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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1102 of 2004

PETITIONER: SATRUCHARLA VIJAYA RAMA RAJU             

RESPONDENT: NIMMAKA  JAYA  RAJU & ORS.                       

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/10/2005

BENCH: CJI R.C. LAHOTI,C.K. THAKKER & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

                1.              The appellant successfully contested the State Assembly  Elections in 1999 from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency in the  State of Andhra Pradesh.  His election was challenged by respondent  No.1 herein, in Election Petition No. 13 of 1999, under Section 80 of the  Representation of the People Act, 1951 read with Sections 5 and 100 (1)  (d) (i) of the Act.  The contention raised by the first respondent was that  the appellant was not qualified to contest from a constituency reserved  for the scheduled tribes.   According to respondent No.1, the election  petitioner, the appellant was a ’Kshatriya’ and was not eligible to contest  from a constituency reserved for the scheduled tribes.  His claim that he  belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe, was not true.  Since he was ineligible  to contest from the constituency, his election was liable to be declared  void and set aside.   The first respondent also prayed that he may be  declared elected instead.   

2.              The appellant resisted the election petition.  He pleaded that  he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe which was a notified Scheduled  Tribe.   He was neither a ’Kondaraju’ nor a ’Kshatriya’.  Even otherwise,  ’Kondaraju’ and "Konda Dora" were synonymous and the "Konda  Dora" tribe was included in the list of Scheduled Tribes.  He further  pleaded that his earlier election from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly  constituency, the self-same constituency, was challenged by a voter in  Election Petition No. 13 of 1983 on the very same ground that he did not  belong to the "Konda Dora" tribe.  That election petition, after contest,   was dismissed by the learned Judge to whom it was assigned after a  regular trial and the said decision barred a fresh enquiry into the same  question in the present election petition and the decision therein was  conclusive on his status.  He also explained that his ancestors and  himself described themselves as ’Kshatriyas’ in view of the status  enjoyed by them in their tribe and not because they belonged to the  ’Kshatriya’ community.  An ancestor of his had been conferred the title  "Satrucharla" and it was the surname of his family.   His predecessors  and his cousin had all contested in prior elections from reserved  constituencies and no objection had ever been raised prior to 1983  regarding their status.  In a similar case, where the members of the  family of a candidate had described themselves as ’Kshatriya’, the  Supreme Court had held in an election petition that was filed challenging  their status, that as a matter of fact that candidate belonged to a  Scheduled Tribe and was not a ’Kshatriya’.  He raised a further  contention that the caste certificate issued by the competent authority  under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act,  1993 to the effect that he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe was final

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and binding on the court.   

3.              Issues were raised, inter alia, on pleas that the judgment in  E.P. 13 of 1983 operated as res judicata with regard to the status of the  appellant, that the judgment therein was a judgment in rem and  consequently conclusive on the status of the appellant and that the  present election petition was not maintainable, so long as the community  certificate issued by the Collector remained in force.  At the instance of  the appellant, the above three issues were taken up for consideration as  preliminary issues.  By order dated 13.12.2002, the assigned Judge of the  High Court held that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 dated 16.1.1984  did not operate as res judicata on the status of the appellant as far as the  present election petition is concerned; that the judgment in E.P. 13 of  1983  was not a judgment in rem and could not bind those who were not  parties to it and that the said adjudication did not bar the trial of the  present election petition.  He held that the provisions of the Andhra  Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes)  Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 or the  certificate issued thereunder did not have any impact on the trial of the  election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and  that the election petition had to be tried and decided on the basis of  evidence that may be adduced in it.  This order of the learned Judge was  challenged before this Court in SLP (C) Nos. 1438-1439 of 2003.  This  Court, by order dated 7.2.2003, dismissed those petitions for special  leave.  Thereafter, evidence was taken in the election petition.   Documents were marked on the side of the parties and oral evidence was  led.  The learned Judge, on an appreciation of the pleadings and the  evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that the appellant did not  belong to "Konda Dora" community, a Scheduled Tribe and was  consequently ineligible to contest the election from a constituency  reserved for the scheduled tribes.  Thus, the learned Judge set aside the  election of the appellant from No.8 Naguru (ST) assembly constituency  in the general elections held on 11.9.1999.  The prayer of the first  respondent to declare him elected, was declined on the ground that such  relief was not liable to be granted at that point of time and in view of the  dissolution of the assembly itself.  Feeling aggrieved by the setting aside  of his election on the ground that he did not belong to a scheduled tribe,  the appellant has filed this appeal under Section 116-A of the  Representation of the People Act, 1951.

