeal  No.314 of 2007 together with Exh.8 in RAE  Suit No.146 of 2001 and also R.A.D. Suit  Stamp No.61 of 2001 (Suit No.6/8 of 2001)  

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and  after  going  through  the  legality,  validity and propriety of the said Appeal  and the said other matters, this Hon’ble  Court be pleased to quash and/or set aside  the  judgment  and  decree  dated  11th  September,  2008  passed  by  the  Hon’ble  Appeal Court in Appeal No.314 of 2007 of  the  Petitioners  and  allow  the  same  in  toto”.

20. Therefore, the petition filed before the High  

Court was a writ petition.

21. Now coming to the Bombay High Court Rules, this  

Court finds that in Chapter I Rule 2B of the  

Bombay High Court (Appellate Side) Rules, 1960  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  rules)  it  is  

provided:

“2B.  Petitions/applications  under  Article  226 an/or 227 of the Constitution of India,  arising out of/or relating to an order of  penalty  or  confiscation  etc.  passed  under  any special statute    

All petitions/applications under Article  226 an/or 227 of the Constitution of India,  arising out of or relating to an order of  penalty or confiscation or an order in the  nature thereof an order otherwise of a penal  character  and  passed  under  any  special  statute  shall  be  heard  and  decided  by  a  Division Bench hearing Writ Petitions.”

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22. It  does  not  appear  from  the  said  Rules  that  

petitions  under  Article  227  are  called  writ  

petitions. What has been provided under the said  

Rules is that petitions under Article 227 filed  

in respect of certain category of cases will be  

heard  by  a  Division  Bench  hearing  writ  

petitions.  That  is  merely  indicative  of  the  

forum where such petitions will be heard.

23. Chapter XVII of the Rules deals petitions under  

Articles  226  and  227  and  applications  under  

Article 228 and rules for issue of writs and  

orders under those Articles. In Chapter XVII,  

Rules 1 to 16 deal with petitions under Article  

226 of the Constitution.

24. Rule 17 deals with application under Articles  

227 and 228. If a comparison is made between  

Rule 1 of Chapter XVII and Rule 17 of the same  

Chapter it will be clear that petitions under  

Article  226  and  those  under  Article  227  are  

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treated differently.  Both these Rules are set  

out one after the other:

“1. (i) Applications for issue of writs,  directions,  etc.  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  

Every  application  for  the  issue  of  a  direction, order or writ under Article 226  of the Constitution shall, if the matter in  dispute  is  or  has  arisen  substantially  outside  Greater  Bombay,  be  heard  and  disposed  of  by  a  Division  Bench  to  be  appointed  by  the  Chief  Justice.  The  application shall set out therein the relief  sought  and  the  grounds  on  which  it  is  sought,  it  shall  he  solemnly  affirmed  or  supported  by  an  affidavit  In  every  such  application,  the  applicant  shall  state  whether he has made any other application to  the  Supreme  Court  or  the  High  Court  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  and  how  that  application has been disposed of.  

(ii)  Applicant  to  inform  Court,  if  during  pendency  of  an  application,  the  Supreme  Court has been approached.  

If the applicant makes an application to  the  Supreme  Court  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  during  the  pendency  of  the  application  in  the  High  Court,  he  shall  forthwith bring this fact to the notice of  the High Court filing an affidavit in the  case  and  shall  furnish  a  copy  of  such  affidavit to the other side.  

(iii)  Hearing  may  be  adjourned  pending  decision by Supreme Court.   

The Court may adjourn the hearing of the  application made to it pending the decision  of the Supreme Court in the matter.”  

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“17.   (i) Applications under Article 227  and 228

An application invoking the jurisdiction  of the High Court under Article 227 of the  Constitution  or  under  Article  228  of  the  Constitution,  shall  be  filed  on  the  Appellate  Side  of  the  High  Court  and  be  heard and disposed of by a Division bench to  be  appointed  by  the  Chief  Justice.   The  application shall set out therein the relief  sought  and  the  grounds  on  which  it  is  sought.  It shall be solemnly affirmed or  supported by an affidavit.  In every such  application,  the  applicant  shall  state  whether he has made any other application to  the  Supreme  Court  or  the  High  Court  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  and  how  that  application is disposed of.

(ii) Application to inform Court, if, during  pendency  of  an  application,  the  Supreme  Court is approached.

If the applicant makes an application to  the  Supreme  Court  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  during  the  pendency  of  the  application  in  the  High  Court,  he  shall  forthwith bring this fact to the notice of  the High Court by filing an affidavit in the  case  and  shall  furnish  a  copy  of  such  affidavit to the other side.   

(iii)  Hearing  may  be  adjourned  pending  decision by Supreme Court

The Court may adjourn the hearing of the  application made to it pending the decision  of the Supreme Court in the matter.  

(iv) Rule 2 to 16 to apply mutatis mutandis Provision of Rules 2 to 16 above shall  

apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  all  such  applications.  

