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PETITIONER: SATTO & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1519            1979 SCR  (3) 768  1979 SCC  (2) 628  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1987 SC1501  (9)

ACT:      Uttar Pradesh  Children Act  1952 and  approved Schools under it,  Sections 2(4), 29, 30, 34, 60, 68, 70, 79 and 79, Scope of-

HEADNOTE:      Three Petitioners  between the  ages of 10 & 14 came by an eleven year old girl, tending cattle in a village, near a neglected brick  kiln which  temptingly  offered  protective privacy for  committing  rape.  They  advanced  towards  the victim and  tied her  up. They  forcibly  went  through  the exercise of  rape. The  courts below  have  held  the  three petitioners guilty  of an  offence under  section 376 J.P.C. and sentenced each to two years’ rigorous imprisonment.      The offenders being children the dilemmatic issue is to fix the  sentencing guide-lines for juvenile delinquents. It was argued  that "Justice  and  the  Child"  is  a  distinct jurisprudential   criminological   branch   of   socio-legal speciality which  is still in its infant status in India and many other  countries. The  children Act  is  a  preliminary exercise, the Borstal School is an experiment in reformation and even  Section 360  Criminal Procedure  Code tends in the same direction.  In the  absence  of  any  report  from  the Reformation Officer  nor any  consideration  of  the  social milieu,   personal    antecedents,    parental    influence, educational status and other material factors bearing on the three petitioners, the Court while accepting the appeal, ^      HELD: The appellants should be released on probation of good conduct  and committed  to the care of their respective parents and  if no  surviving parents,  then their guardian, executing a bond each without sureties to be responsible for the good  behaviour of the youthful offender for a period of two years from the date of release and for the observance of a condition  namely that the child shall be put to school or continue its  studies if  it is already at school and attend any recreational  or meditational  centre, if  any,  of  the parents’ choice  regularly. The Reformation Officer enjoying jurisdiction in the locality will have supervision over each of the  appellants and  shall make a report once every three

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months to  the Trial  Court. The  Reformation  Officer  will explain to  the appellants  and their  parents the import of this order. [776H, 777A-C]      Pathak, J.  (concurring)-On the  question  whether  the youthful offender  should be proceeded against under section 29 or  Section 30  of the  U.P. Children Act 1951, the court must apply  its mind  to certain considerations like the age of the  child,  his  family  background,  his  general  past conduct and  antecedents,  the  circumstances  in  which  he committed the  offence and which of the measures provided by section 29  or section 30 would more effectively and yet not harshly enable  the child  to  develop  into  a  responsible member of  society. The  statute is  concerned with a person whose personality,  judgment  and  discretion  had  not  yet attained maturity.  A "child"  has been  defined under  Sec. 2(4) of  the Act as a person under the age of sixteen years. Therefore the  primary object  must be to place the child in an environment conducive to his rehabilita- 769 tion and  providing scope for corrective action which is the basic criteria for determining the choice between section 29 and section  30 of  the Act.  Where a  child has acted on an impulse in  committing an  offence and  there is  nothing to show the  presence of  any vicious  streak of  character, it would be  more appropriate  to leave  him to  the  care  and attention of  parental authority  under section 30(1) (b) of the Act  rather than  send him to an approved school. On the facts of the present case, such an order would meet the ends of justice  and serve  the object  of the  statute. [779E-H, 780A-B]      William v.  New York,  337 US  241, 249, Sentencing and probation-National Collage  of  the  State  Judiciary  Reno, Nevada, page 258 relied upon.

