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PETITIONER: SAYED MOHOMED BAQUIR EL-EDROOS (DEAD) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/10/1981

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) KOSHAL, A.D. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1981 AIR 2016            1982 SCR  (1) 882  1981 SCC  (4) 383        1981 SCALE  (3)1555

ACT:      Administrative   Law-Special   Tribunals-Statute   gave finality to  the orders-Jurisdiction  of  Civil  Courts-When must be excluded.      Bombay    Personal  Inams  Abolition  Act  1952-Section 2(1)(e) Explanation- Scope of.

HEADNOTE:      A  notice  was  issued  to  the  Sajjadanashin  of  the appellant institution  stating that consequent on the coming into force  of the  Bombay Personal Inams Abolition Act 1952 exemption from  payment of  land revenue was extinguished in respect of the inam village and that he should hand over the village records to mamlatdar.      The appellent  in a  suit  filed  in  the  Civil  Court claimed that  the inam  was held  by a religious institution and that,  therefore, the  provisions of the 1952 Act had no application to  it. In  replication the  State claimed  that under the  provisions of  the 1952  Act the State Government alone was competent to decide the question whether the grant was a  personal or a religious inam and that the Civil Court had no  jurisdiction to  decide it.  Holding that  it was  a personal inam  the Trial  Court  dismissed  the  appellant’s suit.      When the appellant’s appeal was pending before the High Court the  Gujarat Devasthan  Inams Abolition  Act, 1969 was passed abolishing  the inams  held by  religious  charitable institutions as well.      On the  question of  jurisdiction to  decide whether an inam was  personal or  religious the High Court held that it was the  State Government  and not the Civil Court which had exclusive jurisdiction in this respect.      In appeal  to this  Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant  that unless  the jurisdiction  of  the  Civil Court is barred specifically or by necessary implication the Civil Court  would have  jurisdiction and  that the finality contemplated by  Explanation I  to section  2 (1) (e) (which provides that  if any question arises whether any grant is a personal inam  such question  shall be referred to the State Government and  that the  decision of  the State  Government shall be final) is only for the purposes of the 1952 Act and

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could not  stand in  the way of the Civil Court entertaining the suit. 883      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1. The finality of the decision of the Government as contemplated  by Explanation I to section 2(1) (e) of the Act cannot  exclude the  jurisdiction of  the  Civil  Court. Except for  the Explanation,  there is no other provision in the Act  touching upon  the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. [890 C-D]      2. In  Dulabhai v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh,  [1968] 3 S.C.R. 662  this  Court  held  that  where  a  statute  gave finality to  the orders  of the special tribunal the . Civil Court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy  to do  what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Under the provisions of the 1952 Act it cannot be  said  that  an  adequate  remedy  is  available  to  the plaintiffs on reference made to the Government. [888 G.H]      3. The  second principle laid down in the above case is that where  there is  an express  bar to the jurisdiction of the Court,  an examination  of the scheme of the Act to find out the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided there in  may be  relevant. In the absence of any details in the  enactment  about  the  reference  to  be  made  to  the Government, the  procedure to be followed by the Government, and the  opportunity to  be afforded to the aggrieved party, it cannot  be held  that the  expression  "finality  of  the decision of  the Government"  used in  the  Explanation  was meant to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. [890 F-G]      4. The  High Court, however, erred in travelling beyond the  provisions   of  the  1952  Act  by  referring  to  the provisions of the 1969 Act and coming to the conclusion that Explanation I  to section  2(1) (e)  of  the  1952  Act  and section 20  of the 1969 Act put beyond the pale of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had been taken away by the  legislature to  determine  the  question  whether  a particular Inam  was a  personal or devasthan inam. The High Court was  not justified  in invoking  the provisions of the 1969 Act while deciding a case under the 1952 Act. [891 E-G]      5. An entry in the alienation register as to whether an inam is  personal or  religious cannot  be  said  to  be  so sacrosanct that  it cannot  be  changed.  Explanation  1  to section 2  (1) (e)  of the 1952 Act indicates that the entry in the  register is  not an essential part of the definition of personal  inam but is only descriptive. If the Government decides a  case contrary  to the  entry in  the register  of alienation  the  register  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been amended. If an entry in the register would be deemed to have been  automatically   amended  by   the  decision   of   the Government,  there   is  no  sanctity  to  such  entry.  The explanation itself  contemplates a  change in  view  of  the decision of  the Government on the question. An entry in the register  is   mainly  intended  to  serve  the  purpose  of realisation of land revenue. [892 C-D]      6. Section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code provides for an  appeal to a superior officer from an order passed by the  revenue   officer.  This  section  cannot  be  said  to completely bar  the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court because section 212  of the  Code contemplates  that whenever  it is declared that  a decision  or  order  shall  be  final  such expression shall  be deemed to mean that no appeal lies from such decision or order. If this is what finality meant under section 212  it cannot  be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. [893 A-C]

