http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 26  

PETITIONER: SATWANT SINGH SAWHNEY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D.  RAMARATHNAM,  ASSISTANT PASSPORT  OFFICER,GOVERNMENT  OF

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/1967

BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. BACHAWAT, R.S. SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1836            1967 SCR  (2) 525  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1971 SC2560  (19)  RF         1973 SC1425  (14)  RF         1973 SC1461  (313)  F          1977 SC1174  (3)  D          1977 SC1496  (18)  D          1978 SC 489  (9)  R          1978 SC 597  (3,10,40,52,54,73,99,189,207,2  R          1982 SC  33  (27)

ACT: Constitution  of India, Articles 14 and 21-Whether right  to travel  abroad  and to a passport part of  personal  liberty within  the  meaning of Art. 21-In the absence  of  any  law whether exercise of executive discretion to issue or  refuse passport discriminatory.

HEADNOTE: The petitioner carried on the business of import, export and the  manufacture of automobile parts and in connection  with his business it was necessary for him to travel abroad.  For this  purpose  he was holding two valid passports   when  on August 31, 1966 and on September 24, 1966 the first and  the second respondents, being the Assistant Passport Officer  at New  Delhi  and  the Regional  Passport  Officer  at  Bombay respectively  wrote  to the petitioner calling upon  him  to surrender  the two passports as the Central  Government  had decided to withdraw the passport facilities extended to him. The  petitioner filed the present petition under Art. 32  of the  Constitution  alleging  that  the  respondent’s  action infringed his fundamental rights under Art. 21 and 14 of the Constitution and prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to withdraw and cancel the decision contained in the two letters. It  was contended, inter alia, on behalf of  the  petitioner that  the right to leave India and travel outside India  and return to India is part of personal liberty guaranteed under Art.  21 of the Constitution; refusal to give a passport  or withdrawal  of one given amounts to deprivation of  personal liberty inasmuch as, (a) it is not practically possible  for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 26  

a  citizen to leave India or travel abroad or to  return  to India  without  a passport, (b) instructions are  issued  to shipping and air travel companies by the Central  Government not  to  take passengers on board without  a  passport;  (c) under  the Indian Passport Act, re-entering India without  a passport is penalized.  The deprivation of personal  liberty in  the  refusal’  or impounding of a  passport  is  not  in accordance with any procedure established by law within  the meaning  of Art. 21, as admittedly there is no  law  placing any  restrictions on ’the citizens of the country to  travel abroad.  Furthermore, the unfettered discretion given to the respondents to issue or not to issue a passport to a  person offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. The respondents contested the petition mainly on the grounds that  no  fundamental  right  of  the  petitioner  had  been infringed,   that   the  petitioner  had   contravened   the conditions  of  an  import licence  obtained  by  him,  that investigations  were  going on against him  in  relation  to offences  under the Export and Import Control Act, and  that the     passport  authorities  were satisfied  that  if  the petitioner was allowed to continue to have the passports, he was  likely  to leave India and not return to face  a  trial before a court of law and that therefore it was necessary to impound  his  passport.  Further it was contended  that  the passport was a document which was issued to a person at  the pleasure  of  the  President in exercise  of  his  political function and was a political document, and the refusal 526 to  grant a passport could not be a subject of review  in  a court of law. ,For the same reason it was contended that the petitioner had no right to have the passports issued to him. HELD : (per Subba Rao, C.J., Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.), A writ of mandamus must issue to the respondent to  withdraw and  cancel  the decision contained in their  letters  dated August 31, 1966 and ’September 20, 1966. A  person living in India has a fundamental right to  travel abroad  under  Art.  21 of the Constitution  and  cannot  be denied  a  passport  be,cause, factually, a  passport  is  a necessary condition for travel abroad and the Government, by withholding  the passport, can effectively deprive  him  ,of his right. [528 H; 530 G; 540 B] "Liberty"  in our Constitution bears the same  comprehensive meaning  as is given to the expression "liberty" by the  5th and  14th  Amendments  to  the  U.S.  Constitution  and  the expression  "personal liberty" in Art. 21 only excludes  the ingredients   of  liberty  enshrined  in  Art.  19  of   the Constitution.   In  other words,  the  expression  "personal liberty" in Art. 21 takes in the right of locomotion and  to travel  abroad,  but  the  right  to  move  throughout   the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch .as it is specially provided in Art. 19. [540 C-D] Kharak  Singh  v. State of U.P. [1964] 1  S.C.R.  332,  347, referred to. Under Art. 21 of the Constitution no person can be  deprived of  his  -right  to travel  except  according  to  procedure established  by  law and no law had been made by  the  State regulating or depriving a person of such a right. [542B] Whether  the right to travel is part of personal liberty  or not  within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution,  the unchanelled  arbitrary discretion with the executive in  the matter  of  issuing  or  refusing  passports  ,lo  different persons is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. [542 E- F; H] Case law discussed. Per Hidayatullah and Bachawat JJ., dissenting

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 26  

The  citizen’s right of motion and locomotion, in so far  as it  is  recognisable,  has been limited by Art.  19  of  the Constitution  to the territories ,of India and according  to Kharak Singh’s cave, that is the limit of the right.  It  is not possible to read more of that right in Art. 21. [554 H] Whatever the view of countries like the U.S.A. where  travel is a means of spending one’s wealth, the better view in  our country  is  that  a  person is  ordinarily  entitled  to  a passport unless, for reasons which can be established to the satisfaction  of  the  Court, the passport  can  be  validly refused to him.  Since an aggrieved party can always ask for a  mandamus  if he is treated unfairly, it is  not  open  by straining  the  Constitution,  to  create  an  absolute  and fundamental  right  to a passport where none exists  in  the Constitution.   There  is no doubt a  fundamental  right  to equality  in  the matter of grant of passports  (subject  to reasonable  classifications)  but there  is  no  fundamental right to travel abroad or to, the grant of a passport.   The solution  of  a law of passports will not  make  things  any better.   Even if a law were to be made the  position  would hardly  change  because utmost discretion will  have  to  be allowed to decide upon the worth of an applicant.  The  only thing that can be said is that where the passport  authority is proved to be wrong, a mandamus will always  right  the  matter.  The  affidavits  filed  by  the respondents showed that one of the petitioners was a  member of  a gang of passport racketeers and had got many  students stranded in foreign countries by arranging for their  travel with  a  company  which did  not  exist,  had  countermanded emigration  laws of a foreign power and had  suppressed  the fact  that he had once been refused a passport.   The  other petitioner had obtained an import licence to import goods of the  value of Rs. 3 lakhs on condition that he would  export finished  goods worth Rs. 4 lakhs but had sold away most  of the  imports  in the Indian market; he was also  alleged  to have  defrauded the import control authorities in  different ways and investigations into his activities were proceeding. It  was  for  these reasons that the  respondents  took  the action  complained  of  and judging of these  cases  on  the evidence of the affidavits, it was possible to hold that the passports  were  properly  refused  or  impounded.   In  the present  case  there was therefore no valid ground  for  the issuance of a mandamus. [543 E-544 F] The passport is a political document and one which the State may choose to give or to withhold.  Since a passport vouches for  the respectability of the holder, it stands  to  reason that the Government need not vouch for a person it does  not consider worth. [555 A-B] Case law discussed.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ petitions Nos. 230 of 1966  and 30 of 1967. Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights. S.   J.  Sorabjee,  A. J. R Rana, J.  R. Gag?-at and  B.  R. Agarwala,  for the petitioner and the- intervener  (in  W.P. No. 230 of 1966). A.   K.   Sen,  J.  C.  Talwar and  R.  L.  Kohli,  for  the petitioner (in W.P. No. 30 of 1967). Niren  De,  Additional Solicitor-General, N. S.  Bindra  and R.N. Sachthey for R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents (in both the  petitions).