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal  No. 239 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 3-11-78  of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision Nos. 1064 and 1065/75.      S. K. Sabharwal for the Appellants.      O. P. Rana for the Respondent.      The following Judgments were delivered:      KRISHNA IYER,  J. Concurrent  convictions by  both  the courts  below   have,  by   a  rule   of   restriction   and circumspection which this Court often adopts under Art. 136, persuaded me  to circumscribe  the leave  to appeal  to  the critical question  of punishment, usually answered by courts untouched by  current humane  criteria and  drowned  in  the superstition that  the gravity  of the  crime and the tariff prescribed in the Penal Code have a monopolistic hold on the sentencing court. Quackery in criminology is a deficiency in forensic justicing-especially  disastrous is sensitive areas like juvenile  sentencing when unlettered punishment becomes unwitting crime.      The  present   case  is  an  illustration  of  judicial habituation to  prescribing  sentences  conditioned  by  the offence and its milieu, forgetting the fundamental fact that the human  delinquent, not  the criminal  deviance,  is  the cynosure of  punitive processing. The further Gandhian axiom follows that  crime is  like disease,  and  correction,  not cruelty, has  dominance  in  the  sentencing  calculus.  The sadistic  appeal  to  severity  of  infliction  takes  on  a

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sublimated form  in the judicial process, as has happened in the instant  case. The  court has  rightly been horrified by the crime  of rape  here but  wrongly bid  farewell  to  the reform of the vernal criminals. 770      Three boys.  between the  ages of ten and fourteen with simmering  sex   urges  amidst   societal  inhibitions,  and infatuating stimulations,  came by  an eleven  year old girl tending cattle in a village, and this, by happen-stance, was near  a   neglected  brick  kiln  which  temptingly  offered protective  privacy  for  carnal  assault.  This  lascivious opportunity excited  the three  juveniles, otherwise engaged in cutting grass, into erotic experimentalism. They advanced aggressively towards  the artless  victim, tied up by way of preventive detention  a young cowherd who chanced to be near the scene  and forcibly went through the adolescent exercise of rape.  The courts  below have  held the three petitioners guilty of  an offence  under s.376 I.P.C. and we do not feel it  right  to  nibble  at  probabilities  and  disturb  that conclusion.      Current  Indian   ethos  and   standards  of   punitive deterrence make  rape  a  heinous  offence.  The  offenders, however, are children and the dilemmatic issue is to fix the sentencing guidelines  when juvenile delinquents come before the  court.   ’Justice  and   the  Child’   is  a   distinct jurisprudential-criminological   branch    of    socio-legal speciality which  is still in its infant status in India and many other  countries. the  Children Act  is  a  preliminary exercise, the Borstal School is an experiment in reformation and even  s.360  Cr.  P.C.  tends  in  the  same  direction. Correction informed by compassion, not incarceration leading to degeneration,  is  the  primary  aim  of  this  field  of criminal justice.  Juvenile justice has constitutional roots in Articles 15(3) and 39(e) and the pervasive humanism which bespeaks the  superparental concern  of the  State  for  its child-citizens including  juvenile  delinquents.  The  penal pharmacopeia of India, in tune with the reformatory strategy currently  prevalent   in  civilised   criminology,  has  to approach the  child  offender  not  as  a  target  of  harsh punishment but  of humane  nourishment. This  is the central problem of sentencing policy when juveniles are found guilty of delinquency. A scientific approach may insist on a search for fuller material sufficient to individuate the therapy to suit the criminal malady. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Williams v. New York,(1) present the reports:           "have been  given a  high value  by  conscientious      judges  who  want  to  sentence  persons  on  the  best      available information  rather than  on  guess-work  and      inadequate information. To deprive sentencing judges of      this  kind   of  information   would  undermine  modern      penological  procedural   policies   that   have   been      cautiously adopted  throughout the nation after careful      consideration and experimentation." 771      Judge F. Rayan Duffy has written:           "If the  judge  has  before  him  a  complete  and      accurate presentence  investigation report  which  sets      forth the  conditions, circumstances,  background,  and      surroundings of  the defendant,  and the  circumstances      underlying the  offence which  has been  committed, the      judge can  then impose  sentence with greater assurance      that he  has adopted  the proper  course. He  can do so      with much greater peace of mind."      "Regrettably, our  juvenile justice system still thinks in terms  of terror, not cure, of wounding, not healing, and

