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PETITIONER: SECRETARY, H.S.E.B.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SURESH & ORS ETC.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       04/04/1999

BENCH: M.Jagannadha Rao, Umesh C.  Banerjee

JUDGMENT:

BANERJEE, J

     The   doctrine  of  equality  as  enshrined   in   the Constitution  promised  an  egalitarian   society  and   the Contract  Labour  (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 is  the resultant effect of such a constitutional mandate having its due focus in that perspective.  This Court in Minerva Mills’ case  (  AIR 1980 SC 1789) in no uncertain terms  laid  down that  the equality clause in the Constitution does not speak of  mere  formal  equality before the law but  embodies  the concept  of  real and substantive equality which strikes  at the  inequalities  arising  on account of  vast  social  and economic  differentiation  and  is   thus  consequently   an essential  ingredient  of social and economic  justice.   In short,  this  Court has equated the security clause  in  the Constitution  so  as to mean that the people of the  country ought  to  be secured of socio-economic justice by way of  a fusion  of  Fundamental  Right and Directive  Principles  of State  Policy.   As  a matter of fact this  Court  has  been candid  enough  on  more  occasions  than  one  and  rather, frequently to note that socialism ought not to be treated as a  mere  concept  or  an ideal, but the  same  ought  to  be practised  in every sphere of life and be treated by the law courts  as  a  constitutional mandate since the  law  courts exists   for   the  society  and   required  to  act  as   a guardian-angel  of  the  society.  As a matter of  fact  the socialistic concept of society is very well laid in Part III and  Part IV of the Constitution and the Constitution  being supreme,  it  is  a bounden duty of the law courts  to  give shape  and offer reality to such a concept.  In this context reference  to the Constitution Bench decision of this  Court in  Nakara’s  case (D.S.  Nakara & Ors Vs.  Union of  India) (AIR  1983 SC 130) seems to be rather apposite.  This  Court stated  that  democratic  socialism  aims  to  end  poverty, ignorance,  disease  and  inequality  of  opportunity.   The primary  impact of socialism as a matter of fact is to offer and  provide  security of life so that the citizens  of  the country  may have two square meals a day, and maintenance of a  minimum  standard of life, it is expected, would lead  to the abridgment of the gap between the have-s and have not-s. The  feudal exploitation and draconian concept of law  ought not  to outweigh the basic structure of the Constitution, or its  socialistic  status.  Ours is a socialist State as  the Preamble  depicts and the aim of socialism, therefore, ought

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to  be  to distribute the common richness and the wealth  of the  country  in such a way so as to sub-serve the need  and the  requirement of the common man.  Article 39 is a pointer in   that   direction.   Each   clause  under  the   Article specifically fixes certain social and economic goal so as to expand  the horizon of benefits to be accrued to the general public  at large.  In particular reference to Article 39 (a) it  is  seen that the State ought to direct its policies  in such  a manner so that the citizens - men and women equally, have  the right of an adequate means of livelihood and it is in  this perspective again that the enactment in the statute book  as  noticed above (The Contract Labour  (Regulation  & Abolition)  Act  1970) ought to be read and  interpreted  so that  social  and economic justice may be achieved  and  the constitutional  directive  be  given a  full  play.   Having noticed  the  broad  features, as above, be it  noted  these appeals  by  Special  Leave  arise from  the  order  of  the Division  Bench  of  the High court of Punjab &  Haryana  at Chandigarh.   The  contextual facts depict that the  Haryana State   Electricity  Board  (hereinafter   referred  to   as ‘Appellant  Board’)  is  a statutory Board with one  of  its primary  functions  being the supply of power to  urban  and rural  areas  in  the State of HaryanOa through  its various plants  and stations.  In order to keep the said plants  and stations  clean  and  hygienic, the  Appellant  Board,  upon tenders  being floated, awards contracts to contractors  who undertake  the work of keeping the same clean and  hygienic. One  such  contract  was awarded to one Kashmir  Singh,  for "proper,  complete  and  hygienic   cleaning,  sweeping  and removal of garbage from the Main Plant Building" at Panipat, at  the  rate of Rs.33,000 per month with a  stipulation  to engage  minimum  42 safai karamcharis with effect from  15th May,  1987  for a period of one year and in terms  therewith the  Contractor  took over the work and performed  the  said work   through   the     above-stated   Safai   Karamcharis. Subsequently  by  reason however of a dispute raised by  the Safai  Karamcharis,  as  regards  their  entitlement  to  be absorbed  permanently on completion of 240 days in the  year with   the  Board,  the  matters   were  referred   to   the Conciliation  Officer,  Panipat  culminating however  in  an order  of reference by the State Government on 27.12.1988 to the  Labour Court, Ambala which was suObsequently transferred to  Panipat.  On the further factual score, it appears  that the  Labour  Court upon consideration of the facts  and  the evidence  taken  on record passed the impugned  award  inter alia  recording  therein  that  the  workmen  are  otherwise entitled  to  reinstatement  with   continuity  of   service alongwith  10% back wages.  We shall revert to the order  of the   Labour  Court  for   further   consideration   shortly hereafter, but to complete the basic factual backdrop in the matter it ought to be noted that as against the order of the Labour  Court, the appellant moved 37 Writ Petitions in  the High  Court  of  Punjab  and Haryana,  which  were  however, disposed  of  by  a  common judgment and  order  dated  24th January,  1995,  inter alia, recording that there existed  a relationship  of employer and workmen between the  Appellant Board  and the respondents and by reason wherefor, the  High Court  directed  reinstatement  of   the  respondents   with continuity  of  service though however, without back  wages. While  dealing  with these matters the High Court did  place strong reliance on the observation of this Court in the case of  Hussainbhai Vs.  Alath Factory Tezhilali Union (1978 LIC 1264)  wherein  this Court observed:  "Who is  employee,  in

