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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1897 of 2003

PETITIONER: Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs

RESPONDENT: Union of India & Another

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/04/2008

BENCH: B.N. Agrawal & G.S. Singhvi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1897 OF 2003 With C.A. No.1898 of 2003 and C.A. No.5622 of 2006

G.S. Singhvi, J.

1.      Whether Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for  short ’the 1958 Act’) is ultra vires the doctrine of equality enshrined in  Article 14 of the Constitution of India is the question which arises for  determination in these appeals.    

2.      For the sake of convenience, we have noted the facts from Civil  Appeal No.1897 of 2003:   

(i)     On August 18, 1953, Delhi Improvement Trust leased out a plot of  land measuring 184 sq. yards situated at Basti Reghar, Block ’R’,  Khasra Nos.2942/1820 to 2943/1820 to Shri Jagat Singh son of Pt.  Ram Kishan.  In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was  prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it)  for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of  breach of this condition, the lease shall become void. (ii)    After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain  Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the  building, who started using the rented premises for running watch  shop and clinic respectively. (iii)   Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by  her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward  No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal  heirs of the lessee. (iv)    After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of  1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she  needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and  occupation of the family members dependant upon her. The appellant  further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and  reconstruct the same.  She also alleged that tenants have been using  the premises in violation of the conditions of lease and, therefore, they  are liable to be evicted.   

(v)     The tenants contested the eviction petitions by asserting that the so  called need of the landlord was not bona fide; that there were no valid  grounds for permitting the landlord to demolish the building and  reconstruct the same and that they had not violated the conditions of  lease.  They further pleaded that the previous owner let out the  premises for non-residential purposes; that the appellant was also  issuing rent receipts by describing the rented portions as shop/clinic

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and that in view of order dated 11.12.1978 issued by the Government  of India, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Delhi  Development Authority was condoning violations of the lease  conditions.   

(vi)    By an order dated 17.5.1991, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi  dismissed the eviction petitions.  He held that the appellant is owner  and landlady of the suit premises, but she has not been able to prove  that portions thereof were let for residential purposes; that the  appellant and her dependent family members do not have suitable  alternative accommodation except the one occupied by her elder son,   who was under the threat of eviction and that the need of the appellant  is bona fide.  The Additional Rent Controller further held that the  tenants are guilty of violating clause 4(c) of deed dated August 18,  1953.  He, however, declined to pass order for recovery of possession  by observing that under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, such an order can  be passed only in respect of premises let for residential purposes.  The  Additional Rent Controller also rejected other grounds of eviction put  forward by the appellant.

3.      The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Rent Control  Tribunal, Delhi vide its judgment dated 10.11.1998.  The Tribunal agreed  with the Additional Rent Controller that an order of eviction of the tenant  can be passed under Section 14(1)(e) only if the premises were let for  residential purposes. The Tribunal then held that the portions given to the  tenants were being used for non-residential purposes and, therefore, they  cannot be evicted on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.

4.      The appellant challenged the orders of the Additional Rent Controller  and Rent Control Tribunal in Civil Writ Petition No.1093 of 1999.  She filed  another petition, which was registered as Civil Writ Petition No.1092 of  1999, with the prayer that Section 14(1)(e) of the Act be declared ultra vires  of Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it does not provide for eviction of  the tenant from the premises let for non-residential purposes. Both the writ  petitions were heard by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court along with other  writ petitions involving challenge to the vires of Section 14(1)(e) and were  dismissed by the order under challenge.  The Full Bench referred to an  earlier judgment of the Division Bench in H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance  Corporation of India & Anr. [ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 90] and large number of  judgments of this Court including Amarjit Singh vs. Smt. Khatoon  Quamarin [1986 (4) SCC 736] and held:- i)      Tenants of non-residential premises are a class by themselves.  The  Parliament in its legislative wisdom did not think it fit to make any  provision for eviction of a tenant from such premises on the ground of  bona fide requirement of the landlord for residential purpose.   Referenced to Section 29(2)(r) of the 1995 Act, in our opinion, cannot  be said to have any relevance whatsoever for the purpose of  determining.  Admittedly, the 1995 Act is yet to come into force.  If  the said Act is yet to come into force, the question of taking recourse  to the provisions of the said Act would not arise more so because this  court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  Constitution of India would not be in a position to direct the  Government to do so which is a legislative function.  On the other  hand, the very fact that said Act is yet to come into force in an indicia  to the fact that the Central Government does not in its wisdom  consider that the said benefit should be extended to non-residential  premises also.

ii)     Judicial review of legislation is permissible only on limited grounds,  namely when a statute is enacted by a legislature which had no  authority therefor or when it inter alia violates any of the provisions  contained in Part III of the Constitution.  Once it is held, as we are  bound to, that the non-residential premises having regard to the  interpretation clause, forms a separate class, such classification,  having a reasonable nexus with the ground of eviction, cannot be said

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to be discriminatory in nature.  Article 14 of the Constitution would  apply only to persons similarly situated.  Owners of residential and  non-residential premises stand on different footings.  In the event, the  legislature in its wisdom thinks it fit to extend its protective wing to a  class of tenants from being evicted on a particular ground, the same  by itself cannot be said to be discriminatory so as to attract the wrath  of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.  The court in a situation of  this nature is only entitled to see as to whether such classification is  valid and rational.  Once the rationality in such legislation is found,  the court will put its hands off.

iii)    Furthermore, the provisions of the said Act had been declared intra  vires by the Apex Court in Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain  (supra).  In that case, an argument was advanced that unless the  second limb of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is read in such a way that it  was in consonance with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of  India, the same would be void as being unconstitutional.  The question  raised therein has been dealt with the Apex Court.

(iv)    In the instant case, the Statute itself has indicated the persons or things  to whom its provisions are recommended to apply.  The said Act is a  beneficial legislation.  It seeks to protect the tenants.  Tenants are  broadly classified into three categories \026 residential, non-residential  and/or other tenant.  Such a classification as regards premises or  tenancy cannot per se be said to be unreasonable.

(v)     In the instant case, so far as Sections 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(k) are  concerned, the statute itself has indicated the persons to whom the  provisions would apply.  The provision is absolutely clear and  unambiguous.  In such a case the Court is only required to examine  whether the classification is based upon reasonable differentia,  distinguishing the person, group from those left out and whether such  differential has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved.  The  impugned provision indisputably was intended to beneficially apply to  landlords and of one class of tenancy viz. tenancy in respect of the  residential premises and not non-residential premises.

5.      The Full Bench also noticed the judgment in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs.  State of Punjab & Anr. [1996 (1) SCC 1] whereby Section 13(3)(a) of the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as amended by Punjab Act  No.29 of 1956, was struck down but distinguished the same by making the  following observations :- "The objects and reasons of the said Act, thus, were considered  having regard to the provisions made at the time of commencement of  the said Act.  Such a contingency does not arise in the instant case.    Reasonable nexus to the objects to be achieved of the said Act having  regard to the performance for which the building is being used must  be found out from the legislative intent.  Legislative intent may  change from State to State."

6.      Learned counsel for the appellants relied on the judgment of this  Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (supra) and  argued that the classification made between the premises let for residential  purposes and non-residential purposes in the matter of eviction of tenant on  the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is irrational, arbitrary and  violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  Shri A.C. Gambhir submitted  that even though the constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act  was upheld by the Division Bench of the High Court in H.C. Sharma vs.  Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (supra), that decision cannot,  in the changed circumstances and in view of the later judgments of this  Court in Rattan Arya vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(1986) 3 SCC 385],  Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra), Rakesh Vij vs. Dr.  Raminder Pal Singh Sethi [(2005) 8 SCC 504] be treated as good law.  He

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argued that the reason which prompted the legislature to exclude the  premises let for non residential purposes from the purview of Section  14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act and which found approval of the Division Bench of  the High Court has, with the passage of time, become non-existent and the  classification of the premises into residential and non-residential with  reference to the purpose of lease has become totally arbitrary and irrational  warranting a declaration of invalidity qua the impugned section. In support  of this argument, the learned counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in  Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others vs. State of Maharashtra &  Another [1998 (2) SCC 1].  Shri Gambhir pointed out that in the Delhi Rent  Control Act, 1995 (for short ’the 1995 Act’), which was enacted by the  Parliament in the light of the National Housing Policy, 1992 and  observations made by this Court in Prabhakaran Nair vs. State of Tamil  Nadu [1987 (4) SCC 238], no distinction has been made between the  premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of  eviction of the tenant on the grounds of landlord’s bona fide need and argued  that even though that Act has not been enforced, the Court can take  cognizance of the legislative changes and declare the implicit restriction  contained in Section 14(1)(e) on the eviction of tenant from the premises let  for non-residential purposes as unconstitutional.   