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25. The distinction between the two proceedings also  

came up for consideration before the Bombay High  

Court  and  in  the  case  of  Jhaman  Karamsingh  Dadlani vs.  Ramanlal  Maneklal  Kantawala (AIR  1975 Bombay 182) the Bombay High Court held:

“2. This High Court since its establishment  in 1862 under the Letters Patent has been  exercising  original  as  well  as  appellate  jurisdiction  and  its  functioning  is  regulated  by  'the  Bombay  High  Court  (Original Side) Rules, 1957’ and 'Rules of  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay,  Appellate Side, 1960' (hereinafter referred  to respectively as 'O. S. Rules' and 'A. S.  Rules'). Rules also provide for disposal of  petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the  Constitution.  Supervisory  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  is  exclusively  vested  in  a  Bench on the Appellate Side and jurisdiction  of either of the two wings of this Court  under  Article  226,  however,  depends  upon  whether  "the  matter  in  dispute"  arises  substantially  in  Greater  Bombay  or  beyond  it,  the  same  being  exercisable  by  the  original Side in the former case and by the  Appellate Side in the latter case. This is  not made dependent on the matter being in  fact of an original or appellate nature. The  contention of the learned Advocate General  and Mr. Desai is that the matter in dispute,  on averments in the petition, must be said  to have arisen at any rate, substantially  within the limits of Greater Bombay and the  petitioner cannot be permitted to avoid the  impact  of  these  Rules  and  choose  his  own  forum by merely quoting Article 227 of the  title  and  prayer  clause  of  the  petition,  when it is not attracted or by merely making  

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a  pretence  of  the  dispute  having  arisen  beyond Greater Bombay by referring to non- existing facts to attract the Appellate Side  jurisdiction under Article 226”

26. In paragraph 4 of Jhaman (supra), the High Court  further distinguished the nature of proceeding  

under Article 226 of the Constitution to which,  

depending upon the situs of the cause of action,  

Rule  623  of  Bombay  High  Court  original  Side  

Rules  will  apply.  The  said  rule  is  set  out  

below:

“623. Every application for the issue of a  direction, order or writ under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  other  than  an  application  for  a  writ  of  Habeas  Corpus  shall, if the matter in dispute is or has  arisen substantially within Greater Bombay,  be heard and disposed of by such one of the  Judges sitting on the Original Side or any  specially  constituted  Bench  as  the  Chief  Justice may appoint. The application shall  be  by  petition  setting  out  therein  the  relief sought and the grounds on which it is  sought. The petition shall be supported by  an  affidavit.  In  every  such  petition  the  petitioner shall state whether he has made  any other application to the Supreme Court  or  the  High  Court  in  respect  of  the  same  matter  and  how  that  application  has  been  disposed of. The petitioner shall move for a  Rule Nisi in open Court.

If the Petitioner makes an application  to the Supreme Court in respect of the same  

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matter during the pendency of the petition  in the High Court, he shall forthwith bring  this fact to the notice of the High Court by  filing an affidavit in the case and shall  furnish  a  copy  of  such  affidavit  to  the  other side.

The Court may adjourn the hearing of the  application made to it pending the decision  of the Supreme Court in the matter.”   

27. From a perusal of paragraph 4 of Jhaman (supra)  it is clear that to a proceeding under Article  

227  of  the  Constitution  of  India  only  the  

appellate side rules of the High Court apply.  

But to a proceeding under Article 226, either  

the original side or the appellate side rules,  

depending on the situs of the cause of action,  

will apply.

28. Therefore  High  Court  rules  treat  the  two  

proceedings  differently  in  as  much  as  a  

proceeding under Article 226, being an original  

proceeding, can be governed under Original Side  

Rules of the High Court, depending on the situs  

of  the  cause  of  action.  A  proceeding  under  

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Article  227  of  the  Constitution  is  never  an  

original proceeding and can never be governed  

under Original Side Rules of the High Court.

29. Apart  from  that,  writ  proceeding  by  its  very  

nature is a different species of proceeding.

30. Before  the  coming  of  the  Constitution  on  26th  

January, 1950, no Court in India except three  

High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras could  

issue the writs, that too within their original  

jurisdiction.  Prior  to  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution, under Section 45 of the Specific  

Relief Act, the power to issue an order in the  

nature  of  mandamus  was  there.  This  power  of  

Courts to issue writs was very truncated and the  

position has been summarized in the law of writs  

by  V.G.  Ramchandran,  Volume  1  (Easter  Book  

Company).  At  page  12,  the  learned  author  

observed:

“...The power to issue writs was limited to  three High courts.  The other High Courts in  India, however, were created by the Crown  

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under  Section  16  of  the  High  Courts  Act,  1861 but they had no such power.  It is  necessary to mention that under Section 45  of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, even the  High Courts of Madras, Calcutta and Bombay  could not issue the writs of prohibition and  certiorari  or  an  order  outside  the  local  limits  of  their  original  civil  jurisdiction.“

31.  The power to issue writs underwent a sea-change  

with  the  coming  of  the  Constitution  from  26th  

January, 1950. Now writs can be issued by High  

Courts  only  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution and by the Supreme Court only under  

Article 32 of the Constitution.

32. No writ petition can be moved under Article 227  

of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued  

under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution.  

Therefore, a petition filed under Article 227 of  

the  Constitution  cannot  be  called  a  writ  

petition.  This  is  clearly  the  Constitutional  

position. No rule of any High Court can amend or  

alter this clear Constitutional scheme. In fact  

the rules of Bombay High Court have not done  

that and proceedings under Articles 226 and 227  

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have been separately dealt with under the said  

rules.

33. The High Court’s power of superintendence under  

Article 227 of the Constitution has its origin  

as early as in Indian High Courts Act of 1861.  

This  concept  of  superintendence  has  been  

borrowed from English Law.