4.              Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contended that the  learned Judge in the High Court was wrong in holding that the decision  in E.P. 13 of 1983 did not operate as res judicata and was not conclusive  on the status of the appellant.  The judgment was one in rem.  He  alternatively contended that the said judgment operated as a judicial  precedent and should have been accepted as such by the learned Judge.   It was against judicial discipline for a subsequent Judge assigned to try  an election petition, to differ from the conclusion of the High Court  rendered in an earlier election petition on the status of the appellant and  judicial discipline warranted that the matter should have been referred to  a Division Bench for decision, in case the judge was inclined to disagree.  Though, he faintly raised the contention that the issue of the certificate  under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and  Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act,  1993 was conclusive and binding on the proceedings under the  Representation of the People Act, 1951, he did not seriously pursue that  contention, obviously because of the fact that the certificate issued under  that Act served a different purpose and could not stand in the way of an  election petition filed under the Representation of the People Act, 1951  being tried in accordance with law by the High Court.  On facts, he  submitted that the High Court was in error in its appreciation of the  evidence and the finding that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda  Dora" tribe was clearly erroneous.  He emphasized that merely because a  person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe described himself as a

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’Kshatriya’ or claimed to be a ’Kshatriya’, he would not become a  ’Kshatriya’ or cease to be a tribal and this aspect has not been properly  appreciated by the learned Judge.  He ultimately submitted that the  appreciation of the evidence by the learned Judge was perverse and  important pieces of evidence have been ignored or not given the weight  they deserved.  The admissions extracted from the witnesses examined  on behalf of the election petitioner and the deposition of the witnesses  examined on behalf of the appellant and their impact on the relevant  question, have not been considered properly by the election judge.  He  submitted that the decision under appeal suffers from innumerable  infirmities and required to be set aside by this Court in appeal.

5.              Learned counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand,  contended that it has been found by the order dated 13.12.2002, that the  decision in E.P. 13 of 1983 did not operate as res judicata  and was not  conclusive on the tribal status of the appellant and that the certificate  obtained under the State Act was not conclusive on the election tribunal  and that those findings have become final and have been approved by  this Court by dismissing the petitions for special leave to appeal filed by  the appellant challenging that order.  He submitted that it was not open  to the appellant to raise those questions all over again in this appeal.   Even otherwise, the finding in E.P. 13 of 1983 was only to the effect that  the election petitioner therein, had failed to prove that the appellant did  not belong to a  scheduled tribe or that he belonged to the ’Kshatriya’  caste and that did not amount to a declaration of the status of the  appellant as belonging to the "Konda Dora" tribe.  He submitted that  every election furnishes a fresh cause of action and the finding in an  election petition relating to an earlier election to which the present  election petitioner was not even a party, does not operate as res judicata  and does not even have any evidentiary value.  He submitted that a    series of documents have been produced which contained admissions by  the predecessors of the appellant and by the appellant that they were  ’Kshatriyas’ and those admissions were conclusive as against the  appellant, since he was not in a position to show that they were wrong or  to explain them away except stating that they wanted to claim a higher  status for prestige.  He pointed out tht the documents were spread over  for a number of years.  He also pointed out that the appellant had  admitted that in his school leaving certificate book, his caste has been  shown as ’Kshatriya’ and since that piece of evidence was almost  conclusive, there was no reason to interfere with the finding of the  learned Judge that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora"  tribe.  He finally submitted that in the face of the admissions contained  in documents of unimpeachable authenticity, the burden had shifted to  the appellant to show that he belongs to the "Konda Dora" tribe and that  the admissions earlier made, were wrong.  He submitted that on a proper  appreciation of evidence in the case, the learned Judge has rightly come  to the conclusion that the appellant was ineligible to contest from a  reserved constituency and there was no reason for this Court to interfere  with that decision.  He prayed for a dismissal of the appeal.  

6.              First, we will deal with the contention based on the  adjudication in E.P. 13 of 1983.  That was an election petition relating to  an earlier election in respect of the same assembly constituency filed by  a voter challenging the eligibility of the appellant to contest as belonging  to a Scheduled Tribe.  The learned Judge noticed that the election  petitioner had not examined anyone belonging to the ’Kshatriya’  community to show that the appellant had been accepted as a ’Kshatriya’  and had also not led adequate evidence to show that the appellant was  not accepted as a member of the "Konda Dora"  tribe.  In his view, the  explanation of the appellant that they had claimed the status as  ’Kshatriyas’ only for prestige was adequate to wipe out the effect of the  consistent admissions contained in some documents and the entry in the  secondary school leaving certificate.  It was thus held that the election

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petitioner therein, had not chosen to lead any evidence worth the name to  show that the appellant was a ’Kshatriya’ and he had only tried to pick  holes in the evidence adduced on the side of the appellant.  In the light of  the evidence on the side of the appellant, it had to be held that the  appellant belonged to the "Konda Dora" tribe and that his nomination  was rightly accepted.   

