REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 249 OF 2004

Shakson Belthissor                                …. Appellant

Versus

State of Kerala & Anr.                           …. Respondents

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.10.2002  

passed  by  the  Kerala  High  Court  rejecting  the  petition  filed  by  the  

appellant herein praying for quashing of the first information report (for  

short ‘the FIR’) and the charge sheet filed against him.

2. The  Respondent  No.  2  (Valsa)  got  married  with  the  appellant  on  

23.10.1997.  Even otherwise they are related to each other, the Respondent

No. 2 being the daughter of the appellant’s maternal uncle and paternal  

aunt.   Incidentally,  the  aforesaid  marriage  was  the  second marriage  of  

Respondent No. 2 as she was earlier married to one Mr. Varghese, who  

died in the year 1995.  Through the said marriage the Respondent No. 2  

has two sons.  However, it was the first marriage of the appellant.  Out of  

the  wedlock  between  the  appellant  and Respondent  No.  2,  there  is  no  

issue.   

3. The appellant  was  working at  the  relevant  time at  Saudi  Arabia.   The  

appellant got married to Respondent No. 2 when he came on leave for four  

months.    However, after the marriage there appears to be some dispute  

between the parties.  On 21.04.2002, Respondent No. 2 filed an FIR in the  

Kottayam  Police  Station,  District  Kollam,  Kerala  alleging  that  the  

appellant married her when he came on leave for 4 months and that after  

the marriage he stayed in the house of the complainant – wife and that  

after expiry of the period of leave, her husband – the appellant returned to  

the Gulf.  It was also alleged by Respondent No. 2 in the said FIR that  

thereafter,  for  2-3  months,  the  appellant  used  to  send  money  for  the  

expenses in the house, talked to her over phone and also sent letters from  

Saudi Arabia and also behaved with her very affectionately.  It was also  

alleged that the parents of Respondent No. 2 at the time of marriage had  

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given Rs. 5 lakhs and that the said money was utilized by the family of the  

appellant for purchasing a house at Nediyazhikam and also a property at  

Mukkam where they are residing.  It was also alleged that thereafter they  

started  spreading  wrong  information  regarding  the  conduct  of  the  

Respondent No. 2 in the locality and also misled the appellant about her.  

On  believing  his  family  members,  the  appellant  also  stopped  sending  

money  from Saudi  Arabia  for  her  expenses  and  also  stopped  sending  

letters to her.  It was also alleged by the Respondent No. 2 in the said FIR  

that  when  she  called  him on  telephone,  the  appellant  behaved  without  

affection  towards  her  and  disconnected  the  phone  due  to  which  she  

became mentally weak.  It was also alleged that subsequently whenever  

the  appellant  came  on  leave,  he  never  used  to  come  to  the  house  of  

Respondent No. 2 and stayed in the house of his younger brother and when  

Respondent No. 2 herself went to that house, she was turned out from that  

house.  It was also alleged that due to such treatment meted out to her, she  

has been suffering both mentally and physically.

4. On  the  basis  of  the  said  FIR  a  criminal  case  was  registered  and  on  

completion of the investigation made by the police, a charge sheet was  

submitted by the police alleging, inter alia, that in the investigation it is  

established that it is only the appellant, who has committed the offence.  It  

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was also stated in the said charge sheet that investigation as per Section  

498A of the Indian Penal Code (in short “the IPC”) is being continued  

after dropping the provision of Section 34 IPC since it was revealed that  

no offence was committed by any of the family members of the appellant  

under Section 34 IPC.  It was also stated in the charge sheet that since the  

appellant has been in Gulf, arrest could not be made and therefore police  

requested  the  court  to  issue  a  warrant  of  arrest  for  production  of  the  

accused-appellant.    

5. Both the FIR and the charge sheet, which were submitted by the police,  

became the bone of contention so far as the appellant is concerned, and  

therefore, he filed a Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 9376 of 2002 under  

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “the CrPC) before  

the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam praying for quashing of both the  

FIR as also the charge sheet on the ground that no case for prosecution  

under  Section  498  A IPC is  made  out  against  him.   The  High Court,  

however,  without  issuing  any  notice  on  the  said  petition  rejected  the  

petition holding that by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the  

FIR and the charge sheet do not disclose the commission of the offence  

alleged against the appellant.   

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6. Being aggrieved by the said order passed by the learned Single Judge of  

the High Court, the present appeal was filed on which notice was issued  

and further proceedings before the trial court were stayed by this Court.   

7. Now, the appeal is listed before us for hearing and we heard the learned  

counsels  appearing  for  the  parties.   In  order  to  fairly  appreciate  the  

contents of the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the parties,  

it is necessary to extract relevant portion of the FIR and the charge sheet.