7.      Shri C.S. Rajan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Union of  India emphasized that the purpose of the Act is to protect the tenants against  arbitrary eviction by the landlord and argued that the classification of the  premises with reference to the purpose of lease should be treated as based on  rational grounds because the same is meant to further the object of the  enactment.  Shri Rajan referred to the judgment of Amarjit Singh vs. Smt.  Khatoon Quamarin (supra) to show that challenge to the constitutionality  of the Section 14(1)(e) on the ground of violation of Article 14 has already  been negatived and argued that the vires of that provision cannot be re- examined merely because a similar provision contained in the ’Punjab Act’  has been declared unconstitutional in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of  Punjab (supra).  Learned senior counsel relied on the judgments of this  Court In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978 [1979 (1) SCC 380] and Padma  Sundra Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others     [2002 (3) SCC 533] and argued that the Court should not attempt to rewrite  Section 14(1)(e) so as to facilitate evection of the tenants from the premises  let for non-residential purposes.  Shri S.P. Laler, learned counsel appearing  for the respondents in Civil Appeal Nos.1897 of 2003 and 1898 of 2003  supported the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court and argued that  the distinction made by the legislature between the premises let for  residential and non-residential purposes is based on rational ground i.e. acute  shortage of non-residential premises/buildings and, therefore, the same  cannot be treated as unconstitutional.     

8.      We have considered the respective arguments/submissions.  For  deciding the question raised in these appeals, it will be useful to notice the  salient features of rent control legislations, which were made applicable to  Delhi form time to time.  These are:- i)      In exercise of the power vested in it under Rule 81 of the Defence of  India Rules, the Government of India promulgated New Delhi House Rent  Control Order, 1939.  This order was made applicable only to residential  premises.  Section 11 thereof provided that a tenant in possession of a house  shall not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a decree or otherwise  and whether before or after the termination of the tenancy except on the  grounds mentioned therein.  Clause (iv) of sub-section 2 of Section 11A was  as under: "that the landlord was at no time during the twelve months  immediately preceding the date of his application residing within the  limits of the Delhi or New Delhi Municipality or the Notified Areas of  the Civil Station, Delhi or Delhi Fort, that it is essential in the public  interest that he should take up residence in that area and that he is  unable to secure other suitable accommodation, the Controller shall  make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of  the house, and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an

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order rejecting the application."

(ii)    On 15th October, 1942, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1941  was made applicable to the Province of Delhi, except the areas to which the  New Delhi House Rent Control Order was applicable.  The definition of the  expression "premises" in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act made no  distinction between "residential" and non-residential" premises.  Section  10(1) of that Act provided that no order for recovery of possession of any  premises shall be made so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to  pay rent to the full extent allowable by this Act and perform other conditions  of the tenancy.  However, in terms of proviso to Section 19(1), the Court  could make an order for recovery of possession if the landlord satisfied that  the prescribed notice had been served on the tenant. Sub-section 2 of Section  10 provided that where any order mentioned in sub-section 1 has been made  on or after the First day of January, 1939 but not executed before the  commencement of the Act, the Court by which the order was made may if it  is of opinion that the order would not have been made if the Act had been in  operation on the date the order was made, rescind or vary the order. The  proviso to Section 10(2) enumerated the other grounds for eviction of the  tenants. One of the grounds was that the premises are reasonably and bona  fide required by the landlord for his own occupation.

(iii)   In 1944, the Delhi Rent Control Ordinance (XXV), 1944 was  promulgated.  In this Ordinance, the word ’premises’ was defined to mean  any building which is let separately for use as a residence or for commercial  use or for any other purpose.  Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 9 of the  Ordinance specified the grounds on which the landlord could recover  possession of the premises.  One of the grounds was that the landlord  requires the premises for his use as residence.  This means the landlord  could not recover possession of the premises if he needed the same for  commercial use.  

(iv)    In 1947, the Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act was enacted  and was made applicable to all the parts of Delhi.  Section 2(b) of the 1947  Act which contained the definition of the word ’premises’ read as under:- "premises" means any building which is, or is intended to be, let  separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any  other purpose,\005\005\005\005\005\005\005.."

       Section 9(e) which provided for eviction of the tenant on the ground  of bona fide requirement of the landlord was as under:- "that purely residential premises are required bona fide by the  landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a  residence for himself or his family, that he neither has nor is able to  secure other suitable accommodation, and that he has acquired his  interest in the premises at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy  or the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever is later, or if the interest has  devolved on him by inheritance or succession, his predecessor had  acquired the interest at a date prior to the beginning of the tenancy or  the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever is later;\005\005\005\005\005"

(v)     The 1947 Act was replaced by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act,  1952.  Section 13 of that Act enumerated various grounds on which a tenant  could be evicted.  Clause (c) of Section 13(1) was as under:- "that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide  by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a  residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable  accommodation;

Explanation:-   For the purposes of this clause, "residential  premises" include any premises which having been let for use as a  residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally  for commercial or other purposes:\005\005\005\005\005\005\005."

(vi)    After 6 years, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was enacted.  The

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Preamble of this Act shows that it is a legislation for the control of rents and  evictions and of rates of hotels and lodging houses, and for the lease of  vacant premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union Territory of  Delhi.  Section 2(i) of that Act defines the premises to mean any building or  part of a building which is intended to be or is let for use as a residence or  for commercial use or for any other purpose. The definition of the term  "standard rent" contained in Section 2(k) refers to the premises irrespective  of its use.  Section 3 which exempts certain premises from the operation of  the Act also does not make any distinction between residential and non- residential premises.  Clause (c) of that section which provides for  exemption in the context of monthly rent speaks of residential as well as  non-residential premises. Section 6 relates to standard rent. It deals with  residential as well as non-residential premises.  Para A of Section 6(1)  specifies the standard rent for residential premises and para B specifies such  rent for premises other than residential premises.  Sub-section (2) of Section  6 which provides for fixation of standard rent refers to premises irrespective  of their user.   The limitation prescribed (Section 12) for filing application  for fixation of standard rent does not make any distinction between the  premises let for residential, commercial and other purposes.  Section 14(1)  which contains prohibition against passing of an order or decree by any  Court or Controller for recovery of possession of any premises does not  make any distinction between the premises let for residential, commercial or  other purposes.  Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (g), (j), (k) and (l) of proviso to  Section 14(1) specify different grounds for recovery of possession of the  premises irrespective of its user.  Only clauses (d) and (e) speak of premises  let for use as residence or residential purposes.   

       Sections 2(i) and 14(1)(d) and (e) of the 1958 Act which have bearing  on the decision of the appeals, read as under:-         2.      In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires \026  (i)     "premises" means any building or part of a building which is,  or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for  commercial use or for any other purpose, and includes, \026  (i)     the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining  to such building or part of the building’

(ii)    any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such  building or part of the building;

but does not include a room in a hotel or lodging house. 14.     Protection of tenant against eviction. \026 (1) Notwithstanding  anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract,  no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any  premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of  the landlord against a tenant:

       Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to  him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of  possession of the premises on one or more of the following  grounds only, namely:-

(a) to (c)      \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005

(d)     that the premises were let for use as a residence and neither the  tenant nor any member of his family has been residing therein  for a period of six months immediately before the date of the  filing of the application from the recovery of possession  thereof;

(e)     that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona  fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or  for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the  owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises  are held and that the landlord or such person has no other  reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

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Explanation.\026  For the purposes of this clause, "premises let for  residential purposes" include any premises which having been  let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the  landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes.

