http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: SAVITRI W/O SHRI GOVIND SINGH RAWAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI GOVIND SINGH RAWAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/10/1985

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  984            1985 SCC  (4) 337  1985 SCALE  (2)697

ACT:      Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973, s.  125  -  Whether Magistrate can grant interim maintenance.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner filed an application under s. 125 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure,  1973 before the Magistrate for an  order   against  her   husband  directing   him  to  pay maintenance. Thereafter she filed another application for an interim order  directing her husband to pay a reasonable sum by  way   of  maintenance   pending  disposal  of  the  main application. The  Magistrate declined  to  make  an  interim order on  the ground  that there was no express provision in the Code enabling a Magistrate to pass such an order.      The petitioner  filed special  leave petition  in  this Court.      Disposing of the petition, ^      HELD :  1. There  is no  express provision  in the Code which authorises  a Magistrate  to  make  an  interim  order directing payment  of maintenance  pending  disposal  of  an application  for   maintenance.  The   Code  does  not  also expressly prohibit the making of such an order- [617 E]      2. The  provisions contained  in 88.  125, 126, 127 and 128 of  the Code  of Civil Procedure 1973 show that they are intended to  provide for  a preventive  remedy for  securing payment of  maintenance which  can be granted quickly and in deserving cases with effect from the date of the application itself. [618 C] G      3. The  rate of  maintenance that  can be awarded under the Code  is limited even though under the law governing the parties a  competent civil  court may  order  payment  of  a larger sum  in appropriate  cases.  The  civil  courts  have inherent power to grant interim maintenance pending disposal of the suit for maintenance. [618 C-D]      4.The Jurisdiction  of a Magistrate under Chapter IX of the Code  is not  strictly a  criminal  Jurisdiction.  While passing an 616 order under  that Chapter asking a person to pay maintenance to his wife, child or parent, the Magistrate is not imposing any punishment  on such person for a crime committed by him.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

Chapter IX  of  the  Code  contains  a  summary  remedy  for securing some  reasonable sum by way of maintenance, subject to a decree, if any, which may be made in a civil court in a given case  provided the  Personal Law applicable to the per on concerned authorises the enforcement of any such right to maintenance. The  Code, however,  provides a quick remedy to protect the  applicant against  starvation and  to tide over immediate difficulties.  Chapter IX  of the Code does not in reality create any serious new obligation. [618 E-G]      5. It  is the  duty  of  the  Court  to  interpret  the provisions in  Chapter IX  of the Code in such away that the construction placed on them would not defeat the very object of  the   legislation.  In   the  absence   of  any  express prohibition, it is appropriate to construe the provisions in Chapter IX  as conferring an implied power to the Magistrate to direct  the person  against whom  an application  is made under s.  125 of  the Code to pay some reasonable sum by way of maintenance  to the  applicant pending  final disposal of the application. [619 E-G]      Shri Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi and Anr., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 483 at 486, relied upon.      6. There  is no  room for apprehension that recognition of such  implied power  would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may  not exist.  It is, quite possible that such contingency may  arise in  a few  cases  but  the  prejudice caused thereby  to the  person against  whom it  is made  is minimal as it can be set right E‘ quickly after hearing both the parties.  The Magistrate  may, however,  insist upon  an affidavit being  filed by  or on  behalf  of  the  applicant concerned stating  the grounds  in support  of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case  for making  such an  order. If a Civil Court can pass such  interim orders  on affidavits, there is no reason why a  magistrate should not rely on them for the purpose of issuing directions regarding payment of interim maintenance. [620 C-E]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE   JURISDICTION  :   Special   Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1028 of 1984.      From the  Order dated  11.1.1984  of  the  Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi in Case No. 41/1 of 1983. 617      Ms. Bina Gupta for the Petitioner.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  The short  question which arises for consideration in  this case  is whether  a magistrate before whom an application is made under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973 (hereinafter  referred to  as ’the Code’) can  made  an  interim  order  directing  the  person against whom  the application  is made under that section to pay  reasonable   maintenance  to  the  applicant  concerned pending disposal of the application.      In the  instant case,  the petitioner  was an applicant under   section 125  of the  Code  before  the  Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi.  In her  application, she  prayed for  an order against  her husband  directing him to pay maintenance to her.  Immediately after  she filed  the said application, she made  another application  before the  magistrate for an interim order  directing her  husband to pay some reasonable sum by  way of  maintenance pending  disposal  of  the  main application. The learned magistrate declined to make such an