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884

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2132 of 1977.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and  order dated the  23rd September, 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in First Appeal No. 76 of 1963      D.V. Patel,  R.  Shroff,  Gopal  Subramaniam  and  D.P. Mohanty for the Appellant.      M.N.  Phadke,  S.C.  Patel  and  R.N.  Poddar  for  the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA  J.  The  present  appeal  by  special  leave  is directed against  the Full  Bench decision of the High Court of Gujarat  at Ahmedabad  dated 23rd of September, 1976. The sole question  for consideration  in this  appeal is whether Civil Court  has jurisdiction  to entertain  and decide  the suit giving rise to the present appeal.      There is  an old  institution known as Edroos Dargah of Hazrat Sayedina  Mohomed-Bin  Abdulla  El-Edroos  at  Surat. Village  Orma   is  an   inam  village   held  by  the  said institution. The  dispute in the present case relates to the property of  the said  village  orma  comprising  its  soil, trees, lanes,  roads together with cultivated lands of about 1093 acres  with  land  revenue  alienated  Rs.  2,747.10.5. Pursuant to  the Bombay  Personal Inams  Abolition Act, 1952 (Act 42  of 1953) hereinafter referred to as ’the 1952 Act’, the State  of Bombay and after the reorganization of States, the State  of  Gujarat,  declared  that  the  said  Act  was applicable to  village Orma  from I  st of August, 1955 and, therefore, the  exemption from  the payment  of land revenue was extinguished  from the  1st of August, 1955. Accordingly the State  of Bombay  through its  Mamlatdar of Olpad sent a notice to  the Sajjadanashin  of  the  institution  to  that effect and  also  demanded  the  village  records  from  his possession.  He   also  proceeded   to  take   further   and consequential action  and declared  that the  rights of  the institution in  public roads,  lanes, village  site and land etc.   are    extinguished.   In   the   circumstances   the Sajjadanashin was  obliged to  file the suit which was later on numbered as suit No. 9 of 1956.      The stand  of the plaintiff is that village Orma was an inam village  held by  the religious  institution of  Edroos Dargah and the 885 provisions of  section 4 of the 1952 Act have no application in view  of clause  (2) of  section 3  of the  said Act. The defendant State  contested the  suit on  grounds inter  alia that the  village in question was a personal inam within the meaning of  section 2  (1) (a) of the 1952 Act and the State Government alone is competent to decide the question whether the grant  is a personal inam or not and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question. B      The pleadings  of the  parties gave  rise  to  fourteen Issues and  the Trial  Court  decided  all  the  substantial issues against  the plaintiff. Consequently it dismissed the suit holding that the inam in question was personal inam.      Feeling aggrieved,  the plaintiff  went up in appeal to the High  Court. The  appeal came  up for  hearing before  a learned  Single   Judge.  He   took  up   the  question   of jurisdiction first. The stand of the plaintiff-appellant was that the  Civil Court  had the jurisdiction to entertain the

