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PETITIONER: SATYAVIR SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ETC. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/09/1985

BENCH: MADON, D.P. BENCH: MADON, D.P. TULZAPURKAR, V.D. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1986 AIR  555            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 791  1985 SCC  (4) 252        1985 SCALE  (2)488  CITATOR INFO :  R          1986 SC 617  (3,7)  R          1986 SC1173  (22)  RF         1991 SC 385  (4)

ACT:      Service jurisprudence  - Dismissal  from service  under clause (b)  of the  second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of  India read with Rule 19 (ii) of the Central Civil Services  (Classification Control  and  Appeal)  Rules 1965 without  serving any  charge-sheet and  without holding any inquiry - Constitutional validity of.

HEADNOTE:      It is  incumbant upon  the competent  authority, before exercising its power to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of persons employed  in civil  capacities under his control, to follow the  constitutional provisions  contained in  Article 311 and  also the  procedure prescribed in Rules 14 to 18 of the Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control  and Appeal) Rules, 1965.      Prior to the amendment of the second clauses of Article 311 of  the Constitution  (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect  from January 3, 1977, the second proviso to the said clause-was  the only  proviso to  the  said  clause  2. Article  311  as  amended  by  the  Constitution  (Fifteenth Amendment) Act,  1963  and  the  Constitution  (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as follows:-      311 Dismissal,  removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State:-      (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all- India service or a civil service of a State or holds  a civil  post under  the Union or a State shall be dismissed or  removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.      (2) No  such person  as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or  reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has  been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity  of being  heard in  respect of these charges:-      Provided that  where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose  upon him  any such  penalty, such  penalty may be

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imposed 792 on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it  shall   not  be   necessary  to  give  such  person  any opportunity  of   making  representation   on  the   penalty proposed:      Provided further that this clause shall not apply:- (a)  where a  person is  dismissed or  removed or reduced in rank  on  the  ground  of  conduct  which  was  Led  to  his convection on a criminal charge; or (b)  where the  authority empowered  to dismiss  or remove a person or  to reduce  him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to  be recorded  by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c)  where the  President or  the Governor,  as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. (3)  If, in  respect of  any such  person  as  aforesaid,  a question arises whether lt 18 reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry  as is  referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.      In exercise  of the  power conferred  by the proviso to Article 309  Or the  Constitution the President has made the Central Civil  Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965  Rule 19  of the  said Rules 18 in substance the same as  the second  proviso  to  Article  311  (2)  of  the Constitution and provides as follows:-      Rule  19   Special   procedure   in   certain   cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 14 to rule 18:- (i)  where any penalty 18 imposed on a Government servant of the ground  of conduct  which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) where  the  disciplinary  authority  is  satisfied  for reasons to  be recorded  by it  in writing  that it  is  not reasonably practicable  to hold  an inquiry  in  the  manner provided in these rules, or (iii) where  the President is satisfied that in the interest of the  security of  the State,  it is not expedient to hold any 793 inquiry  in   the  manner   provided  in  these  rules,  the disciplinary A  authority may  consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit-      Provided that  the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary before any orders are made in any case under this rule.      The word  "Commission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as meaning "the Union Public Service Commission".      A five-Judge  Constitution Bench  of the Supreme Court, with one  learned Judge  dissenting, except  as regards  the interpretation to  be placed  upon clause  (c) of the second proviso to  Article  311  (2)  of  the  Constitution,  while interpretation Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution and in  particular the  second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution,  in the case of Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram  Patel and other connected matters, [1985] 3 SCC 398 reached  as many  as 114  conclusions on  several issues like the  pleasure doctrine  in the  United Kingdom  and  in India, the  nature of  inquiry under  Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and in particular the second proviso to Article 311 (2),  Article 14  and the  second proviso,  the  Service Rules and  Acts, the ratio decidendi in Divisional Personnel officer, Southern  Railway and  another v.  T.R. Challappan, [1976] 1  SCR 783  and  the  correctness  thereof,  and  the

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remedies  available  to  Civil  servants  both  departmental remedies and by way of judicial review etc.      According to Challappan’s case, a civil servant to whom a service  rule analogous  to the  second proviso to Article 311 (2)  is sought  to be  applied has  only the right to be heard with  respect to  the penalty  proposed to  be imposed upon him.  The majority  judgment in  Tulsiram Patel’s case, has, however,  conferred upon  the civil  servants who  have been dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank by applying the  second  proviso  to  Article  311  (2)  or  an analogous service  rule the  right to  a full  and  complete inquiry  in   an  appeal  or  revision  unless  a  situation envisaged by the second proviso is prevailing at the time of the hearing  of the  appeal cr revision application. Even in such a  case under  the majority judgment the hearing of the appeal or  revision application  is to  be postponed  for  a reasonable length  of  time  for  the  situation  to  become normal.      The appellants  in both  the appeals  were employees of the  Research   and  Analysis   Wing,  Cabinet  Secretariat, Government of 794 India. Earlier,  the difference  branches and departments of the RAW  in New  Delhi were  scattered is several buildings. Ultimately, a  new building  was constructed  for the RAW at Oldie Road.  In the  said building  the Counter Intelligence Section was  housed.  After  the  CIS  was  shifted  to  the building  at  Oldie  Road,  strict  security  measures  were introduced and  the employees,  when going from one floor to the other,  had  to  show  their  identity  cards  This  was resented by  the employees  and they demanded the withdrawal of this  regulation and  insisted  that  the  identification check should  be made  only at  the  time  of  entering  the building. In  the forenoon  on November 27, 1980 a number of staff members  collected in the galleries leading to the CIS rooms, protecting  against the  said security regulation and demanding its  immediate withdrawal.  All attempts to pacify them proved  unsuccessful. More  and more  employees  joined them and  they turned  aggressive, breaking into the various rooms of  the CIS  unit. Several  persons forced their entry into the room of the Director CIS and forced him as also the Assistant Director  and the  Security Field officer who were in the  room to  stand in a corner and did not allow them to move from  the spot  but kept  them as  hostages in order to have their  demand conceded.  The employees who had gathered there shouted  slogans  against  the  organisation  and  its officers. These  slogans were  obscene, abusive, threatening and personal in nature. All attempts made by senior officers to pacify them proved unsuccessful and the employees made it clear that  they would  not let  the said  three officers go unless the  Director of  the  Counter  Intelligence  Section announced the  withdrawal of  the said security regulation’. Ultimately with  the help  of the local police at about 8.30 p.m. the  said three  officers were rescued and 31 agitators who were  found inside  the room  were arrested  and charged under sections 342, 506, 353, 186, 332 and 333 of the Indian Penal Code  and section 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The arrested employees were suspended under clause (b) of sub-rule  1 of  rule 10  of the  Central  Civil  Services (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1965  as  a criminal case against them was under investigation. The next day, namely,  on November  28, 1980, the agitation continued and many  employees did not perform their duties but instead collected inside  the building  and in the premise in groups stopping work  in many branches. A large number of them went

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round shouting slogans and made speeches in the corridors of the office.  On November 29, 1980, a letter was issued by an association called  the Cabinet  Secretariat, (Research  and Analysis Wing)  Employees Association  (Regd.) demanding the immediate withdrawal  of the  criminal cases  against the 31 employees as also of the said security regulation. 795 The letter  stated that  unless these  demands were met, the employees would  go on  a  pen-down  strike  with  immediate effect. Thereupon,  orders of suspension were issued against those who  were taking a leading, active and aggressive role in the agitation and indulging in these activities. The said suspension orders  were issued  from the  1st December, 1980 onwards but  the pen-down  strike continued  and  spread  to other offices  of the  RAW  in  New  Delhi  as  well  as  in different parts  of India including Lucknow and Jammu. Daily the situation  worsened. There was completed insubordination and  total  breakdown  of  discipline.  The  atmosphere  was charged with  tension and there did not seem any hope of the situation becoming  normal. Ultimately  the seven Appellants in Civil  Appeals No.  242 of 1982 and the sole Appellant in Civil Appeal  No. 576 of 1982 were dismissed by orders dated December 6,  1980 without holding any enquiry by applying to then clause  (b) of  the second  proviso to  Article 311 (2) read  with   Rule  lg   of  the   Central   Civil   Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.      Thereupon a  writ petition  was filed in the Delhi High Court. At  the date  of the filing of the said writ petition only appellants  Numbers 1  to 3  in Civil Appeal No. 242 of 1982 had  been served with the orders of dismissal while the remaining Appellants  aud Respondents  Nos. 4 to 44 in Civil Appeal No.  242 of  1982 joined in the said writ petition as co-petitioners  together   with  the   Cabinet   Secretariat (Research and  Analysis Wing) Employees Association (Regd.), contending  that   similar  action  of  dismissal  IS  being apprehended by  them. Pending  the said  writ  petition  the orders of  dismissal were  also served  upon  the  remaining Appellants. During  the course  of the  hearing of  the said writ petition  a statement  was made  to the  High Court  on behalf of  the Union  of India  that the  other  petitioners would not  be dismissed  without holding  a regular inquiry. The said  writ petition, therefore, proceeded only 80 far as the Appellants  in  these  two  appeals  were  concerned.  A Division Bench  of the  said High  Court dismissed  the writ petition by its judgment and order dated September 25, 1981. Hence the appeals by special leave.      In view  of the  judgment in  Tulsiram    patel’s  case overruling Challappan’s  case, the  only contention taken at the hearing of these two Appeals was that the said orders of dismissal were  passed  mala  fide  and  the  reasons  given therein for  dispensing with  the inquiry  were not true and that an  inquiry  was  reasonably  practicable.  In  support thereof, it  was contended that (i) the orders of suspension showed that a disciplinary inquiry 796 was in  fact contemplated  and nothing  had happened between the date  of the  orders of  suspension and  the date of the orders of  dismissal  warranting  the  conclusion  that  the inquiry was  not reasonably  practicable; (ii)  while  eight employees were  dismissed for  their part  in the  agitation which took place in Delhi, in respect of the agitation which took place  in the  Lucknow  office  Of  the  RAW  only  two employees of that office were dismissed and therefore, there was no  application of  mind on the part of the disciplinary authority; (iii) even on December 6, 1980 a suspension order

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was issued against one of the employees and that on December 9, 1980  a suspension  orders were  issued against two other employees, and  that the issuance of these suspension orders on the  6th and  9th December  showed that the holding of an inquiry was  reasonably practicable; (lv) it was not alleged by the authorities that anyone was physically injured in the agitation; (v)  after the  suspension orders, the Appellants were prohibited from visiting any of the Cabinet Secretariat Offices except  for the purpose of collecting their dues and that too with prior permission and therefore, they could not have held  any meeting  or demonstration  inside the  office premises; (vi)  even though  co-workers may  not  have  been available as  witnesses, there  were  policemen  and  police officers posted  inside and  outside the  building and  they were available  to give  evidence and  that superior officer were  also   available  to  give  evidence;  and  (Vii)  the Appellant in Civil Appeal No. 576 of 1982, who was posted at Jammu could not, have taken any active part in the agitation - which took place in Delhi.      Dismissing the  appeals, the  Court, summarizing topic- wise the  conclusions reached  in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram   Patel  and other  connected matters,  [1985] 3 S.C.C. 398. ^      HELD: 1.1  Clause (b)  of the second proviso to Article 311  (2)   and  Rule   19  of  the  Central  Civil  Services (Classification,  Control  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1965,  were properly applied  to the  case of each of the Appellants and the impugned orders of dismissal were validly passed against them. [841 C-D]      Union of  India and another v. Tulsiram Patel and other connected matters.[1985] 3 SCC 398 applied.      1.2 It  is true  that each  order of  suspension stated that the  concerned employee  was  being  suspended  in  the exercise of  the powers  conferred by  Rule 10  (1)  of  the Central Civil Services  (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, because a 797 disciplinary proceeding  against him  under Rule  14 of  the Central Civil  Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965  was contemplated  and that  at the  date of the orders of  suspension disciplinary  proceedings against  the Appellants was in contemplation. This however, does not mean that the  situation will continue to be the same and that at no time  thereafter will  the holding  of the inquiry become "not reasonably  practicable." It  is not  necessary that  a situation  which   makes  the  holding  of  an  inquiry  not reasonably practicable  should exist before the disciplinary inquiry is  initiated, because a situation which renders the holding of  an Inquiry  not reasonably  practicable can come into being even during the course of an enquiry. [838 A-D]      In the  instant case,  the affidavits filed in the High Court clearly  show that  the situation had so changed after the orders  of suspension were issued against the appellants that lt  was not  reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry against the  appellants. The  all-India pen-down  strike was spreading. More  and More  centres in  India were joining in the  said  strike.  The  position  was  fast  deteriorating. Employees  were   being  instigated  into  further  acts  of indiscipline and  insubordination and  loyal  employees  and senior  officers   were  being   intimidated.  Meetings  and demonstrations were  regularly being  held within the office premises and their precincts and there was no possibility of any witness  coming forward  to give  evidence  against  the appellants who  were said  to have  taken a  leading part in

