http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: SETH GULAB CHAND

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SETH KUDILAL AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/03/1958

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BOSE, VIVIAN DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, S.K.

CITATION:  1958 AIR  554            1959 SCR  313

ACT:        Statute,  Construction  of-Retrospective  operation-Rule  of        presumption-Applicability-Duty  of Court-Reference  to  Pre-        existing law, if and when permissible-Right of appeal-United        State  of  Gwalior, Indore and  Malwa  (Madhya-Bharat)  High        Court of Judicature Act, VIII of 1949, SS. 2(b), 25.

HEADNOTE: The  rule  that  a  statute is  not  to  have  retrospective operation  can  apply  only where it is  doubtful  from  the language  used whether or not it was intended to  have  such operation.  Where the language of the statute plainly  gives it  a  retrospective operation, there can be  no  scope  for applying  the  rule  of  presumption  against  retrospective operation.  The rule does not require that the Courts should be  obdurate  in refusing to give  a  statute  retrospective operation,  equally it does not justify the reading of  more words than there are into the statute in order that the rule may apply. Delhi  Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income  Tax  Com- missioner,  Delhi,  (1927)  L.  R. 54  I.A.  421,  Smith  v. Callander, (1901) A.C. 297 and Reid v. Reid, L.R. (1886)  3I Ch.  D. 402, considered. The appellant brought a suit for specific performance of  an agreement of sale in the High Court of Indore at a time when Indore was a Princely State in British India.  On April  22, 1948, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States entered into a Covenant to form the United State of Gwalior, Indore  and Malwa (Madhya-Bharat).  The suit was heard by  a single  Judge  and decreed on June 11, 1948.  The  Ruler  of Indore on June 16, 1948, made over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh of the United State in terms of the Covenant.  By an ordinance promulgated by the Raj Pramukh  a High Court was established for the United State and the High Court of Indore ceased to function from July 29, 1948.   The respondents  preferred an appeal to the Divisional Bench  of the  High Court of the United State on August 24, 1948,  and the appellant preferred a cross appeal under the  provisions of that Ordinance.  The Divisional Bench found in favour  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

the  respondents  in both the appeal  and  cross-appeal  and dismissed the appellant’s suit by a judgment dated  December 2,  1948.   The Interim Legislative Assembly of  the  United State enacted the United State of Gwalior, Indore and  Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) High Court of Judicature Act, VIII Of  1949, which came into force on January 18, 1949, and repealed  the Ordinance. 40 314 By s. 2(b) of the Act it was provided : This Act shall apply to all Criminal and civil proceedings including those under. testamentary, intestate, matrimonial divorce and insolvency jurisdiction pending in the courts in any State on the date on which the State is included in  the united  State and to such proceedings, arising in  the  said states, after those dates. By s. 25 it was provided : Special appeal shall lie to the Full Bench of the High court from :-  (1) a    decree  or  an  appealable  order  passed  by  the Divisional Bench    of  two judges Of the High Court in  the exercise of extraordinary     or       appellate       civil jurisdiction. The  appellant preferred an appeal to the Full Bench of  the High  Court  under  S.  25  against.  the  judgment  of  the Divisional  Bench.  The Full Bench dismissed the  appeal  as incompetent   holding  that  s.  25  could  not   be   given retrospective operation so as to disturb the right that  had vested in the respondents as to the finality of the judgment of the Divisional Bench which was passed before the Act came into force : Held,  that  s.  25  Of  the  Act,  although  not  in  terms retrospective, has to be read with S. 2(b) of the Act  which made  the  Act, and consequently S. 25,  applicable  to  the proceedings mentioned in it and since the appeal before  the Divisional Bench, filed after the inclusion of the State  of Indore  in  the United State, was beyond doubt one  of  such proceedings,  the  competency  of the appeal  could  not  be questioned. Although there can be no hard and fast rule that in no  case should  the pre-existing law be referred to for the  purpose of  interpreting a new enactment, where, as in  the  present case,  the language is simple, free from doubt  and  clearly indicates that a change in the pre-existing law is  intended and  no  reason existed requiring a reference  to  the  pre- existing law, no such reference is permissible. Tumahole Bereng v. The King, (1949) A.C. 253, Abdur Rahim v. Mohomed  Barkat  Ali,  (1927)  L.R. 55 I.A.  96  and  In  re Mayfair .Property Co. (1898) 2 Ch . 28, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 230 of 1953. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated August 29, 1950 of the  former  Madhya Bharat High Court at Indore  in  Special Appeal No. 5 of 1949, arising out of the judgment and decree dated  December  2, 1948, of the said High  Court  in  Civil First Appeal No. 61 of 1948 against the judgment and  decree dated June 11, 315 1948, on its Original Side in Civil Original Suit No. 30  of 1947. N.C Chatterjee, S. C. Isaacs, J. D. Patel, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