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suit and  in support of his contention he placed reliance on Sayed Mohmed Baquir El-Edroos v. The State of Bombay.(1) The learned Single  Judge, however,  doubted the  correctness of the proposition laid down in that case and referred the case to a  larger Bench  and it  was eventually decided by a Full Bench of that Court.      It appears  that during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal another Act  was passed known as the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 (Act 16 of 1969) hereinafter referred to as ’the  1969 Act’. It came into force on I 5th of November, 1969. By this Act devasthan inams or inams held by religious and  charitable   institutions  were   also  abolished.  The inevitable result  of the  1969 Act is that whether the inam in question is a personal inam or a devasthan inam it cannot subsist. The plea of the plaintiff, on the basis of which he filed the  suit, was  no more  available to  him  after  the passing of  the latter Act. But the question was still to be enquired  into   because  if   the  plaintiff   succeeds  in establishing that  the inam  in question  was a religious or charitable inam,  it would be abolished only by the 1969 Act and, therefore,  the plaintiff  will be  entitled to all the benefits of  devasthan inam open to him till the enforcement of that  Act. The  High Court,  therefore, proceeded to hear the appeal  despite the  passing of  the 1969 Act and by its judgment dated 2nd of September, 1976 came to the conclusion that the  exclusive jurisdiction  to decide the question was with the State 886 Government and  the  Civil  Court  has  no  jurisdiction  to entertain the  suit. In  view of its finding on the question of jurisdiction,  the High  Court did not think it necessary to enter  into  other  issues  involved  in  the  case.  The plaintiff has now come to challenge the judgment of the Full Bench on obtaining special leave of this Court to appeal.      In the  present appeal  the plaintiff  again reiterates that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In order  to appreciate  the contentions,  of the counsel of the parties  on the  question of  jurisdiction, it  will  be appropriate to  refer to the relevant provisions of the 1952 Act Section  2 (1) (e) defines personal inams. Insofar as it is material, it reads:           "2. (1)  In this  Act, unless  there  is  anything      repugnant in the subject or context,-      (e) "personal inam" means-           (i)   a grant  of a village, portion of a village,                land or  total  partial  exemption  from  the                payment of  land revenue  entered as personal                inam in  the alienation  register kept  under                section 53 of the Code.           (ii) ...        ...       ...            ...           Explanation 1:  If any question arises whether any      grant  is  a  personal  inam  such  question  shall  be      referred to  the State  Government and  the decision of      the State  Government shall  be final and the entry, if      any,  in  respect  of  such  grant  in  the  alienation      register kept  under section  53 of  the Code  shall be      deemed to have been amended accordingly.           Explanation II...     ...      ...         ..." The expression  ’Code’ has been defined in section 2 (1) (b) of the Act as the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 (Bombay V of 1879). Section  3 of  the Act  insofar as  it  is  material, reads:      "3. Act  not to  apply  to  certain  inams  and  grants Nothing in this Act shall apply to-      (1)  ...              ...             ...          ...

