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PETITIONER: SENJEEVANAGAR MEDICAL & HEALTHEMPLOYEES CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MOHD. ABDUL WAHAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/02/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J) G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3) 600        JT 1996 (2)   173  1996 SCALE  (2)82

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T K. Ramaswamy,J.        This  appeal   by special  leave arises from the judgment of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court made in Writ Appeal No.692  of 1982  on March  2, 1983. Notification under Section  4 [1]  of the   Land Acquisition  Act [1 of 1894]  [for short, "the Act"] acquiring the lands in question to  provide  house  sites  to    Class      IV employees    of  the  appellant-Society,  was published in   the State   Gazette  on   January 11,   1979.  The substance of   the  notification was  published in  the locality on march 17, 1979. Enquiry under Section 5A of the Act  was conducted  and    the  Land    Acquisition Officer [LAO]  submitted his report  to the  Government on June  19, 1979.  Declaration under  Section   6  was published on  March 29,  1980. The LAO after conducting enquiry made his award under Section 11 on December 13, 1980 and   notice  thereof   was    served    on    the respondents. It   is  stated that  since the respondent did not  attend the   office of  the LAO,  as directed, on January 1, 1981, the  compensation was  deposited in the court   of  the Subordinate  Judge.   It is  stated that   after LAO   had  taken possession  of   the land from the  respondents, he  had handed over the  land to the appellant   but  actual   date  was  not mentioned. It    is   also   stated   by   the   appellants   that thereafter plots  were laid  out and  were allotted  to its members and  some members  had started construction of their  houses. At  that stage,  the respondents  had filed the writ petition on  August 9, 1982 and the Full Bench following  its judgment  in Yadaiah   & Ors.  vs. Govt.  of   A.P.[(1983)  1    DLT  233]  quashed    the notification   and the   declaration  holding that  the notifications   under    Section   4(1)     were    not

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simultaneously published  in the  Gazette  and  in  the locality.      Thus this  appeal by  special leave.       Shri C. Sitaramaiah,  learned     senior  counsel    for    the appellant contended   that  in   Deepak Pahwa   v.  Lt. Governor [(1985)  1  SCR 588]  this Court had overruled the Full  Bench  decision  in    Yadaiah’s  case    and approved   of the   ratio   in  various Division  Bench judgments   of   that   Court   referred  therein.  The State legislature   amended    the    Act    by    Land Acquisition [Andhra  Pradesh Amendment  and Validation] Act, 1983  [Act   9 of    1983]  [for    short,    "the Validation   Act"] giving retrospective  effect,  viz., w.e.f.  September  12, 1975, the date on which the Land Acquisition [Andhra Pradesh Amendment]  Act,  1976  had come   into    force.    Though    the  Validation  Act retrospectively prescribes publication of the substance of  the Section  4 [1] notification within 40 days from the  date of  its publication  in the District Gazette, the publication  of the  substance even  after 40  days does not  become invalid   by  the   ratio in    Deepak Pahwa’s case and by operation of  clause [b] of Section 4 of the Validation Act. He also  contended that  since possession   had already   been taken, after  the award was made,   the  land stood vested in the State and the beneficiaries, free  from all  encumbrances.  The  High Court, therefore,   was  not   right in   its  quashing Section 4  [1] notification  and Section 6 declaration. It  is   also  contended   that  the  Land  Acquisition [Amendment] Act  [68 of   1984]     provides  procedure for   publication    of   the  notification   in    the Gazette,   newspapers  and  the  local publication  and limitation    for    publication   of   the declaration under Section  6 within one year from last of the dates of   the publication  under Section  4 [1]  which would indicate that  various publications under Section 4 [1] could be  done   at periodical  intervals without  time limit within  the   maximum    period   of   one  year. The  Validation  Act thereafter also does not hold the field.        Shri  A.   Subbarao, learned   counsel  for  the respondents contended   that    after  the   Validation Act   was   given retrospective effect  from  September 12,   1975   and   local publication  made   after   40 days,   the   notification  under Section 4  [1] became invalid; consequently, the declaration under Section  6 is  not est.  He placed  reliance  on  Land Acquisition Officer,     Hyderabad  Urban   Development  Authority, Hyderabad, A.P.   v.  Mohd.Amri  Khan &  Ors. [(1986) 1 SCC 3]  and C.K.   Narayana  Chary  &Ors. v. Pothepalli Ashanna & Ors. [(1986) 1  SCC 9]  the ratio  wherein it was held  that local  publication   after    40    days invalidates  Section  4  [1] notification.          The   respective contentions  give rise to the question: whether  the   view of   the  High   Court is correct in  law? The  Land Acquisition  [Andhra Pradesh Amendment] Act,   1976  was enacted  with   a view   to accelerate the  pace of  acquisitions to provide  house sites   to the   poor  and  to  empower  the Collectors to issue  notification under  Section  4  [11  and  the declaration under  Section 6  and their  publication in the respective   district     Gazettes   and   to  make payment  of compensation to  the lands  so acquired  if the compensation does not  exceed Rs.500/- and in other cases in  installments not   exceeding   Rs.500/-  with

