15 December 1998
Supreme Court
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SAVITRABAI BHAUSAHEB KEVATE Vs RAICHAND DHANRAJ LUNIA

Bench: S.SAGHIR AHMAD,,M. JAGANNADHA RAO.
Case number: C.A. No.-006343-006343 / 1998
Diary number: 20178 / 1997


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PETITIONER: SMT.   SAVITRABAI  BHAUSAHEB  KEVATE   AND   OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAICHAND DHANRAJ LUNJA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/12/1998

BENCH: S.SAGHIR AHMAD, & M. JAGANNADHA RAO.

JUDGMENT:

M.JAGANNADHA RAO

Leave granted.

This  appeal  is directed against the judgment of  the  High Court  of  Bombay  in  Writ  Petition  3714  of  1982  dated 17.04.1997.   By that judgment the learned Single Judge  set aside  the  judgment of the 2nd Addl.  Small  Causes  Court, Pune  in  Civil Suit No.  1285 of 1979 dated  02.12.1981  as affirmed  by  the District Court, Pune in Civil  Appeal  No. 266  of 1982 dated 20.10.1982.  The trial court had  decreed the  suit  filed  by  the appellants  for  eviction  of  the respondent  on  the ground of bona fide requirement and  the said judgment was affirmed by the District Court.  These two judgments were set aside by the High Court under Article 227 of  the  Constitution of India.  It is this judgment of  the High Court that is challenged in this appeal.

       We shall refer to the facts briefly: ..........L...I.........T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

             The  suit  premises consist of a shop  bearing           No.4  on the ground floor of a house at Pune.  The           shop  was  let out by the predecessor in-title  of           the  appellants, Sri Kevate to the respondent on a           monthly  rent  of Rs.  75/- for running a  grocery           shop.   The  said  Kevate wrote a  letter  to  the           respondent  on  8.3.1978 that the  respondent  had           closed  the shop for more than a year, and that he           was  not using the same for the purpose for  which           it  was  let  out.   Later,  Shri  Kevate  sent  a           registered  notice  on 27.3.1979  terminating  the           tenancy   w.e.f.    01.04.1979   and  asking   the           respondent  to  vacate  the shop.   As  respondent           failed  to  vacate the shop, the said Shri  Kevate           filed  the  present  Civil Suit before  the  Small           Causes  Court, Pune under Section 13(1)(g) and (k)           of  Bombay  Rents, Hotel and Lodging House,  rates           Control  Act,  1947 (hereinafter called the  Act).           According to him the shop was is necessary for his           son  Madhukar  to  start   business.   During  the           pendency  of the suit, Shri Kevate expired and the           appellants,  including  the said Madhukar came  on           record  as plaintiffs, being his legal heirs.  The           parties  led oral and documentary evidence in  the           trial  court.  The learned trial Judge by judgment

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         dated  2.12.1981 held that the appellant failed to           prove  that  the shop was closed continuously  for           more than 6 months prior to the filing of the suit           and  hence  the claim under Section 13(1) (k)  was           liable  to be rejected.  However, in regard to the           claim  for  bona  fide requirement  under  Section           13(1)(g),  the  learned trial Judge held that  the           requirement  of the plaintiff, namely for his  son           Madhukar to start a business, was a bona fide one.           It  was  also  held  that   the  hardship  to  the           appellant’s  son  Madhukar  was   more  than   the           hardship  to the respondent- tenant.  The eviction           suit was decreed.  On appeal, the learned District           Judge  confirmed  the said judgment  holding  that           since  the  family was already in business,  there           was  no  question of the appellant’s son  Madhukar           not  having  the necessary experience and  capital           for  running business.  The learned District Judge           also  held that the respondent had another shop in           Ganesh  Peth which was flourshing and,  therefore,           no hardship would be caused to the respondent if a           decree   for  eviction  was   passed.   When   the           respondent  moved the High Court under article 227           of  the Constitution of India, the learned  Single           Judge  of the High Court allowed the writ petition           holding  that  there  was no  material  on  record           showing  as  to why the landlord did not occupy  a           particular  shop of his which had fallen vacant in           the  year 1976.  According to the High Court,  the           landlord’s  son  Madhukar could have  started  his           business  in that shop in 1976 if there was really           a bona fide need.  Inasmuch as the said shop which           fell  vacant  in  1976  was not  occupied  by  the           landlord’s  son  Madhukar, the High Court came  to           the  conclusion that the need of the landlord  was           not bona fide.  Accordingly, the judgments of both           the  lower courts were set aside and the  eviction           suit was dismissed.