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 26  

The Judgment of SUBBA RAO, C.J., SHELAT and VAIDIALIN- GAM,  JJ.  was delivered by SUBBA RAO, C.J.  The  dissenting Opinion  of HIDAYATULLAH and BACHAWAT, JJ. was delivered  by HIDAYATULLAH, J. Subba Rao, C.J. Satwant Singh Sawhney, the petitioner, is  a citizen  of India.  He carries on the business of  Importer, Exporter   and   Manufacturer  of   automobile   parts   and engineering  goods in the name and style  of  Indi-Europeans Trading Corporation.  He also carries on another business in engineering  goods  in the - name of  "Sawhney  Industries". For  the  purpose of his business,it is  necessary  for  the petitioner  to  travel abroad.  From the year 1958  lie  was taking   passports   for  visiting  foreign   countries   in connection  with  his  business.  On  December  8,  1965  he obtained  a  regular passport from the Government  of  India which is valid upto March 22, 1969.  So too, on October 27, 528 1965 he obtained another passport which was valid upto March 22,  1967.   On  August  31,  1966  the  Assistant  Passport Officer, Government of India, Ministry of External  Affairs, New   Delhi,  the  1st  respondent  herein,  wrote  to   the petitioner   calling  upon  him  to  return  the  said   two passports,  as the 3rd Respondent, the Union of  India,  had decided to withdraw the passport facilities extended to  the petitioner.   So  too,  the  2nd  respondent,  the  Regional Passport  Officer, Bombay, wrote to the petitioner a  letter dated September 24, 1966, calling upon him to surrender  the said  two passports immediately to the Government and  inti- mating  him  that in default action would be  taken  against him.  Though the petitioner wrote letters to the respondents requesting  them  to reconsider their decision, he  did  not receive any reply from them.  The petitioner, alleging  that the said action of the respondents infringed his fundamental rights under Arts. 21 and 14 of the Constitution, filed  the writ  petition ’in this Court for the issuance of a writ  of mandamus  or other appropriate writ or writs  directing  the respondents  to  withdraw  and  cancel  the  said   decision contained  in the said two letters, to forbear  from  taking any  steps  or proceedings in the enforcement  of  the  said decision and to forbear from depriving the petitioner of the said two passports and his passport facilities.  The respondents contested the petition mainly on the ground that  the  petitioner’s  fundamental  right  had  not   been infringed, that the petitioner contravened the conditions of import  licence  obtained by him, that  investigations  were going  on  against  him in relation to  offences  under  the Export  and  Import  Control  Act  and  that  the   passport authorities  were  satisfied  that  if  the  petitioner  was allowed  to continue to have the passports he was likely  to leave India and not return to face a trial before a court of law  and  that,  therefore  his  passports  were  impounded. Further  it  was alleged that the passport  was  a  document which  was  issued  to  a per-,on at  the  pleasure  of  the President  in exercise of his political function and  was  a political  document,  and the refusal to  grant  a  passport could not be a subject of review in a court of law.  For the same reason it was alleged that the petitioner had no  right to have the passports issued to him. It  would be convenient at the outset to record briefly  the respective contentions advanced by learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents. The arguments of Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel for the  peti- tioner,  may be summarized thus : The right to  leave  India and  travel  outside India and return to India  is  Part  of personal   liberty   Guaranteed  under  Art.   21   of   the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 26  

Constitution.  (2) Refusal to give a passport or  withdrawal of  one  given amounts to deprivation  of  personal  liberty inasmuch as, (a) it is not practically  529 possible for a citizen to leave India or travel abroad or to return  to  India without a passport, (b)  instructions  are issued  to  shipping  and  travel  companies  not  to   take passengers  on board without passport, (c) under the  Indian Passport Act reentering India without Passport is penalized. (3) The deprivation of personal liberty is not in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning  of Art.  21,  as  admittedly  there  is  no  law  placing   any restrictions  on  the  citizens of  the  country  to  travel abroad.   (4)  The  unfettered  discretion  given   to   the respondents to issue on not to issue a passport to a  person offends  Art.  14  of the Constitution inasmuch  as  (a)  it enables the State to discriminate between persons  similarly situated and also because it offends the doctrine of rule of law,  (b) the rule of law requires that an executive  action which prejudicially affects the rights of a citizen must  be pursuant to law.  And (5)     the  said  orders  offend  the principles of fairplay. The  learned  Additional Solicitor  General;  presented  his arguments  from  a different perspective.  The gist  of  his arguments  may be stated thus, (1) Passport is  an  official Political  document  to be presented to the  Governments  of foreign  nations and n-tended to be used for the  protection of  the holder of the passport in foreign countries : it  is only a facility provided by the Government and no person has a  right to it. (2) The right to travel is not  included  in "personal  liberty" guaranteed by Art.1 of the  Constitution for  the  following  reasons  :  (a)  the  right  to  travel necessitating  a  passport  cannot  be  a  right  because  a passport gives only a facility -and does not confer a  right : (b) no constitution,-! guarantee of the right to travel is conferred under our Constitution for such a guarantee  would obviously  be  ineffective outside the  territories  of  the country  governed by the said Constitution : and (c) as  the right to travel depends entirely on the municipal law of the foreign  country  governing  the right of  entry  into  that country,  in  the very nature of things no  Costitution  can confer such a right on the people governed by that country, Before we consider the validity of the conflicting arguments and  the  case-law on the subject it will be  convenient  to notice the factual position   India vis-a-vis the importance of  a passport in the matter of exit from India for  foreign travel. As  a  result of international convention  and  usage  among nations  it is not possible for a person residing  in  India to, visit foreign countries, with a few exceptions,  without the  possession of a passport.  The Government of India  has issued instruction to shipping and airline companies not  to take  on board passengers leaving India unless they  possess valid  passports.   Under S. 3 of the Indian  Passport  Act, 1920, the Central Government may CI/67-4 530 make rules requiring that persons entering into India  shall be  in  possession of passports.  In exercise of  the  power conferred under s. 3 of the said Act rules were made by  the Central   Government.   Under  r.  3  thereof,  no   persons proceeding  from  any  place outside India  shall  enter  or attempt to enter India by water, land or air unless he is in possession of a valid passport conforming to the  conditions prescribed in r. 4 thereof.  Under s. 4 of the said Act  any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 26  

such  person  may be arrested by an officer  of  police  not below  the prescribed rank; and under r. 6 of the Rules  any person  who contravenes the said rules shall  be  punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 3 months or with a fine or with both.  Under s. 5 of the Act the Central Government  is  authorised by general or  special  order  to direct  the  removal  of any such person  from  India.   The :combined effect of the provisions of the Act and the  rules made thereunder is that the executive instructions given  by the  Central Government to shipping and  air-line  companies and the insistence of foreign countries on the possession of a  passport  before an Indian is permitted  to  enter  those countries  make  it  abundantly  clear  that  possession  of passport, whatever may be its meaning or legal effect, is  a necessary requisite for leaving India for traveling  abroad. The  argument that the Act does not impose the taking  of  a passport  as  a condition of exit from India,  therefore  it does  not  interfere with the right of a  person  ’to  leave India,  if  we  may say so, is rather  hyper  technical  and ignores  the  realities of the, situation.  Apart  from  the fact that possession of passport is a necessary condition of travel  in  the  international  community,  the  prohibition against  entry indirectly prevents the person  from  leaving India.   The  State in fact tells a person living  in  India "you  can leave India at your pleasure without  a  passport, but  you would not be allowed by foreign countries to  enter them  without  it  and you cannot also come  back  to  India without  it".   No person in India can  possibly  travel  on those conditions.  Indeed it is impossible for him to do so. That apart, even that theoretical possibility of exit is ex- pressly restricted by executive instructions and by  refusal of  foreign-exchange.  We have, therefore, no hesitation  to hold  that  an  Indian passport  is  factually  a  necessary condition  for  travel  abroad  and  without  it  no  person residing in India can travel outside India. If that be the factual position, it may not be necessary  to consider  the legal effect of the possession of a  passport. But as much of the argument turned upon the question of  its scope, it is as well that we noticed the law on the subject. At  the outset we may extract some of the forms of  passport obtaining  in different countries.  The British  form  reads thus  531 .lm15 "The Secretary of State requests and requires in the name of His  Majesty  all  those whom it may concern  to  allow  the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance and to afford him every assistance and protection of which he may stand in need." The form obtaining in the United States of America reads "The Secretary of State requests all whom it may concern  to permit safely and freely to pass and in case of need to give all     lawful     aid     to............     the      named person............................. a citizen of the  United States." In India the form reads thus : "These  are  to  request  and require in  the  Name  of  the President  of  the Republic of India all those whom  it  may concern  to allow the bearer to pass freely without  let  or hindrance,  and  to afford him or her every  assistance  and protection of which he or she may stand in need." There  are  also  other forms.  It will  be  seen  from  the phraseology  used  in the three forms that they are  in  the nature of requests from one State to another permitting  the holder to pass freely through the State and to give him  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 26  

necessary   assistance.    Alverstone,  C.J.,   in   R.   V. Brailsford(1) described a passport thus:               "It  is  a  document issued  in  the  name  of               sovereign on the responsibility of a  Minister               of  the Crown to a named individual,  intended               to be presented to the Governments of  foreign               nations  and to be used for that  individual’s               protection  as  a British subject  in  foreign               countries,  and  it depends for  its  validity               upon  the fact that the Foreign Office  in  an               official  document vouches the  respectability               of the person named.’ The  same definition is given to passport in  Wharton’s  Law Lexicon,  XIV Edition, p. 741.  The House of Lords in  Jayco v. Director of Public Prosecutions(2) accepted the statement of  ,Alverstone, C.J., R. v. Brailsford(1) and held that  by its terms the passport requested and required in the name of His  Majesty  all those whom it might concern to  allow  the bearer to pass freely without lot or hindrance and to afford him every assistance and protection of which he may stand in need.  Lord Jowitt, L. C,. proceeded to state :               "it is, I think, true that the possession of a               passport   by  a  British  subject  does   not               increase the               (1) [1905]2 K. B. 703.               (2) L.R.[1946]A. C. 347,369.                532               sovereign’s duty of protection, though it will               make his path easier.  For him it serves as  a               voucher and means of identification.  But  the               possession  of a passport by one who is not  a               British  subject gives him rights and  imposes               upon  the  sovereign obligations  which  would               otherwise not be given or imposed." A  summary  of  the present law on  passports  is  found  in Halsbury’ Laws of England, Volume IV, at p. 519 and it reads thus:               "Passports may be granted by the Crown at  any               time to enable British subjects to travel with               safety   in   foreign  countries,   but   such               passports would clearly not be available so as               to permit travel in any enemy’s country during               war." A footnote to the above says               "The  possession of a passport is  now  almost               always required by the authorities to enable a               person to enter a country." P.   Weis  in  his book "Nationality  and  Statelessness  in International  Law",  after narrating  briefly  the  earlier history of the passport system speaks of the position in the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century thus :               "Only  since  the  First  World  War  has  the               passport  system  in  its  modern  sense  been               introduced in most countries, i.e., the system               whereby  aliens  who wish to enter  a  foreign               territory  are required to produce a  passport               issued by the authorities of their country  of               nationality." The learned author then described the character of the docu- ment thus :               travel  document  issued to  the  State’s  own               nationals."               Then the learned author stated at p. 226 thus               "In the normal intercourse of State, a foreign               national passport is, as a rule, accepted  as-

