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PETITIONER: SHAIK JAFFAR SHAIK MAHMOOD & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHD.  PASHA HAKKANI SAHAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/12/1974

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR  794            1975 SCR  (2) 890  1975 SCC  (1)  25

ACT: Nature  of revisional power-Narrower than  appellate  power- Whether evidence can be re-appreciated-section 115 of  Civil Procedure  Code-Section  26(c)  of  Hyderabad  Houses  (Rent Eviction and Lease) Control Act. 1954.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  Landlords made an application to  the  Rent Controller  for  eviction of the  appellant-tenants  on  the ground of non-payment of rent and personal requirement under Hyderabad  Houses (Rent.  Eviction and Lease)  Control  Act, 1954.    The  Rent  Controller  negatived   the   landlords’ contention  and  dismissed  the  eviction  application.   An appeal filed by the landlords before the Assistant Judge was also  dismissed.  In a Revision Petition filed by the  land- lords before the High Court under section 26 of the Act  the High Court examined the reasons given by the Rent Controller and  the Assistant Judge and held that there was  no  cogent reason  to reject the testimony of the first  petitioner  on the question of bona fide requirement.-- On appeal to this Court by Special Leave it was contended on behalf  of  the appellant-tenants that the  High  Court  was wrong  in reappreciating the evidence to come to a  contrary conclusion to the one arrived at by both the courts below in Revision  under  section 26 of the Act.  The  scope  of  the section  26 of the Act is narrower than section 115  of  the Civil Procedure Code. Allowing the appeal, HELD : There is a 3 tier machinery provided in the Act.  The first  court is that of Rent Controller which is to  make  a summa ry  enquiry.  The second stage is of an appeal  before the  District  Judge  which is a  complete  re-hearing  with additional power to make further enquiry if necessary.   The third  stage is the revision to the High Court.  It is  well known that the appellate power is different from  revisional power.  Usually in the absence of any clear provision in the law  power  of  revision is narrower than  that  of  appeal. There  is  no  substantial  difference  between  the  powers conferred  by section 26 of the Act and section 115  of  the Civil  Procedure Code.  In a series of  decision-,  starting from  Privy Council days it is firmly well established  that

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section   115  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  applies   to jurisdiction  alone,  the  irregular exercise  or  the  non- exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it.  The section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in  which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. [892E-893C] Rajah  Amir  Hassen  Khan v. Sheo Baksh  Singh,  11  Indian. Appeals  237,  Balakrishna  Udayar v. Vasudeva  Aiyar  "  44 Indian  Appeals  261,  Keshardeo  Chamria  v.  Radha  Kissen Chamriya and Others, [1953] S.C.R. 136 and D.L.F. Housing  & Construction Company Private Ltd., New Delhi v. Sarup  Singh and Others, [1970] 2 S.C.R. 368. Under section 26, the High Court has to see whether there is any  error  of  jurisdiction or whether there  is  any  such manifest  error of procedure committed by the courts as  may affect  the ultimate decision resulting in gross  injustice. The  High Court in reappreciating the evidence in  order  to differ from the conclusions of the two authorities below has clearly made an error of jurisdiction and acted in excess of the power conferred on it under section 26 of the Act.   The High  Court  cannot  sit in appeal over the  orders  of  the original and the appellate authority. [893C-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1586  of 1974. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Order dated  the 12th  February,  1974 of the Bombay High Court  in  Revision Application No. 136 of 1968. 891 M.   N. Phadke and A. G. Ratnaparkhi for the Appellants. S.   Balakrishnan and N. M. Ghatate for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. The short question that arises for consideration in  this appeal is as to the, scope of section 26(c) of  the Hyderabad  Houses  (Rent, Eviction and Lease)  Control  Act, 1954  (No.   XX of 1954) (briefly the Act).  The  facts  may briefly be stated : The  landlords (respondents herein) made an  application  to the Rent Controller for an order of eviction of the  tenants (appellants  herein)  on  two grounds,  namely,  default  in payment of rent and secondly requirement of the premises for their  personal occupation to open a hardware shop at  Latur where  the premises are situated.  It is admitted  that  the landlords  have  a hardware shop at Udgir  where  they  have their own residence as well.  The Rent Controller as well as the  Assistant Judge, who heard the appeal, found  that  the tenants  were not in default in payment of rent.   Both  the courts  also concurrently held that the landlords failed  to establish  the bona fide requirement for their own  use  and occupation.   Being aggrieved by the decision of the  courts below, the landlords preferred a Revision Application  under section 26 of the Act to the High Court of Bombay.  The High Court  examined the reasons given by the Rent Controller  as well those of the Assistant Judge and came to the conclusion that both the courts below have acted illegally inasmuch  as "there  was no cogent reason to reject the testimony of  the 1st  petitioner in this respect".  In its view,  "therefore, it  has been sufficiently proved by the landlord  that  they really  want to start hardware business at Latur  as  well". The High Court, therefore, ordered the appellants to deliver possession  of the suit premises to the respondents.   Hence this appeal by special leave. Section   25  provides  for filing of appeals  and  runs  as