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this agitation.  Further, when  the first batch of dismissal orders was served upon some of the appellants on December 8, 1980, the  pen-down strike  was called  off on  December  9, 1980. In such a situation as was then prevailing, prompt and urgent action  was required  to bring  the  situation  under control. Sometimes  not taking  prompt action  may result in the trouble  spreading and  the situation  worsening and  at times becoming  uncontrolable, and  may  at  times  be  also construed by  the trouble-makers  and agitators as a sign of weakness on  the part  of the authorities and encourage them to step  up the tempo of their activities or agitation. This is exactly  what happened  when the  suspension orders  were issued and  that what  was required  was prompt  and  urgent action against  those who  were considered  to be  the wrong leaders and  that once  such action  was taken the situation improved and started becoming normal. It is penitent to note chat when  the first  batch of  dismissal orders were served upon some  of the  appellants on  December 8, 1980, the pen- down strike was called off on December 9, 1980. [838 D-G]      1.3 The  fact that  it was  thought fit to dismiss only two employes  of the  Lucknow  office  cannot  lead  to  the conclusion 798 that the  appellants  were  wrongly  dismissed  without  any application of mind- [893 C-D]      1.4 It  will not  be reasonably  practicable to hold an inquiry where  an  atmosphere  of  violence  or  of  general indiscipline and insubordination prevails. It is, therefore, not necessary  that the  disciplinary authority  should wait until Incidents  take place  in  which  physical  injury  is caused to others before dispensing with the inquiry. [839 F- G]      1.5  In   view  of   the  admitted  position  that  the appellants were  regularly coming to the office building and talking with  other employees  over the wall and at the gate twice a  day at  11.30 a.m.  and 3.30  a.m. and  were making inflamatory speeches  and holding  out threats, it cannot be said  that    they  could  not  have  held  any  meeting  or demonstration inside the office premises. [839 H, 840 A-B]      1.6 Where the disciplinary authority feels that crucial ant material  evidence will  not be  available in an inquiry because the  witnesses who  could  give  such  evidence  are intimidated and would not come forward and the only evidence which  would   be  available,   namely,  in  this  case,  of policemen, police  officers and  senior officers, would only be peripheral and cannot relate to all the charges and that, therefore, leading  only such  evidence may be assailed in a Court of  law as  being a  mere farce  of an  Inquiry and  a deliberate attempt  to keep  back  material  witnesses,  the disciplinary authority  would be  justified in coming to the conclusion that  an inquiry  is not  reasonable practicable. From a  perusal of  the affidavit filed and its annexures it is clear  that the  police officers,  policemen  and  senior officers could not have possibly given evidence with respect to all  these acts.  Further the  senior officers  were also intimidated ant  were threatened  with dire  consequences if they gave  evidence. Grievances  were also  made against the senior officers  of  the  RAW  in  the  charter  of  demands submitted by  the association  and the  evidence  of  senior officers would  have  been  attacked  as  being  biased  and partisan. [840 C-G]      1.7  The   contention  taken  on  behalf  of  the  sole appellant in  Civil Appeal  No. 576 of 1982 that having been posted at  Jammu, he  could  not  have  taken  part  in  the agitation which  took place in New Delhi is falsified by the

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fact that  during the  relevant time  he hat taken leave for personal reasons  and had  come down to Delhi and had played an active  role in  the said  agitation. He made inflamatory speeches on  the Ist, 3rd, 4th and 5th of December, 1980 and had investigated the other employees to continue 799 the agitation  and intimidated  those who  had not Joined in the A  agitation into doing so. Further, in a speech made by him on  December 4, 1980 he had tried to make public some of the top  secret operations  of  the  RAW  claiming  to  have special knowledge  of these  operations  by  virtue  of  his having been  posted earlier  in a  sensitive branch.  HP was also actively engaged in collecting funds or continuing the agitation. [840 G-H, 841 A-B] B      The Court,  directed:- (i) if any payment has been made to any  of the appellants in pursuance of any interim order, such appellant  will not  be liable to refund such amount or any part thereof; and (ii) since the appellants have a right to file  a  departmental  appeal  under  the  Central  Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 in case they  desires to file such an appeal, they may do so on or before  October 31, 1985 and that the Appellate Authority must condone,  in the  exercise  of  its  power  wonder  the proviso  to   Rule  25   of  the   Central  Civil   Services (Classification, Control  and Appeal)  Rules, 1965 the delay in filing  the appeal  and hear  and dispose of such appeals expeditiously subject to what has been laid down in Tulsiram Patel’a case.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 242 & 576 of 1982.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  25.9.1981  of  the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1786 of 1980      Appellant in  person for Petr. No. 4 in C.A. No. 242 of 1982.      V.N. Ganpule for the Appellant in C.A. No. 242l82.      V.M. Tarkunde,  V.N. Ganpule  and G.B.  Sathe  for  the Appellants in C.A. No. 576 of 1982.      K.Parasaran, Attorney  General and  Miss A.  Subhashini for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MADON, J.  The appellants  who  were  employed  in  the Research and  Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India  were dismissed from service in the exercise of the power conferred  by clause  (b) of  the  second  proviso  to Article 311  (2) of the Constitution of India read with Rule 19 of the Central Civil 800 Services (Classification,  Control and  Appeal) Fuels, 1965, without serving  any  charge-sheet  upon  them  and  without holding any  inquiry. The  Appellants thereupon filed in the Delhi High  Court a  writ  petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging  the said  orders of dismissal. The said writ  petition was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High  Court by  its judgment and order dated September 25, 1981.  It is  against the said judgment and order of the Delhi High  Court that  the present  two Appeals  have  been filed by Special Leave granted by this Court.      Article 311 of the Constitution      Prior to  the amendment of the second clause of Article 311 of  the Constitution  by the  Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,  1976, with effect from January 3, 1977, the

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second proviso  to the  said clause  was the only proviso to the  said   clause  (2).  Article  311  as  amended  by  the Constitution  (Fifteenth   Amendment)  Act,  1963,  and  the Constitution (Forty-second  Amendment) Act,  1976, reads  as follows: "311. Dismissal,  removal or  reduction in  rank  of  person employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.      (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or  an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds  a civil  post under  the Union or a State shall be dismissed or  removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.      (2) No  such person  as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or  reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has  been informed of the charges against him and given a reason able  opportunity of  being heard in respect of those charges:      Provided that  where it is proposed after such inquiry, to impose  upon him  any such  penalty, such  penalty may be imposed on  the basis  of the  evidence adduced  during such inquiry and  it shall  not be  necessary to give such person any opportunity  or making  representation  on  the  penalty proposed:      Provided further that this clause shall not apply      (a)  where a  person is dismissed or removed or reduced           in rank  on the ground of conduct which has led to           his conviction on a criminal charge; or 801      (b)  where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove           a person  or to  reduce him  in rank  is satisfied           that for  some reason,  to  be  recorded  by  that           authority  in   writing,  it   is  not  reasonably           practicable to hold such inquiry; or      (c)  where the  President or  the Governor, as the case           may be,  is satisfied  that in the interest of the           security of  the State it is not expedient to hold           such inquiry.           (3)  If,   in  respect   of  any  such  person  as           aforesaid,  a   question  arises   whether  it  is           reasonably practicable  to hold such inquiry as is           referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of           the authority  empowered to dismiss or remove such           person or to reduce him in rank shall be final." Rule  19  of  the  Central  Civil  Services  (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965      The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,  1965, have  been made  by the  President  in exercise of  the power  conferred by  the proviso to Article 309 of  the Constitution.  Rule 19  of the  said Rules is in substance the  same as the second proviso to Article 311 (2) and provides as follows: "19. Special  procedure in  certain cases  - Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 14 to rule 18 -           (1) where  any penalty  is imposed on a Government           servant on  the ground of conduct which has led to           his conviction on a criminal charge, or           (ii) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied           for reasons  to be  recorded by it in writing that           it  is  not  reasonably  practicable  to  hold  an           inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or           (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the           interest of  the security  of the State, it is not           expedient  to  hold  any  inquiry  in  the  manner           provided in these rules, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of

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the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit: 802      Provided that  the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary, before any order are made in any case under this rule." The word  "Commission" is defined by clause (d) of Rule 2 as meaning" the Union Public Service Commission". The Decision in Tulsiram Patel’s Case      It was not disputed at the hearing of these two Appeals that they  fall to  be decided in the light of what was held in Union  of India  and another  v. Tulsiram Patel and other connected matters.  [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398. By the decision in Tulsiram Patel’s  Case a  large  number  of  writ  petitions either filed  in this  Court or  in various  High Courts and transferred to  this Court  and several  Appeals by  Special Leave, all involving the interpretation of Articles 309, 310 and 311  of the Constitution and in particular of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), were disposed of by a five-judge Constitution Bench  of this  Court, with  one learned  judge dissenting except as regards the interpretation to be placed upon clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2).      A large  number of points fell for decision in Tulsiram Patel’s case.  [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398.  It will, therefore, be convenient first  to summarize  topic-wise  the  conclusions reached by  the majority  in that case and then to emphasize the important rights conferred by the majority judgment upon persons who  are members  of a civil service of the Union of India or  an all-India service or a civil service of a State or hold a civil post under the Union of India or a State, in other words,  upon civil  servants, and  thereafter to  deal with the  facts of  the present  Appeals and the contentions raised at the hearing thereof.      The conclusions  reached by  the majority  in  Tulsiram Patel’s Case were:           I. The Pleasure Doctrine in the United Kingdom           (1) The pleasure doctrine relates to the tenure of           a  government  servant,  that  is,  his  right  to           continue to  hold  office.  Under  it  all  public           officers and  servants of  the Crown in the United           Kingdom hold their appointments at the pleasure of           the Crown  and their services can be terminated at           will without assigning any cause. 803           (2) The  pleasure doctrine  is not  based upon any           special prerogative  of the  Crown but is based on           public policy  and is  in public  interest and for           public good. The basis of the pleasure doctrine is           that the  public  is  vitally  interested  in  the           efficiency and  integrity of  civil services  and,           therefore public  policy requires, public interest           needs and  public good demands that civil servants           who are  inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have           become a  security risk  should  not  continue  in           service.           (3) In the United Kingdom, Parliament is sovereign           and can  make any law whatever and the courts have           no  power  to  declare  it  void.  In  the  United           Kingdom,  therefore,   the  pleasure  doctrine  is           subject  to   what  may   be  expressly   provided           otherwise by legislation.           II. The Pleasure Doctrine in India           (4) In  India the  pleasure doctrine  has received           Constitutional  sanction   by  being   enacted  in           Article 310  (1) of  the  Constitution  of  India.           Under  Article   310  (1),   except  as  expressly