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interest  at  6%  on  such installments.        In  furtherance   thereof, acquisition   of  the lands   of private  persons   on  massive    scale  was undertaken  in   all  the  districts  of    the  State. Collectors exercised   power   under  Section 17    [4] dispensing  with  the  enquiry  under  Section  5A  and notifications under  Section  4  [11  and  declarations under Section  6   were simultaneously published in the Gazette. But  the officers  at the  lower level delayed publication of  the notification  under  section 4  [1] Consequentially, spate  of litigation  had   sprung  up in  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court invariably challenging the validity of the notifications.       As  noticed  by  this  Court  in  Deepak  Pahwa’s case [supra],  several Division Bench of the High Court have taken  consistent   view      that    simultaneous publication   of   the notification under  Section 4[1] in the    Gazette  and    local  publication  of    its substance   was not   mandatory.  A   single Judge  and Division Bench  had struck  a discarded note leading to reference   to the   Full Bench which in Yadaiah’s case had held  that the  publication of  the notification in the Gazette  and the local publication of its substance should be  done on the same  day. Following  that view, the     same    Full    Bench    quashed  the  impugned notification and  declaration covered  in that  appeal. The Validation Act expressly referred the said decision and   validated with   retrospective  effect   all  the notifications issued earlier than the date on which the A.P. Amendment  Act,   1976 came  into force,  removing the base  of the  Full   Bench judgment.  Section 2  of the   Validation  Act  provides  that    the  Collector shall, within 40 days from the date of  the publication of such   notification,   cause   the  substance of the notification published. This led to further litigation.        A  three-Judge  Bench was  required to  consider whether delay  in   giving  public    notice  in    the locality   makes   the notification  invalid. Yadaiah’s case was cited in support of the  contention.   Therein a   combined  notification  under Sections 4  and 17(4) and declaration  under Section 6 were published in  the Gazette on  June 18,  1984 and  public  notice  of  the substance of   the  notification   under Section  4 was given in   the locality  on July  17, 1984 with a delay of 29  days. Post-notification   delay  of  eight years due to  inter- departmental  correspondence was pressed into service  to hold  that there  was no real urgency. Legality of  invoking urgency clause and  consequential omission  to  hold  enquiry  under Section 5A was under challenge.      This Court  had  held  that  Section  4  [1]  does not prescribe  that  public  notice  of  the  substance of   the notification  should  be given in the locality simultaneously  with   the     publication  of      the notification  in the  Official Gazette  or  immediately thereafter.   They   are   two   steps required  to  be taken   under Section   4   [1]  before  taking further steps   under sub-section [2]. The time factor is not a vital   element and   there  is  no warrant to read the words ’simultaneously’ or  ’immediately thereafter’  in Section   4 [1].  They   are not   required to  be done simultaneously         or    immediately    thereafter. Contemporaneity may  involve a  gap of  time and by the very nature  of the  things,  the  publication  in  the Official   Gazette   and   the  public  notice  in  the