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Labour  Law?   That is the short, die-hard  question  raised here  but  covered by this Court’s earlier decisions.   Like the  High Court, we give short shrift to the contention that the petitioner had entered into agreements with intermediate contractors  who had hired the respondent-Union’s worken and so  no  direct  employer-employee   vinculum  juris  existed between the petitioner and the workmen.

     This argument is impeccable in laissez faire economics ‘red in tooth and claw’ and under the Contract Act rooted in English  Common Law.  But the human gap of a century  yawans between  this strict doctrine and industrial  jurisprudence. The  source  and strength of the industrial branch of  Third World  Jurisprudence  is  social justice proclaimed  in  the Preamble  of the Constitution.  This Court in Ganesh Beedi’s case  (1974)  1 Lab LJ 367 (AIR 1974 SC 1832) has raised  on British and American ruligs hold that mere contracts are not decisive  and the complex of considerations relevant to  the relationship  is different.  Indian Justice, beyond Atlantic liberalism,  has a rule of life.  And life, in conditions of poverty  aplenty, is livelihood, and livelihood is work with wages.    Raw  Societal  realities,   not  fine-spun   legal niceties, not competitive market economics but complex

     protective  principles, shape the law when the weaker, working  class  sector needs succour for livelihood  through labour.   The conceptual confusion between the classical law of  contracts  and  the special branch of law  sensitive  to exploitative situations accounts for the submission that the High   Court  is  in  error  in  its  holding  against   the petitioners.

     The  true  test may, with brevity, be  indicated  once again.  Where a worker or group of workers labours to prodce goods  or  services and these goods or services are for  the business  of another, that other is, inOB fact, the employer. He  has  economic  control over  the  workers’  subsistence, skill,  and  continued employment.  If he, for  any  reason, chokes  off,  the  worker  is,  virtually,  laid  off.   The presence  of  intermediate contractors with whom  alone  the workers have immediate or direct relationship ex contractors of  no consequences when, on lifting the veil or looking  at the  conspectus of factors governing employment, we  discern the  naked  truth, though draped in different perfect  paper arrangement,  that the real employer is the Management,  not the immediate contract.  Myried devices, half-hidden in fold after  fold  of  legal  form  depending  on  the  degree  of concealment   needed,  the  type  of  industry,  the   local conditions  and  the  like, may be resorted to  when  labour legislation  casts welfare obligations on the real employer, based  on Arts.38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the  Constitution. The  Court must be astute to avoid the mischief and  achieve the  purpose  of  the law and not be misled by the  maya  of legal appearances."