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         provided in  the Constitution, every person who is           a member  of a  defence  service  or  of  a  civil           service of  the Union  of India or of an all-India           service or  holds any  post connected with defence           or any  civil post  under the Union of India holds           office during  the pleasure  of the president, and           every person who is a member of a civil service of           a State  or holds  any civil  post under  a  State           holds office  during the  pleasure of the Governor           of the State.           (5) Thus,  unlike in  the Untied Kingdom, in India           the pleasure  doctrine is  not subject  to any law           made by  Parliament or  a State Legislature but is           subject to  only what is expressly provided in the           Constitution. In  India, therefore, the exceptions           to the  pleasure doctrine  can only be those which           are expressly provided in the Constitution.           (6) There  are several  exceptions to the pleasure           doctrine expressly provided in the Constitution.           (7) Article 311, being an express provision of the           Constitution, is  an  exception  to  the  pleasure           doctrine 804           contained in  Article 310 (1) of the Constitution.           Clauses (1)  and (2)  of Article  311 restrict the           operation of the pleasure doctrine so far as civil           servants are  concerned by  conferring upon  civil           servants the safeguards provided in those clauses.           (8) Under  clause (1)  of  Article  311  no  civil           servant can  be dismissed  or removed from service           by an  authority subordinate  to that  by which be           was appointed.           (9) Under  Clause (2)  of  Article  311  no  civil           servant can  be dismissed  or removed from service           or reduced  in rank  except after  an  inquiry  in           which he  has been informed of the charges against           him and  given a  reasonable opportunity  of being           heard in respect of such charges. By reason of the           amendment made  by the  Constitution (Forty-second           Amendment) Act, 1976, in clause (2) of Article 311           it is now not necessary to give to a civil servant           an opportunity  of making  a  representation  with           respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon           him.           (10)  An   order  of  compulsory  retirement  from           service imposed  upon a  civil servant  by way  of           penalty  amounts   to  removal  from  service  and           attracts the provisions of Article 311.           (11) Restrictions on the operation of the pleasure           doctrine  contained   in   legislation   made   by           Parliament in  the United  Kingdom and  in clauses           (1) and (2) of Article 311 in India are also based           on public  policy and  are in  public interest and           for public  good inasmuch  as they  give to  civil           servants a feeling of security of tenure.           (12) The  safeguard provided  to civil servants by           clause (2)  of Article  311 is taken away when any           of  the  three  clauses  of  the  second  proviso,           (originally the  only proviso)  to Article 311 (2)           becomes applicable.           (13) It  is incorrect  to say  that  the  pleasure           doctrine   is a  prerogative of  the British Crown           which has been 805           inherited  by   India  and   transposed  into  its

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         Constitution ,  adapted to  suit the  Constitution           adapted to  suit the Constitutional  set up of the           Republic of  India. Authoritative  judicial  dicta           both  in  England  and  in  India,  for  instance,           Shenton v.  Smith, L.R [1895]A.C. 229 J.C. Dunn v.           The Queen,  L.R. [1896]  Q.B.D. 116, 119-120; s.c.           [1895-96] 73  L.T.R. 695  and sub  nomine Dunn  v.           Regen in  [1895-1899] All E.R. Rep. 907. The State           of Uttar  Pradesh and  other  v. Babu Ram Upadhya,           [1961] 2  S.C.R. 679,  696. Moti  Ram Deka etc. v.           General Manager  N.E.F. Railways, Maligaon, Pandu,           etc. [1964]  5 S.C.R.  683, 734-5  and Roshan  Lal           Tandon v.  Union of  India, [1968]  1 S.C.R.  185,           195, have laid down that the pleasure doctrine and           the  protection  afforded  to  civil  servants  by           legislation in  the United  Kingdom and by clauses           (1) and  (2) of  Article 311 in India are based on           public policy  and are  in public interest and for           public good.  Similarly,  the  withdrawal  of  the           safeguard contained   in clause (2) of Article 311           by the second proviso to that clause is also based           on public policy and is in public interest and for           public good.           (14) Neither  Article  309  nor  Article  310  nor           Article 311  sets out  the grounds  for dismissal,           removal or  reduction in rank or for imposition of           any other   penalty  upon a  civil servant.  These           Articles  also  do  not  specify  what  the  other           penalties are.  These matters are left to be dealt           with by  rules made  under the  proviso to Article           309 or  by Acts referable to that Article or rules           made under such Acts.           (15) The pleasure of the President or the Governor           is not to be exercised by him personally. It is to           be  exercised   by   the   appropriate   authority           specified in  rules  made  under  the  proviso  to           Article 309  or by  Acts referable to that Article           or rules made under such Acts. Where, however, the           President or  the Governor,  as the  case may  be,           exercise his pleasure under Article 310 (1), it is           not required  that such  act of  exercise  of  the           pleasure under  Article 310  (1) must be an act of           the President  or the Governor himself but it must           be an  act of the President or the Governor in the           Constitutional sense  that is, with the aid and on           the advice of the Council of Ministers. 806           III. The Inquiry under Article 311 (2)           (16)  Clause   (2)  of   Article   311   gives   a           Constitutional  mandate   to  the   principles  of           natural justice  and the  audi alteram partem rule           by providing  that a  civil servant  shall not  be           dismissed or  removed from  service or  reduced in           rank until  after an  inquiry in which he has been           informed of  the charges  against him and has been           given a  reasonable opportunity  of being heard in           respect of those charges.           (17)  The   nature  of   this  inquiry   has  been           elaborately set out by this Court in Khem Chand v.           The Union  of India and others [1958] S.C.R. 1095-           97 and  even after  the Constitution (Forty-second           Amendment) Act,  1976,  the  inquiry  required  by           clause (2) of Article 311 would be the same except           that it  would not be necessary to give to a civil           servant an  opportunity to  make a  representation

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         with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed           upon him.           (18)  As  held  in  Suresh  Koshy  George  v.  The           University of  Kerala  and  others  [1969]  S.C.R.           317,326-7. and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v.           T.C. Shrivastava  and others, [1984] 3 S.C.R. 361,           369. apart from Article 311 prior to its amendment           by the  Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act,           1976,  it   is  not  necessary  either  under  the           ordinary law  of the  land or under industrial law           to give a second opportunity to show cause against           the  penalty   proposed  to  be  imposed  upon  an           employee.           (19) If  an inquiry  held against  a civil servant           under Article  311 (2)  is unfair or biased or has           been conducted in such a manner as not to give him           a  fair   or  reasonable   opportunity  to  defend           himself, the  principles of  natural Justice would           be violated;  but in  such a  case  the  order  of           dismissal, removal  or reduction  in rank would be           bad as  contravening  the  express  provisions  of           Article 311  (2) and  there is no scope for having           recourse  to   Article  14   for  the  purpose  of           invalidating it.           IV. The Second Proviso to Article 311 (2) 807           (20) The language of the second proviso to Article           311 (2) is plain and unambiguous. The key-words in           the second proviso are this clause shall not apply           . there  is no  ambiguity in  these words.  Where,           therefore, a  situation envisaged  in any  of  the           three clauses  of the  second proviso  arises, the           safeguard provided  to a  civil servant  by clause           (2) of Article 311 is taken away.           (21) The second proviso to Article 311 (2) becomes           applicable in the three cases mentioned in clauses           (a) to  (c) of  that proviso,  namely, (a) where a           person is  dismissed or removed or reduced in rank           on the  ground of  conduct which  has led  to  his           conviction on  a criminal  charge; (b)  where  the           authority empowered  to dismiss or remove a person           or to  reduce him  in rank  is satisfied  that for           some reason,  to be  recorded by that authority in           writing, it  is not reasonably practicable to hold           such inquiry;  and (c)  where the President or the           Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in           the interest  of the  security of  the State it is           not expedient to hold such inquiry.           (2) The  governing words  of the second proviso to           clause (2)  of Article  311, namely,  "this clause           shall not  apply", are mandatory and not directory           and  are   in  the   nature  of  a  Constitutional           prohibitory     injunction     restraining     the           disciplinary authority  from  holding  an  inquiry           under Article  311 (2)  or from giving any kind of           opportunity to  the concerned  Civil servant  in a           case where  one of the three clauses of the second           proviso-becomes applicable. There is thus no scope           for introducing  into the second proviso some kind           of inquiry  or opportunity  to  show  cause  by  a           process of  inference or  implication.  the  maxim           expressum facet  cessare tacitum  ( when  there is           express mention  of certain  things, then anything           not mentioned  is excluded")  applies to the case.           This well-known maxim  is a principle of logic and

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         common sense  and not  merely a  technical rule of           construction  as  pointed  out  in  B.Shankra  Rao           Badani and  other   v. State of Mysore and another           [1969] 3 S.C.R. 1, 12.           (23) The  second proviso  to Article  311 (2)  has           been in  the Constitution  of India since the time           the Constitu- 808           tion was originally created. It was not blindly or           slavishly copied  from  section  240  (3)  of  the           Government  of   India  Act,  1935.  There  was  a           considerable  debate   on  this  proviso  in.  the           Constituent Assembly  as  shown  by  the  Official           Report of  the Constituent  Assembly Debates, vol.           IX, pages  1099  to  1116.  The  majority  of  the           members of the Constituent Assembly had fought for           freedom and had suffered imprisonment in the cause           of liberty  and were,  therefore,  not  likely  to           introduce into our Constitution any provision from           the earlier Government of India Act which had been           enacted  purely  for  the  benefit  of  a  foreign           imperialistic  power.  They  retained  the  second           proviso as  a matter of public policy and as being           in the  public interest  and for public good. They           further inserted  clause (c) in the second proviso           dispensing with  the inquiry under Article 311 (2)           in a  case where the President or the Governor, as           the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest           of the  security of  the State it is not expedient           to hold  such inquiry  as also added a new clause,           namely, clause (3), in Article 311 giving finality           to the decision of the disciplinary authority that           it is  not  reasonably  practicable  to  hold  the           inquiry under Article 311. (2). Section 240 of the           Government of India Act, 1935, did not contain any           provision similar  to clause  (c)  of  the  second           proviso to  Article  311  (2)  or  clause  (3)  of           Article 311.           V. Article 14 and the Second Proviso           (24) The principles of natural justice are not the           creation  of   Article  14  of  the  Constitution.           Article 14  is not  the begetter of the principles           of natural  justice but  is  their  Constitutional           guardian.           (25) The  principles of  natural  justice  consist           primarily of  two main  rules, namely, "nemo judex           in causa sua" ( no man shall be a judge in his own           cause )  and audi  atleram partem  ( hearthe other           side ).  The corollary  deduced from the above two           rules and  particularly the  audi  alteram  partem           rule was  qui  aliquid  statuerit  parte  inaudita           altera, aequum  licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit           ( he  who shall  decide anything without the other           side having been heard, 809           although he  may have  said what is right will not           have done  what is  right" or  as is no  expressed           "Justice  should  not  only  be  done  but  should           manifestly be  seen to  be done ). These two rules           and their  corollary are neither new nor were they           the  discovery   of  English   judges   but   were           recognized in  many civilizations  and  over  many           centuries.           (26) Article 14 applies not only to discriminatory           class  legislation   but  also   to  arbitrary  or

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         discriminatory State  action. Violation  of a rule           of natural  justice results in arbitrariness which           is  the   same  as   discrimination,   and   where           discrimination is the result of a State action, it           is a  violation of  Article.-  14.  Therefor  ,  a           violation of  a principle  of natural justice by a           State action is a violation of Article 14.           (27) The  principles of natural justice apply both           to  quasi-judicial   as  well   as  administrative           inquiries entailing civil consequences.           (28) It is well established both in England and in           India that the principles of natural justice yield           to and  change with  the exigencies  of  different           situation and  do not  apply in the same manner to           situations which  are not  alike. They are neither           cast in  a rigid  mould nor  can they  be put in a           legal strait-jacket.  They are  not immutable  but           flexible and  can be adapted, modified or excluded           by statute  and statutory  rules as  also  by  the           constitution of the tribunal which has to decide a           particular matter and the rules  by the which such           tribunal is  governed. Instances of cases in which           it has  been so  held are  Norwest  Hlst  Ltd.  v.           Secretary of  State for  Trade  and  others,  L.R.           [1978] 1  Ch. 201, 227. Suresh Koshy George v. The           University of  Kerala and  others, [1969] 1 S.C.R.           317, 322. A.K. Kraipak and others etc. v. Union of           India and  others, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 457, 469. Union           of India  v. Col. J.N. Sinha and another, [1971] 1           S.C.R. 791,  694-5. Swedeshi Cotton Mills v. Union           of India,[1981]  2 S.C.R. 533, 591. J. Mohapatra &           Co. and  another v.  State of  Orissa and another,           [1985] 1  S.C.R. 322,  334-5. and Maneka Gandhi v.           Union of India. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, 681. 810           (29) If  legislation  and  the  necessities  of  a           situation can  exclude the  principles of  natural           justice including  the audi altera  partem rule, a           fortiorari so  can a provision of the constitution           such as the second proviso to Article 311 (2).           (30) The  audi alteram  partem  rule  having  been           excluded by  a Constitutional  provision,  namely,           the second proviso to Article 311 (2), there is no           scope for  reintroducing  it  by  a  side-door  to           provide once  again the  same  inquiry  which  the           Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited.           (31) A  right of  making a representation after an           action is  taken against a person has been held by           this Court  in  Maneka  Ganahi’s  Case,  [1978]  2           S.C.R. 621,  681 and  in  Liberty  oil  Mills  and           others v.  union of  India and other,     [1984] 3           S.C.R. 465. to be a sufficient compliance with the           requirements of  natural justice. In the case of a           civil servant to whom the provisions of the second           proviso to  Article 311  (2) have been applied, he           has the right of a departmental appeal in which he           can show that the charges made against him are not           true, and  an appeal is a wider and more effective           remedy than a right of making a representation.           (32) The  majority view  in A.K.  Gopalan  v.  The           State of  Madras, [1950]  S.C.R. 88  namely,  that           particular Articles  governing certain Fundamental           Rights  operate  exclusively  without  having  any           interrelation  with   any  other  Article  in  the           Chapter on  Fundamental Rights was disapproved and