M.   P.  Amin,  C.  B.  Sanghi and 1.  N.  Shroff,  for  the respondents. 1958.   March 28.  The following Judgment of the  Court  was delivered by SARKAR T.-The Princely States that existed in British India, merged themselves in the Union of India not very long  after India  became independent.  Before the merger some of  these States  passed  through certain stages which may  be  called transitional.   The  decision  of  this  appeal  depends  on certain   laws   that  came  into   existence   during   the transitional  stage  through  which the  Princely  State  of Indore passed before it became merged in the Indian Union. Up  to April 22, 1948, Indore as one of the Princely  States of  India enjoyed internal sovereign rights and had its  own laws  and  courts.   These laws  and  courts  derived  their authority  from  the Ruler of Indore in whom  the  sovereign power  was vested.  The highest court in Indore  was  called the High Court. The  suit out of which this appeal arises was filed  by  the appellant  against the respondents in the Indore High  Court on  November  6,  1947.  It, was a  suit  for  the  specific performance  of an agreement whereby it is  said,  Govindram Sakstria,   whose  heirs  and  legal   representatives   the respondents are, agreed to sell to the appellant a share  in a  business.  The said Govindram Saksaria having died  prior to the suit it was brought against the respondents. On April 22, 1948, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other  States in the region known as  Malwa  (Madhva-Bharat) entered  into  a  Covenant  to  unite  and  integrate  their territories   in   one  State  with  a   common   executive, legislature and judiciary, by the name of the -United  State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) and to  include in that United 316 State  any other State the Ruler of which later agreed  with the approval of the Government of India, to merge his  State in the United State.  Article 3 of the Covenant provided for the  constitution of a Council of Rulers one of the  members of  which  was  to be its President,  such  President  being called  the Rajpramukh.  It also provided that the Ruler  of Gwalior would be the first Raj Pramukh of the United  State. Under art. 6 of the Covenant, the Ruler of each  covenanting State  was required to make over the administration  of  his State  to the Raj Pramukh by a date not later than  July  1, 1948.    This   article   also  provided   that   upon   the administration  of  a  State  being made  over  to  the  Raj Pramukh, all rights, authority and jurisdiction belonging to its Ruler and appertaining or incidental to its  Government, would   vest   in  the  United  State.   Similar   provision was  also  made  in respect of the vesting  of  the  rights, authority and jurisdiction of the Ruler of a State which  by a subsequent agreement became included in the United  State. Article   10  provided  that  as  soon  as   practicable   a Constituent Assembly for the United State would be formed in the manner indicated, for framing its Constitution and  that the  Raj  Pramukh  would by August 1,  1948,  constitute  an interim  Legislative Assembly.  It also provided that  until the  Constitution  framed by the Constituent  Assembly  came into operation, the Raj Pramukh would have the power to make and promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good  Government of the United State but such Ordinances would have force for a  period not longer than six months from  its  promulgation and would be liable to be controlled or superseded by an Act of  the  interim  Legislative  Assembly.   As  a  matter  of interest  it may be mentioned here, though nothing turns  on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