34. The power of superintendence owes its origin to  

the supervisory jurisdiction of King’s Bench in  

England.  In  the  Presidency  towns  of  the  then  

Calcutta, Bombay, Madras initially Supreme Court  

was  established  under  the  Regulating  Act  of  

1793. Those Courts were endowed with the power  

of  superintendence,  similar  to  the  powers  of  

Kings  Bench  under  the  English  Law.  Then  the  

Indian  High  Courts  in  three  Presidency  towns  

were  endowed  with  similar  jurisdiction  of  

superintendence.  Such  power  was  conferred  on  

them under Section 15 of the Indian High Courts  

Act, 1861.

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35. Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861  

runs as under:   

“15.  Each  of  the  High  Courts  established  under  this  Act  shall  have  superintendence  over all Courts which may be subject to its  Appellate Jurisdiction, and shall have Power  to  call  for  Returns,  and  to  direct  the  Transfer of any Suit or Appeal for any such  Court  to  any  other  Court  of  equal  or  superior Jurisdiction, and shall have Power  to  make  and  issue  General  Rules  for  regulating the Practice and Proceedings of  such Courts, and also to prescribe Forms for  every  Proceeding  in  the  said  Courts  for  which it shall think necessary that a form  be provided, and also for keeping all Books,  Entries,  and  Accounts  to  be  kept  by  the  officers, and also to settle Tables of Fees  to be allowed to the Sheriff, Attorneys, and  all Clerks and Officers of Courts, and from  Time to Time to alter any such Rule or Form  or  Table;  and  the  Rules  so  made,  and  the  Forms so framed, and the Tables so settled,  shall  be  used  and  observed  in  the  said  Courts, provided that such General Rules and  Forms  and  Tables  be  not  inconsistent  with  the  Provisions  of  any  law  in  force,  and  shall before they are issued have received  the  Sanction,  in  the  Presidency  of  Fort  William of the Governor-General in Council,  and in Madras or Bombay of the Governor in  Council of the respective Presidencies.”  

36. Then  in  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1915  

Section  107  continued  this  power  of  

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superintendence with the High Court. Section 107  

of  the  Government  of  India  Act,  1915  was  

structured as follows:

“107. Powers of High Court with respect to  subordinate  Courts.  -  Each  of  the  High  courts  has  superintendence  over  all  High  Courts  for  the  time  being  subject  to  its  appellate jurisdiction, and may do any of  the following things, that is to say:-  

(a) call for returns; (b) direct  the  transfer  of  any  suit  or  

appeal from any such court any other  court  of  equal  or  superior  jurisdiction;

(c) make  and  issue  general  rules  and  prescribe  forms  for  regulating  the  practice  and  proceedings  of  such  courts;

(d) prescribe  forms  in  which  books,  entries and accounts shall be kept by  the officers of any such courts; and  

(e) settle tables of fees to be allowed  to  the  sheriff,  attorneys  and  all  clerks and officers of courts:

Provided  that  such  rules,  forms  and  tables shall not be inconsistent with the  provisions of any law for the time being in  force,  and  shall  require  the  previous  approval, in the case of the high court at  Calcutta,  of  the  Governor-General  in  council,  and  in  other  cases  of  the  local  government.”

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37. In the Government of India Act, 1935 the said  

Section 107 was continued with slight changes in  

Section 224 of the Act, which is as follows:

“224.  Administrative  functions  of  High  Courts.-  (1) Every  High  Court  shall  have  superintendence over all Courts in India for  the  time  being  subject  to  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  and  may  do  any  of  the  following things, that is to say,-  

(a) call for returns; (b) make  and  issue  general  rules  and  

prescribe  forms  for  regulating  the  practice  and  proceedings  of  such  courts;

(c) prescribe  forms  in  which  books,  entries and accounts shall be kept by  the officers of any such courts; and  

(d) settle tables of fees to be allowed  to  the  sheriff,  attorneys  and  all  clerks and officers of courts:

Provided  that  such  rules,  forms  and  tables shall not be inconsistent with the  provisions of any law for the time being in  force,  and  shall  require  the  previous  approval of the Governor.

(2)  Nothing  in  this  Section  shall  be  construed  as  giving  to  a  High  Court  any  jurisdiction to question any judgment of any  inferior  Court  which  is  not  otherwise  subject to appeal or revision.”

38. The history of this power has been elaborately  

traced  by  a  Division  Bench  of  Calcutta  High  

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Court in the case of Jahnabi Prosad Banerjee and  another vs.  Basudeb Paul & others, reported in  AIR 1950 Calcutta 536 and that was followed in a  

Division Bench Judgment of Allahabad High Court  

in  Sukhdeo Baiswar vs.  Brij Bhushan Misra and  others in AIR 1951 Allahabad 667.

39. The history of Article 227 has also been traced  

by  this  Court  in  its  Constitutional  Bench  

judgment  in  Waryam  Singh  and  another vs.  Amarnath  and  another [AIR  1954  SC  215].  In  paragraph  13  at  page  217  of  the  report  this  

Court observed:

“...The only question raised is as to the  nature  of  the  power  of  superintendence  conferred by the article”.  

40. About the nature of the power of superintendence  

this Court relied on the Special Bench judgment  

delivered  by  Chief  Justice  Harries  in  Dalmia  Jain Airways Limited vs. Sukumar Mukherjee (AIR  1951 Calcutta 193).