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a sort  of blind  man’s buff  is the  result. This  negative approach converts  even the  culture of  juvenile homes into junior jails.  From the reformatory angle, the detainees are left to  drift, there  being no  constructive programmes for the detainees  nor correctional orientation and training for the institutional staff. I highlight these drawbacks largely because the  State’s response to punitive issues relating to juveniles has  been  stricken  with  ’illiteracy’  and  must awaken to  a new  ’enlightenment’, at  least prompted by the international year  of  the  Child.  Patricia  M.  Wald  has strengthened this  perspective in a recent book on "Pursuing Justice for the Child".(1).           "Juvenile detention  needs a  new focus  and a new      rationale. The  detention period  ought to  be used  to      begin  to   draw  together   resources  necessary   for      constructive change,  whether or  not the  juvenile  is      adjudicated. There  is abundant evidence that detention      has failed  as an isolated interlude between those more      dramatic parts  of the  juvenile justice  system-arrest      and trial or disposition.           The Juvenile  judge still  has a vital function to      fulfil in  detention. The  judge is  charged  with  the      solemn determination  whether to  deprive juveniles  of      liberty or  whether  they  can  be  released  in  their      parents’ custody  or to  a third party and, if so, what      conditions should  apply to the release. In making such      a decision  the judge should follow due process hearing      procedures and  the  legal  presumption  should  favour      release. If  the decision  is to detain, the judge must      make a record to support that decision. The legality of      preventive detention  in the juvenile court needs to be      tested.  If   the  power   is  upheld,  the  procedural      safeguards should be as precise as they are for adults.      We should  abandon the  notion that secure detention is      good for the child. 772           Some legal  absolutes seem  imperative;  jail  for      juveniles should  be outlawed;  status offenders should      not be  put into secure detention; finite limits should      be set  on how  long a  child can be detained before or      after  adjudication;  minimum  standards  for  physical      structure, staff, and program should be enforced by the      courts.  Even  then,  we  should  not  cease  inquiring      whether there  are yet better and more enlightened ways      to use  the interlude after arrest to help juveniles so      that, unless  they are  innocent, or  so blighted  that      removal from  the community before or after trial is an      almost indisputable necessity, there may be no need for      the rest of the progress at all."      These general  observations of futuristic import apart, we have  to concretise  the measures  to  be  taken  in  the present case  under the  available  law  and  the  available facilities. The  mainstream of criminal justice has not been refined by restorative legislations.      We have  the  Uttar  Pradesh  Children  Act,  1952  and ’approved schools’  of sorts under it. We have provision for juvenile courts (s. 60), Reformation Officers (s. 34), and a flexible cluster  of factors,  social and  personal,  to  be taken into  consideration in  passing orders  when a tender- aged delinquent  is to  be taken  into custodial care by the court (s.  68).  Reports  by  Reformation  Officers  have  a helpful role  in the  sentencing process. The finer focus of sentencing is  not  furious  reaction  to  the  offence  but habilitative rescue  of the  youthful offender  from  moral- material abandonment and careful reformation by kindling his

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creative   potential.   Judicial   responsibility   is   not mechanistic but  humanistic, and  the ritualistic magistrate is a  misfit. Section 70 of the U.P. Children Act highlights it:      70. Principles to be observed by Courts in dealing with      children and young persons.-           Every Court in dealing with a child who is brought      before it,  either as needing care or as an offender or      otherwise shall have regard to the welfare of the child      and shall  in a proper case take steps for removing him      from undesirable  surroundings and  for  securing  that      proper  provision   is  made   for  his  education  and      training.      Functionally, a  judicial order  on  a  child  must  be guided by  this legislative  value  judgment.  Non-custodial disposition of the young offender is permissible under s. 30 of the Act which reads: 773      30. Power  to discharge  youthful offender or to commit him to suitable custody.