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         held to  be not correct in Rustom Cawasti Coper v.           Union of India. [1970] 3. S.C.R. 530. The position           that the  majority view  in Gopalan’s  case [1950]           S.C.R. 88,  was overruled  in R.C.  Cooper’s  Case           [1970] 3  S.C.R. 530, was reiterated in Sambu Nath           Sarkar v.  The State  of West  Bengal  and  others           [1974] 1  S.C.R.1. Hardhan Saha and another v. The           State of  West Bengal  and others, [1975] 2 S.C.R.           832. Kudiram  Das v.  The State of West Bengal and           others, [1975]  2 S.C.R.  832 and  Mane    Gandhi’           Case [1978]  2 S.C.R. 621, 681. Thus, the majority           view in Gopalan’s Case [1950] S.C.R.88, was buried           in R.C. Cooper’s Case 811           [1970] 3  S.C.R. 530.  its burial service was read           in Sambhu  Nath Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal           and others,[1974]  1 S.C.R.  1. Hardhan  Saha  and           another v.  The State  of  West  Benagland  others           [1975] 1  S.C.R. 832 and Khudiram Das v. The State           of West  Bengal and others [1975] 2 S.C.R. 832 and           its  funeral   oration  was  delivered  in  Maneka           Gandhi’s Case [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621,681 and it is to           be hopel that the ghost of that majority view does           not at  some future  time rise  form its grave and           stand, clanking  its chains,  seeking to block the           onward  march   of  our   country   to   progress,           prosperity and  the  establishment  of  a  Welfare           State.           (33) The  decisions in R.C. Cooper’s Case [1970] 3           S.C.R. 530  and the  other cases which followed it           do not,  however, apply where a Fundamental Right,           including   the   audi   alterem   parte      rule           comprehended within  the guarantee  of Article 14,           is excluded  by the Constitution itself. Instances           of such  express exclusionary provisions contained           in the  Constitution are  Article 31A (1), Article           31B, Article  31C, Article  22 (5), and the second           proviso to  Article 311  (2) as  regards the  audi           alteram  partem   rule,   namely,   affording   an           opportunity of a hearing to a civil servant before           imposing the  penalty  of  dismissal,  removal  or           reduction in rank upon him.           (34) The  principles of  natural Justice  must  be           confined  within   their  proper  limits  and  not           allowed  to  run  wild.  The  concept  of  natural           justice is  a magnificient  thoroughbred on  which           this   nation   gallops   forwards   towards   its           proclaimed and  destined goal  of JUSTICE, social,           economic and  political .  This thoroughbred  must           not be  allowed to  turn into  a wild  and  unruly           horse, careering  off where  it lists,  unsaddling           its rider, and bursting into fields where the sign           no pasaran is put up.           VI. Service Rules and Acts           (35) Article  309 is expressly made subject to the           provisions of  the Constitution.  Rules made under           the proviso  to Article 309 Acts referable to that           Article, and  rules  made  under  such  Acct  are,           therefore, subject both to Article 310 (1) as also           to Article 311. If any 812           such rule  or Act  impinges upon  or restricts the           operation of  the pleasure  doctrine  exbodied  in           Article 310  (1) except  as expressly  provided in           the Constitution  or restricts  or takes  away the

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         safeguards provided  to civil  servants by clauses           (1) and  (2) of  Article 311, it would be void and           unconstitutional as contravening the provisions of           Article 310  (1) or  clause (1)  or clause  (2) of           Article 311,  as the  case may be. Any such Act or           rule which  provides  for  dismissal,  removal  or           reduction in  rank of  a civil  servant  with  out           holding an  inquiry as  contemplated by clause (2)           of Article 311 except in the three cases specified           in  the  second  proviso  to  that  clause  would,           therefore,  be   unconstitutional  and   viod   as           contravening Article 311 (2).           (36) In  the same  way, for  an Act  or a  rule to           provide that in a case where the second proviso to           Article 311  (2) applies,  any of  the  safeguards           excluded by  that proviso  will be  available to a           civil servant  would be  void and unconstitutional           as impinging upon the pleasure of the President or           the Governor, as the case may be.           (37)  A   well-settled  rule  of  construction  of           statutes is  that where  two  interpretations  are           possible, one of which would preserve and save the           constitutionality  of   the  particular  statutory           provision  while   the  other   would  render   it           unconstitutional and void, the one which saves and           preserves its  constitutionality should be adopted           and the other rejected.           (38) Where  an Act  or a  rule provides  that in a           case in  which the  second proviso  to Article 311           (2) applies any of the safeguards excluded by that           proviso will  be available to a civil servant, the           constitutionality  of   such  provision  would  be           preserved by  interpreting it  as being  directory           and not  mandatory. The  breach of  such directory           provision would not, however, furnish any cause of           action or  ground of  challenge to a civil servant           because at  the threshold  such cause of action or           ground of  challenge would be barred by the second           proviso to Article 311 (2). 813           (39) Service rules may reproduce the provisions of           the  second   proviso  to   Article  311  (2)  and           authorize the  disciplinary authority  to dispense           with the  inquiry as contemplated by clause (2) of           Article 311  in the  three cases mentioned in  the           second proviso  to that  clause or any one or more           of them.  Such a  provisions however, is not valid           and constitutional without reference to the second           proviso to  Article 311  (2) and  cannot  be  read           apart from it. Thus, while the source of authority           of a  particular officer  to act as a disciplinary           authority and dispense with the inquiry is derived           from the service rules, the source of his power to           dispense with  the inquiry  is  derived  from  the           second proviso to Article 311 (2) and not from any           service rule.           (40) The  omission  to  mention  in  an  order  of           dismissal,  removal   or  reduction  in  rank  the           relevant clause  of  the  second  proviso  or  the           relevant service  rule will not have the effect of           invalidating the  order imposing such penalty, and           the order  must be  read as having been made under           the applicable  clause of  the second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) read  with the  relevant  service           rule.

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         (41) Rule  37 of  the Central  Industrial Security           Force Rules,  1969, is  clumsily worded  and makes           little sense.  To provide  that a  member  of  the           Central Industrial  Security Force  who  has  been           convicted to  rigorous imprisonment  on a criminal           charge shall  be dismissed from service and at the           same time  to provide that  only a notice shall be           given to  the party  charged proposing the penalty           of dismissal  for his  having  been  convicted  to           rigourous imprisonment  and asking  him to explain           as to why the proposed penalty of dismissal should           not be  imposed   is a  contradiction in terms. To           read these  provisions as  mandatory would  be  to           render  them   unconstitutional  and  void.  These           provisions must,  therefore, be  read as directory           in order to preserve their constitutionality.           (42)  Rule   19  of  the  Central  Civil  Services           (Classification, Control  and Appeal)  Rules, 1965           is identical with Rule 14 of the Railway Servant 814           (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1968,  and  the           interpretation of  the said  Rule 19  would be the           same as that of the said Rule 14.           VII. Challappan’s Case           (43)  The  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in           Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and           another v.  T.R. Challappan,[1976]  1. S.C.R. 783,           was in  error  in  interpreting  Rule  14  of  the           Railway Servant  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,           1968, by  itself and  not in  conjuction with  the           second proviso to Article 311 (2).           (44) The  Court in  Challappan’s  Case,  [1976]  1           S.C.R.  783,   also  erred  in  holding  that  the           addition of  the words  the disciplinary authority           may consider  the circumstances  of the  case  and           make such  order thereon  as it  deems fit’ in the           said Rule  14 warranted  an interpretation  of the           said Rule  different from  that to  be placed upon           the second proviso to Article 311 (2).           (45) The  Court in  Challappan’s   Case, [1976]  1           S.C.R.  783,  also  erred  in  the  interpretation           placed by  it upon the word "consider occurring in           the above  phrase in  the said  rule 14.  The view           taken  by   the  Court   in  that   case  that   a           consideration of  the circumstances  of  the  case           cannot be unilateral but must be after hearing the           delinquent civil servant would render this part of           the said  Rule 14  unconstitutional as restricting           the full  exclusionary  operation  of  the  second           proviso to Article 311 (2).           (46) The word consider in its ordinary and natural           sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it           in Challappan’s Case., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 783.           (47) The  consideration of the circumstances under           the said  Rule 14 must, therefore, be ex parte and           without affording  to the  concerned civil servant           an opportunity of being heard.           (48) The  decision in  Challappan’s Case, [1976] 1           S.C.R. 783,  never held the field for the judgment           in that  case was delivered on September 15, 1975,           it was 815           reported in  [1976] 1  S.C.R. at  page 783ff., and           hardly was  that case  reported, then  in the next           group of  appeals in  which the  same question was

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         raised the  matter was  referred to a larger Bench           by an  order made on November 18, 1976, in view of           the earlier  decision of another three-Judge Bench           in M.  Gopala Krishna  Naidu v.  State  of  Madhya           Pradesh. [1968]1  S.C.R. 355.  The correctness  of           Challappan’s  Case,  [1976]  1  S.C.R.  783,  was,           therefore, doubted from the very beginning.           VIII. Executive Instructions           (49)  Executive  Instructions  stand  on  a  lower           footing   than   a   statutory   rule.   Executive           instruction which provide that in a case where the           second proviso  to Article  311 (2)  applies,  any           safeguard  excluded   by  that  proviso  would  be           available  to   a  civil  servant  would  only  be           directory and not mandatory.           IX. The Scope of the Second Proviso           (50) The  three clauses  of the  second proviso to           Article 311  are not  intended to  be  applied  in           normal and ordinary situations. The second proviso           is an  exception to the normal rule and before any           of the three clauses of that proviso is applied to           the case  of a  civil servant, the conditions laid           down in that clause must be satisfied.           (51) Where  a situation  envisaged in  one of  the           clauses of  the second  proviso to Article 311 (2)           exists, it is not mandatory that the punishment of           dismissal, removal  or reduction in rank should be           imposed upon  a civil  servant.  The  disciplinary           authority  will   first  have   to   decide   what           punishment  is   warranted  by   the   facts   and           circumstances  of  the  case.  Such  consideration           would, however,  be ex  parts and  without hearing           the concerned  civil servant.  If the disciplinary           authority  comes   to  the   conclusion  that  the           punishment  which   is  called   for  is  that  of           dismissal, removal  or reduction  in rank, it must           dispense with  the inquiry  and  then  decide  for           itself which  of  the  aforesaid  three  penalties           should be imposed. 816           X. Clause (a) of the Second Proviso           (52) In  a case  where clause  (a) of  the  second           proviso   to   Article   311   (2)   applies   the           disciplinary authority  is to  take the conviction           of the concerned civil servant as sufficient proof           of misconduct  on his  part. It  has thereafter to           decide whether  the conduct  which had  led to the           civil servant’s  conviction on  a criminal  charge           was such as to warrant the imposition of a penalty           and, if  so, what that penalty should be. For this           purpose  it   must  persue  the  judgment  of  the           criminal Court and take into consideration all the           facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the           various factors  set  out  in  Challappan’s  Case,           [1976] 1  S.C.R. 783,  such as, the entire conduct           of the  civil servant,  the gravity of the offence           committed by  him, the impact which his misconduct           is likely  to have  on the administration, whether           the offence  for which  he was  convicted was of a           technical or  trivial nature,  and the extenuating           circumstances, if  any, present in the case. This,           however,  has  to  be  done  by  the  disciplinary           authority  ex   part  and   without  hearing   the           concerned civil servant.           (53) The  penalty imposed  upon the  civil servant