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41. In paragraph 14 page 217 of Waryam Singh (supra)  this Court neatly formulated the ambit of High  

Court’s power under Article 227 in the following  

words:

“This power of superintendence conferred by  article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries  C.J.,  in  ‘Dalmia  Jain  Airways  Ltd.  v.  Sukumar Mukherjee’, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB)  (B), to be exercised most sparingly and only  in appropriate cases in order to keep the  Subordinate  Courts  within  the  bounds  of  their authority and not for correcting mere  errors.”

42. Chief justice Harries in the Full Bench decision  

in Dalmia (supra) stated the principles on which  the  High  Court  can  exercise  its  power  under  

Article  227  very  succinctly  which,  we  would  

better, quote:

“6.  Though  this  Court  has  a  right  to  interfere  with  decisions  of  Courts  and  tribunals  under  its  power  of  superintendence, it appears to me that that  right must be exercised most sparingly and  only  in  appropriate  cases.  The  matter  was  considered  by  a  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Manmathanath v. Emperor,  AIR 1933 Cal 132.  In that case a Bench over which Sir George  Rankin C. J. presided held that Section 107,  Government  of  India  Act  (which  roughly  

2

corresponds  to  Article  227  of  the  Constitution), does not vest the High Court  with limitless power which may be exercised  at  the  Court's  discretion  to  remove  the  hardship of particular decisions. The power  of superintendence it confers is a power of  a  known  and  well-recognised  character  and  should  be  exercised  on  those  judicial  principles which give it its character. In  general  words,  the  High  Court's  power  of  superintendence  is  a  power  to  keep  subordinate  Courts  within  the  bounds  of  their authority, to see that they do what  their duty requires and that they do it in a  legal manner.”

(page 193-194 of the report)

43. In  stating  the  aforesaid  principles,  Chief  

Justice Harries relied on what was said by Chief  

Justice George Rankin in  Manmatha Nath Biswas  vs.  Emperor reported in AIR 1933 Calcutta 132.  At page 134, the learned Chief Justice held:

“...superintendence is not a legal fiction  whereby a High Court Judge is vested with  omnipotence but is as Norman, J., had said a  term having a legal force and signification.  The general superintendence which this Court  has over all jurisdiction subject to appeal  is a duty to keep them within the bounds of  their authority, to see that they do what  their duty requires and that they do it in a  legal  manner.  It  does  not  involve  responsibility for the correctness of their  decisions, either in fact or law.

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44. Justice Nasir Ullah Beg of Allahabad High Court  

in a very well considered judgment rendered in  

the case of Jodhey and others vs.  State through  Ram Sahai, reported in AIR 1952 Allahabad 788,  discussed the provisions of Section 15 of the  

Indian High Courts Act of 1861, Section 107 of  

the Government of India Act 1915 and Section 224  

of the Government of India Act 1935 and compared  

them with almost similar provisions of Article  

227 of the Constitution.

45. The learned judge considered the power of the  

High Court under Article 227 to be plenary and  

unfettered but at the same time, in paragraph 15  

at page 792 of the report, the learned judge  

held that High Court should be cautious in its  

exercise.  It  was  made  clear,  and  rightly  so,  

that the power of superintendence is not to be  

exercised  unless  there  has  been  an  (a)  

unwarranted  assumption  of  jurisdiction,  not  

vested in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse  

of jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal  

2

to  exercise  jurisdiction  vested  in  Courts  or  

tribunals. The learned judge clarified if only  

there  is  a  flagrant  abuse  of  the  elementary  

principles of justice or a manifest error of law  

patent  on  the  face  of  the  record  or  an  

outrageous  miscarriage  of  justice,  power  of  

superintendence  can  be  exercised.  This  is  a  

discretionary power to be exercised by Court and  

cannot  be claimed  as a  matter or  right by  a  

party.

46. This Court in its Constitution Bench decision in  

the case of  Nagendra Nath Bora & another vs.  Commissioner  of  Hills  Division  and  Appeals,  Assam & others (AIR 1958 SC 398) followed the  ratio  of  the  earlier  Constitution  Bench  in  

Waryam  Singh (supra)  about  the  ambit  of  High  Court’s power of superintendence and quoted in  

Nagendra Nath (supra) the same passage, which  has been excerpted above (See paragraph 30, page  

413 of the report).

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47. The Constitution Bench in Nagendra Nath (supra),  unanimously speaking through Justice B.P. Sinha,  

(as his Lordship then was) pointed out that High  

Court’s power of interference under Article 227  

is not greater than its power under Article 226  

and the power of interference under Article 227  

of the Constitution is limited to ensure that  

the tribunals function within the limits of its  

authority.  

(emphasis supplied)  

48. The  subsequent  Constitution  Bench  decision  of  

this Court on Article 227 of the Constitution,  

rendered in the case of  State of Gujarat etc.  vs. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela (dead) his  legal representatives and others reported in AIR  1968  SC  1481  also  expressed  identical  views.  

Justice  Bachawat  speaking  for  the  unanimous  

Constitution Bench opined that the power under  

Article  227  cannot  be  fettered  by  State  

Legislature but this supervisory jurisdiction is  

meant to keep the subordinate tribunal within  

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the limits of their authority and to ensure that  

they obey law.

49. So the same expression namely to keep the Courts  

and  Tribunals  subordinate  to  the  High  Court  

‘within the bounds of their authority’ used in  

Manmatha Nath Biswas (supra), to indicate the  ambit of High Court’s power of superintendence  

has been repeated over again and again by this  

Court in its Constitution Bench decisions.  