             In  this  appeal,  learned   counsel  for  the           landlord  -appellant contended that the High Court           ought  not  have  reversed  the  finding  of  fact           arrived  by  the  lower courts which  finding  was           based  on  evidence.  It was also argued that  the           High  Court  erred in thinking that Madhukar,  the           landlord’s  son  could  have   occupied  the  shop           vacated  by a barber in 1976 inasmuch as  Madhukar           was  still in college in 1976 and was not ready to           start any business.

             On  the  other hand, learned counsel  for  the           respondent  contended  that the landlord ought  to           have  occupied  the shop vacated by the barber  in           1976  and  made  his  son Madhukar  to  start  his           business there.  According to learned counsel, the           conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  was           consistent with the evidence.

             The  point for consideration is:  whether  the           High  Court  erred  in  reversing  the  concurrent           findings  of fact of both the lower courts and  in           holding  that  the  landlord  did  not  bona  fide           require the shop?

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             From  the  above facts, it is clear that  both           the  courts have arrived at concurrent findings of           fact regarding the bona fide need of the landlord,           namely,  to  enable  his son Madhukar to  start  a           business.   The  High Court has reversed the  said           finding  on the salutary ground that the  landlord           has  not occupied the shop vacated by the  tenant,           namely a barber, in 1976 which he could have given           to his son Madhukar to start business.

             In  our view, the High Court was wrong in  its           assumption  that  Madhukar  could have  started  a           business  in  1976  for   the  following  reasons.           Number of witnesses were examined on behalf of the           landlord  whose evidence was accepted by the trail           court and the first appellate court.  But the most           important  part  of  the evidence which  the  High           Court  omitted  to  consider   was  the  following           statetment of Madhukar:

             "Why my father did not retain the premises let           out  to  the barber, I cannot say.  It is  a  fact           that my father was requiring the suit premises, as           I did not complete education at that time."

             From  the above evidence of the landlord’s son           Madhukar  it  is  clear  that  by  1976  the  said           Madhukar  had not completed his education and  was           not  ripe enough to start a business.  It was only           in  1979  that  the said  Madhukar  completed  his           education,  and  the  landlord thought  of  making           Madhukar  to start a business in the suit shop and           gave  a notice for eviction and filed the  present           suit  in  1979.  Therefore, it is clear  that  the           assumption  of  the High Court that  the  landlord           could  have  given the shop which fell  vacant  in           1976  to  his son Madhkur is the contrary  to  the           evidence placed on record.

             The  above  evidence  of  the  landlord’s  son           Madhukar  was  the  reason  for  the  trial  court           ordering  eviction.  This is what the trial  court           stated.

             "By  the time the suit came to be filed by the           deceased,  the  plaintiff-Madhukar had  not  taken           B.A.  degree."

             This was affirmed by the appellate court.  The           High  Court erred in setting aside the  concurrent           findings of both courts.

             For  the aforesaid reasons the judgment of the           High  Court  cannot be sustained.  We  accordingly           set aside the same and restore the judgment of the           trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.

              The appeal is accordingly allowed.

             The   learned  counsel   for  the  respondent-           tenant,  however, submitted that some time may  be           granted  to respondent to vacate the premises.  We

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         accordingly  grant time up to 30th June, 1999  for           the  respondent to vacate the suit shop subject to           the  condition  that  the   respondent  files   an           undertaking  in  this  Court within 2  weeks  from           today.   If  the  said undertaking  is  not  filed           within  the said period of 2 weeks or in the event           the  conditions mentioned in the said  undertaking           are  committed breach of, the order granting  time           up to 30th June, 1999 shall stand recalled and the           appellant  will be entitled to execute the  decree           of  the  trial court as affirmed by the  appellate           court.