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         should not  be arbitrary  or grossly  excessive or           out of  all proportion to the offence committed or           one not  warranted by  the facts and circumstances           of the case.           (54) Where  a civil  servant goes to the office of           his  superior   office  whom  he  believes  to  be           responsible for  stopping his  increment and  hits           him on  the head  with an  iron rod,  so that  the           superior officer  falls down with a bleeding head,           and the  delinquent civil  servant  is  tried  and           convicted under  section 332  of the  Indian Penal           Code but the Magistrate, instead of sentencing him           to imprisonment,  applies to him the provision  of           section 4  of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958           and  after   such  conviction   the   disciplinary           authority,   taking    the   above    facts   into           consideration, by  way of  punishment compulsorily           retires the  delinquent civil servant under clause           (i) of  section 19  of the  Central Civil Services           (Classification, Control  and Appeal) Rules, 1965,           it cannot  be said  that the  punishment inflicted           upon the civil servant was excessive or arbitrary. 817           XI. Clause (b) of the Second Proviso           (55) There are two conditions precedent which must           be satisfied  before  clause  (b)  of  the  second           proviso to  Article 311  (2) can be applied. These           conditions are:                (i) there  must exist a situation which makes           the holding  of an inquiry contemplated by Article           311 (2) not reasonably practicable, and                (ii) the disciplinary authority should record           in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it           is  not   reasonably  practicable   to  hold  such           inquiry.           (56)  Whether  it  was  practicable  to  hold  the           inquiry or  not must  be judged  in the context of           whether it was reasonably practicable to do so.           (57)   It    is   not    a   total   or   absolute           impracticability which  is required  by clause (b)           of the  second proviso.  What is requisite is that           the holding  of the  inquiry is not practicable in           the  opinion   of  a   reasonable  man   taking  a           reasonable view of the prevailing situation.           (58) The  reasonable practicability  of holding an           inquiry is  a matter  of assessment  to be made be           the disciplinary  authority and  must be judged in           the light  of the  circumstances  then prevailing.           The disciplinary  authority is  generally  on  the           spot and  knows what  is happening.  It is because           the disciplinary  authority is  the best  judge of           the  prevailing   situation  that  clause  (3)  of           Article 311  makes the  decision  of  the  discip-           linary authority on this question final.           (59) It  is not possible to enumerate the cases in           which it  would not  be reasonably  practicable to           hold the inquiry.           Illustrative cases would be -           (a) where a civil servant, particularly through or           together  with   his  associates,  so  terrorizes,           threatens or  intimidates witnesses  who are going           to give evidence against him with fear of reprisal           as to prevent them from doing so, or 818           (b) where the civil servant by himself or together

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         with or  through others threatens, intimidates and           terrorizes the  officer who  is  the  disciplinary           authority or  members of  his family so that he is           afraid to  hold the  inquiry or  direct it  to  be           held, or           (c) where  an atmosphere of violence or of general           indiscipline  and   insubordination  prevails,  it           being  immaterial   whether  the  concerned  civil           servant is  or is  not a  party to  bringing about           such a  situation. In  all these cases, it must be           remembered that  numbers coerce  and terrify while           an individual may not.           (60) The disciplinary authority is not expected to           dispense with  a disciplinary  inquiry lightly  or           arbitrarily or  out of  ulterior motives or merely           in order  to avoid  the holding  of an  inquiry or           because the  Department’s case  against the  civil           servant is weak and must fail.           (61) The  word "inquiry"  in  clause  (b)  of  the           second proviso  includes a  part of an inquiry. It           is, there  fore, not  necessary that the situation           which  makes   the  holding   of  an  inquiry  not           reasonably practicable  should  exist  before  the           inquiry is  instituted against  the civil servant.           Such a  situation can  also  come  into  existence           subsequently during the course of the inquiry, for           instance, after the service of a charge sheet upon           the civil  servant  or  after  he  has  filed  his           written statement  thereto or  even after evidence           has been led in part.           (62) It will also not be reasonably practicable to           afford to  the civil  servant an  opportunity of a           hearing or  further hearing,  as the  case may be,           when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending           it, the  civil  servant  absconds  and  cannot  be           served or  will not participate in the inquiry. In           such cases,  the  matter  must  proceed  ex  parte           andonthe   materials   before   the   disciplinary           authority.           (63) The  recording of  the reason  for dispensing           with the  inquiry is  a condition precedent to the           application of  clause (b)  of the second proviso.           This is  a Constitutional  obligation and  if such           reason is not 819           recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the           inquiry  and   the  order   of  penalty  following           thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.           It is,  however, not  necessary  that  the  reason           should find  a place  in the  final order  but  it           would be advisable to record it in the final order           in order  to avoid  an allegation  that the reason           was not  recorded in  writing before  passing  the           final order but was subsequently fabricated.           (64) The  reason for  dispensing with  the inquiry           need  not  contain  detailed  particulars  but  it           cannot be  vague  or  just  a  repetition  of  the           language of clause (b) of the second proviso.           (65) It  is also  not necessary to communicate the           reason for  dispensing with  the  inquiry  to  the           concerned civil  servant but it would be better to           do so  in order to eliminate the possibility of an           allegation  being   made  that   the  reason   was           subsequently fabricated.           (66)  The  obligation  to  record  the  reason  in

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         writing is  provided in  clause (b)  of the second           proviso so  that the superiors of the disciplinary           authority  may  be  able  to  judge  whether  such           authority had exercised its power under clause (b)           properly  or   not  with   a  view  to  judge  the           performance and  capacity of  that officer for the           purposes of promotion etc.           (67) It  is, however,  better for the disciplinary           authority to  communicate to  the concerned  civil           servant its reason for dispensing with the inquiry           because such  communication  would  eliminate  the           possibility of  an allegation  being mae  that the           reason had  been subsequently fabricated. It would           also enable the civil servant to approach the High           Court under  Article 226  or, in  a fit  case, the           Supreme Court under Article 32           (68)  The   submission  that  where  a  delinquent           government servant  so terrorizes the disciplinary           authority that  neither that officer nor any other           officer stationed at that place is willing to hold           the inquiry,  some senior officer can be sent from           outside to hold the 820           inquiry cannot be accepted. This submission itself           shows that  in such  a  case  the  holding  of  an           inquiry is not reasonably practicable. It would be           illogical to hold that administrative work carried           out by  senior officers  should be  paralysed just           because  a  delinquent  civil  servant  either  by           himself or  along with or through others makes the           holding  of   an   inquiry   by   the   designated           disciplinary  authority  or  inquiry  officer  not           reasonably practicable.           (69) In  a case  falling under  clause (b)  of the           second proviso  it is not necessary that the civil           servant should  be placed  under suspension  until           such time as the situation improves and it becomes           possible to hold the inquiry because in such cases           neither public  interest nor  public good requires           that salary  or subsistence  allowance  should  be           continued to  be paid  out of the public exchequer           to the  concerned civil  servant. It would also be           difficult to  foresee how long the situation would           last  and   when  normalcy   would  return  or  be           restored. In  certain cases,  the exigencies  of a           situation would  require that prompt action should           be taken  and suspending a civil servant would not           serve the  purpose and sometimes not taking prompt           action might  result in  the trouble spreading and           the situation  worsening  and  at  times  becoming           uncontrolable. Not  taking prompt  action may also           be construed  by the  trouble makers  as a sign of           weakness on  the part  of the authorities and thus           encourage them  to step  up  their  activities  or           agitation. Where  such prompt  action is  taken in           order to  prevent  this  happening,  there  is  an           element  of  deterrence  in  it  but  this  is  an           unavoidable and  necessary concomitance of such an           action resulting  from a situation which is not of           the creation of the authorities.           (70) The contention that where an inquiry into the           charges against  a civil servant is not reasonably           practicable, none  the less before dispensing with           the inquiry  there should be a preliminary inquiry           into the question whether the disciplinary inquiry

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         should be  dispensed with  or not is illogical and           is a  contradiction in  terms. If  an inquiry into           the  charges   against  a  civil  servant  is  not           reasonable practicable, it. 821           stands to reason that an inquiry into the question           whether  the   disciplinary  inquiry   should   be           dispensed with  or not  is equally  not reasonably           practicable.           (71) Where a large group of members of the Central           Industrial Security Force Unit posted at the plant           of the  Bokaro Steel  Ltd.  Indulged  in  acts  of           insubordination,  indiscipline,   dereliction   of           duty,  abstention   from  physical   training  and           parade,   taking    out   processions,    shouting           inflammatory   slogans,   participating   in   the           ’gherao’ of  supervisory officers, going on hunger           strike and  ’dharna’ near  the Quarter  Guard  and           Administrative Building  of the Unit, indulging in           threats of violence, bodily harm and other acts of           intimidation to  supervisory  officers  and  loyal           members of  the said  Unit,  and  thus  created  a           situation whereby  the normal  functioning of  the           said Unit of the Central Industrial Security Force           was   made    difficult   and    impossible,   the           disciplinary authority  was justified  in applying           clause (b) of the second proviso to those who were           considered responsible  for such  acts. Clause (b)           of the  second proviso to Article 311 (2) was also           properly applied  in the cases of those members of           the Central  Industrial Security  Force  who  were           considered  responsible  for  creating  a  similar           situation at Hoshangabad.           (72) In  cases  such  as  the  above,  it  is  not           possible to  state in  the order  of dismissal the           particular acts done by each of the members of the           concerned group as such cases are very much like a           case under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.           (73) In  situations such  as the one where a large           group acting  collectively with  the common object           of coercing  those in charge of the administration           of the  Central Industrial  Security Force and the           Government to compel them to grant recoginition to           their Association and to concede their demands, it           is not  possible to particularize in the orders of           dismissal the  acts of  each individual member who           participated in  the commission of these acts. The           participation of  each individual  might be  of  a           greater or  lesser degree  but the  acts  of  each           individual  contributed   to  the  creation  of  a           situation in  which a security force itself became           a security risk. 822           (74) Railway  service is  a public utility service           within the  meaning of  clause (a) of section 2 of           the Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, and the proper           running of  the railway  service is  vital to  the           country.           (75) Where,  therefore, the railway employees went           on an  illegal all-India  strike without complying           with  the   provisions  of   section  22   of  the           Industrial  Disputes   Act,  1947,   and   thereby           committed an  offence punishable with imprisonment           and fine  under section 26 (1) of the said Act and           the  situation   became  such   that  the  railway

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         services  were   paralysed,  loyal   workers   and           superior officers  assaulted and  intimidated, the           country held  to ransom,  and the  economy of  the           country  and   public  interest  and  public  good           prejudicially  affected,   prompt  and   immediate           action was  called  for  in  order  to  bring  the           situation to  normal. In  these circumstances,  it           cannot be  said that  an  inquiry  was  reasonably           practicable or  that  clause  (b)  of  the  second           proviso was  not properly  applied. The  fact that           the railway employees may have gone on strike with           the object of forcing the Government to meet their           demands is not relevant because their demands were           for  their  private  gain  and  in  their  private           interest  and   the  railway  employees  were  not           entitled in seeking to have their demands conceded           to  cause   untold  hardship  to  the  public  and           prejudicially  affect   public  good   and  public           interest and the good and interest of the nation.           (76) The  quantum and  extent of the penalty to be           imposed in  cases such  as the  above would depend           upon the  gravity of the situation at a particular           centre and the extent to which the acts said to be           committed  by   particular  civil  servants,  even           though not  serious in  themselves, in conjunction           with  acts  committed  by  others  contributed  to           bringing about the situation. The fact, therefore,           that at a particular centre certain civil servants           were dismissed  from service  while at  some other           centres they  were only  removed from service does           not  mean  that  the  penalties  were  arbitrarily           imposed.           XII. Clause (c) of the Second Proviso           (77) The  expression "security  of the  State"  in           clause (c)  of the  second proviso  to Article 311           (2) does not 823           mean security  of the  entire country  or a  whole           State but includes security of a part of a State.           (78) Security  of the  State cannot be confined to           an armed rebellion or revolt for there are various           ways in  which the  security of  the State  can be           affected such  as by  State secrets or information           relating to  defence production or similar matters           being  passed   on  to  other  countries,  whether           inimical or  not to India, or by secret links with           terrorists.           (79) The way in which the security of the State is           affected may be either open or clandestine.           (80) One  of the  obvious acts  which would affect           the security of the State would be disaffection in           the armed  forces or  paramilitary forces  or  the           police  force.   The  importance   of  the  proper           discharge of the duties by members of these Forces           and the  maintenance of  discipline among  them is           emphasized in Article 33 of the Constitution.           (81) Disaffection  in any  armed  force  or  para-           military force or police force is likely to spread           because dissatisfied  and  disaffected  member  of           such   a    Force   spread   dissatisfaction   and           disaffection among  other members of the Force and           thus induce  them not  to discharge  their  duties           properly  and  to  commit  acts  of  indiscipline,           insubordination or  disobedience to  the orders of           their superiors.  Such a  situation  cannot  be  a

