“REPORTABLE”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.486-487 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2688-89 of 2005)

Sethuraman      …. Appellant

Versus

Rajamanickam          …. Respondent

J U D G M E N T

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. In these appeals, the common order passed by the Learned Single

Judge  of  the  Madras  High  Court  in  three  Criminal  Revisions,  is  in

challenge.  By the instant order, the Learned Single Judge set aside the

three orders passed by the Trial  Court  dated 26.7.2004 in Crl.M.P. No.

3057 of 2004 in C.C. No. 216 of 2003 and dated 1.4.2004 in Crl.M.P. Nos.

4184  and  4185  of  2004  in  C.C.  No.  215  of  2003,  and  allowed  those

Crl.M.Ps.  Shortly stated, the appellant herein had filed a criminal complaint

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under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred

to as ‘Cr.P.C.’ for short), complaining therein that a cheque signed by the

respondent and given for returning the amount of Rs.2 lakhs, which was a

loan, was bounced and inspite of the notice given thereafter, the accused

(respondent herein) had failed to return the money.  A Trial ensued on the

basis  of  this  complaint  and  the  complainant  (appellant  herein)  was

examined as a first  witness for  the prosecution on 24.8.2004.   He was

cross-examined  also.   On  20.9.2004,  the  respondent  herein  filed

applications under Section 91 Cr.P.C. and Section 311 Cr.P.C., seeking

directions to produce the Bank Pass Books, Income Tax Accounts and the

L.D.S. deposit receipts of the appellant, as also for recalling him for cross-

examination.  This was objected to by a Reply dated 24.9.2004.  The Court

passed an  order  on  1.10.2004,  rejecting  the  applications  made by  the

respondent/accused.   The  respondent/accused  filed  Criminal  Revisions

before the High Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the High Court, by

the impugned common order, proceeded to allow the same.  It is this order,

which has fallen for consideration before us in these appeals.

3. Very  strangely,  the  High  Court  did  not  even  issue  notice  to  the

appellant/complainant, on the spacious ground that the production of the

documents,  which  was  sought  for  by  the  accused,  would  cause  no

prejudice to the appellant/complainant.  We fail  to understand this logic.

After  all,  if  the  documents  in  possession  of  the  appellant/complainant,

which were his personal documents, sought for by the accused and the

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production  of  which  was  rejected  by  the  Trial  Court,  and  which  were

ordered to be produced by the High Court, at least a hearing should have

been given to the appellant/complainant.  He could have shown, firstly, that

no such documents existed or that there was no basis for the production of

those documents,  particularly,  in  view of  the fact  that  he was not  even

cross-examined in respect of those documents.  On this ground, the order

of the High Court would have to be set aside.

4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the

Trial  Court  refusing  to  call  the documents  and rejecting the  application

under  Section  311 Cr.P.C.,  were interlocutory  orders  and  as  such,  the

revision  against  those  orders  was  clearly  barred  under  Section  397(2)

Cr.P.C.  The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that

the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only

defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that

the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque.  The Trial

Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary.  This

order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally.  Therefore, both the

orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production

of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for

recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case,

under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable.   Under such

circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional

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jurisdiction.  The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would

have to be set aside.  It is accordingly set aside.  The appeals are allowed.

………………………………………….J. [Tarun Chatterjee]

………………………………………….J.  [V.S. Sirpurkar]

New Delhi March 18, 2009

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