     Incidentally,  the  claim  of the  workmen  arises  by reason  of  discontinuation  of  the service  at  the  units belonging  to the appellant herein.  The Labour Court  while adjudicating  the  issue,  as to the  justification  of  the termination of services of the workmen in terms of the order of  reference  under Section 10 of the  Industrial  Disputes Act,  came to a definite conclusion on the basis of evidence tendered  that the work force did in fact work for more than

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240  days in the year and as a matter of fact, there was  no dispute  raised on that score by the Board and it is on this factual  score  that  the Labour Court did record  that  the presence  of  an intermediary would not, however, alter  the situation  as  regards  the  existence  of  relationship  of employer  and the workmen and thus between the Board and the claimants  and  as  such  answered   the  reference  in  the affirmative,  resulting  in a finding that the  workmen  are entitled  to be reinstated with continuity of service  along with 10% back-wages.  It is this finding of the Labour Court which  stands  accepted by the High Court in writ  petitions under  Article  226  of the  Constitution,  challenging  the validity  of  the  award of the Labour Court  and  the  High Court,  as  noted above rejected the writ petitions  stating therein:

     "on  the  admitted  facts  of the case  it  is  to  be ascertained  as to whether after complying the principle  of lifting  of  the veil, the existence of the relationship  of workman  and employer is surfaced or not.  After  critically examining the evidence lead in the case, the court below has come  to the conclusion that there existed a relationship of employer and workman between the contestiOOng parties and that the intermediatary contract was just an eye wash.".

     The  High Court did in fact note with care and caution the   doctrine   of   ‘lifting  of   veil’   in   industrial jurisprudence  and recorded that in the contextual facts and upon  lifting  of  the veil, question of having  any  contra opinion  as  regards  the  exact  relationship  between  the contesting  parties  would  not arise and as  such  directed reinstatement  though,  however,  without  any  back  wages. While it is true that the doctrine enunciated in Soloman vs. Soloman (1897 Appeal Cases page 22) came to be recognised in the  corporate  jurisprudence but its applicability  in  the present  context  cannot  be doubted, since  the  law  court invariably  has  to  rise up to the occasion to  do  justice between the parties in a manner as it deems fit.  Rescopound stated  that  the  greatest  virtue  of  the  law  court  is flexibility  and  as and when the situation so demands,  the law court L.......I.......T.......T.......T.......T..

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     ought  to  administer justice in accordance  therewith and  as  per the need of the situation.  Turning  attention, however,  on  to  the legislative intent in  the  matter  of enactment  of the Act of 1970, at the first blush itself, it appears  that  in expression of its intent, the  legislature very aptly coined the enactment, as such, for regulation and abolition  of contract labour.  Conceptually, engagement  of contract  labour  by itself lends to various abuses  and  in accordance  with  devout  objective  as  enshrined  in   the Constitution  and  as noticed herein before, this  enactment has been introduced in the statute book in the year 1970, to regulate contract labour and to provide for its abolition in certain  circumstances  since prior to such, the  factum  of engagement  of  contract labour stood beset with  exploiting

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tendencies  and  resulted  in unwholesome  labour  practice. Incidentally,  however, be it noted that the legislature did not  feel  it expedient to do away with the contract  labour altogether,  since  there are several fields  of  employment where  it  is  not  otherwise possible  to  have  continuous employment  and as such, regard being had to the necessities of the situation, the Act of 1970 provides for

     continuation  of contract labour.  As a matter of fact the  legislature  in  the  enactment,  has  itself  provided various  provisions pertaining to the working conditions  of contract  labour,  provided however engagement  of  contract labour  becoming invariable or necessary in the interest  of the concerned industry.  The legislation therefore subserves twin  purpose, to wit:  (i) to abolish the contract  labour; and  (ii)  to  regulate the working conditions  of  contract labour  wherever such employment is required in the interest of  the  industry.  There is however, a total  unanimity  of judicial pronouncements to the effect that in the event, the contract labour is employed in an establishment for seasonal workings,  question of abolition would not arise but in  the event  of the same being of perennial in nature, that is  to say,  in the event of the engagement of labour force through intermediary  which  is otherwise in the ordinary course  of events  and involves continuity in the work, the legislature is  candid enough to record its abolition since, involvement of   contractor  may  have  its   social  evil   of   labour exploitation  and  thus  the contractor ought to go  out  of scene bringing together the principal