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 26  

             prima   facie   evidence   of   the   holder’s               nationality." He also pointed out that British and American passports con- tained  a  request  to  whom  it  might  concern  to  afford protection  to  the  holder, but  passports  of  most  other countries  did not contain such a request.  Professor  Harry Street in his book "Freedom, the Individual and the Law"  in describing  the essence of a passport says much to the  same effect thus, at p. 271:  533 "In  essence a passport is a document which  identifies  the holder and provides evidence of his nationality."               In "The Grotius Society" Vol.  32-Transactions               for   ’the  year  1946"  under   the   heading               "Passports  and  Protection  in  International               Law"   Kenneth  Diplock,  after  tracing   the               history  of  the  passport  system  from   the               earliest times, observed thus : " Passport’ in the modem sense is, in essence, a document of identity with which a State may, but not I necessarily does- require  alien  travellers  within  its  territories  to  be furnished." The learned author concludes :               "They (passports) are in the same category  as               any  other evidence of the national status  of               an  individual; and any rights  to  protection               recognised  in  international  law  flow  from               national  status,  not from  the  evidence  by               which national status is proved." It is, therefore, clear that in England and a passport takes the  form of a request to foreign countries and enables  the British subjects to travel in safety in those countries.  It is  a  document of identity.  It also  affords  prima  facie evidence that the person holding, the passport is a national of  England.   In  the modern times without it,  it  is  not possible to enter any State. Now let us trace its history in the American law In  Domingo Urtetiqui  v.  John N. D.’ Arcy(1) the scope of  a  passport before relevant statutes were made is described ’thus :               "It  is a document which, from its nature  and                             object,   is  addressed  to   foreign   powers;               purporting  only  to  be a  request  that  the               bearer  of it may pass safely and freely;  and               is to be considered rather in the character of               a  political document, by which the bearer  is               recognised in foreign countries as an American               citizen;  and which, by usage and the  law  of               nations, is received as evidence of the fact."               In  Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, 2nd  Edition,               at  p. 940, the following meaning is given  to               "passport" :                "A document issued on behalf of a citizen  of               the  United States by the Secretary of  State,               addressed to foreign powers and purporting  to               be  a request that the bearer of it many  pass               safely and freely.  It is to be con-               (1)(1835) 9 L, Ed. 275,279.               534               sidered  as a political document by which  the               bearer  is recognized in foreign countries  as               an American citizen,and which by usage and the               law of nations is received as evidence of  the               fact.               This definition is ’taken from the decision in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 26  

             Uretiqui  v. D’Arbel(1).  So too, in  American               Jurisprudence, Vol. 40, the same   description               is given of a passport and it is added that it               is a political document. But  the  Supreme Court of America for the  first  time  had defined  the scope of passport in Kent v. Dulles(2).   There the Secretary of State refused to issue passport to each  of the two plaintiffs because of the refusal to file  affidavit concerning  their  membership in the  Communist  Party.   To obtain  the  passport each of the plaintiffs  instituted  an action  against the Secretary of State in the United  States District Court for the District of Columbia.  In due  course the case went up to the Supreme Court.  Mr. Justice  Douglas described the nature of the passport thus : "A passport  not only  is of great value-indeed necessary-abroad; it is  also an aid in establishing citizenship for purposes of  re-entry into the United States." At page 1212 he went on to say that the document involved more "in part, of course, the issuance of  the  passport carries some implication  of-intention  to extend  the bearer diplomatic protection, though it does  no more  than request all whom it may concern to permit  safely -aid freely to pass, and in case of need to give all  lawful aid  and  protection to this citizen of the  United  States. But  that  function  of the passport  is  subordinate.   Its crucial function today is control over exit".  While in  the earlier  judgment  the emphasis was laid on the  request  to protect  the  citizen,  this judgment  says  that  the  main function  of a passport is to control the exit.  So a  pass- port, whether in England or in the United States of America’ serves  diverse purposes; it is a "request for  protection", it is a document of identity, it is prima facie evidence  of nationality,  in modem times it not only controls exit  from the  State to which one belongs, but without it, with a  few exceptions,  it is not possible to enter another State.   It has become a condition for free travel. The  want of a passport in effect prevents a person  leaving India.   Whether  we  look at it as a facility  given  to  a person to travel abroad or as a request to a foreign country to  give  the  holder diplomatic protection,  it  cannot  be -denied that the Indian Government, by refusing a permit  to a  person  residing in India, completely prevents  him  from travelling abroad.  If a person living in India, whether  he is  a  citizen  or not, has a right to  travel  abroad,  the Government by withholding the passport can deprive (1) (135) 9 L. Ed. 276. (2) (1958) 2 L. Ed. 1204. him of his right. Therefore, the real question in these writ petitions  is  :  Whether a person living  in  India  has  a fundamental right to     travel abroad ? The  relevant  article  of the Constitution is  Article  21, reads :  "Art.  21 No person shall be deprived of  his               life               or    personal  liberty  except  according  to               procedure               established by law." If the right to travel is a part of the personal liberty  of person   he   cannot  be  deprived  of  his   right   except according...  the procedure established by law.  This  court in  Gopolan case(1) has held that law in that article  means enacted  law and it is conceded that the State has not  made any  law  depriving or regulating the right of a  person  to travel abroad. Before  we advert to the Indian decisions on the subject  it may  be useful to consider the American law on the  subject.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 26  

The   5th  and  14th  amendments  embody  a   constitutional guarantee  that no person shall be deprived of  his  liberty without due process of law.  In American Jurisprudence,  2nd Ed. at page 359, it is stated that "Personal liberty largely consists  of the, right of locomotion-to go where  and  when one  pleases only so far restrained as the rights of  others may  make  it  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  all   other citizens." Chief Justice Fuller in R. A. Williams v. Edgar Fears & Anr. (2) says : "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion,, the  right to   remove   from  one  place  to  another   according   to inclination.  is an attribute of personal liberty,  and  the right  ordinarily,  of  free transit  from  or  through  the territory  of  any  State is a right  secured  by  the  14th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." In  Leonard B. Boundin v. John Foster Dulles(3) the  law  is put  thus  : "travel abroad is more than  a  mere  privilege accorded American citizens.  It is a right, an attribute  of personal liberty, which may not be infringed upon or limited in  any  way  unless  there  be  full  compliance  with  the requirements of due process." The  Supreme  Court in Kent v. Dulles (4 )  re-affirmed  the ,;aid  doctrine and declared that the right to travel  is  a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be  deprived without  due process of law under the Fifth  Amendment.   It further  emphasised that freedom to travel is  an  important aspect  of  the  citizen’s  liberty.   No  doubt  the   said statement of law was conceded by the Solicitor General,  but that fact does not detract from the      (1) (1950) S.C.R. 88.    (2) 45 L. Ed. 186.      (3)  136  Faderal Supplement 21 S.(4) [1958] 2  L.  Ed. 1204. 536 validity of the view, as the decision was on merits and  not solely on concession. The Supreme Court again in Herbert Aptheker v. Secretary  of State(1)  re-affirmed the view expressed in Kent’s  case(2). Douglas  J.,  in  a  concurring  judgment  pin-pointed   the importance  of  that right thus : "Freedom of  movement,  at home   and  abroad,  is  important  for  job  and   business opportunities-for cultural, political and social activities- for  all  the commingling which a  gregarious  man  enjoys." Later on the learned Judge emphasised the importance of  the said freedom and described it graphically thus : "America is of  course  sovereign; but her sovereignty is  woven  in  an international  web  +,hat  makes her one of  the  family  of nations.   The  ties  with  all  the  continents  are  close commercially  as  well  as  culturally.   Our  concerns  are planetary,   beyond  sunrises  and   sunsets.    Citizenship implicates us in those problems and perplexities, as well as in domestic ones.  We cannot exercise and enjoy  citizenship in world perspective without the right to travel abroad; and I  see no constitutional way to curb it unless, as  I  said, there is the power to detain." An interesting article in the Yale Law Journal(3)  discusses the subject.  There the content of the word ’Liberty’ in the Fifth  Amendment was described as "not a static  conception" but  I  broad and pervasive view adaptable to  the  changing circumstances of American life and it was expressed that the right  of locomotion’, the right to move from one  place  to another according to inclination is an attitude of  personal liberty.   "Freedom, to leave one’s country temporarily  for travel   abroad  was  considered  to  be  important  to   an individual, national and international well-being". It is, therefore, clear that in America the right to  travel