-      (1) A court may, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful  offender to be detained in an approved school, order him to be-           (a)  discharged after due admonition; or           (b)  released on  probation of  good  conduct  and                committed  to  the  care  of  his  parent  or                guardian or other adult relative or other fit                person, on such parent, guardian, relative or                person executing  a  bond,  with  or  without                sureties, as  the Court  may require,  to  be                responsible for  the good  behaviour  of  the                youthful  offender   for   any   period   not                exceeding three  years and for the observance                of such  other conditions  as the  Court  may                impose  for   securing  that   the   youthful                offender may  lead an  honest and industrious                life.           The Court  may order  that the  youthful  offender      released under  this clause  may be  placed  under  the      supervision of  a Reformation  Officer or of some other      person appointed for the purpose by the Court.           (2) If  it appears  to the  Court on  receiving  a      report from  the Reformation  Officer or otherwise that      the offender  has not been of good behaviour during the      period of  the probation,  it may,  after  making  such      inquiry as  it thinks  fit, order  the offender  to  be      detained in an approved school.      Indeed, a conscientious judge may consider it of better service to society :           "If the  criminal’s past history gives good reason      to believe  that he  is not  of the  naturally criminal      type, that he is capable of real reform and of becoming      a useful  citizen, there  is no  doubt that  probation,      viewed from  the selfish  standpoint of  protection  to      society alone,  is the  most efficient  method that  we      have. And  yet it  is the  least understood,  the least      developed, the  least appreciated of all our efforts to      rid society of the criminal."           "The basic idea underlying a sentence to probation      is very  simple. Sentencing  is in large part concerned      with avoiding  future crimes  by helping  the defendant      learn to  live productively  in the  community which he      has offended  against. Probation proceeds on the theory      that the best way to pursue 774

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    this goal is to orient the criminal sanction toward the      community setting in those cases where it is compatible      with the  other objectives  of sentencing. Other things      being equal,  the odds  are that a given defendant will      learn how to live successfully in the general community      if he  is dealt  with in  that  community  rather  than      shipped off to the artificial and a typical environment      of  an  institution  of  confinement.  Banishment  from      society, in a word, is not the way to integrate someone      into  society.  Yet  imprisonment  involves  just  such      banishment-albeit  for  a  temporary  sojourn  in  most      cases.           This is of course not to say that probation should      be used  in all  cases, or  that it will always produce      better results.  There are  many goals  of  sentencing,      some  of   which  in  a  given  case  may  require  the      imposition of  a sentence  to imprisonment  even in the      face of  a conclusion  that probation is more likely to      assure the  public that  the particular  defendant will      not offend  again. And  there are defendants as to whom      forced removal  from the  environment which may in some      part have  contributed to their offence may be the best      beginning to a constructive and useful life."(1)      Appeal and  revision provided  under s.  79 of  the Act involve the  higher courts  in the  process. We are sad that this crucial  judicial task  has been discharged with lesser awareness of  its seriousness and complexity than necessary. For instance  the Sessions  Court, oblivious of the offender and obsessed  with the offence, in brief confirmation, spent one sentence on sentence.           "Due to  seriousness of  the  crime  there  is  no      justification to release the appellants on probation."      The High Court devoted a paragraph but was upset by the Criminal act and closed its mind to salvaging the sentence :           "Lastly, it  is urged that the sentence awarded to      the revisionists be reduced in view of their ages. I am      reluctant to do so because they committed a crime which      repels against  moral conscience.  They chose a girl of      11 years  to satisfy  their lust. They spoiled her life      by  committing   this  offence   as  her  father  would      experience considerable  difficulty  in  arranging  her      marriage.  They  were  so  cruel  that  all  the  three      committed  rape  on  that  minor  child.  