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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2309 OF 2009

[Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.717 of 2009]

Shabana Bano  ....Appellant   

Versus

Imran Khan  ....Respondent J U D G M E N T

Deepak Verma, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Appellant  Shabana  Bano  was  married  to  the  respondent Imran Khan according to Muslim rites at  Gwalior on 26.11.2001. According to the appellant, at  the time of marriage, necessary household goods to be  used  by  the  couple  were  given.   However,  despite  this, the respondent-husband and his family members  treated the appellant with cruelty and continued to  demand more dowry.

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3. After  some  time,  the  appellant  became  pregnant and was taken to her parents’ house by the  respondent.  The respondent threatened the appellant  that in case his demand of dowry is not met by the  appellant's parents, then she would not be taken back  to her matrimonial home even after delivery. 4. Appellant delivered a child in her parental  home. Since even after delivery, respondent did not  think it proper to discharge his responsibility by  taking  her  back,  she  was  constrained  to  file  a  petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure  (for  short,  'Cr.P.C.')  against  the  respondent in the Court of Family Judge, Gwalior.  It  was averred by the appellant that respondent has been  earning a sum of Rs. 12,000/- per month by doing some  private work and she had no money to maintain herself  and her new-born child.  Thus, she claimed a sum of  Rs.3000/-  per  month  from  the  respondent  towards  maintenance.  5. On notice being issued to the respondent, he

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denied all the contents of the petition filed by the  appellant  under  Section  125  of  the  Cr.P.C.  except  admitting his marriage with the appellant.   6. Preliminary  objections  were  raised  by  the  respondent that appellant has already been divorced  on  20.8.2004  in  accordance  with  Muslim  Law.  Thus,  under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of  Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to  as ‘Muslim Act’), appellant is not entitled to any  maintenance after the divorce and after the expiry of  the iddat period.  It was also contended by him that  appellant herself is earning Rs.6,000/- per month by  giving private tuitions and is not dependent on the  income of the respondent, thus, she is not entitled  to  any  maintenance.  It  was  also  contended  by  respondent that appellant had gone to her parental  home on her own free-will and accord, after taking  all the jewellery and a sum of Rs.1000/- and despite  notice  being  sent,  she  has  not  returned  to  her  matrimonial home. Thus, for all these reasons, she is

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not entitled to receive any amount of maintenance. 7. The Family Court was pleased to frame issues  and  parties  went  to  trial.  After  considering  the  matter  from  all  angles,  the  learned  Judge  of  the  Family  Court  partly  allowed  the  appellant's  application  as under:

“(1) respondent shall pay Rs.2000/- per  month  as  maintenance  allowance  to  the  petitioner from  26.4.2004,  date  of  institution of petition to the date of  divorce,  i.e.  20.8.2004  and  thereafter  from 20.8.2004 to the period of iddat. (2) respondent will bear cost of the suit  of himself as well as of petitioner.”

8. Thus, the claim of the appellant was allowed  to  the  extent  of  Rs.  2,000/-  per  month  towards  maintenance  from  the  date  of  institution  of  the  petition till the date of divorce, i.e., 20.8.2004  and further from the said date till the expiry of  iddat period but amount of maintenance thereafter was  denied. 9. The appellant was, therefore, constrained to  carry the matter further by filing Criminal Revision

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No. 285 of 2008 before the Gwalior Bench of the High  Court of Madhya Pradesh. The said Criminal Revision  came to be disposed of by learned Single Judge on  26.9.2008  and  the  order  of  the  Family  Court  has  substantially  been  upheld  and  consequently,  the  appellant's Revision has been dismissed.  It is this  order and the order passed by the Family Court which  are the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal by  grant of special leave. 10. At  the  outset,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  contended  that  learned  Single  Judge  has  gravely erred in dismissing the appellant's Revision  on  misconception  of  law  on  the  ground  that  after  divorce of a Muslim wife, a petition under Section 125  of the Cr.P.C. would not be maintainable. It was also  contended that learned Single Judge proceeded on wrong  assumption in dismissing appellant's Revision claiming  maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. It was  also argued that both the courts below completely lost  sight  of  the  provisions  of  Section  7(1)(f)  of  the