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 26  

is considered to be an integral part of personal liberty. In  England  the  right to go abroad was  recognised  as  an attribute  of personal liberty as early as in the year  1915 in Article 42 of the Magna Carta.  The said article reads               "42.   It shall be lawful to any  person,  for               the  future. to go out of our kingdom, and  to               return,  safely  and securely, by land  or  by               water, saving his allegiance to us, unless  it               be  in time of war, for some short space,  for               the  common  good of the kingdom  :  excepting               prisoners and outlaws according to the laws of               the  land,  and of the people of  the  us  and               merchants who shall be above.  " (1)  12 L. Ed. 992. (3)  Yale Law Journal, Vol. 61 P. 171. (2) (1958) 2 L. Ed. 1204.  537 True  that this article was omitted in the final version  of the  Magna  Carta and Article 39 only  dealt  with  personal liberty.  Article 39 read :               "No  free man shall be taken or imprisoned  or               disregarded or outlawed, or exiled, or any way               destroyed; nor will we go upon him, nor  will-               we  send  upon  him,  unless  by  the   lawful               judgment  of his peers, or by the law  of  the               land." This article, no doubt, in terms does not guarantee a  right to travel abroad.   But   it  speaks  in   absolute   terms. Blackstone. great authority   on  ’Common Law’, speaking  of personal liberty observed:               "Personal  liberty  consists in the  power  of               locomotion,  of changing direction  or  moving               one’s  person  to  whatever  place  one’s  own               inclination may desire." So too, another authority on Common Law, Odgers, in his book on Common Law in Ch. 11 under the heading "Rights common  to all" states this aspect of the personal liberty thus               "Every  citizen enjoys the right  to  personal               liberty;  he  is entitled to stay at  home  or                             walk    abroad   at   his   pleasure   without               interference or restraint from others." In  the Grotius Society, Vol. 32, under the  heading  "Pass- ports  and protection in the International Law", this  facet of  liberty was traced. In the early development  of  Common Law  it is said that a subject was prohibited from  leaving- the  Realm  without the leave of the Crown, for  to  do  so, would  deprive  the King of a subject’s military  and  other feudal services.  But by the time of Blackstone, the subject has acquired a general Common law right to leave the  Realm, subject  to the prerogative right of tile Crown to  restrain him  by the writ, exeat Vegno  This prerogative  writ  later lapsed  through desuetude.  The result is that  in  England, subject  to  any special legislation, British  subjects  are entitled  at  Common Law to leave and enter the  country  at will.  The right of exit is a common law right. In  India, the Supreme Court had made some  observations  on the  scope of personal liberty in Art. 21 in some  decisions which  throw light on the content of personal  liberty.   In Gopalan  case(1) the petitioner who was detained  under  the Preventive  Detention  Act,  applied under Art.  32  of  the Constitution for a writ of habeas corpus and for his release from  detention on The ground that the said Act  contravened the   provisions  of  Arts.  13,  19,  21  and  22  of   the Constitution and in consequence it was

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 26  

(1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 538 ultra vires and that his detention was, therefore,  illegal. This   Court,  by  majority,  held  that  Art.  19  of   the Constitution  has  no  application to a  law  which  relates directly to the preventive detention even though as a result of  an order of detention the rights referred to in Art.  19 are  restricted  or abridged.  This Court was  not  directly concerned with the question whether the expression ’personal liberty’  in  Art. 21 takes in the right to  travel  abroad. Some of the observations made in regard to the limits of the right  to move throughout the territory of India in Art.  19 (1) (d) of the Constitution are not of much relevance as the limits of the movement are circumscribed by the said  clause itself.  But we are concerned in this case with the question whether the right to travel abroad falls within the scope of personal  liberty  in Art. 21.  At page 138, Fazal  Ali  J., says               "There can therefore be no doubt that  freedom               of  movement  is  in  the  last  analysis  the               essence  of  personal liberty, and just  as  a               man’s  wealth  is generally measured  in  this               country  in terms of rupees, annas  and  pies,               one’s personal liberty depends upon the extent               of  his  freedom  of  movement.   But  it   is               contended on behalf of the State that  freedom               of  movement to which reference has been  made               in article 1 9 ( 1 ) (d) is not the freedom of                             movement to which Blackstone and other   authors               have referred, but is a different _species  of               freedom  which  is  qualified  by  the   words               ’throughout the territory of India’.  How  the               use   of   the  expression   ’throughout   the               territory of India’ can qualify the meaning of               the rest of the words used in the article is a               matter   beyond  my  comprehension.    In   my               opinion,  the words "throughout the  territory               of  India" were used to stretch the  ambit  of               the’ freedom of movement to the utmost  extent               to  which  it  could  be  guaranteed  by   our               Constitution."               This  passage  makes  a  distinction   between               freedom  of  movement,  which  is  a  part  of               personal  liberty  and  the  limits  of   that               liberty under Art. 19(1)(d).               Das  J.,  at page 299, also  brings  out  this               distinction when he says :               "In  my judgment, Article 19 protects some  of               the  important attributes of personal  liberty               as  independent  rights  and  the   expression               "personal liberty" has been used in article 21               as  a  compendious term including  within  its               meaning  all the varieties of rights which  go               to make up the personal liberties of men." Later on he points out that Art. 19(1)(d) comprehends only a  specific and limited aspect of the freedom  of  movement. Again  539 at page 301 the learned Judge reverts to the same  position. observes :               "Its purpose is not to provide protection  for               the  general  right of free  movement  but  to               secure  a -specific and special right  of  the               Indian  citizen to move freely throughout  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 13 of 26  

             territories  of  India regarded  as  an  inde-               pendent   additional  right  apart  from   the               general right to locomotion emanating from the               freedom  of person.  It is  guarantee  against               unfair  discrimination in the matter  of  free               movement of the Indian citizen throughout  the               Indian  ’Union.  In short, it is a  protection               against  provincialism.  It has nothing to  do               with the freedom of the person as such.   That               is  guaranteed  to every  person,  citizen  or               otherwise,  in  the  manner  and  the   extent               formulated by’ article 21."               The observations of Mukherjee J., at page  258               must  also be restricted to the scope  of  the                             free movement under Art. 19(1)(d).               In  Kochunni’s case(1) this Court pointed  out               that  personal liberty in Alt. 21, is  a  more               comprehensive  concept  and has a  much  wider               connotation  than  the right  conferred  under               Art. 19(1)(d).               In  Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. (2)  the               question  was whether +,lie State  by  placing               the  petitioner under  surveillance  infringed               his  fundamental  right under Art. 21  of  the               Constitution.   This Court, adverting  to  the               expression  "personal liberty",  accepted  the               meaning  put upon the expression ’liberty’  in               the  5th  and  14th  Amendments  to  the  U.S.               Constitution   by  Field,  J.,  in   Munn   v.               Illinois(3)   but   pointed   out   that   the               ingredients of the said expression were placed               in two articles, viz., Arts. 21 and 19, of the               Indian Constitution.               This Court expressed thus               "It is true that in Art. 21 as contrasted with               the  4th and 14th Amendments in the U.S.,  the               word  ’Liberty’  is  qualified  by  the   word               ’personal’   and  therefore  its  content   is               narrower.   But the qualifying  adjective  has               been  employed in order to  avoid  overlapping               between   those   element  or   incidents   of               "liberty" like freedom of speech or freedom of               movement etc., already dealt within Art. 19(1)               and   the   "liberty"  guarantteed   by   Art.               21..............               (1)         [1960]3        S.C.R.         887.               (2)[1964] 1 S.C.R. 332, 345, 347               (3)   [1877] 94U.S. 1130                                     He               540               The same idea is elaborated thus :               "We............   consider   that    "personal               liberty"   is  used  in  the  Article   as   a               compendious term to include within itself  all               the  varieties of rights which go to  make  up               the  "personal  liberties" of man  other  than               those  dealt  with in the several  clauses  of               Art. 19(1).  In other words, while Art.  19(1)               deals with particular species on attributes of                             that  freedom,  "Personal liberty" in  Art.  21               take,,; in and comprises the residue." This  decision  is a clear authority for the  position  that "liberty"  in our Constitution bears the  sam  comprehensive meaning  as is given to the expression "liberty" by the  5th