Such  an  act      deserves to be deprecated. The sentence awarded by the 775      learned lower courts does not at all err on the side of      severity.  Moreover,  the  learned  lower  courts  have      already shown  sympathy by  keeping them in an approved      school at Etawah."      While the  victim needs reparation, failure to pay heed to, which  is a  blind spot  in our criminal justice system, the offender’s  circumstances are  material  in  sentencing, omission to  notice which  is a systemic, though traditional failing.  We  find  no  emphasis  on  the  age  antecedents, parental and social circumstances and curative possibilities or  Reformation   Officer’s  report  bearing  on  the  three children  punished.   The  Children   Act  makes  meticulous provisions which  slumber on  the statute  book and  seek no visa into  the court room. We hope this elaborate discussion will activate  sentencing  wisdom  vested  in  the  criminal courts.      At this  late stage, without prolonging the process, we can only  direct some  pragmatic steps.  No  report  from  a Reformation Officer  is available.  No consideration  of the social milieu,  personal antecedents,  parental  influences,

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educational status and other material factors is apparent in the judgments.  Nor, indeed, is there any serious advertence to the  advantages of  community-oriented reformation or the disadvantages  of   institutional   inter-mix   and   quasi- incarceration. The  juvenile detention  system, it  must  be noted, has  not fulfilled  itself even in countries where it is heavily  funded  like  in  the  U.S.A.  where  the  young delinquents are           "penned  like   cattle,  demoralized  by  lack  of      activities and  trained staff,  often brutalized.  Over      half the facilities in which juveniles are held have no      psychiatric or  social work  staff. A  fourth  have  no      school  program.   The  median   age  of  detainees  is      fourteen; the  novice may  be sodomized within a matter      of hours.  Many have  not been  charged with a crime at      all. From  New York  to California,  the field  reports      repeat themselves depressingly.(1)           Our ‘approved  schools’  like  our  adult  prisons      sometimes remind  us of  animal farms,  if only  judges      care to visit jails.      These blemishes,  in far  worse measure,  have blighted our Homes  and Schools  and approved custodial institutions, although   our    correctional   repertory,   augmented   by meditational, recreational  and oriented Gandhian tools, may inexpensively expand and deepen the rehabi- 776 litative potency  of our sentencing strategies in this area. Be that  as it  may, the  U.P. Children  Act appears to have been virtually  given  a  go-bye  in  the  courts  below,  a phenomenon  which   frequently  happens  because  practising lawyers and  judicial officers have not yet given the deeper reflection that welfare-oriented rehabilitative legislations of the mentally and morally retarded in the criminal justice field deserve.  The Criminal  Procedure Code, 1973, has made provision in  s.360 to  deal with  persons under 21 years of age convicted  of offences, punishable with imprisonment for a term of seven years or less and s. 376 I.P.C., cannot come within its  purview. But  the U.P.  Children Act  defines  a ‘youthful offender’  to mean "any child who has been found a to have  committed an offence punishable with transportation or imprisonment".  Thus, life  imprisonment for  the offence does not take the delinquent out of the category of youthful offender as  defined in s. 2(13) of the said Act. Section 30 authorises the Court, if it thinks fit, instead of directing any youthful  offender to be detained in an approved school, order  him   to  be   released  conditionally,   as  earlier indicated. We  think that  the present  case deserves action under s. 30.      Rape is  horrific True.  The victim is a pathetic child and deserves not merely commiseration but also compensation, an aspect  which the  State will  take note of when a proper application is  made to  it. Our  immediate problem  is  the disposition of  the appellants who are also very young. They have served  out some  term in  an ‘approved  school’ which, making a  realistic appraisal, is a ‘junior jail’. It is not as if  these little lads are incorrigible rapists or violent toughs running amok. Parental neglect, tempting opportunity, sex perversionslibadences  (sic) libidinous  environs and  a host of  other factors where state in-action is contributory to exciting adolescent erotica, count for vulgar, vicious or violent  delinquency.   These  boys   can  and   should   be rehabilitated, and  that is  done  best  by  obligating  the parent to  take care  of the  children concerned  and not by institutionalised  custody.   Section  30   of  the  Act  is attracted by  the facts  of this  case to  the extent we are