8. The relevant part of the FIR is as under:

“……On last 23rd October, 1997, Shakson Belthissor of  Nediyazhikam House, Mukkam, Mayyanad married me  at the Iyyathu Church at Kollam in accordance with the  religious  rites  and  custom.   Husband  is  called  by  the  name Raju.  Husband has been working in Saudi Arabia  as Business Executive.  He married me at the time when  he came on leave for 4 months.  After the marriage, after  wedded life  had been in my house.   On expiry  of  the  period of leave, husband returned to Gulf.  Thereafter, for  2-3 months, it was used to send money for the expenses  in the house, to talk over phone, to send letters and to  behave with very affection towards me. At the time of the  marriage,  my parents  had given Rs.  5 lakhs as dowry.  Using  that  amount  with  the  consent  of  husband,  Jose  Major (younger brother of husband), wife Jessilet Manoj,  their mother Jain Franco purchased Nediyazhikam house  and property at Mukkam and resided therein.  Thereafter,  they spread in the locality unnecessary matters regarding  me  and informed husband  and  misled  him.   Husband,  who believed their words, later stopped sending money  for my expenses or sending letters.  When I called him  over phone, he would behave without affection towards  

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me and cut off the phone.  Due to this behaviour from the  part  of  husband  and  the  aforesaid  relatives,  I  was  mentally weakened.  While being so, husband came back  on  leave.   Without  coming  to  my house,  went  to  the  house of the younger brother.  Learning about it, I went  to  there.   Then,  the  younger  brother,  wife  and  wife’s  mother closed the door of the house after sending me out.  From that event and onwards, I had been suffering from  physical and mental torturing…”

Relevant part of the charge sheet is as under:

“… While leading family life in Vivek Bhawan having  number  11  in  Ward  VII  along  the  west  side  of  the  Panchayath  Road  going  from  Cheriyil  Pullichira  Post  Office  Junction  towards  Devalakuzhi  and other  places,  the accused spent off some amount from the Rs 5 lakhs  which had been given as dowry at the time of marriage  and after buying property with the balance amount he left  for  Gulf,  and  thereafter  without  giving  for  the  maintenance  of  the  witness  No.  1  or  looking  after  the  family  affairs,  the  witness  No.  1  was  tortured  through  letters and over phone and when he came on leave, he  spread unnecessary matter about the witness No. 1 and  tortured mentally and thus committed the offence under  the above provision – regarding.”

Report

“…..On getting it revealed during the investigation of the  case  that  only  the  accused  No.  1  has  committed  the  offence, report has been submitted before the Court for  reducing  the  number  from  2  to  4  regarding  the  identification of the full name and address of the accused  No. 1.

Report  has  been  submitted  before  the  Court  regarding continuation of the investigation as per Section  498A IPC after  reducing Section 34 IPC,  since  it  was  

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revealed that no offence was committed under Section 34  IPC.

Since the accused in this  case has been in Gulf,  arrest could not be made and the Hon’ble Court may be  pleased  to  issue  warrant  to  arrest  and  produce  the  accused.”

9. The scope and power of quashing a first  information report  and charge  

sheet under Section 482 of the CrPC is well settled.  The said power is  

exercised by the court to prevent abuse of the process of law and court but  

such a  power could be exercised only when the complaint  filed by the  

complainant or the charge sheet filed by the police did not disclose any  

offence or when the said complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or  

oppressive. A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court on the  

aforesaid issue wherein the law relating to quashing of a complaint has  

been succinctly laid down.

10.In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736, it  

was  held  that  the  Magistrate  while  issuing  process  against  the  accused  

should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations made in the complaint,  

if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. It was  

held that the order of Magistrate for issuing process against the accused  

could be quashed under the following circumstances: (SCC p. 741, para 5)

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“(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  complaint  or  the  statements  of  the  witnesses  recorded  in  support  of  the  same  taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the  accused  or  the  complaint  does  not  disclose  the  essential  ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  complaint  are  patently  absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can  ever  reach  a  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding against the accused; (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing  process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on  no  evidence  or  on  materials  which  are  wholly  irrelevant  or  inadmissible; and (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,  such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally  competent authority and the like.”

11. In the case of  Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishna [1981 (2) SCC  

454] it was held by this Court that in a quashing proceeding, the High Court  

has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition, if proved,  

make  out  a  prima  facie  offence  and  that  the  accused  has  prima  facie  

committed the offence.  In the said decision this Court refused the prayer for  

quashing of the complaint on the ground that there were sufficient allegations  

in the complaint to make out a case that the accused persons were responsible  

for the management and conduct of the firm and, therefore, the extent of their  

liability could be and should be established during trial.   