50. Same principles have been followed by this Court  

in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha  (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs.  Phiroz N.  Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC  141, wherein it has been held that in exercise  

of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High  

Court can set aside or reverse finding of an  

inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where  

there  is  no  evidence  or  where  no  reasonable  

person  could  possibly  have  come  to  the  

conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come  

to. This Court made it clear that except to this  

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‘limited  extent’  the  High  Court  has  no  

jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of  

fact (see para 18, page 149-150).

51. In  coming  to  the  above  finding,  this  Court  

relied on its previous decision rendered in the  

case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata  S.  Guram reported  in  (1986)  4  SCC  447.  The  decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the  principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in  

Waryam Singh  (supra) and  Nagendra Nath  (supra)  discussed above.

52. To the same effect is the judgment rendered in  

the  case  of  Laxmikant  Revchand  Bhojwani  and  another vs.  Pratapsingh  Mohansingh  Pardeshi  reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576. In paragraph 9,  

page  579  of  the  report,  this  Court  clearly  

reminded the High Court that under Article 227  

that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to  

correct  all  species  of  hardship  or  wrong  

decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to  

grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of  

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fundamental principle of law and justice (see  

page 579-580 of the report).

53. Same  views  have  been  taken  by  this  Court  in  

respect of the ambit of High Court’s power under  

Article  227  in  the  case  of  Sarpanch,  Lonand  Grampanchayat vs.  Ramgiri  Gosavi  and  another,  reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page  

222-234 of the report) and the decision of this  

Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan  and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The  Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra)  about  the  scope  of  Article  227  was  again  

followed  in  Ahmedabad  Manufacturing  &  Calico  Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs.  Ram Tahel Ramnand and others  reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898.

54. In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court  

in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and  others,  reported  in  (2003)  6  SCC  675,  a  two  judge  Bench  of  this  Court  discussed  the  

principles of interference by High Court under  

Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra)  3

this Court held that a writ of Certiorari is  

maintainable against the order of a civil Court,  

subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668  

of the report). The correctness of that ratio  

was doubted by another Division Bench of this  

Court  in  Radhey  Shyam  and  another vs.  Chhabi  Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request  to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for a reference to  

a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the  

formulation of the principles on the scope of  

interference by the High Court under Article 227  

is concerned, there is no divergence of views.

55. In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695  

of  the  report,  the  following  principles  have  

been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they  are set out:  

“38  (4)  Supervisory  jurisdiction  under  Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised  for  keeping  the  subordinate  courts  within  the  bounds  of  their  jurisdiction.  When  a  subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction  which  it  does  not  have  or  has  failed  to  exercise a jurisdiction which it does have  or  the  jurisdiction  though  available  is  

3

being exercised by the Court in a manner not  permitted by law and failure of justice or  grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the  High  Court  may  step  in  to  exercise  its  supervisory jurisdiction.”

56. Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also  

on the same lines and extracted below:

“(5)  Be  it  a  writ  of  certiorari  or  the  exercise  of  supervisory  jurisdiction,  none  is available to correct mere errors of fact  or of law unless the following requirements  are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and  apparent on the face of the proceedings such  as when it is based on clear ignorance or  utter  disregard  of  the  provisions  of  law,  and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure  of justice has occasioned thereby.

(6) xxx  xxx  

(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari  and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be  exercised sparingly and only in appropriate  cases where the judicial conscience of the  High Court dictates it to act lest a gross  failure of justice or grave injustice should  occasion.  Care,  caution  and  circumspection  need  to  be  exercised,  when  any  of  the  abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be  invoked during the pendency of any suit or  proceedings in a subordinate court and the  error though calling for correction is yet  capable of being corrected at the conclusion  of the proceedings in an appeal or revision  preferred  thereagainst  and  entertaining  a  petition invoking certiorari or supervisory  

3

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  would  obstruct  the  smooth  flow  and/or  early  disposal  of  the  suit  or  proceedings.  The  High  Court  may  feel  inclined  to  intervene  where  the  error  is  such,  as,  if  not  corrected  at  that  very  moment,  may  become  incapable of correction at a later stage and  refusal  to  intervene  would  result  in  travesty  of  justice  or  where  such  refusal  itself  would  result  in  prolonging  of  the  lis.

(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari  or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert  itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in  re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or  correct  errors  in  drawing  inferences  or  correct errors of mere formal or technical  character.”

57. Articles  226  and  227  stand  on  substantially  

different footing. As noted above, prior to the  

Constitution, the Chartered High Courts as also  

the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  

could  issue  prerogative  writs  in  exercise  of  

their original jurisdiction. [See 1986 (suppl.)  

SCC 401 at page 469)].

58. However, after the Constitution every High Court  

has been conferred with the power to issue writs  

under  Article  226  and  these  are  original  

proceeding. [State of U.P. and others vs.  Dr.  

3

Vijay  Anand  Maharaj –  AIR  1963  SC  946,  page  951].

59. The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other  

hand is not original nor is it appellate. This  

jurisdiction  of  superintendence  under  Article  

227  is  for  both  administrative  and  judicial  

superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred  

under  Articles  226  and  227  are  separate  and  

distinct and operate in different fields.  

60. Another  distinction  between  these  two  

jurisdictions is that under Article 226, High  

Court  normally  annuls  or  quashes  an  order  or  

proceeding but in exercise of its jurisdiction  

under Article 227, the High Court, apart from  

annulling  the  proceeding,  can  also  substitute  

the  impugned  order  by  the  order  which  the  

inferior tribunal should have made. {See  Surya  Dev Rai (supra), para 25 page 690 and also the  decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court  

in  Hari  Vishnu  Kamath vs.  Ahmad  Ishaque  and  others – [AIR 1955 SC 233, para 20 page 243]}.