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 14 of 26  

and  14th  Amendments  to  the  U.S.  Constitution  and  the expression "personal liberty" in Ai.,. 21 only excludes  the ingredients  of  "liberty"  enshrined  in  Art.  19  of  the Constitution.   In  other words,  the  expression  "personal liberty"  in Art. 21 takes in the, right of loco-motion  and to  travel  abroad,  but the right to  move  throughout  the territories of India is not covered by it inasmuch as it  is specially  provided  in.  Art. 19.   There  are  conflicting decisions  of  High Courts oil this  question.   A  division Bench  of the Madras High Court, consisting  of  Rajamannar, C.J.,  and Venkatarama Ayyar.  J. in V. G. Row, v. State  of Madras(1)  considered  this question in the context  of  the application  filed  for the issue of a writ-it  of  mandamus directing  the  state of Madras to endorse passport  of  the petitioner  as  valid  for  travel  to  U.S.S.R.  and  other countries  in Europe.  The petitioner there complained  that the refusal of an endorsement of the passport to any country was  a  violation of the fundamental right  granted  to  him under  Art.  19  (1) (d) of the  Constitution  and  Art.  14 thereof.   The  learned  Judges considered the  scope  of  a passport and its place in the foreign travel and came to the conclusion that, is the law then stood, the State could  not prevent  the petitioner from leaving for U.S.S.R. merely  on the -round that he did not hold a pass.port endorsed to that country and that there was no provision of law under which a citizen   like  the  petitioner  could  be  prevented   from reentering  India after travel to foreign  countries  except with  a  passport.  On the basis of that finding  the  Court held  on. the assumption that Art. 19(1) (d) would apply  to foreign travel, that there was no restriction on that right. It may also be noticed that no argument was advanced  before the  Bench  oil the basis of Art. 21  of  the  Constitution. "This decision does not help the respondents. A  full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Francis  Manjooran v.   Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, New (1) [1954] S.C.R. 399, Delhi(1) held that the expression "personal liberty" took in the right to travel.  M. S. Menon, C.J., observed               "The  right  to travel, except to  the  extent               provided  in Article 19(1) (d), is within  the               ambit of the expression "personal liberty"  as               used in Art. 21..........               Raman  Nayar, J., held that the right of  free               movement whether within the country or  across               its  frontiers,  either  in going  out  or  in               coming  in, was a personal liberty within  the               meaning  of  Art. 21.  Gopalan  Nambiyar,  J.,               observed  that  the  right  to  travel  beyond               India, or at least to cross its frontiers  was                             within the purview of Art. 21 and that  personal               liberty in Art. 21 was, ,not intended to  bear               the  narrow  interpretation  of  freedom  from               physical restraint.               Tarkunde,  J.,  of the Bombay  High  Court  in               Choithram  Verhomal Jethawani v. A.G.  Kazi(2)               held that the compendious expression "personal               liberty" used in Art. 21 included in its ambit               the right to go abroad and a person could  not               be deprived of that right except according  to               procedure established by law as laid down’  in               Art. 21.  On Letters Patent Appeal a  division               Bench of the same High Court in A. G. Kazi  v.               C. V. Jethwani(3) came to the same conclusion.               Tambe, C.J., after elaborately considering the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 15 of 26  

             relevant case law on the subject, came to  the               conclusion   that  the  expression   "personal               liberty"  occurring  in Art. 21  included  the               right to travel abroad and to return to India.               A  division Bench of the Mysore High Court  in               Dr.  S. S. Sadashiva Rao v. Union of  India(4)               came  to  same conclusion.  Hegde, J.,  as  he               then was, expressed his conclusion thus               "For  the reasons mentioned above, we  are  of               the  opinion  :-(i)  the  petitioners  have  a               fundamental right under Art. 21 to go abroad-.               (ii)  they  also have a fundamental  right  to               come back to this country. . . ." But a full Bench of the High Court of Delhi in  Rabindernath Malik  v.  The Regional Passport Office)-,  New,  Delhi  and others  (5),  came to a contrary  conclusion.   Dua,  Acting C.J.,  -,peaking  for the Court, was unable to agree,  on  a consideration  of the language of the Constitution  and  its scheme.  He held that ,’personal liberty" guaranteed by Art. 21 was not intended to extend to the liberty of going out of India and coming back.  He was mainly influenced by the fact that  Art.  21  applied to non-citizens also  and  that  the Constitution not having given a (1)  I.L.R. [1965] 2 Kerala 663, 664. (3)[1966] 68 Bom.  L.R. 529. (2)  [1965] 67 Bom.  L.R. 551. (4)  [1965] 2 Mys.  L.J. 605, 612. (5) Civil Writ No. 857 of 966 (uureporied decided on  23-12- 66) 542 limited  right  to move throughout the territories  to  non- citizens under Art. 19 (i) (d) could not have given a higher right to them under Art. 2 1. For the reasons mentioned above we would accept the view  of Kerala, Bombay and Mysore High Courts in preference to  that expressed  by the Delhi High Court.  It follows that  tinder Art. 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to procedure established by law.   It is not disputed that no law was made by the  State regulating ,or depriving persons of such a right. The  next question is whether the act of the respondents  in refusing  to issue the passport infringes  the  petitioner’s fundamental  right  under  Art.  14  of  the   Constitution. Article 14 says that the State shall not deny to any  person equality before the law or the equal protection of the  laws within  the territory of India.  This doctrine  of  equality before the law is a necessary corollary to the high  concept of the rule of law accepted by our Constitution.  One of the aspects of rule of law is that every executive action, if it is  to  operate to L the prejudice of any  person,  must  be supported  by some legislative authority : see The State  of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh(1).  Secondly, such  a law  would  be  void,  if it  discriminates  or  enables  an authority  to  discriminate  between  persons  without  just classification.   What  a  legislature  could  not  do,  the executive  could not obviously do.  But in the present  case the  executive  claims a right to issue a  passport  at  its discretion; that is to say, it can at its discretion prevent a person from leaving India on foreign travel.  Whether  the right  to travel is part of personal liberty or  not  within the  meaning  of  Art.  21  of  the  Constitution,  such  an arbitrary prevention of a person from travelling abroad will certainly affect him prejudicially.  A person may like to go abroad  for many reasons.  He may like to see the world,  to study  abroad,  to  undergo medical treatment  that  is  not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 16 of 26  

available  in  our  country, to  collaborate  in  scientific research, to develop his mental horizon in different  fields and such others.  An executive arbitrariness can prevent one from  doing  so  and permit another  to  travel  merely  for pleasure.  While in the case of enacted law one knows  where he stands, in the case of unchannelled arbitrary discretion, discrimination  is  writ large on the face of  it.   Such  a discretion. patently violates the doctrine of equality,  for the  difference in the treatment of persons rests solely  on the arbitrary selection of the executive.  The argument that the said discretionary power of the State is a political  or a  diplomatic one does not make it anytheless  an  executive power.  We, therefore, hold that the order refusing to issue the  passport  to  the petitioner offends  Art.  14  of  the Constitution. (1)  [1967]12 S.C.R. 454.  543 In  the view we have taken, it is not necessary  to  express our opinion on the other points raised. In the result we issue a writ of mandamus directing the res- pondents  to withdraw and cancel the decision  contained  in their letters dated August 31, 1966, and September 20,  1966 and  to forbear from taking any steps or proceedings in  the enforcement or implementation of the aforesaid decision  and further  to  forbear  from  withdrawing  and  depriving  the petitioner  of  his  two  passports  and  of  his   passport facilities.  The petitioner will have his costs. Hidayatullah,  J.  On April 10, 1967, the Chief  Justice  of India  on  behalf  of himself and our  brethren  Shelat  and Vaidialingam  delivered the majority judgment in  these  two writ petitions.  For reasons, into which it is not necessary to  go  here, our judgment could not be delivered  with  the judgment of the Chief Justice.  We expressed our dissent and indicated  that our reasons would follow.  We now state  the grounds on which our dissent to the judgment of the Court is founded. Some  of the facts of these cases have been set out  by  the learned  Chief Justice in his judgment and they need not  be repeated.  What has not been stated is that in the affidavit in  reply  on  behalf of the Union of India  it  is  clearly stated  why the passports had been withdrawn  or  cancelled. As the learned Chief Justice has not mentioned these  facts, they  need to be mentioned, before our appraisal of the  so- called fundamental right to travel can be appreciated. In  Writ  Petition No. 30 of 1967, Mr.  R.  D.  Chakravarti, UnderSecretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of External  Affairs states on affidavit that Om Prakash  Kapur was  a member of a gang of passport racketeers and  had  got many  students stranded in foreign countries, because, as  a travel agent he had arranged for their travel with a company which  did not exist.  In another instance he  countermanded the emigration laws of a foreign power.  He was once refused a  passport, but in a subsequent application  he  suppressed this  fact and a passport was issued to him.   The  proposed journey  was to visit his mother stated to be seriously  ill in London.  An attempt to impound his passport failed as  he had  already  left  India.  In proof  of  the  objectionable activities  of  the petitioner, the Union of India  filed  a photostat  copy  of his letter in which the  petitioner  had written  in  his  own handwriting how  tickets  were  to  be manipulated.   It was on this ground that the  passport  was refused to him. In  Writ  Petition No. 230 of 1966, the affidavit  in  reply states that the petitioner Satwant Singh Sawbney obtained in 1961 an import licence under the Export Promotion Scheme for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 17 of 26  