that  in this appeal, that the United State later  became  a Part  B  State as defined in the Constitution of  India  and lastly,  merged in the territories of what is now the  State of Madhya Pradesh. The  suit  brought by the appellant was heard  by  a  single Judge  of  the  Indore  High Court who  decreed  it  by  his judgment pronounced on June 11, 1948.  It 317 was  five  days  after this judgment  had  been  pronounced, namely, on June 16, 1948, that the Ruler of Indore made over the  administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh  of  the United State in terms of the Covenant.  It appears, however, that  the  High Court of Indore continued  functioning  even thereafter.   On June 19, 1948, the Raj Pramukh  promulgated Ordinance No. 2 of 1948 to provide for the establishment  of a  -High  Court  for the United State.  Section.  2  of  the Ordinance  provided  that it would come into force  on  such date as the Raj Pramukh might prescribe and the Raj  Pramukh by  a Notification. published on July 28,  1948,  prescribed July 29, 1948, as such date.  On Ordinance No. 2 of 1948  so coming  into force on July 29, 1948, the High Court  of  the State of Indore ceased to function from that date.   Section 35 of the Ordinance provided that on the taking over of  the administration  of  any State by the Raj  Pramukh  its  High Court  would cease to exist and all cases pending before  it would  be transferred to the High Court of the United  State established  by  the  Ordinance.   The  provisions  of  this section  were found to be anomalous in the cases  of  States like  Indore, where the administration had been  taken  over sometime  before the Ordinance had come into force  and  the High  Court  under it established, for in  regard  to  these States the cases pending in the State High Courts could  not on  the  dates  their  administration  was  taken  over,  be transferred  to  the United State High Court as it  had  not then  come  into  existence.  To  remedy  this  anomaly,  on October 16, 1948, the Raj Pramukh promulgated Ordinance  No. 14 of 1948.  This Ordinance replaced s. 35 in Ordinance 2 of 1948  by a new section and provided that it would be  deemed to  have always been so replaced.  The new section  provided that in the case of any State whose administration had  been taken  over by the Raj Pramukh before the  establishment  of the  High Court of the United State, the High Court  of  the State  would  cease to exist and function from the  date  of such  establishment and thereupon all cases  pending  before the High Court of the State would be transferred to the High Court of the United State and the appeals 318 which  would have lain to the High Court of the State  would lie to the High Court of the United State. Before  Ordinance No. 14 of 1948 had been  promulgated,  the respondents  on August 24, 1948, preferred an appeal to  the -Divisional bench of the High Court of the United State from the  decision  of  the High Court of  Indore  decreeing  the appellant’s  suit on June 11, 1948, to which  reference  has been  made earlier.  A few days later, namely, on  September 7, 1948, the appellant also preferred a cross-appeal to  the Divisional Bench against the same decision.  On December  2, 1948,  the  Divisional  -Bench decided the  appeal  and  the cross-appeal in favour of the respondents and dismissed  the appellant’s suit.  Now  came  the United State of Gwalior,  Indore  and  Malwa (Madhya-Bharat) High Court of Judicature Act, VIII of  1949, hereafter  referred  to as the Act.  It was enacted  by  the Interim  Legislative Assembly of the United State which  had earlier  come  into existence.  The Act came into  force  on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