(vii)   The 1958 Act was amended five times between 1960 to 1988, but  demands continued to be made by the landlords and the tenants for its  further amendment to suit their respective causes.  In 1992 National Housing  Policy was notified.  One of the important features of that Policy was to  remove legal impediments to the growth of housing in general and rental  housing in particular.  Both the Houses of Parliament adopted the Policy.   Thereafter, the 1995 Act was enacted.  Though the new Act has not been  enforced so far and in Common Cause vs. Union of India and Others  [2003 (8) SCC 250], this Court declined to issue a writ of mandamus to  Central Government to notify the same, it will be useful to take cognizance  of the statement of objects and reasons and Section 22(r) of the 1995 Act to  which reference was made by the learned counsel during the course of  hearing.  The same reads as under:-         Statement of objects and reasons:         The relations between landlords and tenants in the National  Capital Territory of Delhi are presently governed by the Delhi Rent  Control Act, 1958.  This Act came into force on the 9th February,  1959.  It was amended thereafter in 1960, 1963, 1976, 1984 and 1988.   The amendments made in 1988 were based on the recommendations  of the Economic Administration Reforms Commission and the  National Commission on Urbanisation.  Although they were quite  extensive in nature, it was felt that they did not go far enough in the  matter of removal of disincentives to the growth of rental housing and  left many questions unanswered and problems unaddressed.   Numerous representations for further amendments to the Act were  received from groups of tenants and landlords and others.

2.      The demand for further amendments to the Delhi Rent Control  Act, 1958 received fresh impetus with the tabling of the National  Housing Policy in both Houses of Parliament in 1992.  The Policy has  since been considered and adopted by Parliament.  One of its major  concerns is to remove legal impediments to the growth of housing in  general and rental housing in particular.  Paragraph 4.6.2 of the  National Housing Policy specifically provides for the stimulation of  investment in rental housing especially for the lower and middle  income groups by suitable amendments to rent control laws by State  Governments.  The Supreme Court of India has also suggested  changes in rent control laws.  In its judgment in the case of  Prabhakaran Nair vs. State of Tamil Nadu, the Court observed that the  laws of landlords and tenants must be made rational, humane, certain  and capable of being quickly implemented.  In this context, a Model  Rent Control Legislation was formulated by the Central Government  and sent to the states to enable them to carry out necessary  amendments to the prevailing rent control laws.  Moreover, the  Constitution (Seventy-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1994 was passed to  enable the State Governments to set up State-level rent tribunals for  speedy disposal of rent cases by excluding the jurisdiction of all  courts except the Supreme Court.

3.      In the light of the representations and developments referred to  above, it has been decided to amend the rent control law prevailing in  Delhi.  As the amendments are extensive and substantial in nature,  instead of making changes in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it is  proposed to repeal and replace the said Act by enacting a fresh  legislation.

4.      To achieve the above purposes, the present Bill, inter alia, seeks  to provide for the following, namely:-

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(a)     exemption of certain categories of premises and tenancies  from the purview of the proposed legislation; (b)     creation of tenancy compulsorily to be written  agreement; (c)     compulsory registration of all written agreements of  tenancies except in certain circumstances; (d)     limit the inheritability of tenancies; (e)     redefine the concept of rent payable and provide for its  determination, enhancement and revision; (f)     ensure adequate maintenance and repairs of tenanted  premises and facilitate further improvement and  additions and alterations of such premises; (g)     balance the interests of landlords and tenants in the  matter of eviction in specified circumstances; (h)     provide for limited period tenancy and automatic eviction  of tenants upon expiry of such tenancy; (i)     provide for the fixing and revision of fair rate and  recovery of possession in respect of hotels and lodging  houses; (j)     provide for a simpler and speedier system of disposal of  rent cases through Rent Authorities and Rent Tribunal  and by barring the jurisdiction of all courts except the  Supreme Court; and (k)     enhance the penalties for infringement of the provisions  of the legislation by landlords and tenants.

5.      On enactment, the Bill will minimize distortion in the rental  housing market and encourage the supply of rental housing both from  the existing housing stock and from new housing stock.

6.      The Notes on clauses appended to the Bill explain the various  provisions of the Bill." 22.     Protection of tenant against eviction.\026 (r)     that the premises let for residential or non-residential purposes  are required, whether in the same form or after re-construction  or re-building, by the landlord for occupation for residential or  non-residential purpose for himself or for any member of his  family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose  benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such  person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation.

9.      An analysis of the above noted provisions would show that till 1947  no tangible distinction was made between the premises let for residential and  non-residential purposes. The implicit restriction on the landlord’s right to  recover possession of the non-residential premises was introduced in the  Delhi and Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947 and was continued under  the 1958 Act.  However, the 1995 Act does not make any distinction  between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the  matter of eviction of tenant on the ground that the same are required by the  landlord for his/her bona fide use or occupation. Even though, the 1995 Act  is yet to be enforced  and  in  Common  Cause  vs. Union  of  India  (supra)    this Court  declined  to  issue  a writ of mandamus to the Central  Government, for that purpose, we can take judicial notice of the fact that the  legislature has, after taking note of the developments which have taken place  in the last 37 years i.e. substantial increase in the availability of the  commercial and non-residential premises or the premises which can be let  for commercial or non-residential purposes and meteoric rise in the prices of  land and rentals of residential as well as non-residential premises, removed  the implicit embargo on the landlord’s right to recover possession of the  premises if  the same are bona fide required by him/her. 10.     Section 13(3)(a) of the Punjab Act (unamended and amended), which  came up for consideration in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab  (supra) reads as under:- Unamended Section 13(3)(a) of the Punjab Act.

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 13(3)(a).       A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  directing tenant to put the landlord in possession\026  

       (i)     in the case of a residential or a scheduled building if\026                  (a)     he requires it for his own occupation; (b)     he is not occupying another residential or a scheduled  building, as the case may be, in the urban area concerned;  and  (c)     he has not vacated such a building without sufficient  cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said  urban area;

(ii)    in the case of a non-residential building or rented land,  if\026

(a)     he requires it for his own use; (b)     he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the  purpose of his business any other such building or rented  land, as the case may be and (c)     he has not vacated such a building or rented land without  sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in  the urban area concerned;  

(iii)   in the case of any building, if he requires it for the re- erection of that building, or for its replacement by another  building, or for the erection of other building;

(iv)    in the case of any building, if he requires it for use as an  office or consulting room by his son who intends to start  practice as a lawyer or as a "registered practitioner" within the  meaning of that expression as used in the Punjab Medical  Registration Act, 1916 (II of l916), or for the residence of his  son who is married, if\026

(a)     his son as aforesaid is not occupying in the urban area  concerned any other building for use as office, consulting  room or residence, as the case may be; and  (b)     his son as aforesaid has not vacated such a building  without sufficient cause after the commencement of this  Act, in the urban area concerned:

Provided that where the tenancy is for a specified period agreed  upon between the landlord and the tenant, the landlord shall not  be entitled to apply under this sub-section before the expiry of  such period:

Provided further that where that landlord has obtained  possession of a residential, a scheduled or non-residential  building or rented land under the provisions of sub-paragraph  (i) or sub-paragraph (ii) he shall not be entitled to apply again  under the said sub-paragraphs for the possession of any other  building of the same class or rented land:

Provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession  of any building under the provisions of sub-paragraph (iv) he  shall not be entitled to apply again under the said sub-paragraph  for the possession of any other building for the use of or, as the  case may be, for the residence of the same son.

(b)     The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the  landlord is bona-fide make an order directing the tenant to put the  landlord in possession of the building or rented land on such date as  may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so

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satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application:

Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for  putting the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and  may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the  aggregate.

Amended Section 13(3)(a) of the Punjab Act.

13. Eviction of tenants.\026     (1)    A tenant in possession of a building or  rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a decree  passed before or after the commencement of this Act or otherwise and  whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in  accordance with the provisions of this section, or in pursuance of an  order made under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction  Act, 1949, as subsequently amended.

       (2)             *                       *                       *

       (3)(a)  A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order  directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession\026

       (i)     in the case of a residential building, if\026                 (omitted as not relevant)

       (ii)    in the case of rented land, if\026         (a)     he requires it for his own use; (b)     he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for  the purpose of his business any other such rented  land, and (c)     he has not vacated such rented land without  sufficient cause after the commencement of this  Act, in the urban area concerned.