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locality must   necessarily be  separated by  a gap  of time. This  does   not mean  that the  publication  and the  public notice may  be separated by a long interval of time.  What is  necessary is  that the continuity of action should  not appear to be  broken by  a deep gap. If there  is publication  in the  Gazette and  if there is public  notice in  the locality, the requirements of Section 4   [1] must be held to be satisfied unless the two are  unlinked from  each other  by a gap of time so long   as it may lead one to the prima facie conclusion of lack  of   bona fides    in  the    proceedings  for acquisition. It  was held   that  when   the Government exercises   power   under Section  17 [4], it obviously feels that  urgency is  such that  it does   not  brook delay   and,   therefore,  the  Government directs that possession  of   the  land   be  taken  immediately  on publication of   the  declaration under  Section 6  and followed by  notice   under Section  9. Delay  of eight years on  the part  of the   tardy  officials  to  take further action  in the  matter of  acquisition   is not sufficient to   nullify   the  urgency which existed at the time  of issuing  the notification and to hold that there was  never any  urgency. This Court overruled the Full   Bench   judgment   in   Yadaiah’s  case  [supra] and approved  of   the Division   Bench   judgments  of the    Andhra  Pradesh High  Court,  apart  from  other cases.        In  Mohd.   Amri Khan’s  case  and  C.K.Narayana Chary’s cases  [supra]   this   Court   considered  the effect   of   the Validation Act  and another  Bench of three Judges  held that  after   the    Validation  Act had   come    into   force   with retrospective effect, despite the   law   in    Deepak    Pahwa’s  case,  the Validation Act   is  required   to be    given  effect. Notification  and    public  notice  of  the  substance thereof has to be  given in the locality within 40 days from the  date of  the publication   of  Section  4 [1] notification which would apply  to  every  notification issued     by     the    appropriate  Government  after September 12,   1975.  ln case  the substance  of  such notification was not given in the locality within 40 days  from   the  date   of  the   publication  of  the notification in the Gazette, it would introduce a fatal infirmity invaliding  such notification. In that case a delay of more than 40 days in  the   local  publication of  the   substance  of   the notification violated the mandate enacted  in sub-section [1] of Section  4 as it stood from  and after September 12, 1975. Therefore, it was liable to be struck down.       The  Parliament   enacted  Amendment  Act  68  of 1984  prescribing   the     procedural     steps     in publication   of   the notification  under   Section  4 [1]    and    declaration    under  Section  6  without prescribed  time   limit  with   consequences  of  non- compliance thereof   and  in Section 11A declaring that if the  steps respectively  prescribed therein  are not taken, the acquisition entails  lapse. In  other words, The parliament  evinces   that    neither  simultaneous nor   immediate   local publication  of   substance  is insisted upon.   But compliance thereof and publication in two  newspapers are  required to be done. The object is to  put the  owner or interested person on notice of acquisition of   the land  for public  purpose. In case of  enquiry under Section 5A it should also be done and all the  steps should be taken within one year from the

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last of  the    dates    of    the    publication    of notification    under  Section  4  [1].  Otherwise  the acquisition  stands   lapsed.  Even   thereafter  award should be   made  within   two years  from the date  of the   publication    of   Section     6    declaration. Publication of   Section  4(1)   notification in    the Official Gazette,  its   substance in  the locality and also publication  of  the  notification  in  two  local newspapers is  envisaged but  no time  limit for  their compliance   has    been    prescribed  thereunder.  if urgency power   under  Section  17 [4]  is not invoked, notice  under Section 5A is required to be given to the owner  and  then  enquiry  is  conducted  after  giving opportunity to    the  owner    or  interested  person. Thereafter, declaration  should be published within one year from  last of the dates  of the  publication under Section 4  [1]. In  other words,  from   September  24, 1984,   all    the  prescribed procedural steps  should be   done but  without time  schedule. The  declaration should be  published within  one  year.  Maximum  outer limit was  prescribed. The  Central Act  68 of 1984 and Validation Act  were enacted  under Entry  42  of  List III [Concurrent   List    of   the   Seventh   Schedule to    the  Constitution. By   operation  of proviso  to Article 254  of the  Constitution, the Amendment Act 68 of 1984  is made  operative and  it   has occupied  the same   field w.e.f.   September   24,  1984. In   Gauri Shankar   Gaur & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1994) 1 SCC 92]   this  Court   surveyed the   effect  of   the Amendment Act   vis-a-  vis   the U.P.  Awas Evan Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam,  1965 and held in paragraphs 39 and 40 that  unless both   the     Acts  are   inconsistent and    cannot     operate harmoniously,  the  State Act prevails over   the  Central Act but to  the extent  of repugnancy the  State Act becomes void since it  is not fully consistent  with the  provisions of the Amendment Act.   In that   case,  it   was held   that they  were intended to  act  independently  since  the  State  law was enacted  under   Entries 56   and  66   of List  II [State   List] while  the   Amendment Act   was enacted under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List.        The  rigor   of  40    days  thereby  under  the Validation Act  got  diffused   w.e.f.  September   24, 1984   since  it  is inconsistent with Amendment Act 68 of 1984.  It would  be seen  that the   Validation  Act relates to  acquisition of the land for providing house sites to  the poor  thereunder the  urgency power under Section 17   [4]  was   invoked and  possession was not taken.   The  notification  under  Section  4  [1]  and declaration  under    Section-  6  were  simultaneously published. But  public  notice of  the substance of the notification was  not given simultaneously. But for the Full  Bench  decision,  law  did    not  insist    upon simultaneous   action which   was an impossibility  and concept   of    simultaneous    action    was  judicial interpretation   and   its   effect   was  diffused  by Validation  Act.     It   is    to  remember  that  the acquisition was  to provide   housing accommodation  to the  poor.  The  State Government always  exercise  the power   of  publishing  the notification under  Section 4   [1] and  the  declaration  under  Section  6    for acquiring   the properties  in urban areas. The enquiry under   Section   5A   was   not  dispensed  with.  The declaration under  Section 6  was published  only after the enquiry under  Section 5A  had  been  conducted  as