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

interim order  on the  ground  that  there  was  no  express provision in  the Code enabling a magistrate to pass such an order. Aggrieved by the said order the application has filed this  special  leave  petition  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution.      It is  true that  there is  no express provision in the Code which  authorises a magistrate to make an interim order directing payment  of maintenance  pending  disposal  of  an application  for   maintenance.  The   Code  does  not  also expressly prohibit the making of such an order. The question is whether  such a  power can  be implied  to be vested in a magistrate having  regard to  the nature  of the proceedings under section  125 and  other cognate  provisions  found  in Chapter  IX  of  the  Code  which  is  entitled  "Order  For Maintenance of  Wives, Children and Parents". Section 125 of the Code confers power on a magistrate of the first class to direct a  person having sufficient means but who neglects or refuses  to  maintain  (i)  his  wife,  unable  to  maintain herself, or (ii) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married  or not, unable to maintain itself, or (iii) his legitimate  or illegitimate  child (not  being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of  any physical  or  mental  abnormality  or  injury unable to  maintain itself  or (iv)  his father  or  mother, unable to  maintain himself  or herself,  upon proof of such neglect or refusal, to pay a monthly allowance for 618 the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, as the  case may be, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees  in the  whole as such magistrate thinks fit. Such allowance  shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if  so ordered  from the  date of  the  application  for maintenance.  Section   126  of   the  Code  prescribes  the procedure for  the disposal  of an  application  made  under section 125. Section 127 of the Code provides for alteration of  the rate  of maintenance  in the light of the changed circumstances  or an  order or decree of a competent civil  court.  Section  128  of  the  Code  deals  with  the enforcement of the order of maintenance. It is not necessary to refer  to the  other details  contained in the above said provisions.      A reading  of the  above provisions shows that they are intended to  provide for  a preventive  remedy for  securing payment of  maintenance which  can be granted quickly and in deserving cases with effect from the date of the application itself. The  rate of maintenance that can be awarded is also limited even  though under  the law  governing the parties a competent civil  court may  order payment of a larger sum by way of  maintenance in  appropriate cases.  The civil courts have inherent  power to  grant interim  maintenance  pending disposal  of   the  suit  for  maintenance.  The  point  for consideration is  whether the  magistrate can also make such an interim order or not.      The jurisdiction  of a  magistrate under  Chapter IX of the Code  is not  strictly a  criminal  jurisdiction.  While passing an  order under  that Chapter asking a person to pay maintenance to  his wife,  child or  parent, as the case may be, the  magistrate is  not imposing  any punishment on such person for  a crime committed by him. Chapter IX of the Code contains a  summary remedy  for securing some reasonable sum by way  of maintenance,  subject to  a decree, if any, which may be  made in  a civil  court in a given case provided the Personal Law  applicable to  the person concerned authorises the enforcement  of any such right to maintenance. The Code, however, provides  a quick  remedy to  protect the applicant