7.              Before proceeding to consider this question, it requires to be  noticed that at the instance of the appellant, the learned Judge had held  by his order dated 13.12.2002, that the adjudication in E.P. 13 of 1983   did not operate as res judicata and was not conclusive on the question of  the status of the appellant. That order had been challenged before this  Court in Petitions For Special Leave To Appeal (Civil) Nos. 1438-1439  of 2003.  Though, this Court had not given reasons, this Court had  dismissed those Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal  by order dated  7.2.2003 without granting liberty to the appellant to challenge the  findings while challenging the final decision, if it became necessary.   Whether there be a merger of the order of the High Court with the order  of this Court or not (the present view is that there is no merger), as far as  the present proceedings are concerned, would it not be conclusive as  against the appellant?  This Court is only a court of co-equal jurisdiction  and is normally bound to respect its own earlier orders.  Similarly, the  High Court also could not reconsider the issues after trial.  If the  appellant had not challenged the order made by the learned Judge then  and there, he could have set out a challenge to the order dated  13.12.2002 in the present memorandum of appeal as envisaged by the  principle recognized in Section 105 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,  1908 (the Code, of course, does not stricto sensu apply to these  proceedings).  In the present appeal, though the appellant had raised a  ground that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983  is a judgment in rem and it  consequently precluded the High Court from going against that decision,  he has not set out a specific challenge to the order dated 13.12.2002.   Really, it is possible to say that as far as the present appeal is concerned,  the appellant is not entitled to raise the questions covered by the order  leading to SLP (C) Nos. 1438-1439 of 2003, in view of the dismissal of  those petitions.

8.              But, we do not think it necessary to rest our decision on that  ground alone. Even otherwise, the plea that the earlier adjudication  operated as res judicata is difficult of acceptance.  The first respondent  herein, the petitioner in the present election petition, was not a party to  the prior election petition.  This Court in C.M. Arumugam Vs. S.  Rajgopal and Ors. [(1976) 1 SCC 863] has held that every election  furnishes a fresh cause of action for a challenge to that election and an  adjudication in a prior election petition cannot be conclusive in the  subsequent proceeding. Res judicata is nothing but the merger of a cause  of action in a decree, transit in rem judicatum.  So, even if the cause of  action in the earlier election petition merged in the final adjudication  therein, since according to this Court, the subsequent election furnishes a  fresh cause of action, the merger of the earlier cause of action with the  decision therein cannot bar the trial of the fresh cause of action arising  out of subsequent election.     It is true that the earlier election petition  was filed by a voter in the constituency concerned and he had also raised  the plea that the appellant did not belong to the "Konda Dora"  community.  An election petition filed, though it abates on the death of  the petitioner therein, could be pursued by another person coming  forward to prosecute that election petition as enjoined by Section 112 of  the Act.  But that does not make an election petition a representative  action in the sense in which it is understood in law.  Therefore, normally,  the adjudication in an election petition, not inter-parties, cannot operate  as res judicata in a subsequent election petition challenging that  subsequent election.  

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9.              The appellant could have invoked explanation VI to Section  11 of the Code of Civil Procedure if it were possible to hold that the  person who was the petitioner in E.P. 13 of 1983, was litigating in  respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for  himself and others and he was also bona fide litigating therein.   Though,  as noticed earlier, Section 112 of the Representation of the People Act  gives any other voter the right  to come forward and pursue E.P. 13 of  1983, the prior election petition, in case the petitioner therein died and  the election petition abated, on that basis alone, the earlier action cannot  be understood to be a representative action so as to attract explanation  VI  to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   We do not think it  necessary to advert to the authorities on the scope of explanation VI to  Section 11 and the nature of litigations prior and subsequent, to which  that explanation would have relevance.   Suffice it to say that the plea of  res judicata raised by counsel for the appellant cannot be sustained. The  appellant, therefore, cannot rely on Section 40 of the Evidence Act.