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able to  glean from  the meagre  material on record. We hope that when  children are brought before court, the provisions of the  Children Act will be remembered by the Bench and the Bar and its rehabilitative engineering set in motion.      In the  present case,  we direct  the appellants  to be released on  probation of  good conduct and committed to the care of  their respective parents and if no surviving parent then their guardian executing a bond each, without sureties, to be responsible for the good behaviour 777 of the  youthful offender for a period of two years from the date of  release and  for the  observance  of  a  condition, namely, that  the child  shall be  put to school or continue its studies  if it  is already  at  school  and  attend  any recreational or  meditational centre if any, of the parent’s choice regularly.  Many systematic experiments, acknowledged in prison  reports and judgments of trial courts have proved the therapeutic value of transcendental Meditation viz-a-viz juvenile  delinquents.(1)  The  Reformation  Officer  having jurisdiction over  the locality  shall have supervision over each of the appellants and shall make a report once in three months to the trial court. If the report shows laps into bad behaviour, the  court may  direct detention  of the  deviant appellant  or   appellants  in   an  approved   school.  The Reformation Officer  will explain  to  the  parents  of  the delinquents and  the appellants  the import of this order so that  they  may  appreciate  the  necessity  for  compliance therewith and cooperate in the rehabiliatory process.      I  may   venture  a   view  in   conclusion  that   the revolutionary  contribution   Indian  culture  may  make  to criminology is  apt to  be the  focus on human consciousness whose mutilation  leads to  sickness, crime  and sorrow  and whose  restoration,   collective  and   individual,  is  the insurance against  psychic stress  and its  off-shoots-crime and related  maladies. The  technology  of  sentencing  must release man  from distortions and pressures on lines ancient and modern. This parenthesis, in a sense, argues for the new orientation in juvenile justice.      A copy  of this  order will  be sent  to  the  approved school,  Etawah,  and  to  the  trial  Judge  for  immediate compliance. A  copy of  the order will also be served on the Advocate  for   the  appellants  for  communication  to  and compliance by  his clients  and to  the Home  Department for correctional actions.      PATHAK,  J.  The  petitioners  were  convicted  by  the learned Assistant  Sessions Judge,  Aligarh for  the offence under s.  376 of  the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment. He 778 directed their detention for the period of their sentence in an approved  school at Etawah. Their appeal was dismissed by the learned  Additional Sessions  Judge, Aligarh.  The  High Court declined  to interfere  in revision, From the material on the  record it is not possible to say that the finding of the courts  below that the petitioners committed the offence is not  substantiated by  the evidence on the record and, in my opinion,  no case  has been made out for interfering with the conviction.  But so  far as the sentence is concerned, I think that  the High  Court and  the courts  below have  not sufficiently  appreciated  the  need  for  a  proper  order. Special leave granted on the question of sentence only.      Order on the appeal.      The appellants are children. At the time of the offence the age  of the three appellants ranged between 10 years and 14 years,  the youngest,  Satto, being  10 and  the  eldest,

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Bucha, being  14. They  were cutting  Rizka in their village fields when  Kumari Bismillah,  who was  then about 12 years old, passed  by grazing  her cattle.  Apparently, the  three youngsters were  seized with  the temptation  of having  sex with her  and borne  on that  impulse they  forced the  girl inside a  brick  kiln  and  committed  rape  on  her,  after securing a  bystander, Baboo, who was also grazing his goats at the  spot, to  a tree. There can be no doubt that the act cannot  possibly   be  condoned.   It   calls   for   severe condemnation by  the plainest  moral standards.  But on  the question of  sentence, the  High Court  and the courts below have, almost  mechanically, affirmed a sentence of two years imprisonment to  be served  out by  detention in an approved school.  They   have  failed   to  apply   their   mind   to considerations which  are relevant  when a youthful offender is sentenced.  The U.P.  Children  Act,  1951  contains  two provisions in  that regard. Section 29 provides that where a child is  found to have committed an offence punishable with transportation or  imprisonment, the  court, if satisfied an inquiry that  it is expedient so to deal with the child, may order him  to be  sent to  an approved  school for  a stated period. Section 30 provides.