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follows               "25.  Appeal-(1)   Notwithstanding    anything               contained  in  any law for the time  being  in               force,  an  appeal from an order made  by  the               Controller  shall lie within 30 days from  the               date of such order to the District Judge ....               (2)     x                x                   x               x               (3)   The  appellate authority shall send  for               the  records of the case from  the  Controller               and after giving the parties an opportunity of               being  heard,  and if necessary  after  making               such  further inquiry as it thinks fit  either               personally  or through the  Controller,  shall               decide the appeal.               (4)   Save  as  provided  in  section  26  the               decision   of  the  appellate  authority   and               subject to only such decision, an order of the               Controller  shall  be final and shall  not  be               liable  to be called in question in any  Court               of Law whether in a suit or other  proceedings               or by way of appeal.               892               Section  26 which provides for revision  reads               as under               "26.   Notwithstanding anything  contained  in               this  Act or any other law for the time  being               in  force, an application for  revision  shall               lie  to  the High Court from any  final  order               passed on appeal by an appellate authority  on               the following grounds :-               (a)  that the original or appellate  authority               exercised  a jurisdiction not vested in it  by               law, or               (b)   that the original or appellate authority               failed  to exercise a jurisdiction so  vested,               or               (c)   in  following the procedure  or  passing               the order, the original or appellate authority               acted     illegally    or    with     material               irregularity". Mr.  Phadke, learned counsel for the appellants,  made  only one submission before us.  He submitted that the High  Court was clearly wrong in re-appreciating the evidence to come to a  contrary  conclusion  by interfering  in  revision  under section  26(c)  of the Act with the concurrent  findings  of fact with regard to bona fide requirement of the  landlords. He further submitted that the scope of section 26(c) of  the Act  is necessarily narrower than that of an appeal  and  is similar  to  section 115 of the Civil Procedure  Code.   The High Court, therefore, erred in jurisdiction in  interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below and in passing the decree for eviction. There  is  a three tier machinery provided in  the  Act  for dealing  with  a landlord’s application for  eviction.   The first Court is that of the Rent Controller which is to  make a summary inquiry in the manner usually done by a Magistrate exercising  summary powers in trying a criminal  case.   The Controller  is not required to record evidence  exhaustively and  has  only  to  record brief  reasons  for  his  finding (section  24).  The second stage is of an appeal before  the District  Judge.  The District Judge in deciding the  appeal has  power  even  to  make  further  inquiry  if  he  thinks necessary  [section  25(3)].  This being  the  first  appeal before him it is a complete rehearing with additional  power

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to  make further inquiry if necessary.  The order  which  he ultimately,  passes is final and there is no further  second appeal  against his order.  In the third place,  section  26 provides  for an application for rev;-;on against the  final appellate  order of the District Judge to the High Court  on the  grounds which we have already set out.  The High  Court can examine under section 26-               (a)   whether   the  original   or   appellate               authority exercised jurisdiction not vested in               it by law, or               (b)   whether   the  original   or   appellate               authority failed to exercise a jurisdiction so               vested, or               (c)   whether  in following the  procedure  or               passing  the order, the original or  appellate               authority  acted  illegally or  with  material               irregularity. It  is  well-known that appellate power  is  different  from revisional  power  usually,  in the  absence  of  any  clear provision in the law,                             893 power  of revision is narrower than that of appeal.   Having compared  section 26 with section 115 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure,  it  is  difficult  to hold  that  there  is  any substantial   difference   in  the  contents  of   the   two provisions.  If there is some verbal difference between  the above  two  sections, it is without any distinction.   In  a series  of  decisions from the Privy Council  days  starting from  year  1894, Rajah Amir Hassan  Khan’s  case(1),  1917, Balakrishna  Udayar’s  case(2)  till recent  times,  as  for example, in Keshardeo Chamria’s case(3) and D.L.F. Housing & Construction  Company’s case, (4 ) it is firmly  well-estab- lished  that section 115, Civil Procedure Code, "applies  to jurisdiction  alone,  the irregular exercise., or  the  non- exercise  of  it,  or the illegal assumption  of  it".   The section  is not directed against conclusions of law or  fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved". The High Court under section 26(c) has to see whether  there is any error of jurisdication committed by the Controller or by  the appellate authority in passing the order or  whether there  is any such manifest error of procedure committed  by the courts as may effect the ultimate decision resulting  in gross  injustice.   It is only in that  context  that  under section 26(c) the words "acted illegally" or "with  material irregularity" have been used.  In view of the scheme of  the Act  that  the  inquiry  contemplated  before  the  original authority  is  of  a  summary nature  (section  24),  to  be disposed  of  in an expeditious manner section 21)  and  the order  of the appellate authority, which is vested with  the power  to  make further inquiry, is made  final  subject  to revision  (section  25), it cannot be the intention  of  the legislature in making the power of revision under section 26 wider  than it is under section 115 of the  Civil  Procedure Code.   The revisional power under section 26 is limited  in terms of the section itself and is necessarily narrow.   The High  Court is, therefore, not correct in its view that  the power of revision under section 26 is of wider amplitude. Inasmuch  as  the  High Court  sought  to  reappreciate  the evidence in order to differ from the conclusions of the  two authorities,  it has clearly made an error  of  jurisdiction and  acted  in  excess of the power conferred  on  it  under section  26(c)  of the Act.  We are, therefore,  clearly  of opinion that the High Court cannot sit in appeal, as it  has done  in this case, over the orders of the original and  the appellate authority in order to reappreciate the evidence in

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exercising  its power of revision tinder section 26  of  the Act.  We, therefore, accept the, sumbission of Mr. Phadke. We may observe that although the appeal lies to the District Judge  under  section  25 of the Act, it  appears  that  the Assistant Judge heard the appeal.  Since this point was  not canvassed at the Bar, we express no opinion on this aspect. I  In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment  of the  High Court is set aside.  The parties will  bear  their own costs.      P.H.P.    Appeal allowed. (1) 11 I.A.237.     (2) 44 I.A. 261. (3) [1953] S.C.R. 136.   (4) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 368. 894