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         matter affecting only law and order or pubic order           but is  a matter vitally affecting the security of           the State.           (82) The interest of the security of the State can           be  affected   by  actual  acts  or  even  by  the           likelihood of such acts taking place.           (83)  In   an  Inquiry  into  acts  affecting  the           interest of  the security  of the  State,  several           matters not  fit or  proper  to  be  made  public,           including the  source of  information involving  a           civil servant in such acts, would be disclosed and           thus  in   such  cases   an  inquiry   into   acts           prejudicial to the interest of the security 824           of the  State would as much prejudice the interest           of  the  security  of  the  State  as  those  acts           themselves would.           (84) The  condition for  the application of clause           (c) of  the second  proviso to  Article 311 (2) is           the satisfaction of the President or the Governor,           as the  case may  be, that  it is not expedient in           the interest  of the security of the State to hold           a disciplinary inquiry.           (85) Such  satisfaction is not required to be that           of the President or the Governor personally but of           the President or the Governor, as the case may be,           acting in the Constitutional sense.           (86) "Expedient" means "advantageous, fit, proper,           suitable  or   politic".  Where,   therefore,  the           President or  the Governor, as the case may be, is           satisfied that  it will not be advantageous or fit           or proper  or suitable  or politic in the interest           of the  security of  the State to hold an inquiry,           he would  be entitled  to dispense  with it  under           clause (c) of the second proviso.           (87) Under  clause (c)  of the  second proviso the           satisfaction  reached  by  the  President  or  the           Governor, as  the case may be, must necessarily be           a  subjective   satisfaction  because   expediency           involves matters of policy.           (88) Satisfaction of the President or the Governor           under clause  (c) of  the second  proviso  may  be           arrived at  as  a  result  of  secret  information           received  by  the  Government  about  the  brewing           danger to  the security  of  the  State  and  like           matters. There  are other  factors which  are also           required to be considered, weighed and balanced in           order to  reach the requisite satisfaction whether           holding an  inquiry would  be expedient or not. If           the requisite  satisfaction has  been reached as a           result  of  secret  information  received  by  the           Government, making known such information may very           often result  in disclosure  of the source of such           information and  once known  the particular source           from which  the information  was received would no           more be available to 825           the Government.  The reason  for the  satisfaction           reached by  the President  or the  Governor  under           clause  (c)   of  the   second   proviso   cannot,           therefore, be required to be recorded in the order           of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor can           it be made public.           (89) The  police are  the  guardians  of  law  and           order. They  stand guard at the border between the

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         green valleys  of law  and order and the rough and           hilly terrain  of lawlessness and public disorder,           and if  these guards  turn law-breakers and create           violent public  disorder and  incite others  to do           the same, one can only exclaim with Juvenal, "Quis           custodietimsos! Custodes?"           Who is  to guard the guards themselves? "(Satires,           VI, 347).  In such  a situation  prompt and urgent           action becomes  necessary and  the holding  of  an           inquiry into the conduct of each individual member           of the  police force would not be expedient in the           interest of the security of the State.           (90) When,  therefore, a  number of members of the           Madhya  Pradesh  District  Police  Force  and  the           Madhya Pradesh  Special Armed  Force, in  order to           obtain  the  release  on  bail  of  two  of  their           colleagues who  had been refused bail and remanded           into judicial custody because of an incident which           took place  at the  annual Mela held at Gwalior in           which one man was burnt alive, indulged in violent           demonstrations and  rioted  at  the  Mela  ground,           attacked the  police station  at the  Mela ground,           ransacked it  and forced  the wireless operator to           close down  the wireless  set  and  the  situation           became  so  dangerous  that  senior  district  and           police  officers  had  to  approach  the  Judicial           Magistrate  at  night  to  get  the  two  arrested           constables released  on bail and, after discussion           at a Cabinet meeting, a decision was taken and the           advice of the Council of Ministers was tendered to           the Governor of Madhya Pradesh who accepted it and           issued orders  of dismissal  of these  persons  by           applying clause (c) of the second proviso to them,           it cannot  be said that the provisions of the said           clause (c) were not properly applied. 826           (91) Similarly,  when after  these members  of the           Madhya  Pradesh  District  Police  Force  and  the           Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Force were dismissed,           some hotter members of these Forces began carrying           on an  active propaganda  against the  Government,           visiting various  places in  the State  of  Madhya           Pradesh,  holding  secret  meetings,  distributing           leaflets and  inciting the  constabulary in  these           places to  rise against  the administration  as  a           body in  protest against  the action  taken by the           Government  and,   on   such   information   being           received, they  were also  dismissed  by  applying           clause (c)  of the  second  proviso  to  them,  it           cannot be  said that  the said  clause (c) was not           properly applied.           XIII. Remedies available to a Civil Servant           (92) A  civil  servant  who  has  been  dismissed,           removed or reduced in rank by applying to his case           one of  the  clauses  of  the  second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) or  an analogous service rule has           two remedies available to him. These remedies are:           (i) the  appropriate departmental  remedy provided           for in the relevant service rules, and           (ii) if  still dissatisfied,  invoking the court’s           power of judicial review.           XIV. Departmental Remedies           (93)   Service   rules   generally   provide   for           departmental  remedies   by  way   of  an  appeal,           revision and  review in  the case  of disciplinary

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         action taken against a civil servant.           (94) Sub-clause  (ii) of  clause (c)  of the first           proviso to  Rule 25  (1) of  the Railway  Servants           (Discipline and  Appeal) Rules,  1968  inter  alia           provides that  where an inquiry has not been held,           the revising  authority  shall  itself  hold  such           inquiry or direct such inquiry to be held, subject           to the  provisions of  Rule 14  of the  said Rules           which  is  analogous  to  the  second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2). Thus,  under the  said  Rules  a           railway servant has a right to demand 827           in revision  an inquiry  into the  charges against           him subject to a situation envisaged in Rule 14 of           the said Rules not prevailing at that time.           (95) Although  a provision  similar to  sub-clause           (ii) of clause (c) of the first proviso to Rule 25           (1)  of   the  Railway  Servants  (Discipline  and           Appeal) Rules,  1968, does  not exist in the rules           relating to  appeals in  the  said  Rules,  having           regard to  the factors  set out  in Rule 22 (2) of           the said  Rules which  are to be considered by the           appellate  authority  in  deciding  an  appeal,  a           provision similar  to the  said sub-clause (ii) of           clause (c)  of the  first proviso  to Rule  25 (1)           should be  read and  imported into  the provisions           relating to appeals in the said Rules.           (96)  Where   service  rules   do  not  contain  a           provision similar to sub-clause (ii) of clause (c)           of the first proviso to Rule 25 (1) of the Railway           Servants  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1968,           having regard  to the  factors to  be  taken  into           account by  the appellate authority in deciding an           appeal, a provision similar to the said sub-clause           (ii) of  clause (c)  of Rule 25 (1) of the Railway           Servants  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1968,           should be  read and  imported into  the provisions           relating to appeals and revision contained in such           service rules.  This would, however, be subject to           a situation  envisaged by  the second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) not  existing at  the time of the           hearing of the appeal or revision.           (97) Even  in a  case where  at the  time  of  the           hearing of the appeal or revision, as the case may           be, a situation envisaged by the second proviso to           Article 311  (2) exists,  as the civil servant, if           dismissed or removed, is not continuing in service           and if  reduced in  rank, is continuing in service           with the  reduced rank,  the hearing of the appeal           or  revision,  as  the  case  may  be,  should  be           postponed for  a  reasonable  length  of  time  to           enable the situation to return to normal.           (98) An  order  imposing  penalty  passed  by  the           President or  the Governor,  as the  case may  be,           cannot be  challenged in  a departmental appeal or           revision. 828           (99) A  civil servant  who has  been dismissed  or           removed  from   service  or  reduced  in  rank  by           applying to  his case  one of  the clauses  of the           second  proviso  of  Article  311  (2)  or  of  an           analogous service  rule has,  therefore, the right           in a departmental appeal or revision to a full and           complete inquiry into the allegations made against           him subject to a situation envisaged in the second

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         proviso to  Article 311  (2) not  existing at  the           time of  the hearing  of the  appeal  or  revision           application. Even in a case where such a situation           exists, he  has the  right to  have the hearing of           the appeal or revision application postponed for a           reasonable length  of time  for the  situation  to           become normal.           (100) In  an appeal, revision or review by a civil           servant who  has been  dismissed or  removed  from           service or reduced in rank by applying to his case           clause (a)  of the  second proviso or an analogous           service rule,  it is not open to the civil servant           to contend  that he  was wrongly  convicted by the           criminal Court.  He can, however, contend that the           penalty  imposed   upon  him   is  too  severe  or           excessive or  was one  not warranted  by the facts           and circumstances  of the  case. If  he is in fact           not the  civil servant  who was actually convicted           on a  criminal charge,  he can  contend in appeal,           revision or  review against  such order of penalty           that it was a case of mistaken identity.           (101) A  civil servant  who has  been dismissed or           removed  from   service  or  reduced  in  rank  by           applying to  his case  clause (b)  of  the  second           proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous service           rule can  claim in  appeal  or  revision  that  an           inquiry should be held with respect to the charges           on which  such penalty  has been  imposed upon him           unless a situation envisaged by the second proviso           is prevailing  at the  hearing of  the  appeal  or           revision application.  Even in  such  a  case  the           hearing of  the  appeal  or  revision  application           should be  postponed for  a reasonable  length  of           time for the situation to return to normal.           (102) In  a case  where a  civil servant  has been           dismissed or  removed from  service or  reduced in           rank by  applying clause (b) of the second proviso           or an 829           analogous service rule to him, by reason of clause           (3) of  Article 311  it is  not  open  to  him  to           contend in  appeal, revision  or review  that  the           inquiry was wrongly dispensed with.           (103) In  a case  where a  civil servant  has been           dismissed or  removed from  service or  reduced in           rank by  applying clause (c) of the second proviso           or an  analogous service rule to him, no appeal or           revision will  lie if  the order  of  penalty  was           passed by  the  President  or  the  Governor.  If,           however, the  inquiry has  been dispensed  with by           the President  or the  Governor and  the order  of           penalty  has   been  passed  by  the  disciplinary           authority (a position envisaged by clause (iii) of           Rule 14  of the  Railway Servants  (Discipline and           Appeal) Rules,  1968, and  clause (iii) of Rule 19           of the  Central  Civil  Services  (Classification,           Control and  Appeal) Rules,  1965), a departmental           appeal or  revision will lie. In such an appeal or           revision, the civil servant can ask for an inquiry           to be  held into his alleged conduct unless at the           time of  the hearing  of the  appeal or revision a           situation  envisaged  by  the  second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) is  prevailing. Even  in  such  a           situation the  hearing of  the appeal  or revision           application should  be postponed  for a reasonable