12. In  Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [1983  

(1) SCC 1] it was held that when on the allegation made in the complaint, a  

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clear case was made out against all the respondents (accused persons), the  

High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the  

complaint did not disclose any offence. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi  

(supra), this Court observed as follows in para 8:  

“8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind  is  as  to  when  the  High  Court  acting  under  the  provisions  of  Section  482  should  exercise  the  inherent  power  insofar  as  quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was  gone  into  in  greater  detail  in  Smt  Nagawwa v.  Veeranna  Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736  where the scope of  Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was considered and  while  laying  down  the  guidelines  and  the  grounds  on  which  proceedings could be quashed this  Court  observed as follows:  [SCC para 5, p. 741 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12] Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of  the  Magistrate  issuing  process  against  the  accused  can  be  quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements  of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their  face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the  complaint  does  not  disclose  the  essential  ingredients  of  an  offence, which is alleged against the accused; (2)  where  the  allegations  made  in  the  complaint  are  patently  absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can  ever  reach  a  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient  ground  for  proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing  process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on  no  evidence  or  on  materials  which  are  wholly  irrelevant  or  inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,  such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally  competent authority and the like.

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The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative  and provide  sufficient  guidelines  to  indicate  contingencies  where  the  High  Court can quash proceedings.”

13.    In  State of Haryana v.  Bhajan Lal,  1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335,  a  

question came up for consideration as to whether quashing of the FIR filed  

against the respondent Bhajan Lal for the offences under Sections 161 and  

165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was proper  

and  legal.  Reversing  the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court,  this  Court  

explained the circumstances under which such power could be exercised.  

Apart  from reiterating the earlier  norms laid down by this Court,  it  was  

further explained that such power could be exercised where the allegations  

made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on  

the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that  

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It observed as  

follows in para 102:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant  provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles  of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to  the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the  inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have  extracted  and  reproduced  above,  we  give  the  following  categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power  could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any  court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not  be  possible  to  lay  down  any  precise,  clearly  defined  and  sufficiently  channelised  and  inflexible  guidelines  or  rigid  formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases  wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report  or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and  accepted  in  their  entirety  do  not  prima  facie  constitute  any  offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and  other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a  cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers  under  Section 156(1)  of  the Code except  under an order  of  a  Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or  complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do  not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case  against the accused. (4) Where,  the  allegations  in  the  FIR  do  not  constitute  a  cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,  no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order  of  a  Magistrate  as  contemplated  under  Section  155(2)  of  the  Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so  absurd  and  inherently  improbable  on  the  basis  of  which  no  prudent  person  can  ever  reach  a  just  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the  provisions  of  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act  (under  which  a  criminal  proceeding  is  instituted)  to  the  institution  and  continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,  providing  efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with  mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted  with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused  and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

14. However, in paragraph 108 of the said judgment, this Court referred to  

and  relied  upon  it  earlier  judgment  in  Sheonandan  Paswan vs.  State  of  

Bihar; AIR SC 877 wherein it has been held as under:

“It  is  a  well  established  proposition  of  law  that  a  criminal  prosecution,  it  otherwise  justifiable  and  based  upon  adequate  

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evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or  political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant.”

Thus, in such circumstances, the issue of malafice becomes irrelevant.

15. The above decision was followed by this Court in  Pepsi Foods Ltd.  

and Anr. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others [1998 (5) SCC 749].  

In paragraph 28 of the said judgment this Court held thus :  

“28.  Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious  matter.  Criminal  law cannot be set  into motion as a matter  of  course.  It  is  not  that  the  complainant  has  to  bring  only  two  witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the  criminal  law  set  into  motion.  The  order  of  the  Magistrate  summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind  to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to  examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the  evidence  both  oral  and  documentary  in  support  thereof  and  would  that  be  sufficient  for  the  complainant  to  succeed  in  bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate  is  a  silent  spectator  at  the  time  of  recording  of  preliminary  evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has  to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may  even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses  to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or  otherwise  and  then  examine  if  any  offence  is  prima  facie  committed by all or any of the accused.”

16. Further,  this  Court  observed in  S.  W. Palanikar v.  State  of  Bihar  

[2002 (1)  SCC 241]  that  every  breach  of  trust  may not  result  in  a  penal  

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offence of criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act of  

fraudulent misappropriation. It observed as follows:

“8. Before  examining  respective  contentions  on  their  relative  merits,  we think  it  is  appropriate  to  notice  the  legal  position.  Every  breach  of  trust  may  not  result  in  a  penal  offence  of  criminal breach of trust unless there is evidence of a mental act  of fraudulent misappropriation. An act of breach of trust involves  a civil wrong in respect of which the person wronged may seek  his redress for damages in a civil court but a breach of trust with  mens rea gives rise to a criminal prosecution as well.