January 18, 1949.  Section 40 of this Act repealed Ordinance No.  2  of 1948.  The question that arises  in  this  appeal depends  on  the construction of some of the  provisions  of this Act which are now set out. Preamble:  Whereas  it  is  necessary  to  provide  for  the continuance  of the High Court of Judicature for the  United State   of   Gwalior,  Indore  and   Malwa   (Madhya-Bharat) established  under  Ordinance No. 11 of 1948, it  is  hereby enacted as follows: S. 4. In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in  the subject  or context: (d)  " High Court " means the High Court functioning as  the High Court of the United State. S.   2(a).  It shall extend to the whole of the United State of Gwalior Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat) and shall  apply to  all persons within the said United State over  whom  the Courts having jurisdiction in the Covenanting States forming part of the said United State had jurisdiction. (b)  This  Act  shall  apply  to  all  Criminal  and   Civil Proceedings including those under testamentary, 319 intestate, matrimonial, divorce and insolvency jurisdiction, pending in the Courts in any State on the (late on which the State   is  included  in  the  United  State  and  to   such proceedings, arising in the said States,after those dates. S.25.  Special appeal shall lie to the Full Bench of the    High Court from :-  (1)  a  decree  or  an  appealable  order  passed  by   the Divisional  Bench  of two Judges of the High  Court  in  the exercise of extraordinary or appellate civil jurisdiction. On March 31, 1949, the appellant filed an appeal to the Full Bench of the High Court from the judgment of the -Divisional Bench  dismissing  his suit.  He claimed to be  entitled  to file  this  appeal under s. 25 of the Act.  The  Full  Bench dismissed  the  appeal  on the ground that  s.  25  was  not available to the appellant and in this view of the matter it did  not  go into the merits of the  appellant’s  case.   It appears that another Full Bench of the High Court consisting of  three Judges had held on an earlier occasion that s.  25 did  not apply where the Divisional Bench had delivered  its judgment  before the Act had come into force and  no  appeal Jay from such a judgment under this section.  That view  was endorsed  by  the  judgment of the later  Full  Bench  which however  was  larger  consisting of  five  Judges.   In  the present  appeal to this Court, the correctness of  the  last Full Bench judgment is being challenged. The appellant contends that s. 2(b) of the Act ap. plied the Act  including s. 25 to the proceedings mentioned in it  and s. 25 so applied gave a right of appeal to the Full Bench of the  High Court from the decision of a Divisional  Bench  of that  Court passed in these proceedings.  He then says  that the judgment of the Divisional Bench dated ]December 2, 1948 from which he had appealed to the Full Bench had been passed in such a proceeding and therefore his appeal was competent. The  High  Court  does not appear to  have  held  that  that proceeding was not of any 320 of the kinds mentioned in s. 2(b) and it seems to us that it was of one of these kinds.  Section 2(b) mentions two  kinds of proceedings, namely, first those pending in the Courts in any  State on the date on which that State was  included  in the  United,  State and secondly those which  arose  in  the States  after those dates.  Now the proceeding in which  the Divisional  Bench pronounced judgment was an appeal  from  a decision of a Single Judge of the Indore High Court given on