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         length of time for the situation to become normal.           The civil servant, however, cannot contend in such           appeal or  revision that  the inquiry  was wrongly           dispensed with by the President or the Governor.           XV. Judicial Review           (104) Where  a clause  of the  second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) or  an analogous  service rule is           applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having           no relation  to the  situation envisaged  in  such           clause or  rule, the  action of  the  disciplinary           authority in applying that clause or rule would be           mala fide and, therefore, bad in law and the Court           in exercise  of its power of judicial review would           strike down  both the  order dispensing  with  the           inquiry  and   the  order   of  penalty  following           thereupon. 830           (105) Where  a civil servant has been dismissed or           removed  from   service  or  reduced  in  rank  by           applying clause  (a)  of  the  second  proviso  to           Article 311  (2) or  an analogous service rule and           he invokes  the Court’s  power of judicial review,           if the Court finds that the penalty imposed by the           impugned order  is arbitrary  or grossly excessive           or out  of all proportion to the offence committed           or  was   not   warranted   by   the   facts   and           circumstances of  the case  or the requirements of           the particular  government service  to  which  the           concerned civil  servant belonged,  the Court will           strike down the impugned order. In such a case, it           is, however,  not necessary  that the Court should           always order  reinstatement. The Court can instead           substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be           just and  proper in the circumstances of the case.           If, however,  the Court  finds that  he was not in           fact the  civil servant who was convicted, it will           strike down  the impugned  order  of  penalty  and           order his reinstatement.           (106) In  the case of a civil servant who has been           dismissed or  removed from  service or  reduced in           rank by  applying clause (b) of the second proviso           to Article  311 (2)  or an analogous service rule,           the High  Court under  Article 226  or this  Court           under Article  32 will  interfere on grounds well-           established in  law for  the exercise of its power           of judicial review in matters where administrative           discretion is exercised.           (107) The  finality given by clause (3) of Article           311 to  the disciplinary authority’s decision that           it was  not reasonably  practicable  to  hold  the           inquiry is  not binding  upon the  court  and  the           court would  consider whether  clause (b)  of  the           second proviso  or an  analogous service  rule had           been properly applied or not.           (108) In  examining the  relevancy of  the reasons           given for  dispensing with  the inquiry, the Court           will consider  the circumstances  which, according           to the disciplinary authority, made it come to the           conclusion that  it was not reasonably practicable           to hold  the inquiry.  If the court finds that the           reasons are  irrelevant, the order dispensing with           the inquiry  and the  order of  penalty  following           upon it would be void 831           and  the   Court  will   strike  them   down.   In

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         considering the  relevancy of the reasons given by           the disciplinary  authority, the  Court will  not,           however, sit  in judgment  over the reasons like a           Court of  first appeal  in order to decide whether           or not  the reasons  are germane  to clause (b) of           the second  proviso or  an analogous service rule.           The Court  must put  itself in  the place  of  the           disciplinary authority  and consider  what in  the           then prevailing  situation a reasonable man acting           in a  reasonable manner  would have  done. It will           judge  the   matter  in  the  light  of  the  then           prevailing   situation   and   not   as   if   the           disciplinary authority  was deciding  the question           whether the  inquiry should  be dispensed  with or           not in  the cool  and  detached  atmosphere  of  a           Court-room, removed  in time from the situation in           question. Where  two views are possible, the Court           will decline to interfere.           (109) Where  it is  alleged that clause (b) of the           second proviso  or an  analogous service  rule was           applied mala  fide, the  Court  will  examine  the           charge of  mala fides.  A mere  bare allegation of           mala fides  without any  particulars of mala fides           will not,  however, amount to a plea of mala fides           and requires to be ignored.           (110) If  the  reasons  for  dispensing  with  the           inquiry are  not  communicated  to  the  concerned           civil servant  and the  matter comes to Court, the           Court can  direct the  reasons to  be produced and           furnished to  the civil  servant and  if still not           produced, a  presumption should  be drawn that the           reasons were  not  recorded  in  writing  and  the           impugned order  would then stand invalidated. Such           presumption  can,   however,  be   rebutted  by  a           satisfactory explanation for the non-production of           the written reasons.           (111)  Where  a  civil  servant  is  dismissed  or           removed  from   service  or  reduced  in  rank  by           applying clause  (c) of  the second  proviso or an           analogous  service   rule   to   his   case,   the           satisfaction of the President or the Governor that           it  is  not  expedient  in  the  interest  of  the           security of  the State  to hold an inquiry being a           subjective satisfaction  would not be a fit matter           for judicial review. 832           (112) It  is not necessary for the Court to decide           the  question  whether  the  satisfaction  of  the           President or  the Governor  has been  reached mala           fide  or   is  based   on  wholly   extraneous  or           irrelevant  grounds   in  a  case  where  all  the           materials including  the advice  of the Council of           Ministers have  been produced  and such  materials           show that the satisfaction of the President or the           Governor was  neither reached mala fide nor was it           based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground.           (113)  By  reason  of  the  express  provision  of           Article  74   (2)  and  Article  163  (3)  of  the           Constitution the  question whether  any, and if so           what, advice  was tendered by the Ministers to the           President or  the Governor,  as the  case may  be,           cannot be inquired into by any Court.           (114) Whether the Court should order production of           the materials upon which the advice of the Council           of Ministers  to the President or the Governor, as

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         the case  may be,  was based in order to determine           whether the  satisfaction of  the President or the           Governor was  arrived at mala fide or was based on           wholly  extraneous  or  irrelevant  grounds  would           depend upon  whether the documents fall within the           class  of  privileged  documents  and  whether  in           respect  of   them  privilege  has  been  properly           claimed or not.      In Tulsiram  Patel’s Case  [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398,  where appeals filed  by certain  dismissed members  of the Central Industrial Security  Force had  not been  disposed of by the appellate authority,  the  majority  judgment  directed  the appellate  authority   to  dispose   of  such   appeals   as expeditiously as  possible. In  those  matters  where  civil servants had  been dismissed  or  removed  from  service  by applying to  their cases clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule, the Court gave such civil  servants time  to file  appeals and directed the concerned appellate authority to condone, in the exercise of its power  under the  relevant service  rule, the  delay  in filing such appeals.      It is  important to  note that the majority judgment in Tulsiram  Patel’s   Case  [1985]   3  S.C.C.  398,  is  more beneficial to civil servants and confers greater rights upon them than  Challappan’s Case  did. According  to Challappa’s Case a civil 833 servant to  whom a  service rule  analogous  to  the  second proviso to  Article 311 (2) is sought to be applied has only the right  to be  heard with respect to the penalty proposed to be  imposed upon  him. The  majority judgment in Tulsiram Patel’s Case  [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398,  has, however, conferred upon the  civil servants  who have been dismissed or removed from service  or reduced  in rank  by  applying  the  second proviso to  Article 311 (2) or an analogous service rule the right to  a full  and  complete  inquiry  in  an  appeal  or revision unless  a situation envisaged by the second proviso is prevailing  at the  time of  the hearing of the appeal or revision application. Even in such a case under the majority judgment the  hearing of  the appeal or revision application is to  be postponed  for a reasonable length of time for the situation to become normal.      The Facts of the Two Civil Appeals      Having seen  what was decided in Tulsiram Patel’s Case, [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398,  we now  turn to  the facts of the two Civil Appeals before us. The facts of both these Appeals are common. All  the Appellants  were employees  of the Research and analysis  Wing ("RAW",  in short).  Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India.      In 1904  an Intelligence  Bureau had  been formed which was reorganized  in 1948. Originally the Intelligence Bureau was  concerned   both  with   domestic   and   international intelligence. In  1968, a  branch of the Intelligence Bureau was set  up as  a separate  department and  the Intelligence Bureau since  that time  was concerned  with  only  domestic affairs while  the  RAW  was  concerned  with  international affairs and  under-cover activities  pertaining to  national security. Certain  cadres of  employees of the RAW formed an Association under  the  name  of  "The  Cabinet  Secretariat (Research and  Analysis Wing) Employees Association (Regd.)" The said  Association submitted  a character  of demands. We are not  concerned in  these Appeals with the reasonableness or otherwise of the said demands.      Earlier, the  different branches and departments of the RAW in  New  Delhi  were  scattered  in  several  buildings.

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Ultimately, a  new building  was constructed  for the RAW at Lodhi Road.  In the  said building  the Counter Intelligence Section ("CIS", for short) was housed. The other departments were housed  in the South Block at R.K. Puram. After the CIS was shifted  to the  building at Lodhi Road, Strict security measures were  introduced and the employees, when going from one floor to the other, had to show their 834 identity cards.  This was resented by the employees and they demanded the withdrawal of this regulation and insisted that the identification  check should be made only at the time of entering the building. This demand can only be characterized as  wholly   unreasonable.  The   RAW  is   a  security  and intelligence section  the Government  of India  dealing with many  sensitive  matters  affecting  national  security  and relations   with    other   countries    including   counter intelligence. The basic rule of intelligence work is that no person engaged  in it should know more than what he needs to know. It  is for  this reason  that when an outside agent is employed for  espionage, care  is taken  to see that he does not know  who his real employers are but knows only the name of his  contact  man  which  name  is  generally  an  alias. Employees of  an intelligence  service cannot, therefore, be the best  judges of what security measures should be adopted to prevent secrets from leaking out.      To return to our narrative, in the forenoon on November 27, 1980,  a  number  of  staff  members  collected  in  the galleries leading  to the  CIS rooms, protesting against the said  security   regulation  and   demanding  its  immediate withdrawal. All attempts to pacify them proved unsuccessful. More  and   more  employees  joined  them  and  they  turned aggressive, breaking into the various rooms of the CIS unit. Several persons  forced their  entry into  the room  of  the Director (CIS) and forced him as also the Assistant Director and the Security Field Officer who were in the room to stand in a corner and did not allow them to move from the spot but kept  them  as  hostages  in  order  to  have  their  demand conceded. The  employees  who  had  gathered  there  shouted slogans against  the organization  and its  officers.  These slogans were  obscene, abusive, threatening, and personal in nature. All  attempts made by senior officers to pacify them proved unsuccessful  and the  employees made  it clear  that they would  not let  the said  three officers  go unless the Director of  the Counter  Intelligence Section announced the withdrawal of  the said  security regulation.  This state of affairs continued until late in the evening. Ultimately, the local police  were sent  for and  about 8.30  p.m. the local police entered  the premises  and went  to the  galleries in front of  the CIS  branch. Some of the agitators who were in the gallery  escaped. Those  inside the said room closed the door to  prevent the  police party  from entering it but the police forced  open the  door and  rescued  the  said  three Officers. Thirty-one  agitators who  were found  inside  the room were  arrested and charged under section 342, 506, 353, 186, 332  and 333  of the Indian Panel Code and section 7 of the Criminal 835 Law Amendment  Act, 1952. They were subsequently released on bail by  the Judicial  Magistrate. These  arrested employees were suspended  under clause  (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 10 of the  Central Civil  Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,  1965, as  a criminal  case against  them was under investigation.      The  next  day,  namely,  on  November  28,  1980,  the agitation continued and many employees did not perform their

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duties. Instead,  they collected  inside the building and in the premises  in groups  stopping work  in many  branches. A large number  of them  went rung  shouting slogans  and made speeches in  the corridors  of the  office. On  November 29, 1980, a  letter was issued by the said Association demanding the immediate  withdrawal of  the criminal cases against the said employees  as also of the said security regulation. The letter stated  that  unless  these  demands  were  met,  the employees would  go on  a  pen-down  strike  with  immediate effect. Thereupon,  orders of suspension were issued against those who  were taking a leading, active and aggressive role in the agitation and indulging in these activities. The said suspension orders  were issued  from the  1st December  1980 onwards but  the pen-down  strike continued  spread to other offices of  the RAW  in New  Delhi as  well as  in different parts of  India  including  Lucknow  and  Jammu.  Daily  the situation worsened.  There was  complete insubordination and total breakdown  of discipline.  The atmosphere  was charged with tension  and  there  did  not  seem  any  hope  of  the situation becoming  normal. Ultimately, the seven Appellants in Civil  Appeal No.  242 of  1982 and the sole Appellant in Civil Appeal  No. 576 of 1982 were dismissed by orders dated December 6, 1980, without holding any inquiry by applying to them clause  (b) of  the second  proviso to  Article 311 (2) read with  Rule 19  of the  said  Rules.  Thereupon  a  writ petition was  filed in  the Delhi High Court. At the date of the filing  of the said writ petition only Appellants Nos. 1 to 3  in Civil  Appeal No.  242 of 1982 had been served with the orders  of dismissal, while the remaining Appellants and Respondents Nos.  4 to  44 in  Civil Appeal  No. 242 of 1982 joined in  the said writ petition as co-petitioners together with the  Cabinet Secretariat  (Research and  Analysis Wing) Employees Association (Regd.), contending the similar action of dismissal was being apprehended by them. Pending the said writ petition  the orders of dismissal were also served upon the remaining  Appellants. During  the course of the hearing of the  said writ  petition a statement was made to the High Court on  behalf of  the  Union  of  India  that  the  other petitioners would not be dismissed without holding a regular 836 inquiry. The  said writ  petition, therefore, proceeded only so  far   as  the  Appellants  in  these  two  Appeals  were concerned. A Division Bench of the said High Court dismissed the writ  petition by its judgment and order dated September 25, 1981.  It is against this Judgment and order of the said High Court,  that these  two Appeals  by Special  Leave have been preferred.      The Impugned Orders of Dismissal      All the  eight impugned  orders of  dismissal  were  in identical terms  and it  will, therefore,  be sufficient  to reproduce the  order of  dismissal passed  against the First Appellant in  Civil Appeal  No. 242  of 1982. The said order reads as follows:-           "No. 3/ADMN/80-6486(N)           GOVERNMENT OF INDIA           Cabinet Secretariat,           Room No. 8-B, South Block. New Delhi, the 6th Dec, 1980.                          O R D E R           Whereas a large number of employees of the Cabinet           Secretariat (R  & AW)  located at  Delhi have  for           some time  past been  indulging in various acts of           misconduct,   indiscipline,    intimidation    and           insubordination, such  as  abstaining  from  work,           wilful neglect  of the duties assigned to them and