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61. Jurisdiction  under  Article  226  normally  is  

exercised where a party is affected but power  

under Article 227 can be exercised by the High  

Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In  

fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised  

in favour of persons or citizens for vindication  

of  their  fundamental  rights   or   other  

statutory rights. Jurisdiction  under  Article  

227 is  exercised  by  the  High  Court for  

vindication    of   its   position   as    the  

highest  judicial  authority  in  the  State.  In  

certain  cases  where  there  is  infringement  of  

fundamental right, the relief under Article 226  

of  the  Constitution  can  be  claimed  ex-debito  

justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases  

where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction  

under  Article  227,  such  exercise  is  entirely  

discretionary and no person can claim it as a  

matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge  

passed  under  Article  226,  a  Letters  Patent  

Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable.  

But no such appeal is maintainable from an order  

3

passed  by a  Single Judge  of a  High Court  in  

exercise of power under Article 227. In almost  

all  High  Courts,  rules  have  been  framed  for  

regulating  the  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  

Article 226. No such rule appears to have been  

framed for exercise of High Court’s power under  

Article  227  possibly  to  keep  such  exercise  

entirely in the domain of the discretion of High  

Court.   

62. On  an  analysis  of  the  aforesaid  decisions  of  

this  Court,  the  following  principles  on  the  

exercise  of  High  Court’s  jurisdiction  under  

Article  227  of  the  Constitution  may  be  

formulated:

(a) A  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution is different from a petition  

under Article 227. The mode of exercise of  

power  by  High  Court  under  these  two  

Articles is also different.

(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227  

cannot  be  called  a  writ  petition.  The  

history  of  the  conferment  of  writ  

3

jurisdiction  on  High  Courts  is  

substantially different from the history of  

conferment of the power of Superintendence  

on the High Courts under Article 227 and  

have been discussed above.

(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat,  

in exercise of its power of superintendence  

under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution,  

interfere with the orders of tribunals or  

Courts  inferior  to  it.  Nor  can  it,  in  

exercise of this power, act as a Court of  

appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal  

subordinate  to  it.  In  cases  where  an  

alternative statutory mode of redressal has  

been provided, that would also operate as a  

restrain on the exercise of this power by  

the High Court.

(d) The  parameters  of  interference  by  High  

Courts  in  exercise  of  its  power  of  

superintendence have been repeatedly laid  

down by this Court. In this regard the High  

Court must be guided by the principles laid  

down  by  the  Constitution  Bench  of  this  

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Court  in  Waryam  Singh (supra)  and  the  principles  in  Waryam  Singh  (supra)  have  been  repeatedly  followed  by  subsequent  

Constitution  Benches  and  various  other  

decisions of this Court.  

(e) According  to  the  ratio  in  Waryam  Singh  (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the  

High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction  

of superintendence can interfere in order  

only  to  keep  the  tribunals  and  Courts  

subordinate to it, ‘within the bounds of  

their authority’.  

(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by  

such  tribunals  and  Courts  by  exercising  

jurisdiction which is vested in them and by  

not declining to exercise the jurisdiction  

which is vested in them.

(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e)  

and  (f),  High  Court  can  interfere  in  

exercise of its power of superintendence  

when there has been a patent perversity in  

the  orders  of  tribunals  and  Courts  

subordinate to it or where there has been a  

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gross and manifest failure of justice or  

the  basic  principles  of  natural  justice  

have been flouted.

(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence  

High Court cannot interfere to correct mere  

errors  of  law  or  fact  or  just  because  

another  view  than  the  one  taken  by  the  

tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a  

possible  view.  In  other  words  the  

jurisdiction  has  to  be  very  sparingly  

exercised.

(i) High Court’s power of superintendence under  

Article  227  cannot  be  curtailed  by  any  

statute. It has been declared a part of the  

basic structure of the Constitution by the  

Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  the  

case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India  & others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and  therefore abridgement by a Constitutional  

amendment is also very doubtful.

(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment  

of a rather cognate provision, like Section  

115  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  by  the  

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Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999  

does not and cannot cut down the ambit of  

High Court’s power under Article 227.  At  

the same time, it must be remembered that  

such  statutory  amendment  does  not  

correspondingly  expand  the  High  Court’s  

jurisdiction  of  superintendence  under  

Article 227.

(k) The power is discretionary and has to be  

exercised  on  equitable  principle.  In  an  

appropriate  case,  the  power  can  be  

exercised suo motu.

(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and  

unfettered power of the High Court under  

Article 227, it transpires that the main  

object of this Article is to keep strict  

administrative and judicial control by the  

High Court on the administration of justice  

within its territory.

(m) The  object  of  superintendence,  both  

administrative and judicial, is to maintain  

efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning  

of the entire machinery of justice in such  

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a way as it does not bring it into any  

disrepute. The power of interference under  

this Article is to be kept to the minimum  

to ensure that the wheel of justice does  

not  come  to  a  halt  and  the  fountain  of  

justice  remains  pure  and  unpolluted  in  

order to maintain public confidence in the  

functioning  of  the  tribunals  and  Courts  

subordinate to High Court.