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Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as  the 'Family Act'). 11. On the other hand, Shri S.K. Dubey, learned  Senior Counsel for the respondent contended that no  illegality or perversity can be found in the order  passed by the learned Single Judge and the same calls  for no interference.  It was also contended that the  appeal  being  devoid  of  any  merit  and  substance,  deserves to be dismissed. 12.  In the light of the aforesaid contentions,  we have heard the learned counsel for the parties and  perused the records. 13. The basic and foremost question that arises  for consideration is whether a Muslim divorced wife  would  be  entitled  to  receive  the  amount  of  maintenance from her divorced husband under Section  125 of the Cr.P.C. and, if yes, then through which  forum. 14. Section 4 of Muslim Act reads as under:

  “4. Order for payment of maintenance:  -(1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained

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in the foregoing provisions of this Act  or in any other law for the time being  in  force,  where  a  Magistrate  is  satisfied that a divorced woman has not  re-married and is not able to maintain  herself after the  iddat  period, he may  make  an  order  directing  such  of  her  relatives  as  would  be  entitled  to  inherit  her  property  on  her  death  according  to  Muslim  law  to  pay  such  reasonable and fair maintenance to her  as  he  may  determine  fit  and  proper,  having  regard  to  the  needs  of  the  divorced  woman,  the  standard  of  life  enjoyed by her during her marriage and  the  means  of  such  relatives  and  such  maintenance  shall  be  payable  by  such  relatives  in  the  proportions  in  which  they would inherit her property and at  such periods as he may specify in his  order:

Provided  that  where  such  divorced  woman has children, the Magistrate shall  order  only  such  children  to  pay  maintenance to her, and in the event of  any  such  children  being  unable  to  pay  such  maintenance,  the  Magistrate  shall  order the parents of such divorced woman  to pay maintenance to  her:  Provided  further that if any of the  parents  is  unable  to  pay  his  or  her  share of the maintenance ordered by the  Magistrate on the ground of his or her  not having the means  to pay the same,  the  Magistrate  may,  on  proof  of  such  inability being furnished to him, order  that the share of such relatives in the  maintenance  ordered  by  him  be  paid  by

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such  of  the  other  relatives  as  may  appear  to  the  Magistrate  to  have  the  means  of  paying  the  same  in  such  proportions as the Magistrate may think  fit to order.  (2) Where a divorced woman is unable  to  maintain  herself  and  she  has  no  relatives  as  mentioned  in  sub-section  (1) or such relatives or any one of them  have  not  enough  means  to  pay  the  maintenance ordered by the Magistrate or  the other relatives have not the means  to  pay  the  shares  of  those  relatives  whose  shares  have  been  ordered  by  the  Magistrate  to  be  paid  by  such  other  relatives  under  the  second  proviso  to  sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, by  order,  direct  the  State  Wakf  Board  established under Section 9 of the Wakf  Act,  1954  (29  of  1954),  or  under  any  other law for the time being in force in  a  State,  functioning  in  the  area  in  which  the  woman  resides,  to  pay  such  maintenance as determined by him under  sub-section (1) or, as the case may be,  to  pay  the  shares  of  such  of  the  relatives who are unable to pay, at such  periods as he may specify in his order.”

15. Section 5 thereof deals with the option to be  governed by the provisions of Section 125 to 128 of  the Cr.P.C.  It appears that parties had not given any  joint or separate application for being considered by  the Court.  Section 7 thereof deals with transitional

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provisions. 16. Family Act, was enacted w.e.f. 14th September,  1984  with  a  view  to  promote  conciliation  in,  and  secure  speedy  settlement  of,  disputes  relating  to  marriage and family affairs and for matters connected  therewith. 17. The purpose of enactment was essentially to  set  up  family  courts  for  the  settlement  of  family  disputes, emphasizing on conciliation and achieving  socially  desirable  results  and  adherence  to  rigid  rules of procedure and evidence should be eliminated.  In other words, the purpose was for early settlement  of family disputes. 18.  The  Act,  inter  alia,  seeks  to  exclusively  provide within jurisdiction of the family courts the  matters  relating  to  maintenance,  including  proceedings under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C.  19. Section  7  appearing  in  Chapter  III  of  the  Family  Act  deals  with  Jurisdiction.  Relevant  provisions thereof read as under:

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   “7. Jurisdiction-(1) Subject to the  other  provisions  of  this  Act,  a  Family  Court shall -

(a) have  and  exercise  all  the  jurisdiction  exercisable  by  any  district  Court  or  any  subordinate  civil  Court  under  any  law  for  the  time  being  in  force  in  respect  of  suits and proceedings of the nature  referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be  deemed,  for  the  purposes  of  exercising  such  jurisdiction  under  such law, to be a district Court or,  as the case may be, such subordinate  civil Court for the area to which the  jurisdiction  of  the  Family  Court  extends. Explanation.–  The  suits  and  

proceedings  referred  to  in  this  sub- section are suits and proceedings of the  following nature, namely:-

(a) .... .... .... (b) .... .... .... (c) .... .... .... (d) .... .... .... (e) .... .... .... (f) a  suit  or  proceeding  for  

maintenance; (g) .... .... ....”

20. Section  20  of  the  Family  Act  appearing  in  Chapter  VI  deals  with  overriding  effect  of  the  provisions of the Act.  The said section reads as

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under :  “20. Act  to have overriding effect –  The provisions of this Act shall have effect  notwithstanding  anything  inconsistent  therewith contained in any other law for the  time  being  in  force  or  in  any  instrument  having  effect  by  virtue  of  any  law  other  than this Act.”

21. Bare perusal of Section 20 of the Family Act  makes it crystal clear that the provisions of this  Act  shall  have  overriding  effect  on  all  other  enactments in force dealing with this issue. 22. Thus, from the abovementioned provisions it  is quite discernible that a Family Court established  under  the  Family  Act  shall  exclusively  have  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  upon  the  applications  filed under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. 23. In the light of the aforesaid contentions and  in view of the pronouncement of judgments detailing  the  said  issue,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submits  that  matter  stands  finally  settled  but  learned Single Judge wholly misconstrued the various  provisions  of  the  different  Acts  as  mentioned

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hereinabove,  thus,  committed  a  grave  error  in  rejecting the appellant’s prayer. 24. In our opinion, the point stands settled by  judgment of this Court reported in (2001) 7 SCC 740  titled  Danial  Latifi  &  Anr. Vs.  Union  of  India  pronounced  by  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court.  Paras 30, 31 and 32 thereof fully establish the said  right  of  the  appellant.   The  said  paragraphs  are  reproduced hereinunder :

“30. A comparison of these provisions with  Section  125  CrPC  will  make  it  clear  that  requirements provided in Section 125 and the  purpose,  object  and  scope  thereof  being  to  prevent vagrancy by compelling those who can  do  so  to  support  those  who  are  unable  to  support themselves and who have a normal and  legitimate claim to support are satisfied. If  that is so, the argument of the petitioners  that a different scheme being provided under  the Act which is equally or more beneficial on  the interpretation placed by us from the one  provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure  deprive  them  of  their  right,  loses  its  significance. The object and scope of Section  125 CrPC is to prevent vagrancy by compelling  those who are under an obligation to support  those who are unable to support themselves and  that  object  being  fulfilled,  we  find  it  difficult to accept the contention urged on  behalf of the petitioners.

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31. Even under the Act, the parties agreed  that the provisions of Section 125 CrPC would  still  be  attracted  and  even  otherwise,  the  Magistrate has been conferred with the power  to make appropriate provision for maintenance  and, therefore, what could be earlier granted  by a Magistrate under Section 125 CrPC would  now  be  granted  under  the  very  Act  itself.  This being the position, the Act cannot be  held to be unconstitutional. 32. As on the date the Act came into force the  law applicable to Muslim divorced women is as  declared by this Court in Shah Bano's case  [(1985) 2 SCC 556 Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah  Bano Begum & Ors.]. In this case to find out  the personal law of Muslims with regard to  divorced  women's  rights,  the  starting  point  should  be  Shah  Bano's  case  and  not  the  original texts or any other material - all the  more  so  when  varying  versions  as  to  the  authenticity of the source are shown to exist.  Hence,  we  have  refrained  from  referring  to  them in detail.    That declaration was made  after considering the Holy Quran, and other  commentaries or other texts.   When  a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  analysed  Suras 241-242 of Chapter II of the Holy Quran  and other relevant textual material, we do not  think, it is open for us to re-examine that  position and delve into a research to reach  another conclusion.  We respectfully abide by  what has been stated therein.  All that needs  to  be  considered  is  whether  in  the  Act  specific  deviation  has  been  made  from  the  personal laws as declared by this Court in  Shah  Bano's  case  without  mutilating  its  underlying ratio. We have carefully analysed  the same and come to the conclusion that the  Act actually and in reality codifies what was  stated  in  Shah  Bano's  case.  The  learned