import  of brake liners in ribbons and brass rivets  of  the face value of Rs. 3 lakhs on condition that lie would export finished brake liners worth 544 Rs.  4  lakhs to non-rupee account areas.  He  however  sold away  in  Indian markets 91% of the imports.   He  was  also alleged to have defrauded the import control authorities  by showing  fraudulent exports with a view to obtaining  import licences under the Export Promotion Scheme.   Investigations were  going on into his doings in Kuwait and  the  passports were  withdrawn,  because  Satwant  Singh  Sawhney,  it  was apprehended, wished to leave India to tamper with  evidence. No   doubt  in  a  rejoinder  affidavit  he   denied   these allegations but the matter was not gone into at the  hearing before us because the two petitions were heard and  disposed of by the Court on the high plane of fundamental rights  and their  breach divorced from any facts whatever.   The  facts have,  therefore, to be stated because persons  seeking  the facility  of passports may have very different  credentials. For  example the case of an innocent traveller can never  be the  same as that of an anarchist who is suspected of  going into another country with the object of assisting at a  coup or to commit an offence or wanting to avoid his  prosecution for offences committed in India. Many questions have been raised but they resolve  themselves into  a single question in two parts which is : is  there  a fundamental  right  to  ask  for a  passport  and  does  the Constitution  guarantee such a right ? It may be  stated  at once that in limiting the controversy, it is not intended to say that arbitrary action in refusing a passport or evidence of  discrimination  will not have  any  redress.   Executive action has to comply with the equal protection clause of our Constitution,  and a complaint of refusal of a  passport  on insufficient or improper grounds is capable of being raised, irrespective  of  whether there is a  fundamental  right  to travel  abroad  or  not.   Judging of  these  cases  on  the evidence  of the affidavits it is possible to hold that  the passports  were  properly refused or impounded: but  as  the question  has assumed a constitutional hue, we  express  our opinion on the general question. What  is  a  passport  is the first  question.   It  is  not necessary  to  go into the history of passports  which  have become  very  common from the days of the First  World  War. The character of the passports, however, has not changed and the  classic  definition  of  Alverstone,  C.J.  in  R.   v. Brailsford-(1)  has  been generally quoted  and  applied  in cases dealing with passports.  It says that a passport .lm15 responsibility  of  a  Minister  of the  Crown  to  a  named individual,  intended to be presented to the Governments  of foreign  nations  and  to  be  used  for  that  individual’s protection as a British subject in foreign countries, and it depends for its validity upon the fact that (1)  [1951] 2.K.B.703.  545 the Foreign Office in an official document vouches  the respectability of the person named." In  essence this document serves as a means of  establishing identity  and  nationality.   See  Weis  :  Nationality  and Statelessness  in  International Law p. 226,  Harry  Street: Freedom,  the Individual   and the Law p.  271,  The Grotius Society-Vol.   32(1946)   Passports   and   Protection    in International Law by Kenneth Diplock. In.India the passport reads :               "These are to request and require in the  name

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 18 of 26  

             of the President of the Republic of India  all               those whom it may concern to allow the  bearer               to  pass freely without let or hindrance,  and               to  afford  him or her  every  assistance  and               protection  of  which he or she may  stand  in               need." This  form of passport follows closely that of  the  English passport.   The  American passport  is  slightly  different. There the passport contains the following writing :               "The  Secretary of State requests all whom  it               may  concern  to permit safely and  freely  to               pass  and in case of need to give  all  lawful               aid. to...... a citizen of the United States."               (name) The  American form not only makes a request but also  states that  the  holder  is a citizen of the  United  States.   In certain  other countries, such as Switzerland, the  passport only declares the holder’s nationality but makes no request. Whatever the form of the passport, it is clear that it is  a political      document  and  the ownership of  it  strictly speaking remains in the Government which grants it  although a  fee  may  be charged for it.  In England  a  passport  is considered  to  be  a  document of  the  Crown  and  can  be recalled. In India the Constitution does not make a mention of foreign travel  at  all.  In the Legislative Lists  the  subject  of passports  is  c item No. 19 in the Union List.   The  entry reads :               19.   "Admission   into,   a   emigration   an               expusion from, India; passports and visas." As  the executive power of the Union extends to  the  topics included in the Union List, executive action is open on  the topics   mentioned  in  the  entry.   Admission   into   and emigration  and  expulsion  from India  may  be  subject  of legislative   action  and  equally  of   executive   action. Similarly there may be executive action in respect of  pass- ports  and visas.  of course executive action normally  must follow L7SupC.I./67- 5 546 legislation  and  not  precede  it,  but  the  existence  of statutory  enactment is not a condition for the exercise  of executive action. Since it is questioned that the action to refuse a  passport or  to  withhold  one granted must be based on  law,  it  is necessary  to  find out the true nature of a  passport.   It appears  to  us that passports must be  treated  as  falling within  the prerogative domain of foreign affairs,  and  the authorities  which  grant  or  withhold  them  must  possess considerable freedom of action.  In England, the passport is so  regarded.  Halsbury, summarising the law on the  subject says               "Passports may be granted by the Crown at  any               time to enable British subjects to travel with               safety in foreign countries but such passports               would clearly not be available so as to permit               travel in an enemy’s country during- war."               NOTE  : "The possession of a passport  is  now               almost  always required by the authorities  to               enable a person to enter a country."               (Halsbury’s  Laws  of England,  Vol.   IV,  p.               519). The  history  of  passports in India  is  a  chequered  one. Before  the First World War, passports were not  so  common. During  the  First World War, the necessity for  a  passport

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 19 of 26  

arose  because  several  countries began to  insist  on  the possession of a passport before allowing entry.  The  Indian Passport Rules of 1917  created a double obligation.   There was an obligation to obtain passports to leave India and  an obligation to obtain passports to enter India.  In 1920, the Indian Passport Act was passed.  The obligation to -obtain a passport to leave India was abandoned.  This, however, ,made no practical difference because almost all the countries  of the  world  had  begun  to insist on  the  possession  of  a passport  and no shipping company would take a passenger  on board  a ship bound for a foreign land unless the  passenger was  in  possession of a passport endorsed for  the  foreign country  and a visa (if necessary) granted by that  country. The  Indian Passport Act, 1920 has continued to be the  only legislation  on the subject.  It is an extremely short  Act. The  long title shows its purport by stating that it  is  an Act by which power is taken to require passports of  persons entering India.  After setting out the title and the  extent of  the  Act and giving the necessary definitions,  the  Act proceeds  to  confer on the Central Government by s.  3  the power  to make rules requiring that persons  entering  India shall  be  in possession of passports and  for  all  matters ancillary   and   incidental  to  that   purpose.    Without prejudice, however, to the generality of this power, the Act gives  illustrations  of the topics on which  rules  may  be made,  such as to prohibit the entry into India or any  part thereof  ,of  any  person who has not in  his  possession  a passport issued to  547 him;  to  prescribe the authorities by whom  passports  must have  been issued or renewed, and the conditions with  which they  must  comply,  for the purposes of  the  Act;  and  to provide  for  the  exemption either  absolutely  or  on  any condition,  of  any  person or class  of  persons  from  any provision  of such rules.  The Act also gives power to  make rules for punishment of the contravention of th   rules   or orders  issued under the Act and sets the maximum  limit  of such punishments.  The rules so made have to be published in the Official Gazette and thereupon have effect as if enacted in  the Passport Act.  The last two sections give  power  of arrest  and  removal of persons who enter  India  without  a passport or against whom a reasonable suspicion exists  that they  have  contravened  any rule or order  made  under  the Passport  Act.  The Act is enabling.  The force  resides  in the rules. In furtherance of the power, the Indian Passport Rules, 1950 have  been framed and promulgated.  They lay down in  detail the  condition  for  the grant of passports  and  of  visas. These  are to be read as part of the. parent Act.   No  rule states  specifically that a passport is needed by  a  person leaving India.  Indeed there is no provision which compels a person to take a passport to leave India.  The necessity for a passport arises from the fact that no travel agency  would agree  to  take out a person who is not in possession  of  a valid  passport,  because  if it did so,  the  agency  would expose itself to the burden of bringing back such person  to the  place  from  where  he  started.   No  foreign  country (except Nepal) today accepts an Indian citizen who is not in possession  of  a  valid  passport.   The  necessity  for  a passport  also  arises  indirectly, because  a  citizen  who leaves  India needs a passport to re-enter his own  country. This is true of most of the countries of the world.   France did  attempt to exempt French citizens from the  requirement of  a passport to enter their own country but it  was  found that such persons were delayed considerably because they had

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 20 of 26  

to   establish   the  fact  of  their   French   nationality independently.   This was a very arduous process.   In  fact foreigners found it easier to enter France than a  national, because  every foreigner who possessed a passport issued  by his country with a visa for entering into France could  walk in whereas every national had to establish his nationality. It is however not to be thought that a passport is the  only means by which a person can be enabled to leave or to  enter India.   There exist two modes in which persons  can  leave, and  three  in which they can enter, India.  The  first  two mode-,  are (a) passport and (b) identity certificate.   The former  are  granted to Indian citizens and  the  latter  to Stateless  persons residing in India or to foreigners  whose countries are not represented in India and who cannot obtain passports from their countries or to 548 persons whose nationality is in some doubt.  Exit from India whether  by  an Indian or a foreigner through  the  ordinary traffic  lines is only on the strength of one of  these  two documents.   Similarly,  exit through  customs  barriers  is allowed  only  on  the  production  of  one  of  these   two documents.  For entry into India, one of three documents  is needed : a passport, issued by a foreign country and  visaed by  Indian  Diplomatic  Mission or  Government,  serves  for foreigners;  the  same  is the  case  with  persons  holding identity   certificates.    Then  there  is   in   emergency certificate which is issued for a single journey to a person not in possession of a passport The emergency certificate is regarded  as  a passport for purpose of entry of  an  Indian into India. It will therefore be seen that there is no compulsion of law that  a passport must be obtained before one  leaves  India. Compulsion arises because no travel line will take an Indian out  of India unless he possesses a passport.  If an  Indian wishes to leave India without a passport he may do so, if he can.   There is nothing to prevent an Indian getting into  a jolly  boat and attempting to cross the Arabian sea;  but  a foreign  country  would  refuse to  receive  him  unless  he possesses a passport and on his return to India he would not be  able to enter India unless he produces the  passport  as required by the Indian Passport Act.  The need for  passport is indirect.   Passport is necessary because it requests the foreign Governments to  let the holder pass and  it  vouches for the respect ability and   nationality of the holder. It is now necessary to consider whether there is a right  to demand a passport.  Is, it a right of the same nature as the right to buy a railway ticket ? The difference obviously  is that  before  Government places in the hands of a  person  a document which pledges the honour of the country, Government is  entitled to scrutinise the credentials of  such  person. The right therefore to obtain a passport is a qualified one, and  not  an  absolute one.  Since  Government  pledges  its honour,  it is a privilege which can be exercised  with  the concurrence  of Government.  Subject to this there arises  a qualified  right.  A person refused a passport may ask  that his case be considered by a court of law.  But what is there the  document on which one can found an absolute right ?  Is the State compelled to grant a document pledging its  honour to   all  kinds  of  person  and  must  it  vouch  for   the respectability   of   every   one   going   abroad   ?   The considerations  which  must  enter in  the  appraisal  of  a person’s  worth, before his respectability can  be  vouched, are  so  numerous  and varied that they  can  never  be  the subject of a successful enumeration and categorisation.   If a  person is wrongfully refused a passport, he can  complain