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

June 11, 1948, that is, before that State became included in the  United  State.  The appeal had however  been  filed  on August 24, 1948, that is, after Indore had been included  in the United State.  The appellant contends that the fact that the decree from which he had appealed had been passed before the  date of inclusion of Indore in the United  State  while his appeal had been filed after that date made no difference for  an appeal being only a continuation of the  proceedings in  a  suit,  the proceedings must be deemed  to  have  been pending all along since the filing of the suit and therefore on  the  date when Indore was included in the  United  State though the appeal was filed later.  Dinonath Ghose v.  Shama Bibi (1) to which we were referred would seem to support the appellant’s  contention.  In any case it seems beyond  doubt that  the  appeal in which the judgment  of  the  Divisional Bench,  dated  December  2,  1948,  was  pronounced,  was  a proceeding of the second kind mentioned in s. 2(b),  namely, " proceedings, arising in the said States, after those dates ",  i.  e., the date of the inclusion of the  State  in  the United State.  It seems clear to us that the words " arising in the said States " do not refer to proceeding arising in a Princely  State for the Princely State had ceased  to  exist after  its inclusion in the United State and  no  proceeding could arise therein after such inclusion.  So to  understand these  would result in this part of s. 2(b)  being  rendered nugatory.   We  do  not think,. however  such  a  result  is inevitable.   These  words can well be taken to refer  to  a proceeding  arising  in the areas of an  erstwhile  Princely State subsequently included in the United (1)  (1900) I.L.R. 28 Cal. 23. 321 State.   We think that to be the proper meaning to be  given to  these  words.   So understood the appeal  in  which  the judgment  of the Divisional Bench, dated December  2,  1948, was  given  was  a proceeding arising in the  areas  of  the erstwhile Indore State after the inclusion of that State  in the United State for it was filed after such inclusion.   It is  therefore  clearly  a  proceeding  of  the  second  kind mentioned in s. 2(b). The  learned  Judges of the High Court however did  not,  as earlier stated, accept the appellant’s contention that s. 25 gave  a right of appeal to the Full Bench from the  judgment of the Divisional Bench passed in a proceeding mentioned  in s.  2(b).  Their reasons for this view would appear  broadly to  be  these:  To accede to the  appellant’s  contention  a retrospective  operation would have to be given to  the  Act and  thereby affect the right vested in the  respondents  at the  date of the passing of the Act to the finality  of  the judgment of the Divisional Bench delivered before that date; the  rules of construction of a statute required  that  only such  retrospective operation should be given to it  as  its language  compelled; there was no such language used  in  s. 2(b),  which, properly understood, only gave the High  Court of the United State jurisdiction over proceedings pending in the  High  Court of’ a Princely State on the date  on  which that  State was included in the United State; ’in any  event the  language of s. 2(b) would be fully satisfied by  giving retrospective  operation  to  s. 25 only to  the  extent  of applying it to proceedings pending on the date of  inclusion of  a  State in the United State and not closed by  a  final judgment passed before the Act came into force. It may be conceded that the judgment of the Divisional Bench was  final  under  the law as it stood at the  date  it  was passed  and no appeal lay from it before the Act  came  into force.  The respondents had therefore at the date of the Act

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

a vested right to the finality of this judgment.  It is also clear  that  a  right to the finality of  a  judgment  is  a substantive right and that the acceptance of the appellant’s contention would result in depriving the respondents of such a right. 41 322 The  only question in this appeal is whether s. 25  gives  a right  of appeal from the judgment of the Divisional  Bench. The  rule is clear that " provisions which touch a right  in existence  at  the  passing of the statute  are  not  to  be applied retrospectively in the absence of express  enactment or  necessary intendment " : Delhi Cloth and  General  Mills Co.  Ltd.  v. Income Tax Commissioner,  Delhi  (1).   Before proceeding  further we wish to observe that the rule that  a statute  is  not  to have retrospective  operation  is  only applicable  where  it  is doubtful from  the  language  used whether  or  not, it was intended to  have  such  operation. Where  the  language  of  a  statute  plainly  gives  it   a retrospective operation, the rule has no application, for, " Of course, it is obviously competent for the Legislature, if it  pleases, in its wisdom to make the provisions of an  Act of  Parliament retrospective ": Smith v. Callander (2).   We may usefully read here what Bowen L. J. said in Reid v. Reid (3): "  Now  the particular rule of construction which  has  been referred to, but which is valuable only when the words of an Act  of Parliament are not plain, is embodied in  the  well- known  trite maxim ominis nova constitution  futuris  forman imponere  debet  non praeteritis, that is,  that  except  in special  cases  the new law ought to be construed so  as  to interfere as little as possible with vested rights.- We wish to emphasise that it is not as if all efforts should be made so  as  not  to give a  statute  a  retrospective  operation whatever  its language is. The rule does not require of  the courts  an  " obdurate persistence " in refusing to  give  a statute retrospective operation. Now,  what is the language of the Act before us  Section  25 does  not contain any words to show that it was intended  to have  retrospective  operation.  It only  provides  for  the future.  It gives a new right of appeal and such appeal  can of  course only be filed after the Act has come into  force. But there is s. 2 (b).  That section says that the Act shall apply  to all civil and criminal proceedings pending in  the Courts  in  any  State on the date on  which  the  State  is included in the (1)  (1927)  L.R. 54 1. A. 421. 425.  (2) (1901)  A.C.  297, 305. (3) L.R. (1886) 31 Ch.  D. 402.408. 323 United  State, and to such proceedings arising in  the  said States after these dates.  Section 2 (b) therefore makes  s. 25,  and also all other sections of the Act,  applicable  to the proceedings mentioned in it.  Now what -is the effect of this  ?  What is the result if a section giving a  right  of appeal  is made applicable to a proceeding ? It can only  be that an appeal would lie under that section from a  judgment passed  in that proceeding.  It is, in our view, clear  that the language of s. 2(b) applies s. 25 to a proceeding  which was  pending on a date before the Act came into  force,  and therefore  gives  a  right of appeal from a  judgment  of  a Divisional Bench passed in that proceeding, whenever it  may have been passed, that is to say, irrespective of whether it was  passed before the Act or after it.  We have here  plain language  which gives the statute  retrospective  operation.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