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Solicitor General contended that what has been  stated  in  the  Objects  and  Reasons  in  Bill  leading  to  the  Act  is  a  fact  and  that  we  should  presume  to  be  correct.   We  have  analysed the facts and the law in Shah Bano's  case and proceeded to find out the impact of  the same on the Act.   If the language of the  Act is as we have stated, the mere fact that  the Legislature took note of certain facts in  enacting  the  law  will  not  be  of  much  materiality.”

25. Judgment of this Court reported in (2007) 6  SCC 785 titled  Iqbal Bano Vs.  State of U.P.& Anr.  whereby the provisions contained in Section 125 of  the  Cr.P.C.  have  been  aptly  considered  and  the  relevant portion of the order passed in Iqbal Bano's  case reads as under:

“10.Proceedings  under  Section  125  Cr.P.C.  are  civil  in  nature.  Even  if  the  Court  noticed  that  there  was  a  divorced  woman in the case in question, it was open  to it to treat it as a petition under the  Act considering the beneficial nature of the  legislation.  Proceedings under Section 125  Cr.P.C. and claims made under the Act are  tried  by  the  same  court.  In  Vijay  Kumar  Prasad Vs State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 196 it  was held that proceedings under Section 125  Cr.P.C. are civil in nature.  It was noted  as follows: (SCC p.200, Para 14).

14.   The  basic  distinction  between  Section 488 of the old Code and Section  126 of the Code is that Section 126 has

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essentially  enlarged  the  venue  of  proceedings  for  maintenance  so  as  to  move the place where the wife may be  residing on the date of application. The  change was thought  necessary because of  certain  observations  by  the  Law  Commission, taking note of the fact that  often  deserted wives  are compelled  to  live with their relatives far away from  the  place  where  the  husband  and  wife  last resided together.  As noted by this  Court  in  several  cases,  proceedings  under Section 125 of the Code are of  civil nature.  Unlike clauses (b) and  (c) of Section 126 (1) an application by  the  father  or  the  mother  claiming  maintenance has to be filed where the  person from whom maintenance is claimed  lives.”

26.    In the light of the findings already recorded  in earlier paras, it is not necessary for us to go  into the merits.  The point stands well settled which  we would like to reiterate. 27. The appellant’s petition under Section 125 of  the Cr.P.C. would be maintainable before the Family  Court as long as appellant does not remarry.  The  amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125  of the Cr.P.C. cannot be restricted for the  iddat  period only.

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28. Learned Single Judge appeared to be little  confused  with  regard  to  different  provisions  of  Muslim  Act,  Family  Act  and  Cr.P.C.  and  thus  was  wholly  unjustified  in  rejecting  the  appellant's  Revision.  29. Cumulative reading of the relevant portions  of judgments of this Court in  Danial Latifi (supra)  and  Iqbal Bano (supra) would make it crystal clear  that even a divorced Muslim woman would be entitled  to claim maintenance from her divorced husband, as  long  as  she  does  not  remarry.   This  being  a  beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit thereof  must accrue to the divorced Muslim women. 30. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the  impugned orders are hereby set aside and quashed.  It  is  held  that  even  if  a  Muslim  woman  has  been  divorced, she would be entitled to claim maintenance  from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.  after the expiry of period of iddat also, as long as  she does not remarry.

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31. As  a  necessary  consequence  thereof,  the  matter is remanded to the Family Court at Gwalior for  its  disposal  on  merits  at  an  early  date,  in  accordance with law. The respondent shall bear the  cost of litigation of the appellant.  Counsel’s fees  Rs.5,000/-. 32. Consequently,  the  appeal  stands  allowed  to  the extent indicated above.

    ......................J.

[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY]

  ......................J. [DEEPAK VERMA]

New Delhi. December 04, 2009.