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 21 of 26  

that he has been discriminated against and the courts  would right  the  matter unless the State gives  a  valid  reason. There is thus no  549 absolute  right  that  the State must grant  a  passport  to whomsoever  applies  for  it and subject to  a  question  of arbitrariness or discrimination no one can really be said to possess a right enforceable at law. It is however contended that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental  right  because  it is a part  of  the  personal liberty   of  a  person  guaranteed  by  Art.  21   of   the Constitution,  which  a  person  can  only  be  deprived  of according  to procedure established by law.  In  support  of the  contention  that foreign travel is a part  of  personal liberty, reliance is placed on certain observations in A. K. Gopalan  v. The State of Madras(1) and Kharak Singh  v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh(2) and some cases of the High  Courts following  Gopalan’s case(1), and drawing support from  the, cases  of the Supreme Court of the United States.   Reliance was placed in these Judgments upon the classic definition of ’personal  liberty’ by Blackstone.  Blackstone  divided  jus personal-um’  (rights  attaching to the person) into  two  : "personal  security"  and  "personal  liberty".   Under  the former  he included rights to life, limb, body,  health  and reputation  and  under the latter, the right to  freedom  of movement.  B1ackstone’s words were               "personal  liberty  consists in the  power  of               locomotion,  of changing situation  or  moving               one’s  person  to whatsoever place  one’s  own               inclination  may direct, without  imprisonment               or restraint unless by due process of law".               (W.   Blackstone : Commentaries on the Laws of               England 4th Edn., Vol. 1, p. 134). The expression ’life’ and ’personal liberty’ in Art. 21,  it is said, incorporated these two meanings respectively. There  is no doubt that this Court has accepted the  meaning of  ’life’ as ’personal security’ according to  Blackstone’s definition. In Kharak Singh’s case(1) this Court  considered Art.  21 in connection with the domiciliary visits and  such other  checks upon a person under police surveillance.   The word  ’life’ was interpreted according to the definition  of Mr. Justice Field in Munn v. Illinois(3). Mr.  Justice Field observed in that case :               "By  the  term "life" as here  used  something               more is meant than mere animal existence.  The               inhibition against its deprivation extends  to               all  these limits and faculties by which  life               is  enjoyed.  The provision equally  prohibits               the mutilation of the body or amputation of               (1)   [1950] S.C.R. 88.               (3) [1877]94 U.S. 113.               (2) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332.               550               an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye  or               the destruction of any other organ of the body               through  which the soul communicates with  the               outer world...... by the term liberty, as used               in the provision something more is meant  than                             mere  freedom  from physical restraint   or  the               bounds of a prison." Mr.  Justice  Field  was  merely  reaffirming   Blackstone’s definition  in  relation to the word ’life’ in the  5th  and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  It may be pointed out that the American decisions on the subject of  passports

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 22 of 26  

accept  also Blackstone’s definition of  "personal  liberty" and this has led to the acceptance of travel abroad as  more than a privilege and as a right.  These cases are  mentioned in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice. The  question, however, is whether this Court  has  accepted the  definition  of Blackstone to interpret  the  expression "personal liberty" in Art. 21 so that foreign travel or  the right  to  leave  India can be said to be  included  in  the expression.  The American cases cannot of course be used  to establish  a  fundamental  right to travel or  aliter  to  a fundamental right to leave India.  The claim of such a right must  be  established  strictly  on the  terms  of  our  own Fundamental  Law.  The difference between the  American  and the Indian Constitutions arises because of the existence  of certain  specified fundamental rights in Art. 19  guaranteed to  a citizen of which sub-cl. (d) of cl. (1) read with  cl. (5)  deals  with  the  right of a  citizen  to  move  freely throughout  the territory of India.  There is no doubt  that the right of motion and locomotion throughout the  territory of  India  is Guaranteed to the Indian  citizen.   Does  the Constitution  speak  again of a further right of  motion  or locomotion in Art. 21 for the citizen and the non-citizen  ? The  Indian  Constitution cannot, of course,  guarantee  the right of motion and locomotion in foreign land.  Thus in  so far  as  an  Indian citizen is concerned, if  Art.  21  adds anything to the right of motion and locomotion of a  citizen guaranteed under Art. 19, it can only speak of the right  to leave  India.  The learned Chief Justice gives this  meaning to Art. 21.  We respectfully disagree and think that it  was not  open to the learned Chief Justice to take this view  of Art.  21  so  long as the earlier decisions  of  this  Court stand. Now it is obvious that Blackstone, when he defined ’personal liberty’  was  not  writing  a  commentary  on  the   Indian Constitution.  The generality of his Observations cannot  be woven  into  our  Constitution without paying  heed  to  the context in which the words occur.  It seems strange that the Constitution should have guaranteed the right of motion,  in one  place,  limited  to the territories of  India,  and  in another,  without  specifying the right of motion  given  an added  fundamental  right  to leave  India.   This,  in  our opinion,  has  been earlier noticed indirectly  in  the  two cases of this Court already referred to.  551 Gopalan’s case(’ is one of them.  It was concerned with pre- ventive  detention and was not directly concerned  with  the question  whether  Art. 21 comprehends the right  to  travel abroad-or  to  leave  India  as  an  attribute  of  personal liberty.   The  point now before us did  not  really  arise. However, varied opinions were expressed by the  Constitution Bench.   Kania,  C.J.  did  not  express  any  clear   view. According  to him there was no conflict between Arts.  19and 21.  He thought of personal liberty in terms of right to eat or  sleep  when one likes, to work or not to work.   To  him personal  liberty meant liberty of the physical body.   Fazl Ali, J. accepted that freedom of movement was the essence of personal liberty; but observed at p. 139 as follows :               "In  my  opinion, the  words  ’throughout  the               territory  of India’ were used to stretch  the               ambit of the freedom of movement to the utmost               extent to which it could be guaranteed by  our               Constitution." (Italics added). Patanjali  Sastri,  J. (later C.J.)  thought  that  personal liberty  in  Art.  21 was used in  a  sense  which  excluded freedoms  dealt  with in Art. 19, that is to  say,  personal

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 23 of 26  

liberty  in the context of Part III of the Constitution  was something   distinct  from  the  freedom  to   move   freely throughout  the  territory of India.  Das, J.  (later  C.J.) dealing with Art. 19 observed at p. 301 :               "Its purpose, as I read it, is not to  provide               protection  for  the  general  right  of  free               movement but to secure a specific and  special               right  of  the Indian citizen to  move  freely               throughout  the territories of India  regarded               as an independent additional right apart  from               the  ’general  right of  locomotion  emanating               from  the  freedom  of the person.   It  is  a               guarantee against unfair discrimination in the               matter of free movement of the Indian  citizen               throughout the Indian Union.  In short, it  is               a  protection against provincialism.   It  has               nothing  to do with the freedom of the  person               as such.  That is guaranteed to every  person,               citizen or otherwise, in the manner and to the               extent formulated by article 21." Mahajan J. (later C.J.) thought that in providing that  life and  liberty  might  be deprived  only  in  accordance  with procedure  established  by law, the intention  was  to  give immunity   against  exercise  of  despotic  power   by   the Executive.  Mukherjea J. (later C.J.) thought that  movement throughout the territory of India could be curtailed in  the interest  of the public but movement outside could  only  be curtailed by law. The learned Chief Justice has selected the views of Fazl Ali and  Das JJ. and drawn the conclusion that personal  liberty in  Art. 21 is a more comprehensive concept and has  a  much wider  [1950] C.R. 88. 552 connotation than ’the right conferred by Art. 19(1)(d).  The learned  Chief Justice refers to Kharak Singh’s case(1)  and observes as follows :               "This  Court,  adverting  to  the   expression               "personal  liberty", accepted the meaning  put               upon  the expression ’liberty’ in the 5th  and               14th  Amendments to the U.S.  Constitution  by               Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois, but pointed out               that  the ingredients of the  said  expression               were  placed in two articles, viz.,  Arts.  21               and 19 of the Indian Constitution." He  then extracts two passages from Kharak  Singh’s  case(1) which are as follows :               "It is true that in Art. 21 as contrasted with               the  4th and 14th Amendments in the U.S.,  the               word  ’liberty’  is  qualified  by  the   word               ’personal’   and  therefore  its  content   is               narrower.   But the qualifying  adjective  has               been  employed in order to  avoid  overlapping               between   those  elements  or   incidents   of               "liberty"  like freedom of speech, or  freedom               of  movement etc., already dealt with in  Art.               19(1)  and  the "liberty" guaranteed  by  Art.               21. . . . "               "We........  consider that "personal  liberty"               is  used in the Article as a compendious  term               to include within itself all the varieties  of               rights  which  go to make up  the  "  personal               liberties" of man other than those dealt  with               in  the  several clauses of  Art.  19(1).   In               other  words,  while  Art.  19(1)  deals  with