9. The ingredients in order to constitute a criminal breach of trust  are: (i) entrusting a person with property or with any dominion  over  property,  (ii)  that  person  entrusted  (a)  dishonestly  misappropriating or converting that property to his own use; or  (b)  dishonestly using or  disposing of that  property or  wilfully  suffering  any  other  person  so  to  do  in  violation  (i)  of  any  direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be  discharged,  (ii)  of  any  legal  contract  made,  touching  the  discharge of such trust.

10. The ingredients of an offence of cheating are: (i) there should  be fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving  him, (ii)(a) the person so deceived should be induced to deliver  any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall  retain  any  property;  or  (b)  the  person  so  deceived  should  be  intentionally  induced  to  do  or  omit  to  do  anything  which  he  would not do or omit if  he were not so deceived; and (iii)  in  cases covered by (ii)(b), the act of omission should be one which  causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced  in body, mind, reputation or property.

11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in  Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC  168 on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para  15)

15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the  distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of  cheating  is  a  fine  one.  It  depends  upon  the  intention  of  the  accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his  subsequent  conduct  but  for this  subsequent  conduct  is  not  the  sole test.  Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal  prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention  is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time  

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when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is  the intention which is the gist of the offence.  To hold a person  guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent  or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From  his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable  intention  right  at  the  beginning,  that  is,  when  he  made  the  promise cannot be presumed.”                                                                                (emphasis supplied)

17. This  Court  in  the  case  of  Indian  Oil  Corpn.  v.  NEPC  India  

Ltd.,(2006) 6 SCC 736, at page 747 has observed as under :  

“12. The  principles  relating  to  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  to  quash  complaints  and  criminal  proceedings  have  been  stated  and  reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few— Madhavrao  Jiwajirao  Scindia v.  Sambhajirao  Chandrojirao  Angre,  State  of  Haryana v.  Bhajan  Lal,  Rupan Deol  Bajaj v.  Kanwar  Pal  Singh  Gill,  Central  Bureau  of  Investigation v.  Duncans  Agro  Industries  Ltd.,  State  of  Bihar v.  Rajendra  Agrawalla,  Rajesh  Bajaj v.  State  NCT  of  Delhi,  Medchl  Chemicals  & Pharma  (P)  Ltd. v.  Biological  E.  Ltd.,  Hridaya  Ranjan Prasad Verma v.  State of Bihar,  M. Krishnan v.  Vijay  Singh and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful  Haque.. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in  the  complaint,  even  if  they  are  taken  at  their  face  value  and  accepted  in  their  entirety,  do  not  prima  facie  constitute  any  offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole,  but without examining the merits  of the allegations.  Neither a  detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an  assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in  the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing  of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of  the  process  of  the  court,  as  when  the  criminal  proceeding  is  

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found to have been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking  vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd  and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or  scuttle  a  legitimate  prosecution.  The  power  should  be  used  sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv)  The  complaint  is  not  required  to  verbatim reproduce  the  legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual  foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a  few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings  should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted  only where the  complaint  is  so bereft  of  even the  basic  facts  which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong;  or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a  criminal  offence.  A  commercial  transaction  or  a  contractual  dispute,  apart  from  furnishing  a  cause  of  action  for  seeking  remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the  nature  and  scope  of  a  civil  proceeding  are  different  from  a  criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a  commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil  remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground  to  quash  the  criminal  proceedings.  The  test  is  whether  the  allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.”

18. This  Court  has  recently  in  R.  Kalyani  v.  Janak  C.  Mehta  and  

Others, (2009) 1 SCC 516, observed as follows:

“15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions  are: (1)   The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent  jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a  First Information Report unless the allegations contained therein,  even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety,  disclosed no cognizable offence.

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(2)   For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very  exceptional  circumstances,  would  not  look  to  any  document  relied upon by the defence. (3)   Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the  allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence,  the  court  shall  not  go beyond the same and pass  an order  in  favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus  reus. (4)   If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself  may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should  not be allowed to continue. 16.   It is furthermore well known that no hard and fast rule can  be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits.  The Court,  while  exercising  its  inherent  jurisdiction,  although  would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view  the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482  and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced  by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction  in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior  courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not  subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false  and wholly untenable complaint.”