     employer  and  the  contract labourers  rendering  the employment  as  direct, and resultantly a  direct  employee. This  aspect  of  the  matter  has  been  dealt  with  great lucidity,  by one of us (Majmudar,J.) in Air India Statutory Corporation etc.  vs.  United Labour Union & Ors.  etc.  [JT 1996  (11)  SC  170].    While  recording  concurrence  with Ramaswamy, J.  and but observed:  presenting his own reasons therefor  Majmudar,  J.   "It has to be kept  in  view  that contract  labour system in an establishment is a  tripartite system.   In  between  contract workers  and  the  principal employer  is the intermediary contractor and because of this intermediary  the employer is treated as principal  employer with  various statutory obligations flowing from the Act  in connection  with regulation of the working conditions of the contract  labourers  who  are brought  by  the  intermediary contractor  on the principal’s establishment for the benefit and for the purpose of the principal employer and who do his work  on  his  establishment  through   the  agency  of  the contractor.   When these contract workers carry out the work of the principal employer which is of a perennial nature and if  provisions of Section 10 get attracted and such contract labour  system  in  the   establishment  gets  abolished  on fulfilment  of the conditions requisite for that purpose, it is  obvious  that the intermediary contractor  vanishes  and along  with  him  vanishes the  term  ‘principal  employer’. Unless  there  is a contractor agent there is no  principal. Once the contractor intermediary

     goes  the  term ‘principal’ also goes with  it.   Then remains out of this tripartite contractual scenario only two parties  -  the  beneficiaries  of   the  abolition  of  the erstwhile  contract  labour system i.e.  the workmen on  the one  hand  and  the employer on the other who is  no  longer their  principal  employer but necessarily becomes a  direct employer  for  these erstwhile contract labourers.   It  was

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urged   that  Section  10  nowhere   provides  for  such   a contingency  in  express term.  It is obvious that  no  such express  provision  was  required  to be made  as  the  very concept of abolition of a contract labour system wherein the work  of the contract labour is of perennial nature for  the establishment  and  which otherwise would have been done  by regular  workmen, would posit improvement of the lot of such workmen and not its worsening.  Implicit in the provision of Section  10  is the legislature intent that on abolition  of contract labour system, the erstwhile contract-workmen would become   direct   employees  of   the  employer   on   whose establishment  they  were earlier working and were  enjoying all  the  regulatory facilities on that  very  establishment under  Chapter  V  prior to the abolition of  such  contract labour  system.   Though the legislature has  expressly  not mentioned  the consequences of such abolition, but the  very scheme  and ambit of Section 10 of the Act clearly indicates the  inherent  legislative  intent of making  the  erstwhile contract  labourers  direct  employees of  the  employer  on abolition  of the intermediary contractor.  It was contended that  contractor might have employed a number of workmen who may  be  in  excess of the requirement and,  therefore,  the principal  employer on abolition of the contract labour  may be  burdened  with  excess  workmen.   It  is  difficult  to appreciate this contention.  The very condition engrafted in section 10(2)(d) shows that while abolishing contract labour from the given

     establishment,  one of the relevant considerations for the  appreciate  Government  is to ascertain whether  it  is sufficient  to  appoint  considerable number of  whole  time workmen.  Even otherwise there is an inbuilt safety valve in Section  21 of the Act which enjoins the principal  employer to  make  payment of wages to the given number  of  contract workmen  who he has permitted to be brought for the work  of the establishment if the contractor fails to make payment to them.  It is, therefore, obvious that the principal employer as  a wordly businessman in his practical commercial  wisdom would  not  allow  contractor  to  bring  larger  number  of contract labour which may be in excess of the requirement of the  principal  employer.   On the contrary,  the  principal employer  would  see to it that the contractor  brings  only those  number of workmen who are required to discharge their duties  to  carry out the work of the principal employer  on his  establishment  through,  of course the  agency  of  the contractor.   In fact the scheme of the Act and  regulations framed  thereunder clearly indicate that even the number  of the  workmen  required for the given contract work is to  be specified in the licence given to the contractor."

     Incidentally,  the Haryana State Electricity Board  in the  usual course of business has had to maintain the  plant and  stations  as  a licencee within the meaning  of  Indian Electricity  Act,  1910  and Electricity Supply  Act,  1948. This  maintenance work cannot by any stretch be ascribed  to be  of seasonal nature but a continued effort to achieve the purpose of its existence in terms of the statute.  The

     number of employees required for such purpose had been specified  in  the contract itself and as a matter  of  fact supervision  of the Board as regards the attendance has also not  been disputed before the Labour Court:  Maintenance  of records pertaining to other statutory duties and liabilities has  also not been disputed.  Documents, as disclosed before the  Labour  Court,  (to wit Exb.  M.5) depict  the  overall