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 24 of 26  

             particular  species  or  attributes  of   that               freedom,  "personal liberty" in Art. 21  takes               in and comprises the residue."               The  learned  Chief Justice then  reaches  the               conclusion that Kharak Singh’s ease(1) was               a  clear  authority  for  the  position   that               "liberty " in our Constitution bears the  same               comprehensive  meaning  as  is  given  to  the               expression  "liberty"  by  the  5th  and  14th               Amendments  to the U.S. Constitution  and  the               expression "personal liberty" in Art. 21  only               excludes   the   ingredients   of    ’liberty’               enshrined in Art. 19 of the Constitution.   In               other words, the expression "personal liberty"               in  Art. 21 takes in the right  of  locomotion               and  to travel abroad, but the right  to  move               throughout  the  territories of India  is  not               covered  by  it inasmuch as  it  is  specially               provided in Art. 19." In our Judgment, these remarks, with due respects, involve a misreading  of  Kharak Singh’s case.  They are  rather  -the minority (1)  [1964] 1. S.C.R. 332.  553 view  expressed  in  the  same case  by  the  learned  Chief Justice.  They are not the views of the majority. In  Kharak Singh’s case(1), the concept of personal  liberty was considered in connection with surveillance by the police under the police Regulations.  The expression "life" in Art. 21   was  interpreted  according  to  Mr.  Justice   Field’s definition  already quoted earlier Domiciliary  visits  were considered  violative of Art. 21 in the absence of  a  valid law.   Other modes of surveillance such is secret  picketing etc.  were  considered valid as they did  not  directly  and tangibly   impede  either  movement  or  personal   liberty. apealing, however, with Arts. 19 (1) (d) and 21 together, it was  pointed out that the right to move about  was  excluded from  Art.   1.  Article  21  represented  other   residuary personal  liberties,  not the subject of treatment  in  Art. 19(1).  The majority stated its opinion as follows :               "Having regard to the terms of Art.  19(1)(d),               we  must  take it  that  expression  (personal               liberty)  is used as not to include the  right               to  move about or rather of  locomotion.   The               right   to  move  about  being  excluded   its               narrowest  interpretation  would  be  that  it               comprehends  nothing  more than  freedom  from               physical    restraint   or    freedom.    from               confinement within the bounds of a prison;  in               other   words,   freedom   from   arrest   and               detention, from false imprisonment or wrongful               confinement.  We feel unable to hold that  the               term  was  intended to bear only  this  narrow               interpretation but on the other hand  consider               that "personal liberty" is used in the Article               as a compendious term to include within itself               all  the varieties of rights which go to  make               up the "personal liberties" of man other  than               those  dealt  with in the several  clauses  of               Art.  19(1) In other words, while  Art.  19(1)               deals with particular species or attributes of               that  freedom, "personal liberty" in  Art.  21               takes in and comprises the residue." Referring  to the observations of Mr. Justice Field, it  was stated  that  ’life’  meant "not merely  the  right  to  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 25 of 26  

continuance of a person’s animal existence, but also a right to  the possession of each of his organs-his arms and  legs, etc." An invasion of one’s house was therefore considered an invasion  of personal liberty.  The majority,  however,  did not attempt to add to the right of locomotion, the right  to go  abroad or to leave India.  In fact the majority  implies that  the right of locomotion possessed by a citizen is  all contained in Art. 19(1)(d) and is guaranteed only with  res- pect to the territories of India. (1)  [1964]2 S.C. R. 332. 554 Subba  Rao J. (as he then was) read personal liberty as  the antithesis of physical restraint or coercion and found  that Arts.  19 ( 1 ) and 21 overlapped and Art. 19 (1 )  (d)  was not carved out of personal liberty in Art. 21.  According to him,  personal liberty could be curtailed by law,  but  that law  must  satisfy the test in Art. 19(2) in so far  as  the specific  rights in Art. 19(1)(3) are concerned.   In  other words,  the  State must satisfy that  both  the  fundamental rights are not infringed by showing that there is a law  and that  it  does  not amount to  an  unreasonable  restriction within the meaning of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.  As in that  case there was no law, fundamental rights, both  under Art.  19(1)(d) and Art. 21 were held to be  infringed.   The learned  Chief  Justice has read into the  decision  of  the Court  a  meaning which it does not intend  to  convey.   He excludes  from  Art.  21  the  right  to  free  motion   and locomotion  within  the territories of India  and  puts  the right  to travel abroad in Art. 21.  He wants to see  a  law and if his earlier reasoning were to prevail, the law should stand the test of Art. 19(2).  But since el. (2) deals  with matters  in Art. 19(1) already held excluded, it is  obvious that  it will not apply.  The law which is made can only  be tested on the ground of articles other than Art. 19 such  as Arts. 14, 20 and 22 which alone bears upon this matter.   In other words, the majority decision of the Court in this case has rejected Ayyangar J.’s view and accepted the view of the minority in Kharak Singh’s case(1).  A similar reasoning had previously  prevailed with the Chief Justice in the case  of Kavalappara  Kottarathil Kochuni and others v. The State  of Madras  and  others (2 ) , but there Art. 19  was  held  not excluded  by Art. 31 after the latter ceased to be  a  self- contained article by reason of the fourth amendment and  the addition of el. 2-A and the amendment of el. (2).  The  same exercise in the reverse direction i.e., extending protection to  property beyond what is stated in Art. 31 by calling  in aid  something extra from Art. 19 was attempted.   According to  the learned Chief Justice there is an absolute right  of property [Art. 19(1)(f)] curtailed to some extent by el. (5) and Art. 3 1. The same reasoning is adopted here.  There  is an  absolute  right of locomotion in Art. 21  of  which  one aspect  alone is said to be covered by Art. 19(1)(d).   This view obviously clashes with the reading of Art. 21 in Kharak Singh’s  case,  because  there  the  right  of  motion   and locomotion  was held to be excluded from Art. 21.  In  other words,  the present decision advances the minority, view  in Kharak Singh’s case above the majority view stated in,  that case. We  have shown above that the citizen’s right of motion  and locomotion in so far as it is recognisable. has been limited by  the  Constitution to the territories of India  and  that according  to Kharak Singh’s case -that is the limit of  the right.  It is not possible to read (1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 332. (2) [1960]3 S.C.R. 887.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 26  

555 more  of that right in Art. 21.  In any event, there  is  no absolute  right to demand a passport because that is  not  a right  to personal liberty even in the  Blackstonian  sense. The  passport being a political document, is one  which  the State  may  choose  to  give or  to  withhold.   Since  that document  vouches for the respectability of the  holder,  it stands to reason that Government need not vouch for a person it does not consider worthy.  This is not to say that we are insensible  to  the  importance  of  travel,  so  adequately described  by  writers and  judgments.   Those  observations apply  to  the  bulk  of the  people  to  whom  passport  is generally  never refused.  What we are concerned with  is  a slender  body of persons whose travel’ abroad is  considered harmful  to  the  larger interests of our  country  and  who themselves  are in any event undesirable emissaries  of  our nation  and who might, if allowed to go abroad,  cause  many complications.  A system of passports is thus essential  and requires a wide discretion. The Universal declaration of human rights-"Everyone has  the right to leave any country including his own" is  applicable to normal persons.  It does not apply to criminals  avoiding penalties  or  political agitators, etc.  likely  to  create international  tensions  or  persons who  may  disgrace  our country abroad. To conclude : whatever the view of countries like the U.S.A. where travel is a means of spending one’s wealth, the better view in our country is that a person is ordinarily  entitled to  a passport unless, for reasons which can be  established to  the  satisfaction  of’ the Court, the  passport  can  be validly refused to him.  Since an aggrieved party can always ask  for  a mandamus if he is treated unfairly,  it  is  not open,  by straining the Constitution, to create an  absolute and fundamental right to a passport where none exists in the Constitution.   There  is no doubt a fundamental  right  to, equality  in  the matter of grant of passports  (subject  to reasonable  classifications)  but there  is  no  fundamental right to travel abroad or to the grant of a passport.   With all due respect we say that the Court has missed one for the other.   The  solution of a law of passports will  not  make things  any  better.   Even if a law were  to  be  made  the position  would hardly change because the utmost  discretion will  have  to  be allowed to decide upon the  worth  of  an applicant.   The only thing that can be said is  that  where the  passport  authority is proved to be wrong,  a  mandamus will always right the matter.  In the present cases we found no  valid  ground for the issuance of a mandamus.   We  had, therefore, earlier ordered the dismissal of the petitions. ORDER In  accordance  with the opinion of the majority a  writ  of mandamus  will issue directing the respondents  to  withdraw and  cancel  the decision contained in their  letters  dated August 31, 1966, and 556 September  20, 1966 and to forbear from taking any steps  or proceedings  in  the enforcement or  implementation  of  the aforesaid  decision and further to forbear from  withdrawing and depriving the petitioner of his two passports and of his passport facilities.  The petitioner will have his costs. R.K.P.S.