It  does  not seem to us that there is any  scope  here.  of applying  the rule of presumption against the  retrospective operation of a statute. But it is said that s. 2(b) only extends the jurisdiction of the High Court to the pending cases over which it would  not otherwise have any jurisdiction, and is not intended to give retrospective operation to any part of the Act.  It is  said that  that  this  is the real effect of  s.  2(b)  is  clear because  it is put along with 2(a) which only specifies  the territories and the persons over whom the High Court  having authority  under the Act is to have jurisdiction.  It  seems to  us,  however,  that  whether  a  section  only   creates jurisdiction  or not will depend on its language and not  on its  proximity  to  another  section  of  the  same  statute defining  jurisdiction.   Then  it  is  said  that  the  Act repealed  and  substantially re-enacted Ordinance No.  2  of 1948  and  as the corresponding section of  that  Ordinance, namely,  s.4(b), which was practically in the same  language as  s.2(b) of the Act, was only concerned with jurisdiction, s.2(b)  must be understood to do the same.  This  contention was accepted by the learned Judges of the High Court but  in this  they  were  clearly in error.  We do not  wish  to  be understood  as saying that in no case is a reference to  the old  law permissible for interpreting a new statute, but  it seems to us that in the present 324 case  such a reference was not justified.  One of the  cases on  which  the  learned  Judges  of  the  High  Court  based themselves  is Tumahole Bereng v. The King (1).   There  the Judicial  Committee were dealing with a statute only a  part of which had been amended and after reminding themselves  of the wisdom of the warning given by Lord Watson in  Bradlaugh v. Clarke (2) that it is " an extremely hazardous proceeding to refer to provisions which have been absolutely  repealed, in order to ascertain what the legislature meant to enact in their room and stead," observed at p. 267: "...... the circumstances of the present case put it  beyond the mischief Lord Watson was minded to discourage, and  that for  two  reasons.   In the first place, the  terms  of  the section  as  it now stands are  sufficiently  difficult  and ambiguous  to justify the consideration of its evolution  in the  statute-book  as  a  proper  and  logical  course;  and secondly, the object of the instant enquiry is to  ascertain the  true meaning of that part of the section which  remains as  it  was, and which there is no ground for  thinking  the substitution of a new proviso was intended to alter.  " In the case before us the language admits of no  difficulty- it  is simple and it applies all the sections of the Act  to certain  proceedings and as one of these sections at  least, namely,  s.  25,  is new, clearly a change in  the  law  was intended.  We do not wish to suggest that the  circumstances which  would  justify a reference to the old law  have  been exhaustively  set  out  by the Judicial  Committee.   It  is enough for us to say that none of those circumstances exists here.   In Abdur Rahim v. Mahomed Barkat Ali (3), which  was also  referred to by the High Court, the Judicial  Committee had to decide whether a suit was within s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and for that purpose to find out what reliefs  the expression " further and other relief " in  the section  would  include.  These words are plainly  wide  and require definition.  The Judicial Committee referred to  the earlier  law  on the subject to find out what  that  general expression was intended to include.  This case (1) (1949) A.C. 253.    (2) (1883) 8 App.  Cas. 354. (3) (1927) L.R. 55 I.A. 96.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