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         disobedience of  lawful instructions and orders of           the official superiors;           and whereas  the said employees are also regularly           holding meetings and demonstrations unauthorisedly           and in  violation of  specific orders,  within the           office premises and its precincts;           and whereas  the said  employees have  resorted to           coercion, intimidation  and  incitement  of  other           fellow employees  which has a serious demoralizing           effect on  the members  of the  organization,  and           whereas such  conduct of  the  said  employees  is           unbecoming of a Government servant and is in gross           violation of  the Central  Civil Service (Conduct)           Rules, 1964;           and whereas  Shri Satyavir Singh, Field Assistant,           is   one    of   the   said   employees   actively           participating in such activities; 837           and whereas  due  to  the  practice  of  coercion,           intimidation and  such like  threats and  postures           adopted by the said employees the atmosphere is so           tense and abnormal that no witness will co-operate           with  any   proceedings  in  accordance  with  the           provisions   of   the   Central   Civil   Services           (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965;           and whereas  I am satisfied that the circumstances           are such  that it is not reasonably practicable to           hold a  regular enquiry  as  contemplated  by  the           Central Civil  Services  (Classification,  Control           and Appeal) Rules, 1965;           and whereas  on a  consideration of  the facts and           circumstances of the case, I am satisfied that the           penalty  of   dismissal  from  service  should  be           imposed on Shri Satyavir Singh, Field Assistant;           Now, therefore,  in exercise  of the  powers under           the proviso  (b) of  Clause (2)  of Article 311 of           the Constitution  read with rule 19 of the Central           Civil  Services   (Classification,   Control   and           Appeal) Rules, 1965, I as the appointing authority           do hereby  dismiss Shri  Satyavir Singh  from  the           post of  Field Assistant in the R & AW with effect           from the forenoon of December 6, 1980. Sd/- 6.12.80. (H.N. KAK) Joint Director      Contentions      Though several contentions were raised in the said writ petition, in  view of  the judgment in Tulsiram Patel’s Case [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398,  the  only  contention  taken  at  the hearing of  these two  Appeals was  that the  said orders of dismissal were  passed  mala  fide  and  the  reasons  given therein for  dispensing with  the inquiry  were not true and that an  inquiry was  reasonably practicable. Several points were urged in support of this contention.      The first  point was  that  the  orders  of  suspension showed that  a disciplinary inquiry was in fact contemplated and, if  so, nothing  had happened  between the  date of the orders of suspension 838 and the  date of  the orders  of dismissal  to come  to  the conclusion that  the inquiry was not reasonably practicable. (Each order or suspension stated that the concerned employee was being  suspended in the exercise of the powers conferred by Rule  10 (1)  of the  said Rules  because a  disciplinary

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proceeding against  him under  Rule 14 of the said Rules was contemplated.) Clause  (a) of Rule 10 (1) confers power upon a disciplinary  authority to  place the  government  servant under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated  or  is  pending.  Rule  14  prescribes  the procedure for  imposing major  penalties. One  of the  major penalties set  out in  Rule 11  is the  penalty or dismissal from service.  It is  thus clear  that at  the date  of  the orders of  suspension disciplinary  proceedings against  the Appellants was in contemplation. This however, does not mean that the  situation will continue to be the same and that at no time  thereafter will  the holding  of the inquiry become "not reasonably  practicable". As  pointed out  in  Tulsiram Patel’s Case [1985] 3 S.C.C. 398, it is not necessary that a situation  which   makes  the  holding  of  an  inquiry  not reasonably practicable  should exist before the disciplinary inquiry is  initiated, because a situation which renders the holding of  an inquiry  not reasonably  practicable can come into being  even  during  the  course  of  an  inquiry.  The affidavits filed  in the  High Court  clearly show  that the situation had so changed after the orders of suspension were issued against  the appellants  that it  was not  reasonably practicable to  hold any inquiry against the Appellants. The all-India pen-down  strike  was  spreading.  More  and  more centres in  India were  joining  in  the  said  strike.  The position  was   fast  deteriorating.  Employees  were  being instigated   into   further   acts   of   indiscipline   and insubordination and loyal employees and senior officers were being  intimidated.   Meetings   and   demonstrations   were regularly being  held within  the office  premises and their precincts and there was no possibility of any witness coming forward to  give evidence  against the  Appellants who  were said to  have taken  a leading part in this agitation. It is also  pertinent  to  note  that  when  the  first  batch  of dismissal orders  was served  upon some of the Appellants on December 8,  1980, the  pen-down strike  was called  off  on December  9,   1980.  In   such  a  situation  as  was  then prevailing, prompt  and urgent  action was required to bring the situation  under control.  As pointed  out  in  Tulsiram Patel’s Case,  [1985] 3  S.C.C. 398,  sometimes  not  taking prompt action  may result  in the  trouble spreading and the situation worsening and at times becoming uncontrolable, and may at  times be  also construed  by the  trouble-makers and agitators  as  a  sign  of  weakness  on  the  part  of  the authorities and encourage 839 them to  step up the tempo of their activities or agitation. The affidavits  filed in  the High  Court clearly  show that this is  exactly what  happened when  the suspension  orders were issued and that what was required was prompt and urgent action against  those who  were considered  to be  the  ring leaders and  that once  such action  was taken the situation improved and started becoming normal.      The next  point which  was urged  was that  while eight employees were  dismissed for  their part  in the  agitation which took place in Delhi, in respect of the agitation which took place  in the  Lucknow  office  of  the  RAW  only  two employees of  that office  were  dismissed  and,  therefore, there was  no  application  of  mind  on  the  part  of  the disciplinary authority.  It is  very difficult to understand this argument. We do now how what precisely the situation at Lucknow was  and how many employees were actively engaged in leading the  agitation, and the fact that it was thought fit to dismiss  only two  employees of the Lucknow Office cannot lead to  the conclusion  that the  Appellants  were  wrongly

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dismissed without any application of mind.      The next  point  which  was  urged  was  that  even  on December 6,  1980, a suspension order was issued against one of the  employees and  that on  December 9, 1980, suspension orders were issued against two other employees, and that the issuance of  these suspension  orders on  the  6th  and  9th December show what the holding of the inquiry was reasonably practicable. As the charge-sheets issued against these three employees show,  these employees  were working  in the  R.K. Puram Office  and are  not alleged to have taken any leading part in the agitation or in bringing about the atmosphere of violence, insubordination and indiscipline.      The next  point was  that it  was not  alleged  by  the authorities  that  anyone  was  physically  injured  in  the agitation. This  is another  argument which  is difficult to understand. As held in Tulsiram Patel’s case, it will not be reasonably  practicable   to  hold   an  inquiry   where  an atmosphere  of  violence  or  of  general  indiscipline  and insubordination prevails.  It is,  therefore, not  necessary that the  disciplinary authority should wait until incidents take place  in which  physical injury  is caused  to  others before dispensing with the inquiry.      It was next submitted that after the suspension orders, the appellants  were prohibited  from visiting  any  of  the Cabinet  Secretariat  Offices  except  for  the  purpose  of collecting their 840 they could not have held any meeting or demonstration inside the  office   premises.  There   is  no  substance  in  this submission. The  admitted position  is that  the  Appellants were regularly  coming to  the office  building and  talking with other  employees over  the wall and at the gate twice a day at 11.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. and were making inflammatory speeches and holding out threats.      The point  which was  next  urged  in  support  of  the contention that  the impugned  orders were  passed mala fide was that  even though co-workers may not have been available as witnesses,  there  were  policemen  and  police  officers posted  inside  and  outside  the  building  and  they  were available to  give evidence  and that superior officers were also available  to give  evidence. The  crucial and material evidence against  the Appellants  would be that of their co- workers for  these co-workers were directly concerned in and were eye-witnesses  to  the  various  incidents.  Where  the disciplinary  authority  feels  that  crucial  and  material evidence will  not be  available in  an inquiry  because the witnesses who  could give  such evidence are intimidated and would not  come forward and the only evidence which would be available,  namely,  in  this  case,  of  policemen,  police officers and  senior officers,  would only be peripheral and cannot relate  to  all  the  charges  and  that,  therefore, leading only such evidence may be assailed in a court of law as being a mere farce of an inquiry and a deliberate attempt to keep  back material witnesses, the disciplinary authority would be  justified in  coming to  the  conclusion  that  an inquiry is  not reasonably  practicable. The affidavit filed by the  Joint Director,  Research and Analysis Wing, Cabinet Secretariat, Hari  Narain Kak,  who had  passed the impugned orders sets  out in detail the various acts of intimidation, violence and incitement committed by each of the Appellants. Copies of  the  written  reasons  for  dispensing  with  the inquiry in the case of the Appellants have also been annexed to the  said affidavit.  It is  clear from  a perusal of the said affidavit.  It is  clear from  a perusal  of  the  said affidavit  and  its  annexures  that  the  police  officers,

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policemen and  senior officers could not have possibly given evidence with  respect to all these acts. The said affidavit further states  that the  senior officers  of the RAW in the said charter  of demands  submitted by  the said Association and the evidence of senior officers would have been attacked as being  biased and partisan. There is thus no substance in this point also.      The last  point which  was urged  that D.P.  Vohra, the Appellant in  Civil Appeal  No. 576  of 1982  was posted  at Jammu and  could not,  therefore, have taken any active part in the agitation 841 which took  place in  Delhi. This  submission is  completely belied by  the said  affidavit of  Hari Narain Kak. The said affidavit shows  that during  the relevant  time  Vohra  had taken leave for personal reasons and have come down to Delhi and had played on active role in the said agitation. He made inflammatory speeches  on the  1st,  3rd,  4th  and  5th  of December, 1980  and had  instigated the  other employees  to continue the  agitation and  intimidated those  who had  not joined in  the agitation  into doing so. In a speech made by him on December 4, 1980, he had tried to make public some of the top  secret operations  of  the  RAW  claiming  to  have special knowledge  of these  operations by  virtue of having been posted  earlier in  a sensitive  branch.  He  was  also actively engaged  in collecting  funds  for  continuing  the agitation.      We are,  therefore, of  the opinion  that clause (b) of the second  proviso to  Article 311(2)  and Rule  19 of  the Central Civil  Services (Classification, control and Appeal) Rules, 1965,  were properly  applied to  the case of each of the Appellants  and the  impugned orders  of dismissal  were validly passed against them.      Final Orders      In  the   result,  both  these  Appeals  fail  and  are dismissed and the interim orders passed in these Appeals are hereby vacated.  If any  payment has been made to any of the Appellants in  the pursuance  of  any  interim  order,  such Appellant will  not be  liable to  refund such amount or any part  thereof.  The  Appellants  have  a  right  to  file  a departmental  appeal   under  the   Central  Civil  Services (Classification Control  and Appeal)  Rules, 1965.  In  case they desire  to file such an appeal, we give them time until October 31,  1985, to  do so  and we  direct  the  appellate authority to  condone in the exercise of its power under the proviso to Rule 25 of the said Rules the delay in filing the appeal and to hear and dispose of such appeals expeditiously subject to  what has been laid down in Tulsiram Patel’s case and summarized in the earlier part of this judgment.      There will  be no  order  as  to  the  costs  of  these Appeals. S.R. Appeals dismissed. 842