19. The same view has been taken by this Court in Chunduru Siva Ram  

Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr., SLP (Crl.) No. 2991 of  

2007; and  V. V. S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., SLP  

(Crl.) No. 1529 of 2007.  

20. It  was  fairly  agreed  at  bar  that  the  aforesaid  FIR  was  filed  by  

Respondent  No. 2 with the  intention of  making out  a  prima facie case of  

offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal  Code.  The charge sheet,  

which was filed by the police was under Section 498A of the Indian Penal  

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Code.  As to whether or not in the FIR filed and in the charge sheet a case of  

Section 498A IPC is made out or not is  an issue, which is  required to be  

answered in this appeal. Section 498A of the IPC reads as follows:

                                                                                                           “498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman  subjecting her to cruelty.

Whoever,  being  the  husband  or  the  relative  of  the  husband  of  a  woman,  subjects  such  woman to  cruelty  shall  be punished with imprisonment  for a term which  may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.  

Explanation-For  the  purpose  of  this  section,  "cruelty"  means-

(a) Any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is  likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause  grave  injury  or  danger  to  life,  limb or  health  whether  mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is  with a view to coercing her or any person related to her  to  meet  any  unlawful  demand  for  any  property  or  valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any  person related to her meet such demand”.

21. In the light of the aforesaid language used in the Section, the provision  

would be applicable only to such a case where the husband or the relative of  

the husband of a woman subjects the said woman to cruelty.    When the  

ingredients of the aforesaid Section are present in a particular case, in that  

event  the person concerned against  whom the offence is alleged would be  

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tried in accordance with law in a trial instituted against him and if found guilty  

the  accused  would  be  punished with imprisonment  for  a  term which  may  

extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. The said section contains  

an explanation,  which defines “cruelty” as understood under Section 498A  

IPC.   In  order  to  understand  the  meaning  of  the  expression  ‘cruelty’  as  

envisaged under Section 498A, there must be such a conduct on the part of the  

husband or relatives of the husband of woman which is of such a nature as to  

cause the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life,  

limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman.

  22. When we examine the facts of the present case particularly the FIR and  

the charge sheet we find that there is no such allegation either in the FIR or in  

the charge sheet making out a prima facie case as narrated under explanation  

(a).  There is no allegation that there is any such conduct on the part of the  

appellant which could be said to be amounting to cruelty of such a nature as is  

likely to cause the Respondent No. 2 to commit suicide or to cause any injury  

to her life.  The ingredient to constitute an offence under explanation (a) of  

Section 498A IPC are not at all mentioned either in FIR or in charge sheet and  

in absence thereof, no case is made out.  Therefore, explanation (a) as found  

in Section 498A IPC is clearly not attracted in the present case.   

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23. We, therefore, now proceed to examine as to whether the case would  

fall under explanation (b) of Section 498A of IPC constituting cruelty of the  

nature as mentioned in explanation (b).  In order to constitute cruelty under  

the said provision there has to be harassment of the woman with a view to  

coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any  

property or valuable security or a case is to be made out to the effect that there  

is a failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.   When  

the allegation made in the FIR and charge sheet is examined in the present  

case in the light of the aforesaid provision, we find that no prima facie case  

even under the aforesaid provision is made out to attract a case of cruelty.

24. The  marriage  between  the  appellant  and  Respondent  No.  2  was  

performed on 23.10.1997 when it is alleged that Rs. 5 lakhs was given by the  

parents of Respondent No. 2 to the family of appellant as dowry.  The FIR  

was filed in the month of April, 2002 and in the said FIR there is no allegation  

that subsequent thereto any harassment was made by the appellant with a view  

to  coercing  her  or  any  person  related  to  Respondent  No.  2  to  meet  any  

unlawful demand or any property.   

25. In that view of the matter neither explanation (a) nor explanation (b) of  

Section 498 A of IPC is attracted in the present case.  It is crystal clear that  

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neither in the FIR nor in the charge sheet there is any ingredient of Section  

498A IPC, which could prima facie constitute a case of cruelty as defined in  

that Section.    

26. It is thus established that on a reading of the FIR as also the charge  

sheet filed against the appellant no case under Section 498A is made out on  

the face of the record, and therefore, both the FIR as also the charge sheet are  

liable to be quashed in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC.  

Clearly, the High Court failed to appreciate the facts in proper perspective,  

and therefore, committed an error on the face of the record.   

27. We,  therefore,  allow this  appeal  and quash the  proceedings  initiated  

against the appellant under Section 498A of the IPC.   

28. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.

          .………..………………J. (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)

..………………………..J. (Dr. B.S. Chauhan)

New Delhi, July 6, 2009

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