(n) This  reserve  and  exceptional  power  of  

judicial  intervention  is  not  to  be  

exercised  just  for  grant  of  relief  in  

individual cases but should be directed for  

promotion  of  public  confidence  in  the  

administration  of  justice  in  the  larger  

public  interest  whereas  Article  226  is  

meant  for  protection  of  individual  

grievance.  Therefore,  the  power  under  

Article  227  may  be  unfettered  but  its  

exercise  is  subject  to  high  degree  of  

judicial discipline pointed out above.

(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this  

power will be counter-productive and will  

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divest  this  extraordinary  power  of  its  

strength and vitality.     

63. In the facts of the present case we find that  

the  petition  has  been  entertained  as  a  writ  

petition  in  a  dispute  between  landlord  and  

tenant amongst private parties.    

64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a  

remedy in public law which may be filed by any  

person but the main respondent should be either  

Government, Governmental agencies or a State or  

instrumentalities of a State within the meaning  

of  Article  12.  Private  individuals  cannot  be  

equated with State or instrumentalities of the  

State. All the respondents in a writ petition  

cannot be private parties. But private parties  

acting  in  collusion  with  State  can  be  

respondents  in  a  writ  petition.  Under  the  

phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue  

writ to any person, but the person against whom  

writ will be issued must have some statutory or  

public duty to perform.

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65. Reference in this connection may be made to the  

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the  

case  of  Sohan  Lal vs.  Union  of  India  and  another, reported in AIR 1957 SC 529.

66. The facts in  Sohan Lal (supra) are that Jagan  Nath,  a  refugee  from  Pakistan,  filed  a  writ  

petition  in  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  against  

Union  of  India  and  Sohan  Lal  alleging  

unauthorized  eviction  from  his  residence  and  

praying  for  a  direction  for  restoration  of  

possession. The High Court directed Sohan Lal to  

restore  possession  to  Jagan  Nath.  Challenging  

that order, Sohan Lal approached this Court. The  

Constitution Bench of this Court accepted the  

appeal and overturned the verdict of the High  

Court.

67. In paragraph 7, page 532 of the judgment, the  

unanimous  Constitution  Bench  speaking  though  

Justice  Imam,  laid  down  a  few  salutary  

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principles which are worth remembering and are  

set out:

“7.  The  eviction  of  Jagan  Nath  was  in  contravention of the express provisions of  Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction)  Act. His eviction, therefore, was illegal.  He was entitled to be evicted in due course  of law and a writ of mandamus could issue to  or an order in the nature of mandamus could  be  made  against  the  Union  of  India  to  restore possession of the property to Jagan  Nath from which he had been evicted if the  property was still in the possession of the  Union  of  India.  The  property  in  dispute,  however, is in possession of the appellant.  There is no evidence and no finding of the  High  Court  that  the  appellant  was  in  collusion with the Union of India or that he  had  knowledge  that  the  eviction  of  Jagan  Nath  was  illegal.  Normally,  a  writ  of  mandamus does not issue to or an order in  the nature of mandamus is not made against a  private  individual.  Such  an  order  is  made  against a person directing him to do some  particular  thing,  specified  in  the  order,  which appertains to his office and is in the  nature of a public duty (Halsbury's Laws of  England  Vol.  11,  Lord  Simonds  Edition,  p.  84). If it had been proved that the Union of  India  and  the  appellant  had  colluded,  and  the  transaction  between  them  was  merely  colourable,  entered  into  with  a  view  to  deprive  Jagan  Nath  of  his  rights,  jurisdiction to issue a writ to or make an  order in the nature of mandamus against the  appellant  might  be  said  to  exist  in  a  Court...”

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68. These principles laid down by the Constitution  

Bench in Sohan Lal (supra) have not been doubted  so far.

69. Subsequently in some other cases question arose  

whether writ will lie against a private person.  

In Engineering Mazdoor Sabha & another vs. Hind  Cycles Ltd., reported in AIR 1963 SC 874, it was  held that an arbitrator appointed under Section  

10A of Industrial Disputes Act is not a private  

arbitrator even though he cannot be equated with  

a tribunal to be amenable under Article 136 of  

the Constitution of India. The Court held that  

in discharging his duties as an arbitrator, the  

arbitrator is clothed with some trappings of a  

Court  and  a  writ  of  certiorari  would  be  

maintainable  against  him.  So  even  though  an  

arbitrator,  acting  under  Section  10A  of  the  

Industrial  Disputes  Act,  is  a  private  

individual,  he  discharges  public  function.  So  

the ratio in the Constitution Bench decision in  

Engineering Mazdoor Sabha (supra) is consistent  with the decision in Sohan Lal (supra).

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70. It is only a writ of Habeas Corpus which can be  

directed  not  only  against  the  State  but  also  

against private person. Justice Hidaytullah (as  

his Lordship then was) on behalf of a Bench of  

this Court stated the principle as “the writ of  

Habeas Corpus issues not only for release from  

detention by the State but also for release from  

private  detention.”  (see  AIR  1964  SC  1625  at  

1630).

71. In Rohtas Industries Ltd., & another vs. Rohtas  Industries Staff Union & others [(1976) 2 SCC  82]  this  Court  held  that  in  view  of  the  

amendment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  

by  amendment  Act  36  of  1964  and  in  view  of  

provisions  like  Section  27  of  the  Act,  an  

arbitrator under Section 10A of the Industrial  

Disputes  Act  is  virtually  a  part  of  State’s  

sovereign dispensation of justice and his award  

is amenable to review under Articles 226 & 227  

of  the  Constitution.  In  Rohtas (supra),  the  

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ratio of  Engineering Mazdoor Sabha (supra) was  followed.