325 does not justify a resort to the old law by us, for here  we have no general words as to the meaning of which  difficulty has  arisen.   The last case on which the High  Court  based itself  for this part of it,-, judgment to which we wish  to refer  was In re Mayfair Property Co. There  the  contention was that a certain interpretation would defeat the object of the  Act and in order to as certain that object a  reference to the old law was found necessary.  No such question arises in  the case before us. It is not contended that the  object of the Act before us would be defeated if s. 2(b) applied s. 25  retrospectively.  For these reasons it seems to us  that the  present  is not a case where it is permissible  to  in- terpret  s. 2(b) of the Act by reference to s. 4(b)  of  the Ordinance.   Further in our view, in any event, s. 4 (b)  of the Ordinance provides no assistance in interpreting s. 2(b) of the Act.  Section 4(b) of the Ordinance was not concerned with  applying to any case another provision in it giving  a right of appeal which s. 2(b) of the Act clearly is What  we have  to decide is, in what cases that right of  appeal  was given and for that purpose plainly s. 4(b) of the  Ordinance can  afford no assistance as it was not concerned  with  any such right of appeal. It  is then said that sufficient meaning would be  given  to the  words " pending in the Courts in any State on the  date on  which the State is included in the United State " in  s. 2(b), if they are understood as referring to the cases which were  -pending  on that day and which had not  been  finally decided  and determined before the Act had come into  force. This contention is sought to be justified on the principle " that you ought not to give a larger retrospective power to a section, even in an Act which is to some extent intended  to be  retrospective, than you can plainly see the  Legislature meant ". See Reid v. Reid (2).  Now it seems to us that  the principle has no application here.  There is nothing in  the section  to  indicate  that  the  legislature  intended  the retrospective  operation  of s. 25 to be confined  to  those pending  cases which had not terminated before the  Act  had come  into force.  Such a construction would require  adding to the section the (1) (1898) 2 Ch. 28. (2) L.R. (1886) 31 Ch.  D- 402,408. 326 words  " and not finally decided before the Act  comes  into force  ". The rule of presumption against the  retrospective operation  does not require the addition of any words  to  a section otherwise plain.  We recall here, what we have  said earlier, that the rule applies only where the words are  not plain  or are capable of two meanings.  It does not  justify subtlety  in  adding words to the section to make  the  rule applicable. It  is  also said that though s. 2(b) applies s. 25  to  the proceedings  mentioned  therein, it does not  expressly  say that  in  so  applying  it,  vested  rights  shall  also  be affected.  We think it enough to dispose of this  contention to  say that, the necessary result of applying s. 25 to  the proceedings  mentioned is to disturb vested rights and  that in  order that a statute may have a retrospective  operation it  is not necessary to find words in it  expressly  stating that  it will have such operation notwithstanding that  that will disturb vested rights.  We do not think that the  words are not plain to give a retrospective operation. We  therefore  think that the appellant’s  appeal  from  the Divisional Bench was competent under s. 25 of the Act.   The result  is that this appeal is allowed.  The decree  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

Full  Bench of the High Court is set aside.  The  case  will now  go  back to the High Court of  (Madhya-Pradesh)  to  be decided  on the merits.  The appellant will have  the  costs here and below. We have here to state that there were three other  connected matters.   First, there was an application by the  appellant to this Court for special leave to appeal from the  Judgment of the Divisional Bench, being Petition for Special Leave to Appeal  (Civil)  No. 368 of 1957.  Then  there  was  another application by the appellant to this Court for special leave to  appeal  from  the  judgment of  the  Full  Bench,  being Petition  for  ,Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No.  242  of 1957.   These  had  been made by way  of  abundant  caution. Lastly,   there  was  an  application  for  leave  to   file additional  documents  in  the appeal  that  has  just  been disposed  of. It was Civil Misc.  Petition No. 472 of  1956. None  of  these applications were pressed and  we  therefore dismiss them but without any order for costs.                      Appeal allowed, cause remitted. 327