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in   the present case.  The need,  therefore,  to  make simultaneous local  notice of the substance was not the requirement of  law and  was not declared by this Court in Deepak  Pahwa’s case  [supra   and   also    several decisions   of   various  Division Benches of  the High Courts. The   Full  Bench   judgment   was primarily in relation to  the lands  in rural areas to provide house sites   to the poor. The Full Bench also did not notice the distinction  since common  question was  argued and the main   concentration     was    only      of    the acquisitions   for providing  house  sites to the poor. The same  was repeated  in  Mohd.  Amri    Khan’s  case [supra]. C.K.  Narayana Chary’s  cases [supra]  closely followed the heels of Mohd Amri Khan’s case. Therefore, the   Validation Act   was  not   applicable   to   the acquisition  made     pursuant  to    the  notification published by the State Government in its State Gazette.        That  apart,  as facts  disclose, the  award was made on  November 24,   1980  and the writ petition was filed on  August 9,   1982.   It   is  not  in  dispute that  compensation  was deposited in  the court  of the Subordinate  Judge.  lt  is asserted by  the appellant- Society that   possession of the land was  delivered to it and  the land  had been  divided and allotted to its members   for   construction   of   houses   and   that construction of  some houses  had been commenced by the date the  writ   petition was   filed.  It    would  be obvious that the question of division of the properties among its  members and  allotment of    the  respective plots  to  them  would  arise  only  after  the    Land Acquisition    Officer  had  taken  possession  of  the acquired   land  and    handed  it    over    to    the appellant-Society. By  operation of Section 16 the land stood vested in the State  free from  all encumbrances. In Satendra   Prasad  Jain &   Ors.  v.  State of  U.P. &Ors.[(1993) 4  SCC 369],  the question  arose: whether notification under Section 4  and the declaration under Section 6   get  lapsed if the award is not made within two years   as  envisaged  under Section  11A?  A Bench of   three Judges  had held  that once  possession  was taken and   the  land  vested in  the Government, title to the  land so  vested in the State is subject only to determination of  compensation   and to pay the same to the  owner.   Divesting  the   title    to  the    land statutorily vested in the Government and reverting  the same   to the   owner  is   not  contemplated under the Act. Only   Section 48(1)  gives power to withdrew from acquisition  that too  before possession is taken. That question did   not  arise  in this  case. The  property under  acquisition   having     been  vested    in  the appellants, in  the absence of  any power under the Act to have The title of the appellants divested  except by exercise of   the  power under  Section 48(1),    valid title cannot be defeated. The exercise of the  power to quash the   notification  under Section  4(1) and   the declaration   under    Section   6     would   lead  to incongruity.   Therefore,    the   High   Court   under those circumstances  would not have interfered with the acquisition  and   quashed     the   notification   and declaration  under   Sections  4  and  6  respectively. Considered from either perspective, we are of  the view that the   High  Court was  wrong in  allowing the writ appeal.         Consequentially,  the    writ  appeal    stands dismissed and the order  passed by  the learned  single

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Judge  in the writ petition stands restored. The appeal is accordingly  allowed,  but,  in  the  circumstances, without costs.