11.     Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to observe that  there has been a definite shift in the Court’s approach while interpreting the  rent control legislations.  An analysis of the judgments of 1950s’ to early  1990s’ would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in  favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant \026 Mohinder  Kumar and Others vs. State of Haryana and Another [1985 (4) SCC  221], Prabhakaran Nair and Others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others  (supra), D.C. Bhatia and Others vs. Union of India and Another [1995  (1) SCC 104] and C.N. Rudramurthy vs. K. Barkathulla Khan [1998 (8)  SCC 275].  In these and others case, the Court consistently held that the  paramount object of every Rent Control Legislation is to provide safeguards  for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue  advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of  people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the  background of acute scarcity thereof.  However, a different trend is clearly  discernible in the latter judgments.  In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and  Others vs. State of Maharashtra & Another (supra), this Court considered  the question whether determination and fixation of rent under the Bombay  Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses, Rates Control Act, 1947, by freezing or  pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on the date of first letting was  arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  The  three-Judge Bench answered the question in affirmative but declined to  strike down the concerned provisions on the ground that the same were to  lapse on 31.3.1998.  Some of the observations made in that judgment are  worth noticing.  These are: "Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act is concerned,  the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try  to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a  disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society.  When there is shortage of accommodation it is desirable, nay,  necessary that some protection should be given to the tenants in order

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to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time such a law has  to be revised periodically so as to ensure that a disproportionately  larger benefit than the one which was intended is not given to the  tenants. It is not as if the government does not take remedial measures  to try and off set the effects of inflation. In order to provide fair wage  to the salaried employees the government provides for payment of  dearness and other allowances from time to time. Surprisingly this  principle is lost sight of while providing for increase in the standard  rent \026 the increases made even in 1987 are not adequate, fair or just  and the provisions continue to be arbitrary in today’s context." "When enacting socially progressive legislation the need is greater to  approach the problem from a holistic perspective and not to have  narrow or short sighted parochial approach. Giving a greater than due  emphasis to a vocal section of society results not merely in the  miscarriage of justice but in the abdication of responsibility of the  legislative authority. Social Legislation is treated with deference by  the Courts not merely because the Legislature represents the people  but also because in representing them the entire spectrum of views is  expected to be taken into account. The Legislature is not shackled by  the same constraints as the courts of law. But its power is coupled  with a responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the courts to look  at legislation from the altar of Article 14 of the Constitution. This  Article is intended, as is obvious from its words, to check this  tendency; giving undue preference to some over others."

12.     In Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal [2002 (5) SCC 397], the  Court after noticing several judicial precedents on the subject observed as  under: "The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the  tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring  legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of  greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the  courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to  legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only  in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the  extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the  tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts have to adopt a  reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control  legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has  been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the  overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such  of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court  should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such  provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of  those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel  humble.                                                         [Emphasis added]

13.     We shall now deal with the core question whether Section 14(1)(e) of  the 1958 Act can be treated as violative of equality clause embodied in  Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it differentiates between the  premises let for residential and non-residential purposes in the matter of  eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord and restricts  the landlord’s right only to the residential premises.                                    14.     Article 14 declares that the state shall not deny to any person equality  before the law or the equal protection of the laws.  The concept of equality  embodied in Article 14 is also described as doctrine of equality. Broadly  speaking, the doctrine of equality means that there should be no  discrimination between one person and another, if having regard to the  subject matter of legislation, their position is the same.  The plain language  of Article 14 may suggest that all are equal before the law and the State  cannot discriminate between similarly situated persons. However,  application of the doctrine of equality embodied in that Article has not been  that simple.  The debate which started in 1950s on the true scope of equality

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clause is still continuing. In last 58 years, the courts have been repeatedly  called upon to adjudicate on the constitutionality of various legislative  instruments including those meant for giving effect to the Directive  Principals of State Policy on the ground that same violate the equality  clause.  It has been the constant refrain of the courts that Article 14 does not  prohibit the legislature from classifying apparently similarly situated  persons, things or goods into different groups provided that there is rational  basis for doing so.  The theory of reasonable classification has been invoked  in large number of cases for repelling challenge to the constitutionality of  different legislations.   

15.     In Ram Krishna Dalmia and Ors. vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar  and Ors., [AIR 1958 SC 538], this Court considered the inter-play of the  doctrines of equality and classification and held:- "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class  legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes  of legislation.   In order, however, to pass the test of permissible  classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the  classification must be found on an intelligible differentia which  distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others  left out of the group, and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational  relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.   The classification may be founded on different bases, namely,  geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like.  What  is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of  classification and the object of the Act under consideration.  It is also  well established by the decisions of Supreme Court that article 14  condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a  law of procedure."   

       Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice S.R. Das enunciated some  principles, which have been referred to and relied in all subsequent  judgments.  These are: "(a)    that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a  single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or  reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single  individual may be treated as a class by himself;

(b)     that there is always a presumption in favour of the  constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who  attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the  constitutional principles ;

(c)     that it must be presume that the legislature understands and  correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are  directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its  discriminations are based on adequate grounds;  

(d)     that the legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm and may  confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be  the clearest;  

(e)     that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the  Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge,  matters of common report, the history of times and may assume every  state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of  legislation; and

(f)     that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions  on the part of a legislature are to be resumed, if there is nothing on the  face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice  of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as  based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the  extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and  unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to

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hostile or discriminating legislation."

16.     In Mohd. Shujat Ali vs. Union of India [1975 (3) SCC 76], the  Court observed that Article 14 ensures to every person equality before law  and equal protection of the laws.  However, the constitutional code of  equality and equal opportunity does not mean that the same laws must be  applicable to all persons. It does not compel the State to run "all its laws in  the channels of general legislation". It recognises that having regard to  differences and disparities which exist among men and things, they cannot  all be treated alike by the application of the same laws. "To recognise  marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical  differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." The  Legislature must necessarily, if it is to be effective at all in solving the  manifold problems which continually come before it, enact special  legislation directed towards specific ends limited in its application to special  classes of persons or things. "Indeed, the greater part of all legislation is  special, either in the extent to which it operates, or the objects sought to be  attained by it."  At the same time, the Court cautioned against the readymade  invoking of the doctrine of classification to ward off every challenge to the  legislative instruments on the ground of violation of equality clause and  observed:  "The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection of  equal laws". But laws may classify. And, as pointed out by Justice  Brawer, "the very idea of classification is that of inequality". The  Court has tackled this paradox over the years and in doing so, it has  neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative  right to classify. It has adopted a middle course of realistic  reconciliation. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative  specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable  classification. This doctrine recognises that the legislature may  classify for the purpose of legislation but requires that the  classification must be reasonable. It should ensure that persons or  things similarly situated are all similarly treated. The measure of  reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in  treating similarly those similarly situated." "A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or  things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. There  should be no discrimination between one person or thing and another,  if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is  substantially the same. This is sometimes epigrammatically described  by saying that what the constitutional code of equality and equal  opportunity requires is that among equals, the law should be equal and  that like should be treated alike. But the basic principle underlying the  doctrine is that the Legislature should have the right to classify and  impose special burdens upon or grant special benefits to persons or  things grouped together under the classification, so long as the  classification is of persons or things similarly situated with respect to  the purpose of the legislation, so that all persons or things similarly  situated are treated alike by law. The test which has been evolved for  this purpose is \027 and this test has been consistently applied by this  Court in all decided cases since the commencement of the  Constitution \027 that the classification must be founded on an  intelligible differentia which distinguishes certain persons or things  that are grouped together from others and that differentia must have a  rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the  legislation." "We have to be constantly on our guard to see that this test which has  been evolved as a matter of practical necessity with a view to  reconciling the demand for equality with the need for special  legislation directed towards specific ends necessitated by the complex  and varied problems which require solution at the hands of the  Legislature, does not degenerate into rigid formula to be blindly and  mechanically applied whenever the validity of any legislation is called  in question. The fundamental guarantee is of equal protection of the