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    (2)   devasthan inams  or inams  held by  religious  or           charitable institutions. 887      (3)  ...              ...      (4)  ...              ...      (5)  ...              ...           Explanation: -For  the purposes  of  this  section      inams held  by  religious  or  charitable  institutions      means  Devasthan   or  Dharmadaya   inams  granted   or      recognised by  the ruling  authority for the time being      for a  religious or  charitable institution and entered      as such  in the  alienation register kept under section      53 of  the Code  or in the records kept under the rules      made under the Pensions Act 1871 (XXIII of 1871)." Section 4 of the Act reads:           "4. Abolition  of personal  inams  and  rights  in      respect   of   such   inams.-Notwithstanding   anything      contained in  any usage,  settlement, grant,  sanad  or      order or  a decree  or order  of a Court or any law for      the time  being in  force, with  effect from and on the      appointed date .           (i)   all personal  inams shall  be deemed to have                been extinguished,           (ii) save  as expressly  provided by  or under the                provisions of  this Act,  all rights  legally                subsisting on  the said  date in  respect  of                such personal  inams shall  be deemed to have                been extinguished:           Provided that  in the  case  of  a  personal  inam      consisting  of  exemption  from  the  payment  of  land      revenue only,  either wholly or in part, such exemption      shall be deemed to have been extinguished:-      (a)   if the amount of such exemption is or exceeds Rs.           5,000 with  effect from  the 1st  day  of  August,           1953, and      (b)   in all  other cases, with effect from the 1st day           of August, 1955."      Mr. D.V.  Patel,  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant, assisted by  Mr. G. Subramaniam, has contended that the High Court has  gravely erred in holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction  to deal  with the  suit. According  to  the learned counsel unless the 888 jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred specifically or by necessary   implication   the   Civil   Court   would   have jurisdiction. Admittedly  there is no specific bar under the 1952 Act.  No provision  has  been  brought  to  our  notice specifically excluding  the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Now the  question is  whether the  jurisdiction of the Civil Court has  been excluded  by necessary implication. The only bar is  provided by  Explanation I  to section  2  (1)  (e). Explanation r  provides that  if any question arises whether any grant  is personal inam, such question shall be referred to the  State Government  and  the  decision  of  the  State Government shall  be final. Whether Explanation I to section 2 (1)  (e) excludes  the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court by necessary implication is the question for consideration. The finality  of   the  decision   of   the   State   Government contemplated by  the explanation,  says the learned counsel, is only  for the  purpose of  the Act, namely, the 1952 Act, and this finality cannot stand in the way of the Civil Court to entertain  the suit.  In support  of his  contention  the learned counsel  has strongly  relied  upon  two  decisions: Secretary of  State, Represented by the Collector n of South Arcot v.  Mask and Company,(1) and Dhulabhai and Ors. v. The

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State of  Madhya Pradesh  and Anr.(2)  In the first case the Privy Council  dealing with  the jurisdiction  of the  Civil Court observed as follows (at page 236):           "It is  settled law  that  the  exclusion  of  the      jurisdiction of  the civil  courts is not to be readily      inferred,  but  that  such  exclusion  must  either  be      explicitly expressed  or clearly  implied. It  is  also      well settled  that even if jurisdiction is so excluded,      the civil  courts have  jurisdiction  to  examine  into      cases where  the provisions  of the  Act have  not been      complied with,  or the statutory tribunal has not acted      in  conformity   with  the  fundamental  principles  of      judicial procedure." In Dulabhai’s  case (supra)  Hidayatullah C.J., speaking for the Court,  on an  analysis of  the various  decisions cited before the  Court expressing  diverse views,  laid down  the following propositions:      (1)   Where the  statute gives a finality to the orders           of  the   special  tribunals   the  Civil  Court’s           jurisdiction must  he held to be excluded if there           is adequate remedy to 889           do what  the Civil  Courts would  normally do in a           suit. A  Such provision, however, does not exclude           those cases where the provisions of the particular           Act have  not been  complied with or the statutory           tribunal has  not acted  in  conformity  with  the           fundamental principles of judicial procedure. B      (2)   Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction           of the  court, an examination of the scheme of the           particular  Act   to  find  the  adequacy  or  the           sufficiency  of   the  remedies  provided  may  be           relevant  but  is  not  decisive  to  sustain  the           jurisdiction of the civil court. C                Where  there  is  no  express  exclusion  the           examination of  the remedies and the scheme or the           particular Act  to find out the intendment becomes           necessary and  the result  of the  inquiry may  be           decisive. In  the latter  case lt  is necessary to           see if  the statute  creates a  special right or a           liability and  provides for  the determination  of           the right  or liability and further lays down that           all questions  about the  said right and liability           shall  be   determined   by   the   tribunals   so           constituted,   and   whether   remedies   normally           associated  with   actions  in  Civil  Courts  are           prescribed by the said statute or not.      (3)   Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act           as ultra  views cannot be brought before Tribunals           constituted under  that Act.  Even the  High Court           cannot go  into that  question on  a  revision  or           reference from the decision of the Tribunals.      (4)      When   a   provision   is   already   declared           unconstitutional or  the constitutionality  of any           provision is  to be  challenged, a suit is open. A           writ of  Certiorari may  include a  direction  for           refund if  the claim  is clearly  within the  time           prescribed by  the Limitation  Act but it is not a           compulsory remedy to replace a suit. G      (5)  Where the particular Act contains no machinery for           refund   of    tax   collected    in   excess   of           constitutional limits  or  illegally  collected  a           suit lies.      (6)   Questions of  the correctness  of the  assessment           apart  from  its  constitutionality  are  for  the