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control  of  the workings of the contract  labour  including administrative   control   being  with    the   Board.    We deliberately  refrain  ourselves from going into  the  same, since  that would be beyond the purview of writ jurisdiction and may amount to an appraisal of evidence but the factum of overall  supervision and administration being with the Board and  as dealt with by the Labour Court cannot in any way  be doubted.  It is on this perspective that the High Court also thought  it  fit  to  rely on the judgment  and  record  its affirmation  to  what had been passed by the  Labour  Court, since  no  reasonable  person  could come  to  a  conclusion different  upon lifting the veil.  In the contextual  facts, we  also  record our concurrence to the observations of  the High  Court  that finding of fact arrived at by  the  Labour Court  cannot otherwise be interfered with while  exercising powers under Article 226 of the

     Constitution, unless the same is otherwise perverse or there  is  existing  an error apparent on the  face  of  the record.  It would in this context, however, be convenient to note  the  observations  of the High Court as  below:-  "The learned  counsel for the petitioner has tried to argue  that the  findings of fact arrived at by the Labour Court was not based  upon  proper  appreciation of  evidence.   This  plea cannot  be  accepted  in  as much as the  Labour  Court  has referred  to  the  whole of the evidence lead  in  the  case before coming to such a conclusion.  Otherwise, also in view of  the law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.K.   Panda’s case  (supra) the findings of fact arrived at by the  Labour Court  cannot be set aside in writ jurisdiction particularly when  it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record  but based only on appreciation of evidence.  Keeping in view the nature  of the work being carried on by the petitioner,  the nature  of  duties which were performed by the  respondents- workmen, the continuity of the work for which the labour was employed  and  the  fact  that the wages were  paid  by  the petitioner-employer  who supervised and controlled not  only the  attendance  but also discipline of the workmen  in  the discharge of their duties and keeping in view the conditions of contract of the employer with Kashmira Singh, Contractor, there  is no other conclusion which can be arrived at except the  one that there existing a relationship of employer  and workmen  between the contesting parties and the Labour Court had  rightly  passed  the award which is  impugned  in  this petition."

     Needless  to  note at this juncture that the  Contract Labour   Regulation   Act  being  a  beneficial   piece   of legislation  as  engrafted  in the statute  book,  ought  to receive  the widest possible interpretation in regard to the words  used  and  unless words are taken  to  their  maximum amplitude, it would be a violent injustice to the framers of the  law.   As a matter of fact law is well settled by  this court and we need not dilate much by reason, therefor to the effect  that the law courts exist for the society and in the event  of  there  being a question posed in  the  matter  of interpretation  of  a  beneficial   piece  of   legislation, question  of  interpreting the same with a  narrow  pedantic approach  would  not  be justified.  On  the  contrary,  the widest possible meaning and amplitude ought to be offered to the  expressions  used as otherwise the  entire  legislation would  loose its efficacy and contract labour would be  left on  the  mercy  of  the   intermediary.   As  noticed  above Draconian  concept  of  law is no longer available  for  the

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purpose  of  interpreting a social and beneficial  piece  of legislation  specially  on the wake of the  new  millennium. The  democratic  polity ought to survive with  full  vigour: socialist  status as enshrined in the Constitution ought  to be  given  its full play and it is in this  perspective  the question arises - is it permissible in the new

     millennium  to  decry  the  cry of  the  labour  force desirous  of absorption after working for more than 240 days in an establishment and having their workings supervised and administered  by an agency within the meaning of Article  12 of  the Constitution - the answer cannot possibly be in  the affirmative  -  the law courts exist for the society and  in the event law courts feel the requirement in accordance with principles  of justice, equity and good conscience, the  law courts ought rise up to the occasion to meet and redress the expectation  of  the  people.  The  expression  ‘regulation’ cannot possibly be read as contra public interest but in the interest of public.  Reliance on the decision in the case of Denanath  & Ors.  v.  National Fertilisers Ltd.  & Ors.  (JT (1991)  4  SC  413)  in support of  the  Boards  contention, however,  stands diluted by reason of the decisions of  this Court  in Gujarat Electricity Board v.  Hind Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.    (JT  1995  (4)  SC   264  and  Air  India  Statutory Corporation etc.  v.  U.L.U.  & Ors.  etc.  (JT 1996 (11) SC 109).   The  ratio as has been decided in Air  India’s  case appears  to  have  softened the edges of  Dinanath’s  ratio. While  dealing with this issue in Air India’s case  (supra), this court has, as a matter of fact taken note of

     more  or less the entire catena of cases pertaining to contract labour and we do thus feel it wholly unnecessary to deal  with  the same in extenso excepting however  recording some  observations of this Court in Air India’s case (supra) as below:-