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laws and the doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule  evolved by courts to give a practical content to that guarantee by  accommodating it with the practical needs of the society and it should  not be allowed to submerge and drown the precious guarantee of  equality. The doctrine of classification should not be carried to a point  where instead of being a useful servant, it becomes a dangerous  master, for otherwise, as pointed out by Chandrachud, J., in State of  Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa the guarantee of equality  will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to  govern well-marked classes characterised by different and distinct  attainments". Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an  anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification  may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the guarantee of equality of  its spacious content. That process would inevitably end in substituting  the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality: the  fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of  the laws may be replaced by the overworked methodology of  classification. Our approach to the equal protection clause must,  therefore, be guided by the words of caution uttered by Krishna Iyer,  J. in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa: (at SCC p.  42) "Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to  our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward  classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have  constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo  equality."                                                                 [Emphasis added]

17.     In L.I.C. of India and Another vs. Consumer Education &  Research Centre and Others [1995 (5) SCC 482], the Court reiterated the  above noted principal in the following words:- "The doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule evolved by the  courts to give practical content to the doctrine of equality,  overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or anxious or sustained  attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and  imperceptibly erode the profound potency of the glorious content of  equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.  The  overemphasis on classification would inevitably result in substitution  of the doctrine of classification to the doctrine of equality and the  Preamble of the Constitution which is an integral part and scheme of  the Constitution.  Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978 (1) SCC  248] ratio extricated it from this moribund and put its elasticity for  egalitarian path finder lest the classification would deny equality to  the larger segments of the society.  The classification based on  employment in Government, semi-Government and reputed  commercial firms has the insidious and inevitable effect of excluding  lives in vast rural and urban areas engaged in unorganized or self- employed sectors to have life insurance offending Article 14 of the  Constitution and socio-economic justice."

18.     In Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. [1985 (2) SCC 683]  the Supreme Court considered the question whether the statutory tenancy in  respect of commercial premises is heritable.  The facts of that case were that  one  Wasti Ram was tenant in respect of Shop No. 20, New Market, West  Patel Nagar of the respondents at a monthly rental of Rs.110/-.  The tenancy  commenced from September 1, 1959.  In April, 1970, the respondent  landlord determined the tenancy by serving a notice to quit.  In September,  1970 he filed a petition under Section 14 of the Act for eviction of Wasti  Ram on the grounds of non-payment of rent, bona fide requirement, change  of user from residential to commercial, substantial damage to the property  and sub-letting.  He also impleaded one Ashok Kumar Sethi, as defendant  No. 2 by alleging that he had been unlawfully inducting a sub-tenant.  The  Rent Controller negatived all the grounds of challenge except the non- payment of rent.  He held that the premises had been let out for commercial

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purpose and as such the ground of bona fide requirement was not available  to the landlord for seeking eviction of the tenant.  On the issue of non- payment of rent, the Rent Controller held that the tenant was liable to pay a  sum of Rs.24/-  by way of arrears for the period from March 1, 1969 to  February 28, 1970 after taking into consideration all payments made and a  further sum of Rs.90/- on account of such arrears for the month of  September, 1970.  He, accordingly, directed eviction of the tenant.  The  landlord challenged the order of the Rent Controller by filing an appeal.  The  tenant, namely Wasti Ram, filed cross objection on the findings recorded by  the Rent Controller on the issue of default.  The Rent Control Tribunal  allowed the cross objection of the tenant and held that there was no default  in the matter of payment of rent.  The Tribunal rejected the landlord’s plea  regarding damage to the property but remanded the matter to the Rent  Controller for deciding the question of sub-letting afresh after affording  opportunity to the parties to lead evidence.  Smt. Gian Devi Anand, the  widow of the deceased tenant appealed against the order of the Tribunal. The  landlord filed cross objections to question the finding recorded by the  Tribunal on the issue of default by the tenant in payment of rent.  The High  Court held that after the demise of the statutory tenant, his heirs do not have  the right to remain in possession because the statutory tenancy was not  heritable and the protection afforded to the statutory tenant was not available  to the heirs.  This Court reversed the order of the High Court and held: "We find it difficult to appreciate how in this country we can proceed  on the basis that a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been  determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute, has no  right of property but only a personal right to remain in occupation,  without ascertaining what his rights are under the statute.  The concept  of a statutory tenant having no estate or property in the premises,  which he occupies is derived from the provisions of the English Rent  Acts.  But it is not clear how it can be assumed that the position is the  same in this country without any reference to the provisions of the  relevant statute.  Tenancy has its origin in contract.  There is no  dispute that a contractual tenant has an estate or property in the  subject matter of tenancy, and heritability is an incident of the  tenancy.  It cannot be assumed, however, that with the determination  of the tenancy the estate must necessarily disappear and the statute  can only preserve his status of irremovability and not the estate he had  in the premises in his occupation.  It is not possible to claim that the  "sanctity" of contract cannot be touched by legislation.  It is therefore  necessary to examine the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act, 1961 to find out whether the  respondent’s predecessors-in-interest retained a heritable interest in  the disputed premises even after the termination of their tenancy."

       In paragraph 34 of the judgment, the Court highlighted difference  between the residential and commercial tenancies and concluded that the  legislature could never have intended that the landlord would be entitled to  recover possession of the premises or the building let for commercial  purposes on the death of the tenant of the commercial tenancies, even if no  ground for eviction as prescribed in the rent Act is made out.  In the  concluding part of the judgment, the Court took cognizance of the absence  of provision for eviction of the tenant of non-residential premises even when  the same are bona fide required by the landlord for his use or occupation and  observed: "Before concluding, there is one aspect on which we consider it  desirable to make certain observations. The owner of any premises,  whether residential or commercial, let out to any tenant, is permitted  by the Rent Control Acts to seek eviction of the tenant only on the  grounds specified in the Act, entitling the landlord to evict the tenant  from the premises. The restrictions on the power of the landlords in  the matter of recovery of possession of the premises let out by him to  a tenant have been imposed for the benefit of the tenants. In spite of  various restrictions put on the landlord’s right to recover possession of  the premises from a tenant, the right of the landlord to recover  possession of the premises from the tenant for the bona fide need of

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the premises by the landlord is recognised by the Act, in case of  residential premises. A landlord may let out the premises under  various circumstances. Usually a landlord lets out the premises when  he does not need it for own use. Circumstances may change and a  situation may arise when the landlord may require the premises let out  by him for his own use. It is just and proper that when the landlord  requires the premises bona fide for his own use and occupation, the  landlord should be entitled to recover the possession of the premises  which continues to be his property in spite of his letting out the same  to a tenant. The Legislature in its wisdom did recognise this fact and  the Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement of the  landlord for his own use will be a legitimate ground under the Act for  the eviction of his tenant from any residential premises. This ground  is, however, confined to residential premises and is not made available  in case of commercial premises. A landlord who lets out commercial  premises to a tenant under certain circumstances may need bona fide  the premises for his own use under changed conditions on some future  date should not in fairness be deprived of his right to recover the  commercial premises. Bona fide need of the landlord will stand very  much on the same footing in regard to either class of premises,  residential or commercial. We, therefore, suggest that Legislature may  consider the advisability of making the bona fide requirement of the  landlord a ground of eviction in respect of commercial premises as  well."                                                 [Emphasis added]

19.     What is significant to be noted is that in para 34 of the aforementioned  judgment, the distinction between residential and non-residential tenancies  was made in the context of the rights of the heirs of the tenant to continue to  enjoy the protection envisaged under Section 14(1).  The Court was of the  view that the heirs of the tenants of the commercial premises cannot be  deprived of the protection else the family of the tenant may be brought on  road or deprived of the only source of livelihood.  The Court also opinioned  that if the heirs of the individual tenants of commercial tenancies are  deprived of the protection, extremely anomalous consequences will ensue  because the companies, corporations and juridical entities carrying on  business or commercial activities in rented premises will continue to enjoy  the protection even after the change of management, but the heirs of  individual tenants will be denuded of similar protection.   At the same time,  the Court noted that the landlord of a premises let for residential purpose  may bona fide require the same for his own use or the use of his dependent  family members and observed that the legislature should remove apparent  discrimination between residential and non-residential tenancies when the  landlord bona fide requires the same.  If the observations contained in para  34 are read in any other manner, the same would become totally  incompatible with the observation contained in the penultimate paragraph of  the judgment and we do not see any reason for adopting such course., more  so, because the later part of the judgment has been relied in Harbilas Rai  Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra) and Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal  Singh Sethi (supra).