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         decision of the 890           authorities and  a civil  suit does not lie if the           orders of the authorities are declared to be final           or  there   is  an   express  prohibition  in  the           particular Act.  In either  case the scheme of the           particular Act  must be  examined because  it is a           relevant enquiry.      (7)   An exclusion  of the  jurisdiction of  the  Civil           Court is  not readily  to be  inferred unless  the           conditions above set down apply."      If we  consider the  present case,  in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted case, in  our opinion  the finality  of the  decision of the Government as contemplated by Explanation I to section 2 (1) (e) cannot  exclude the  jurisdiction of  the  Civil  Court. Except for  the Explanation,  there is no other provision in the Act  touching upon  the jurisdiction  of the Civil Court and none has been referred to before us by either party. The Act does not give any details about the reference to and the enquiry by  the Government.  No appeal has been provided for and it  cannot be  said that  the case  of the plaintiff has been considered  by the  Government in  the same  way as  it would have been considered if the case had been filed before a Civil Court.      The very  first principle  laid down  in  the  case  of Dhulabhai postulates  that where  a statute gives a finality to the  orders of  the special  tribunal the  Civil  Court’s jurisdiction must  be  held  to  be  excluded  if  there  is adequate remedy  to do  what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. From a perusal of the provisions of the Act it cannot be  said that  there is  adequate remedy available to the plaintiffs  on reference  made to  the Government.  Even according p to the second principle laid down by the Supreme Court where  there is  an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court,  an examination  of the  scheme of the particular Act to  find out  the adequacy  or the  sufficiency  of  the remedies provided may be relevant. The Act does not give any details about  the reference  to be  made to the Government, the  procedure   to  be  followed  by  the  Government,  the opportunity to  be afforded  to the  aggrieved party. In the absence of any such details in the Act it is not possible to hold that  the  use  of  the  expression  ’finality  of  the decision of  the Government’  in Explanation  I to section 2 (1) (e) of the 1952 Act was meant to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.      The High  Court in our opinion has committed a manifest error in travelling beyond the 1952 Act and referring to the provi- 891 sions of  the 1969 Act. The High Court referred to section 4 of the 1969 Act, which exclusively vests the power to decide whether any  village, portion  of a village, or land is held in devasthan  inam, in the authorised officer, and the State Government is  empowered to  authorise any officer under the proviso to  section 4  (l) to decide questions arising under clauses (a)  (b) or  (c) of  section 4.  Subsection  (2)  of section 4  of the  said Act  enables the person aggrieved by the decision of the authorised officer to go up in appeal to the State  Government within sixty days from the date of the decision. The  High Court also referred to section 20 of the 1969 Act  which specifically  bars the  jurisdiction of  the Civil Court. It reads:           "20. No  Civil Court  shall have  jurisdiction  to      settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or