-           "30. Power  to discharge  youthful offender  or to      Commit him to suitable custody.                (1) A  court may, if it think fit, instead of           directing any  youthful offender to be detained in           an approved school, order him to be -                (a) discharged  after due  admonition; or (b)           released  on   probation  of   good  conduct   and           committed to the 779           care  of  his  parent,  guardian  or  other  adult           relative or  other  fit  person  on  such  parent,           guardian, relative  or person  executing  a  bond,           with  or   without  sureties,  as  the  court  may           require, to  be responsible for the good behaviour           of  the  youthful  offender  for  any  period  not           exceeding three  years and  for the  observance of           such other  conditions as the court may impose for           securing that  the youthful  offender may  lead an           honest and industrious life.           The Court  may order  that the  youthful  offender      released under  this clause  may be  placed  under  the      supervision of  a Reformation  Officer or of some other      person appointed for the purpose by the Court.           (2) If  it appears  to the  Court on  receiving  a      report from  the Reformation  Officer or otherwise that      the offender  has not  been of good behavior during the      period of  the probation,  it  may  after  making  such      inquiry as  it thinks  fit order  the  offender  to  be      detained in an approved school."      Almost invariably  the question  will arise whether the youthful offender should be proceeded against under s. 29 or s. 30 The answer to the question lies in the judgment of the Court, which  judgment must be made in the sound exercise of its discretion.  Among the considerations to which the court must apply  its mind  are the  age of  the child  his family background, his  general past  conduct and  antecedents, the circumstances in  which he  committed the offence, and which of the  measures provided  by the  statute, s.  29 or s. 30, will more  effectively and  yet not harshly enable the child to develop  into a responsible member of society. It must be remembered that  the U.P.  Children Act deals with children, and a "child" is defined by s.2(4) as a person under the age of sixteen  years. The  Statute is  concerned with  a person

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whose personality,  judgment  and  discretion  has  not  yet attained maturity.  The primary object then must be to place the child  in an environment conducive to his rehabilitation and providing  scope for  corrective action. That appears to be the basic criterion for determining the choice between s. 29 and s. 30. In a case where the child has acted on impulse in committing  an offence,  and there is nothing to show the presence of  any vicious  streak of  character, it  would be more appropriate  to leave  him to the care and attention of parental authority  rather than  to send  him to an approved school.  That  will  depend,  however  on  whether  parental attention is  possible and  forthcoming and  whether it does not suffer from want 780 of sufficient  effectiveness in  moulding the  proper  moral development of  the child.  In my  opinion, having regard to the facts  and circumstances  of the  present case the order contemplated  by   s.  30(1)  (b)  of  the  Act  would  more appropriately meet  the ends of justice and serve the object of the statute.      Accordingly, the  appeal is  allowed on the question of sentence. The  sentence imposed  by  the  learned  Assistant Sessions  Judge  and  affirmed  by  the  learned  Additional Sessions Judge  and  the  High  Court,  is  set  aside.  The appellants are  ordered to  be released on probation of good conduct and  to be committed to the care of their respective parents, and  if there  are no  surviving parents then their guardian, on  such parents or guardian executing a bond each without sureties,  to be  responsible for the good behaviour of the  youthful offender  for period  of two years from the date of  the release  and for  the observance of a condition that the  child should  be put  to school  or  continue  his studies if he is already in school, and regularly attend any recreational centre  or meditational  centre (if any) of the parent’s   choice.    The   Reformation   Officer   enjoying jurisdiction in the locality will have supervision over each of the  appellants and  shall make a report once every three months to  the trial  court. The  Reformation  Officer  will explain to  the appellants  and their  parents the import of this order.      A copy  of this  order will  be sent  to  the  approved school,  Etawah,  and  to  the  trial  court  for  immediate compliance. A  copy of  the order  will also  be  served  on counsel  for   the  appellants  for  communication  to,  and compliance by, the appellants. N.K.A.                                       Appeal allowed. 781