20.     In Rattan Arya vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), the Court  considered challenge to the constitutionality of Section 30(ii) of the Tamil  Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 under which residential  buildings or part thereof occupied by any tenant paying monthly rent of  more than Rs.400/- were exempted from operation of the Act.  It was urged  on behalf of the appellant that distinction made between the residential and  non-residential buildings in the matter of applicability of the Act was  unreasonable, irrational and arbitrary.  The Court referred to different rent  control legislations applicable to the State of Tamil Nadu and observed that  the scheme of the Act does not make any distinction between residential and  non-residential buildings insofar as the rights of the tenant’s and obligations  of the landlord’s are concerned and there are no special rights attached to the  tenancies of the non-residential buildings as against the tenancies of

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residential buildings so as to warrant exemption only to residential buildings.   The Court also took cognizance of enormous increase of rents throughout  the country, referred to the judgment in Motor General Traders vs. State  of Andhra Pradesh [1984 (1) SCC 222] and struck down Section 30(ii) of  the Tamil Nadu Act on the ground that the same is violative of Article 14 of  the Constitution. 21.     In Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (supra), the  Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the amendment made in the   Punjab Act, whereby the landlord was deprived of his right to seek eviction  of tenant from non-residential building on the ground of bonafide  requirement for his own use.  This Court referred to the unamended and  amended Section 13(1)(a) of the Punjab Act and observed: "The Scheme of the Act, unmistakably aims at regulating the  conditions of tenancy, controlling the rents and preventing  unreasonable and mala fide eviction of tenants of the residential and  non-residential buildings. For the advancement of these objects,  tenants are invested with certain rights and landlords are subjected to  certain obligations. These rights and obligations are attached to the  tenants and the landlords of all buildings, residential or non- residential. None of the main provisions of the Act, to which we have  referred, make any serious distinction between residential and non- residential buildings."  

The provisions of the Act, prior to the amendment, were uniformly  applicable to the residential and non-residential buildings. The  amendment, in the year 1956, created the impugned classification.  The objects and reasons of the Act indicate that it was enacted with a  view to restrict the increase of rents and to safeguard against the mala  fide eviction of tenants. The Act, therefore, initially provided \027  conforming to its objects and reasons \027 bona fide requirement of the  premises by the landlord, whether residential or non-residential, as a  ground of eviction of the tenant. The classification created by the  amendment has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the  Act. To vacate a premises for the bona fide requirement of the  landlord would not cause any hardships to the tenant. Statutory  protection to a tenant cannot be extended to such an extent that the  landlord is precluded from evicting the tenant for the rest of his life  even when he bona fide requires the premises for his personal use and  occupation. It is not the tenants but the landlords who are suffering  great hardships because of the amendment. A landlord may genuinely  like to let out a shop till the time he bona fide needs the same.  Visualise a case of a shopkeeper (owner) dying young. There may not  be a member in the family to continue the business and the widow  may not need the shop for quite some time. She may like to let out the  shop till the time her children grow up and need the premises for their  personal use. It would be wholly arbitrary \027 in a situation like this \027  to deny her the right to evict the tenant. The amendment has created a  situation where a tenant can continue in possession of a non- residential premises for life and even after the tenant’s death his heirs  may continue the tenancy. We have no doubt in our mind that the  objects, reasons and the scheme of the Act could not have envisaged  the type of situation created by the amendment which is patently harsh  and grossly unjust for the landlord of a non-residential premises."

22.     For taking the aforesaid view, the Court drew support from the  observations contained in the concluding portion of the judgment in Gian  Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. (supra).  This is evident from  paragraph 17 of the judgment, which is extracted below:-  "In Gian Devi case the question for consideration before the  Constitution Bench was whether under the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958, the statutory tenancy in respect of commercial premises was  heritable or not. The Bench answered the question in the affirmative.  The above-quoted observations were made by the Bench keeping in  view that hardship being caused to the landlords of commercial  premises who cannot evict their tenants even on the ground of bona

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fide requirement for personal use. The observations of the  Constitution Bench that "bona fide need of the landlord will stand  very much on the same footing in regard to either class of premises,  residential or commercial" fully support the view we have taken that  the classification created by the amendment has no reasonable nexus  with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. We, therefore, hold  that the provisions of the amendment, quoted in earlier part of the  judgment, are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and  are liable to be struck down."

23.     The ratio of Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra) was  noted and approved in Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Ravinder Pal Singh Sethi  (supra), in the backdrop of the argument that the amendment made to the  Punjab Act 1956 was not applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh.    While rejecting the argument, the three Judge Bench referred to Article  13(2) of the Constitution, some of the judgments in which that Article was  considered and observed: "We find sufficient force in the contention raised by the learned  counsel for the respondent landlord. In Harbilas Rai Bansal this Court  held in very clear terms that the classification created by the  Amendment Act, 1956, by which the words "a non-residential  building or" occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) were deleted and certain  other amendments had been made, had no reasonable nexus with the  object sought to be achieved by the Act and consequently the  provisions of the Amendment Act were violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution."

24.     The judgment in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra)  was recently noticed in Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain  [(2006) 2 SCC 724].  The respondent in that case applied for eviction of the  tenant (appellant) from the shop in question on the ground of bona fide  personal requirement i.e. for the purpose of running wholesale business in  Ayurvedic medicines. The Rent Controller dismissed the application on the  ground that bona fide requirement of the landlord has not been proved.  The  Appellate Authority reversed the order of the Rent Controller and returned a  finding that the landlord has been able to prove his bona fide requirement.    In the revision filed by the appellant, reliance was placed on the judgment of  the Full Bench of Delhi High Court in Satyawati Sharma Vs. Union of  India & Ors. (that judgment is under challenge in these appeals) and it was  urged that an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona  fide requirement of the landlord is not maintainable in respect of non- residential premises. The learned Single Judge of Punjab & Haryana High  Court referred to an earlier judgment of the Division Bench of that Court in  State of Haryana vs. Ved Prakash Gupta [(1999) 1 Rent Law Reporter  689], wherein the restriction imposed on the landlord’s right to evict the  tenant under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973,  was struck down and held that the judgment of the Full Bench of Delhi High  Court cannot be relied for granting relief to the appellant. This Court noted  that a similar provision had been declared unconstitutional in Harbilas Rai  Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra), which was approved by three Judge  Bench in Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Ravinder Pal Singh Sethi (supra) and held  that the tenant cannot question the landlord’s right to seek eviction of the  tenant from non-residential premises.    

25.     We may now advert to the judgment of Delhi High Court in H.C.  Sharma vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (supra) and the  one under challenge.   The facts of H.C. Sharma’s case were that the  petitioner had leased out Flat No.28-E, Connaught Place, New Delhi to  National Insurance Company Limited for non-residential use.  Subsequently,  the National Insurance Company Limited became Life Insurance  Corporation of India.  The petitioner made efforts to convince the  Corporation that the premises are required for his bona fide use and  occupation but could not convince the concerned authorities.  He, therefore,  filed an application for recovery of possession.   The same was dismissed by  the High Court.  He then filed Writ Petition questioning the constitutionality

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of Section 14(1)(e) on the ground that the classification of the premises into  residential and non-residential is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution.  The Division Bench of Delhi High Court traced the history of  rent control legislation applicable to Delhi, the background in which  protection was extended to the tenants generally and the limited right given  to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenants only from the premises let for  residential purposes and observed: "In judging whether the restriction imposed by the impugned  provisions is reasonable, the court can look into the circumstances  under which the restriction came to be imposed.  Judicial notice can  be taken of the fact that in 1947 there was a large influx of refugees  into Delhi.  A large number of people who were uprooted from their  hearths and homes in West Pakistan settled in Delhi.  This resulted in  acute shortage of house accommodation and business premises with  the result that rents soared to a high level which necessitated the  regulation of relations between landlords and tenants\005\005..."