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    under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt      with, by  the officer  authorised under  the proviso to      sub section  (I) of  section 4  or section  25  or  the      Collector, the  Gujarat Revenue  Tribunal in appeal, or      the State  Government  in  appeal  or  revision  or  in      exercise of their power of control." On the  basis of  the provisions  of the  1969 Act  the High Court came to the conclusion that Explanation 1 to section 2 (1) (e)  of the  1952 Act and section 20 or the 1969 Act put beyond the  pale of  any doubt  that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court  had been  taken  away  by  the  legislature  to determine the  question  whether  a  particular  inam  is  a personal or a devasthan inam.      We  are   concerned  in   the  present  case  with  the provisions of  the  1952  Act.  There  is  no  corresponding provision like  section 20  of the  1969 Act in the 1952 Act nor is  there any  detailed procedure of appeal and revision in that  Act as contemplated by the 1969 Act. The High Court in our  opinion was not justified in invoking the provisions of the 1969 Act while deciding the case under the 1952 Act.      The counsel  for the State of Gujarat on the other hand referred to  the definition  of personal  inam as  given  in section 2  (1) (e)  of the  1952 Act  and according  to  the learned counsel  the inam  in question is a personal inam in view of  the definition  itself which  says:  Personal  inam means a  grant of  a village,  portion of a village, land or total partial  exemption from  the payment  of land  revenue entered as personal inam in the alienation register kept 892 under section  53 of  the Code."  So, entry of the nature of the inam in the alienation register is a decisive factor. In the instant  case the  inam in  question has been entered as personal  inam   in  the   alienation  register.  Therefore, perforce it  has to  be taken  as a  personal inam  and  the plaintiff cannot  escape the  definition of  the  expression ’personal inam’ as given in section 2 (1) (e). Likewise, for a devasthan  inam also  it is  necessary to be so entered in the alienation register kept under section 53 of the Code in view of  Explanation to  section 3  of  the  1952  Act.  The counsel for  the appellant  on the  other hand  referred  to Explanation I  to section  2 (1)  (e) of  the 1952 Act which indicates that the entry in the register is not an essential part of  the definition  of the personal inam but it is only descriptive. If  the Government decides the case contrary to t he  entry  in  the  alienation  register,  the  alienation register shall  be deemed  to have been amended accordingly. This part  of the  Explanation takes  away the rigour of the entry in  the alienation  register.  If  the  entry  in  the alienation  register   will   be   deemed   to   have   been automatically amended  by the  decision of the Government on the question  whether it  is a  personal inam or a devasthan inam there  is no  sanctity attached  to such entry which is mainly intended  to serve the purpose of realisation of land revenue. The  entry cannot  be said to be so sacrosanct that it  cannot   be  changed.   Indeed  the  explanation  itself contemplates a  change  in  view  of  the  decision  of  the Government on the question.      It was  next contended  for the  State that the Revenue Court  alone  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  correct  the entries in  the revenue  records and the counsel referred to section 53 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. It reads:           "53. A  Register shall be kept by the Collector in      such form as may from time to time be prescribed by the      State Government  of all lands, the alienation of which      has been established or recognized under the provisions

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    of any  law for  the time  being in  force; and when it      shall be  shown to  the satisfaction  of the  Collector      that  any   sanad  granted  in  relation  to  any  such      alienated lands has been permanently lost or destroyed,      he may,  subject to  the rules  and the  payment of the      fees prescribed  by the  State Government under section      213, grant  to any  person whom he may deem entitled to      the same  a certified  extract from  the said Register,      which shall  be endorsed by the Collector to the effect      that it  has been  issued in  lieu of the sanad said to      have been  lost or destroyed, and shall be deemed to be      as valid a proof of title as the said sanad." 893 Section 203  of the  said Code  provides for appeal from any order passed  by the  Revenue officer to his superior and on the strength  of these  provisions it is sought to be argued that the  plaintiff could have gone up in appeal against the decision of the officer under section 53 of the Code and the jurisdiction of  the Civil Court is completely barred. If we refer to  section 212  of the  Code,  the  argument  of  the counsel for  the State  cannot be accepted. Section 212 con- templates that  whenever in  this Code it is declared that a decision or  order shall  be final  such expression shall be deemed to  mean that  no appeal  lies from  such decision or order. If  this is  what finality means under section 212 it cannot be  argued with any force on behalf of the State that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. C      For the  foregoing discussion  the decision of the Full Bench of  the High Court cannot be sustained. We accordingly accept the  appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 23rd  September, 1976  and remand the case to the High Court for  deciding other  points involved  in the case. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs. P.B.R.                                  Appal allowed. 894