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

against starvation  and to tide over immediate difficulties. Chapter IX  of the  Code does  not  in  reality  create  any serious new  obligation unknown  to Indian  social life.  In Shri Bhagwan  Dutt v.  Smt. Kamla  Devi and  Anr., [1975] 2. S.C.R. 483  at 486,  this Court  has explained the object of sections 488, 489 and 490 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which  are replaced  by the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code thus :           "Sections 488, 489 and 490 constitute one family. 619           They have  been grouped  together in Chapter XXXVI           of the  Code of  1898 under  the caption  "Of  the           maintenance  A   of  wives   and  children".  This           chapter, in  the words  of Sir  James  Fitzstephen           provides "a  mode of  preventing vagrancy,  or  at           least  of   preventing  its  consequences".  These           provisions  are   intended  to   fulfil  a  social           purpose. Their  object  is  to  compel  a  man  to           perform the  moral obligation  which  he  owes  to           society in  respect of  his wife  and children. By           providing a  simple, speedy  but  limited  relief,           they seek  to ensure  that the  neglected wife and           children are  not left  beggared and destituted on           the scrap-heap  of society and thereby driven to a           life of  vagrancy, immorality  and crime for their           subsistence. Thus,  section 488 is not intended to           provide for  a full and final determination of the           status and  personal rights  of the  parties.  The           jurisdiction  conferred  by  the  section  on  the           Magistrate is  more in  the nature of a preventive           rather  than   a  remedial   jurisdiction;  it  is           certainly  not   punitive.  As   pointed  out   in           Thompson’s case 6 NWP 205 the scope of the Chapter           XXXVI is limited and the Magistrate cannot, except           as thereunder  provided, usurp the jurisdiction in           matrimonial  disputes   possessed  by   the  civil           courts. Sub-section  (2) of  section 489 expressly           makes orders  passed under  Chapter XXXVI  of  the           Code subject to any final adjudication that may be           made  by   a  civil   court  between  the  parties           regarding their status and civil rights."      In view of the foregoing it is the duty of the court to interpret the provisions in Chapter IX of the Code in such a way that  the construction  placed on  them would not defeat the very  object of  the legislation.  In the absence of any express prohibition,  it  is  appropriate  to  construe  the provisions in  Chapter IX  as conferring an implied power on the  Magistrate   to  direct  the  person  against  whom  an application is  made under  section 125  of the  Code to pay some reasonable  sum by  way of maintenance to the applicant pending final  disposal of  the  application.  It  18  quite common that  applications made under section 125 of the Code also take  several months  for being disposed of finally. In order to  enjoy the  fruits of the proceedings under section 125, the  applicant should  be alive  till the  date of  the final order  and that the applicant can do in a large number of cases only if an order for payment of interim maintenance is passed  by the  court. Every  court  must  be  deemed  to possess by necessary intendment all 620 such powers  as are  necessary to make its orders effective. This  principle  is  embodied  in  the  maxim  ’ubi  aliquid conceditur, conceditur  et id  sine quo  res ipsa  esse  non potest (Where  anything is  conceded, there is conceded also anything without which the thing itself cannot exist.) (Vide

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

Earl Jowitt’s  Dictionary of  English Law 1959 Edn. P.1797). Whenever anything  is required  to be  done by law and it is found impossible  to do  that  thing  unless  something  not authorised in express terms be also done then that something else will  be  supplied  by  necessary  intendment.  Such  a construction though  lt may  not always be admissible in the present  case  however  would  advance  the  object  of  the legislation under  consideration. A  contrary view is likely to result  in grave  hardship to the applicant, who may have no means  to subsist  until the final order is passed. There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied power would lead to the passing of interim orders in a  large   number  of  cases  where  the  liability  to  pay maintenance may  not exist.  It is  quite possible that such contingency may  arise in  a few  cases  but  the  prejudice Caused thereby  to the  person against  whom it  is made  is minimal as  it can  be set  right quickly after hearing both the parties.  The magistrate,  may, however,  insist upon an affidavit being  filed by  or on  behalf  of  the  applicant concerned stating  the grounds  in support  of the claim for interim maintenance to satisfy himself that there is a prima facie case  for making such an order. Such an order may also be made  in an  appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of  the application  subject to  any modification  or even an  order of  cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is  heard. If a civil court can pass such interim orders on  affidavits, there  is no  reason why a magistrate should  not   rely  on  them  for  the  purpose  of  issuing directions regarding  payment of  interim  maintenance.  The affidavit may  be treated  as supplying prima facie proof of the case  of  the  applicant.  If  the  allegations  in  the application or the affidavit are not true, it is always open to the  person against  whom such  an order  is made to show that the order is unsustainable. Having regard to the nature of the  jurisdiction exercised by a magistrate under section 125 of  the Code,  we feel that the said provision should be interpreted as  conferring power by necessary implication on the magistrate  to pass  an order directing a person against whom an application is made under it to pay a reasonable sum by  way   of  interim   maintenance  subject  to  the  other conditions referred  to there  pending final disposal of the application. In  taking this view we have also taken note of the provisions of section 7 (2)(a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Act No. 66 of 1984) passed recently by Parlia- 621 ment proposing  to transfer  the jurisdiction exercisable by magistrates under  section 125  of the  Code to  the  Family Courts constituted under the said Act.      The above  opinion according to us is based on the true construction of the relevant provisions of the Code. We are, however, informed that the dispute regarding maintenance  is now finally  settled between  the parties.  Hence no further orders  are   necessary  in   this  case.  The  petition  is accordingly disposed of. A.P.J. 622