The object in not providing for the eviction of a tenant from a non- residential premises on the ground specified in sub-clause (e) was to  give security of tenure to a tenant of such premises.  If a tenant of a  non-residential premises was allowed to be evicted on the ground of  personal requirement by the landlord, it would have had the effect of  completely dislocating the business of the tenant and this in turn could  have grave consequences on the social and economic fabric of the  country, besides causing untold misery to the tenant."                                                 [Emphasis added]                 

       The Division Bench rejected the plea of discrimination and observed:- "The grievance of the petitioner is that the discrimination between the  two classes of landlords is without any rational basis.  World War II  broke out in 1939 and an acute shortage of housing accommodation  developed.  To control the rents and eviction of tenants, the Rent  Control Order of 1939 was issued.  A study of the relevant provisions  of the rent control legislation discussed in the earlier part of the  judgment would show that the restrictions imposed on the landlords to  recover possession of residential premises were very stringent upto  1952. Under the Rent Control Order of 1939 and the Delhi Rent  Control Ordinance, 1944 a landlord could recover possession of  residential premises only when he had not resided within the limits of  Delhi or New Delhi during the twelve months immediately preceding  the date of the application and further satisfied the conditions that it  was essential in the public interest that he should take up residence in  that area and that he was unable to secure other suitable  accommodation.  Under the Rent Control Act of 1947, a landlord  could recover possession of residential premises only if he did not  possess other suitable accommodation and further, that he had  acquired his interest in the premises at a date prior to the beginning of  the tenancy or the 2nd day of June, 1944, whichever was later.  The  rigour of the restrictions qua residential premises was relaxed in the  Act of 1952 and a landlord could recover possession of residential  premises if he required it bonafide for occupation as a residence for  himself or his family and he had no other suitable accommodation.    In comparison to this the Rent Control Order, 1939 was not applied to  non-residential premises.  The Delhi Rent Control Ordinance did not  place any bar on the right of the landlord to recover possession of  non-residential premises.  The only restriction placed was that the  landlord could recover possession of the premises for his residential  use.  The bar against the eviction of tenants from non-residential  premises was introduced in the Rent Control Act, 1947 and it has  continued since then.  A landlord cannot recover possession of non- residential premises on the ground of his personal need.  There is a  clear object behind classification of the premises into "residential"  and "non-residential".  We have earlier observed that in 1947, on  partition of the country, there was a large influx of refugees into  Delhi.  The Government was faced with the problem of resettling the

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refugees.  This necessitated the imposition of restrictions on the right  to evict tenants from residential and non-residential premises.  The  legislature keeping in view the needs of the people and other  circumstances allowed the landlord to evict tenants from residential  premises for his personal use in case he did not have any other  suitable accommodation, but restricted the right of the landlord to  recover possession of non-residential premises on the ground of  personal need.  The necessity behind this discrimination is to assure  the security of tenure to the tenants of non-residential premises so that  they can settle in their business without the fear of being ejected.   

       Owners of residential buildings and non-residential buildings  each stand out as a class by themselves.  The impugned provisions  make no distinction inter se between the two classes of properties or  their landlords.  The impugned provisions take within their fold all the  persons similarly situate.  So long as there is equality under similar  conditions and among persons similarly situated, there is no  infringement of Article 14."                                                           [Emphasis added]

26.     A critical analysis of the above noted judgment makes it clear that the  main reason which weighed with the High Court for approving the  classification of premises into residential and non-residential was that by  imposing restriction on the eviction of tenants of premises let for non- residential purposes, the government wanted to solve the acute problem of  housing created due to partition of the country in 1947.  The Court took  cognizance of the fact that as an aftermath of partition many hundred- thousands of people had been uprooted from the area which now forms part  of Pakistan; that they were forced to leave their homes and abandon their  business establishments, industries, occupation and trade and the  Government was very much anxious to ensure resettlement of such persons.  It was felt that if the landlords are readily allowed to evict the tenants, those  who came from West Pakistan will never be able to settle in their life.   Therefore, in the 1947 and 1958 Acts, the legislature did not provide for  eviction of tenants from the premises let for non-residential purposes on the  ground that the same are required by the landlord’s for their bona fide use  and occupation.    

27.     Insofar as the judgment under challenge is concerned, we find that the  Full Bench upheld the validity of Section 14(1)(e) mainly by relying upon  the judgment of the Division Bench in H.C. Sharma Vs. Life Insurance  Corporation of India & Anr. (supra) and of this Court in Amarjit Singh  vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra) and by observing that legislature has  the right to classify persons, things, and goods into different groups and that  the Court will not sit over the judgment of the legislature.  It is significant to  note that the Full Bench did not, at all, advert to the question whether the  reason/cause which supplied rational to the classification continued to  subsist even after lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises let  for non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefit of implicit  exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide requirement of the landlord  despite sea saw change in the housing scenario in Delhi and substantial  increase in the availability of buildings and premises which could be let for  non-residential or commercial purposes.   

28.     In our opinion, the reasons which weighed with the High Court in  H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. (supra) and  the impugned judgment cannot in the changed scenario and in the light of  the ratio of Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra), which was  approved by three-Judge Bench in Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh  Sethi (supra) and of  Rattan Arya vs. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), as also  the observations contained in the concluding portion of the judgment in  Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & Ors. (supra).  now be made basis  for justifying the classification of premises into residential and non- residential in the context of landlord’s right to recover possession thereof for  his bona fide requirement.   At the cost of repetition, we deem it proper to

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mention that in the rent control legislations made applicable to Delhi from  time to time residential and non-residential premises were treated at par for  all purposes. The scheme of the 1958 Act also does not make any substantial  distinction between residential and non-residential premises.  Even in the  grounds of eviction set out in proviso to Section 14(1), no such distinction  has been made except in Clauses (d) and (e).  In H.C. Sharma vs. Life  Insurance Corporation of India (supra), the Division Bench of the High  Court, after taking cognizance of the acute problem of housing created due  to partition of the country, upheld the classification by observing that the  Government could legitimately restrict the right of the landlord to recover  possession of only those premises which were let for residential purposes.   The Court felt that if such restriction was not imposed, those up-rooted from  Pakistan may not get settled in their life.  As of now a period of almost 50  years has elapsed from the enactment of the 1958 Act.  During this long span  of time much water has flown down the Ganges.  Those who came from  West Pakistan as refugees and even their next generations have settled down  in different parts of the country, more particularly in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi  and surrounding areas.   They are occupying prime positions in political and  bureaucratic set up of the Government and have earned huge wealth in  different trades, occupation, business and similar ventures.  Not only this,  the availability of buildings and premises which can be let for non- residential or commercial purposes has substantially increased.  Therefore,  the  reason/cause which prompted the Division Bench of the High Court to  sustain the differentiation/classification of the  premises with reference to  the purpose of their user, is no longer available for negating the challenge to  Section 14(1)(e) on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution,   and we cannot uphold such arbitrary classification ignoring the ratio of  Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab (supra), which was reiterated in  Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal (supra) and approved by three- Judges Bench in Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi (supra).  In  our considered view, the discrimination which was latent in Section 14(1)(e)  at the time of enactment of 1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost  50 years) has become so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot be  treated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational  criteria.     29.     It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and  rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due  to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of  the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have  been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation,  strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has  become non-existent. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhopal Sugar  Industries [AIR 1964 SC 1179], this Court while dealing with a question  whether geographical classification due to historical reasons could be  sustained for all times and observed: "Differential treatment arising out of the application of the laws so  continued in different regions of the same reorganised, State, did not  therefore immediately attract the clause of the Constitution prohibiting  discrimination. But by the passage of time, considerations of necessity  and expediency would be obliterated, and the grounds which justified  classification of geographical regions for historical reason may cease  to be valid. A purely temporary provision which because of  compelling forces justified differential treatment when the  Reorganisation Act was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to  assume permanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without a  rational basis to support it after the initial expediency and necessity  have disappeared.  