72. Therefore, a private person becomes amenable to  

writ jurisdiction only if he is connected with a  

statutory authority or only if he/she discharges  

any official duty.

73. In the instant case none of the above features  

are present, even then a writ petition was filed  

in a pure dispute between landlord and tenant  

and where the only respondent is the plaintiff  

landlord.  Therefore,  High  Court  erred  by  

entertaining the writ petition.  However, the  

petition  was  dismissed  on  merits  by  a  rather  

cryptic order.

74. It has repeatedly been held by this Court that a  

proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution  

is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of  

property disputes or disputes relating to title.  

In  Mohammed Hanif vs.  The State of Assam [1969  (2) SCC 782] a three Judge Bench of this Court,  

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explaining the general principles governing writ  

jurisdiction under Article 226, held that this  

jurisdiction is  extraordinary in nature and is  

not meant for declaring the private rights of  

the  parties.  [See  para  5,  page  786  of  the  

report].

75. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion in  Hanif  (supra), this Court referred to the Constitution  

Bench decision in  T.C. Basappa vs.  T. Nagappa  and another [AIR 1954 SC 440].  

76. Following  the  aforesaid  principles  in  Hanif  (supra), this  Court  in  M/s.  Hindustan  Steel  Limited, Rourkela vs. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee and  others [(1973)  1  SCC  273]  held  that  serious  questions  about  title  and  possession  of  land  

cannot  be  dealt  with  by  writ  court.  In  

formulating these principles in Kalyani Banerjee  (supra), this Court relied on Constitution Bench  

decision in Sohan Lal (supra) [See paragraph 16  page  282  of  the  report).  Again  in  State  of  Rajasthan vs. Bhawani Singh & others [1993 Supp.  

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(1)  SCC  306]  this  Court  held  that  a  writ  

petition is not the appropriate forum to declare  

a person’s title to property. [see para 7, page  

309 of the report]. Subsequently, again in the  

case of  Mohan Pandey & another vs.  Usha Rani  Rajgaria & others reported in (1992) 4 SCC 61,  this  Court  held  that  a  regular  suit  is  the  

appropriate  remedy  for  deciding  property  

disputes  between  private  persons  and  remedy  

under  Article  226  is  not  available  to  decide  

such disputes unless there is violation of some  

statutory  duty  on  the  part  of  a  statutory  

authority. [See para 6, page 63 of the report].

77. Following the aforesaid ratio in  Mohan Pandey  (supra), this Court again in Prasanna Kumar Roy  Karmakar vs.  State of W.B and others [(1996) 3  SCC 403], held that in a dispute between the  

landlord and tenant, a tenant cannot be evicted  

from his possession by a writ court. Again in  

the case of P.R. Murlidharan & others vs. Swami  Dharmananda Theertha Padar & others [(2006) 4  SCC 501], this Court held that it would be an  

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abuse of the process to approach a writ court in  

connection with dispute on questions of title  

for  deciding   which  civil  court  is  the  

appropriate forum.

78. However, this Court unfortunately discerns that  

of late there is a growing trend amongst several  

High Courts to entertain writ petition in cases  

of pure property disputes.  Disputes relating to  

partition suits, matters relating to execution  

of  a  decree,  in  cases  of  dispute  between  

landlord and tenant and also in a case of money  

decree and in various other cases where disputed  

questions of property are involved, writ courts  

are entertaining such disputes. In some cases  

High  Courts,  in  a  routine  manner,  entertain  

petition under Article 227 over such disputes  

and  such  petitions  are  treated  as  writ  

petitions.

79. We would like to make it clear that in view of  

the law referred to above in cases of property rights  

and  in  disputes  between  private  individuals  writ  

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court  should  not  interfere  unless  there  is  any  

infraction  of  statute  or  it  can  be  shown,  that  a  

private  individual  is  acting  in  collusion  with  a  

statutory authority.

80. We  may  also  observe  that  in  some  High  Courts  

there  is  tendency  of  entertaining  petitions  under  

Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as  

writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an  

erroneous  appreciation  of  the  ratio  in  Surya  Dev  (supra)  and  in  view  of  the  recent  amendment  to  

Section  115  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  by  Civil  

Procedure  Code  (Amendment)  Act,  1999.  It  is  urged  

that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section  

115 of CPC has been curtailed.  In our view, even if  

the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has  

not  resulted  in  expanding  High  Court’s  power  of  

superintendence.   It  is  too  well  known  to  be  

reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High  

Court must follow the regime of law.

81. As a result of frequent interference by Hon’ble  

High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the  

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Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal  

cases,  the  disposal  of  cases  by  the  civil  and  

criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing  

serious problems in the administration of justice.

82. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising  

its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon’ble  

High Court will follow the time honoured principles  

discussed  above.   Those  principles  have  been  

formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the  

High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within  

their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.

83. For the reasons aforesaid, it is held that the  

High  Court  committed  an  error  in  entertaining  the  

writ  petition  in  a  dispute  between  landlord  and  

tenant and where the only respondent is a private  

landlord. The course adopted by the High Court cannot  

be approved. Of course, High Court’s order of non-

interference in view of concurrent findings of facts  

is  unexceptionable.   Consequently,  the  appeal  is  

dismissed.  However, there shall be no order as to  

costs.        

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.....................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.....................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi July 23, 2010

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