     "In  this behalf, it is necessary to recapitulate that on  abolition  of the contract labour system,  by  necessary implication,  the  principal  employer  is  under  statutory obligation  to  absorb  the contract  labour.   The  linkage between  the  contractor and the employee stood snapped  and direct   relationship  stood   restored  between   principal employer   and  the  contract   labour  as  its   employees. Considered  from  this perspective, all the workmen  in  the respective  services working on contract labour are required to be absorbed in the establishment of the appellant."

     It  has to be kept in view that this is not a case  in which it is found that there was any genuine contract labour system  prevailing  with  the Board.  If it  was  a  genuine contract  system, then obviously, it had to be abolished  as per  Section  10  of  the  Contract  Labour  Regulation  and Abolition  Act  after  following  the  procedure  laid  down therein.   However, on the facts of the present case, it was found by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the High Court that  the so called contractor Kashmir Singh was a mere name lender and had procured

     labour  for  the Board from the open market.   He  was almost  a broker or an agent of the Board for that  purpose. The Labour Court also noted that the Management witness Shri A.K.   Chaudhary  also could not tell whether  Shri  Kahsmir Singh  was  a licensed contractor or not.  That workmen  had

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made  a statement that Shri Kashmir Singh was not a licensed contractor.   Under  these circumstances, it has to be  held that   factually  there  was  no  genuine  contract   system prevailing at the relevant time wherein the Board could have acted  as only the principal employer and Kashmir Singh as a licensed contractor employing labour on his own account.  It is also pertinent to note that nothing was brought on record to  indicate  that even the Board at the relevant time,  was registered  as principal employer under the Contract  Labour Regulation  and  Abolition  Act.  Once the Board was  not  a principal  employer  and  the so called  contractor  Kashmir Singh  was  not  a licensed contractor under  the  Act,  the inevitable  conclusion  that  had to be reached was  to  the effect  that  the  so  called contract  system  was  a  mere camouflage,  smoke  and a screen and disguised in  almost  a transparent  veil which could easily be pierced and the real contractual

     relationship  between the Board, on the one hand,  and the  employees,  on the other, could be clearly  visualised. Before  we  conclude, the other aspect of the matter as  has been contended by the learned Advocate, appearing in support of  the appeals ought to be noticed, to the effect that as a matter of fact the principal employer, namely, the Board has in  fact applied for registration of establishment and there are  documentary  evidence  available  in  support  thereof. Though,  however,  no  such case has been made out  nor  the issue  raised  either before the Labour Court or before  the High  Court,  this Court, however, to subserve the  ends  of justice permitted the appellant to file documentary evidence in  support  of the same and as such three weeks’  time  was granted  at  the conclusion of the hearing on 13th  January, 1999  so that the same may be produced before the Court.  We however  wish  to  place  on   record  that  in  the  normal circumstances, no such opportunities are granted, especially at  this  stage of the proceeding, but by reason of  special facts,  which  are singularly singular, this  Court  granted such an opportunity so as to meet the ends of justice..  The appellant, however, has failed to obtain such an opportunity and as a matter of fact no such

     documentary  evidence  has seen the light of  the  day even  after  such an opportunity to the appellant.  In  that view  of the matter we do not see any merit in these appeals and  the appeals therefore fail and are thus dismissed.   No order  however as to costs.  In view of the order as  above, we  do  not  deem it fit to pass any order  in  the  pending Interlocutory  Applications  including the  Application  for Contempt  and  the same thus stand disposed of, without  any order as to costs.

     ..........J (S.B.  Majmudar)

     ...........J (Umesh C.  Banerjee) New Delhi, March 30, 1999

     IN   THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  INDIA  CIVIL   APPELLATE

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JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO190 OF 1991

     Mishri   Lal  (dead)  by   Lrs.   ..Appellant   Versus Dhirendra Nath (dead) by Lrs.  & Ors.  ...Respondents

     Dear   Brother  Rao,  Draft   Judgment  in  the  above mentioned  matter  is  being  sent herewith  for  your  kind consideration.