30.     In Narottam Kishore Dev Verma vs. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC  1590] the challenge was to the validity of Section 87-B of the Code of Civil  Procedure which granted exemption to the rulers of former Indian States  from being sued except with the consent of the Central Government.  In the  course of judgment, it was observed as under: "If under the Constitution all citizens are equal, it may be desirable to  confine the operation of Section 87-B to past transactions and nor to

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perpetuate the anomaly of the distinction between the rest of the  citizens and Rulers of former Indian States. With the passage of time,  the validity of historical considerations on which Section 87-B is  founded will wear out and the continuance of the said section in the  Code of Civil Procedure may later be open to serious challenge."  31.     In H.H. Shri Swamiji Shri Admar Mutt Etc, vs. The  Commissioner, Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Department  [1979 (4) SCC 642] this Court was called upon to consider the validity of  the continued application of the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious  Endowment Act, 1951 in the area which had formerly been part of State of  Madras and which had latter become part of the new State of Mysore (now  Karnataka) as a result of the State Re-organisation Act, 1956. While  declining to strike down the legislation on the ground of violation of Article  14 of the Constitution, the Court observed: "An indefinite extension and application of unequal laws for all time  to come will militate against their true character as temporary  measures taken in order to serve a temporary purpose. Thereby, the  very foundation of their constitutionality shall have been destroyed  the foundation being that Section 119 of the State Reorganisation Act  serves the significant purpose of giving reasonable time to the new  units to consider the special circumstances obtaining in respect of  diverse units. The decision to withdraw the application of unequal  laws to equals cannot be delayed unreasonably because of the  relevance of historical reasons which justify the application of  unequal laws is bound to wear out with the passage of time. In  Broom’s Legal; Maxim (1939 Edition, page 97) can be found a useful  principle "Cessante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex", that is to say,  "Reason is the sour of the law, and when the reason of any particular  law ceases, so does the law itself."  

32.     In Motor General Traders vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra),  validity of Section 32(b) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)  Control, Act, 1960 was considered.  By that Section it was declared that the  provisions of the main Act will not apply to the buildings constructed after  25th August, 1957.  The Court noted that exemption had continued for nearly  a quarter century and struck down the same despite the fact that validity  thereon had been upheld by the High Court in Chintapalli Achaiah vs. P.  Gopala Krishna Reddy [ AIR 1966 AP 51].  Some of the observations  made in the judgment are worth noticing.  These are:  "What may be unobjectionable as a transitional or temporary measure  at an initial stage can still become discriminatory and hence violative  of Article 14 of the Constitution if it is persisted in over a long period  without any justification."  "What was justifiable during a short period has turned out to be a case  of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of century....We  are constrained to pronounce upon the validity of the impugned  provision at this late stage because of grab of Constitution which it  may have possessed earlier has become worn out and its  unconstitutionality is now brought to a successful challenge". "As already observed, the landlords of the buildings constructed  subsequent to August 26, 1957 are given undue preference over the  landlords of buildings constructed prior to that date in that the former  are free from the shackles of the Act while the latter are subjected to  the restrictions imposed by it. What should have been just an incentive  has become a permanent bonanza in favour of those who constructed  buildings subsequent to August 26, 1957. There being no justification  for the continuance of the benefit to a class of persons without any  rational basis whatsoever, the evil effects flowing from the impugned  exemption have caused more harm to the society than one could  anticipate. What was justifiable during a short period has turned out to  be a case of hostile discrimination by lapse of nearly a quarter of  century. The second answer to the above contention is that mere lapse  of time does not lend constitutionality to a provision which is  otherwise bad. "Time does not run in favour of legislation. If it is ultra  vires, it cannot gain legal strength from long failure on the part of

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lawyers to perceive and set up its invalidity. Albeit, lateness in an  attack upon the constitutionality of a statute is but a reason for  exercising special caution in examining the arguments by which the  attack is supported."

33.     In Rattan Arya and Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (supra)  the Court relied on the ratio of Motor General Traders vs. State of  Andhra Pradesh (supra) and struck down Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu  Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1960 by observing that there was  no rational basis in picking out the class of tenants of residential buildings  paying a rent of more than Rs.400/- per month and to deny similar right to  tenants of other buildings and residential or non-residential premises.   34.     In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others vs. State of  Maharashtra & Another (supra), the Court found that the criteria for  determination and fixation of rent by freezing or by pegging down of rent as  on 1.9.1940 or as on first date of letting, had, with the passage of time  become irrational and arbitrary but did not strike down the same on the  ground that extended period of Bombay Rent Act was coming to an end on  31.3.1998.  35.     Before parting with this aspect of the case, we may refer to the  judgment of Amarjit Singh vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin (supra), on which  reliance has been placed by the Full Bench of the High Court for negating  the appellant’s challenge to Section 14(1)(e).  In that case, the respondent  sought eviction of the tenant from the first floor of the premises situated at  Maharani Bagh, New Delhi on the ground of personal and bona fide  necessity.  The suit filed by the landlady was decreed by the learned Single  Judge of the Delhi High Court and a direction was issued for eviction of the  tenant (appellant).  This Court referred to the earlier judgments in  Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor & General Traders [1975 (1) SCC  770], Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103] and held that  in view of the availability of alternative accommodation to the landlady, the  High Court was not justified in ordering eviction of the tenant. 36.     A careful reading of the aforementioned judgment shows that the plea  of unconstitutionality of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act was neither raised  nor debated with any seriousness and the observation made by the Court in  that regard cannot be treated as the true ratio of the judgment, which as  mentioned above, mainly rested on the interpretation of the expression  "reasonably suitable residential accommodation".   The bedrock of the  respondent’s claim was that she had a right to comfortable living and  availability of alternative accommodation, by itself not sufficient for  declining eviction of the tenant.   While rejecting this argument, the Court  observed: "17.  \005\005The logic of the argument of Shri Kacker is attractive, but  the legality of the said submission is unsustainable. Rent restriction  laws are both beneficial and restrictive, beneficial for those who want  protection from eviction and rack renting but restrictive so far as the  landlord’s right or claim for eviction is concerned. Rent restriction  laws would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be,  but not to seek comforts other than habitat \027 that right the landlord  must seek elsewhere."

37.     Another contention raised on behalf of the landlady was that Section  14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act should be read in a manner which will make it in  conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.  This is evinced from  para 18 of the judgment which is extracted below:- "18. Our attention was drawn to the decision in the case of  Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.[1982 (1) SCC 39]  and our attention was drawn to the observations at p. 66 and 67 of the  said case in aid of the submission that right to property is still a  constitutional right and therefore in exercise of that right if a landlord  or an owner of a house lets out a premises in question there was  nothing wrong. Shri Kacker submitted that the second limb of Section  14(1)(e) of the Act should be read in such a way that it was in  consonance with Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution.  Otherwise it would be void as being unconstitutional. As a general

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proposition of law this is acceptable."

The Court rejected the argument and observed: "The Act in question has the authority of law. There is no denial of  equality nor any arbitrariness in the second limb of Section 14(1)(e) of  the Act, read in the manner contended for by the appellant. Article 21  is not violated so far as the landlord is concerned. The rent restricting  Acts are beneficial legislations for the protection of the weaker party  in the bargains of letting very often. These must be so read that these  balance harmoniously the rights of the landlords and the obligations of  the tenants. The Rent Restriction Acts deal with the problem of rack  renting and shortage of accommodation. It is in consonance with the  recognition of the right of both the landlord and the tenant that a  harmony is sought to be struck whereby the bona fide requirements of  the landlords and the tenants in the expanding explosion of need and  population and shortage of accommodation are sought to be  harmonised and the conditions imposed to evict a tenant are that the  landlord must have bona fide need. That is satisfied in this case. That  position is not disputed. The second condition is that landlord should  not have in his or her possession any other reasonably suitable  accommodation. This does not violate either Article 14 or Article 21  of the Constitution."

38.     In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the  1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of  the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let  for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona  fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his  family dependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek eviction of the  tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.   

39.     However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as  total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither  the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section  14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will  be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so  that the remaining part thereof may read as under :- "that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord for himself  or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner  thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and  that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable  accommodation."    

       While adopting this course, we have kept in view well recognized   rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing  violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible \026  R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 628) and  Bhawani Singh vs. State of Rajasthan [1996 (3) SCC 105].         As a sequel to the above, the explanation appearing below Section  14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant.

40.     In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set  aside and Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is partly struck down.  Section  14(1)(e) shall now read as indicated in para 39 above.   Consequently, the  writ petitions filed by the appellants shall stand allowed and the orders  impugned therein shall stand quashed.  The parties are left to bear their own  costs.