10.             The contention that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a  judgment in rem also cannot be accepted.   Under the Indian Evidence  Act Section 41 is said to incorporate the law on the subject.   A judgment  in rem is defined in English Law as "an adjudication pronounced (as its  name indeed denotes) by the status, some particular subject matter by a  tribunal having competent authority for that purpose".   Spencer Bower  on Res Judicata defines the term as one which "declares, defines or  otherwise determines the status of a person or of a thing, that is to say,  the jural relation of the person or thing to the world generally".   An  election petition under Section 80 of the Representation of the People  Act, 1951 cannot be held to lead to an adjudication which declares,  defines or otherwise determines the status of a person or a jural relation  of that person to the world generally.  It is merely an adjudication of a  statutory challenge on the question whether the election of the successful  candidate is liable to be voided on any of the grounds available under  Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.  It is not an  action for establishing the status of a person.  It is not an action initiated  by a person to have his status established or his jural relationship to the  world generally established, to borrow the language of Spencer Bower.    No doubt in E.P. 13 of 1983, the question was whether the election  petitioner therein who alleged that the appellant before us was not  qualified to contest as a candidate belonging to a Scheduled Tribe, in a  constituency reserved for that tribe and to that extent, having relationship  to the status of the appellant.   In such an action under the Representation  of the People Act, 1951 what is decided is whether the election petitioner  had succeeded in establishing that the successful candidate belonged to a  caste or community, that was not included in the Scheduled Tribes  Order.   In a case where the election petitioner failed to establish his  claim, it could not be said that it amounted to a declaration of the status  of the respondent in that election petition, the successful candidate and  that such a finding on status would operate as a judgment in rem so as to  bind the whole world.  It is also not one of the judgments specifically  recognized by Section 41 of the Evidence Act.   It has been held that the  challenge to an election is only a statutory right.  An election petition is  not a suit of a general nature or a representative action for adjudication  of the status of a person.  Even if we take it that the earlier judgment is  admissible in the evidence, on that, no objection was raised even at the  trial, it could be brought in under Section 42 of the Evidence Act on the  basis that it relates to a matter of a public nature or under Section 43 of  the Evidence Act.  In either case, not being inter-parties, the best status  that can be assigned to it is to say that it is of high evidentiary value,  while considering the case of the parties in the present election petition.

11.             In fact, learned senior counsel concentrated his fire on the  contention that the earlier judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983 is a judgment in  rem.   He referred to the decision in Inamati Mallappa Basappa vs.  Desai Basavaraj Ayyappa and othersb (1959 SCR 611).  He relied on

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the portions of the judgment wherein their Lordships indicated the nature  and scope of an election petition.   Quoting from the decision in K.  Kamaraja Nadar vs. Kunju Thevar and others ( 1959 SCR 583) their  Lordships held that an election petition is not a matter in which the  persons interested are the candidates who strove against each other at the  elections.  The public also are substantially interested in it and this is not  merely in the sense that an election has news value.   An election is an  essential part of democratic process.   An election petition is not a suit  between two persons but is a proceeding in which the constituency itself  is the principal party interested.   He also referred to the decision of the  Madras High Court in  A. Sreenivasan vs. Election tribunal, Madras  and anotherb  (Vol.XI    E.L.R.  278) wherein the above two decisions  were followed.

12.             With respect to learned senior counsel, these decisions do  not show that the judgment in an election petition could be treated as a  judgment in rem.  Obviously, the whole of the constituency concerned is  interested in the outcome of an election petition, since it either affects  the choice they have already made, or their right to have the freedom of  a fresh choice.   But since a challenge to an election petition is only a  statutory challenge under the Representation of the People Act and since  the acceptance of the challenge or the rejection of it in a given case  would be based on facts and law available therein, and since an  adjudication therein is not one which comes directly within the purview  of Section 41 of the Act, the same could not be treated as a judgment in  rem.   In fact, if it were a judgment in rem, the ratio of the decision of  this Court in C.M. Arumugam Vs. S. Rajgopal and Ors. [(1976) 1  SCC 863] earlier referred to, would not have been rendered, since the  adjudication in the earlier election petition would have barred the  consideration of the question even if it be based on additional facts.  We,  therefore, overrule the argument that the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983,  should be held to be a judgment in rem binding on the whole world  including the election petitioner herein, even though he was not a party  to the earlier proceeding.

13.             The argument that the earlier decision must be treated to be  a judicial precedent cannot also be accepted.   The decision in the earlier  election petition depended upon the pleadings and the evidence adduced  in that case and their appreciation.  The essential finding was that the  election petitioner therein had not established the plea set up by him.   It  was not a case where a particular document was interpreted in a  particular manner by the highest court of the land and the interpretation  of the same document was again involved in a subsequent litigation  between those who were not parties to the earlier litigation.  In   Kharkan and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1965 SC 83) this  Court held that an earlier judgment can only be relevant if it fulfills the  conditions laid down by the Indian Evidence Act in Sections 40 to 43.    The earlier judgment is, no doubt, admissible to show the parties and the  decision but it is not admissible for the purpose of relying upon the  appreciation of the evidence.   What happened in E.P. 13 of 1983was  that the documentary and oral evidence adduced in that case were  appreciated by the High Court and the learned Judge came to the  conclusion that the election petitioner had failed to prove that the present  appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe.   No doubt, at the end of  the judgment, there was also a sentence to the effect that the appellant  belonged to a Scheduled Tribe.   What we intend to point out is that, that  appreciation of evidence has no relevance in the present election petition  and, in our view, the High Court rightly held that the present election  petition has to be tried on the pleadings and the evidence available in this  case.

14.             Now we will come to the merits of the case.  The evidence  on the side of the election petitioner consisted of Exhibits A1 to A27 and  the oral evidence of PWs 1 to 8.   Exhibits C1 to C10 were also cited and  marked through CW1.   On behalf of the appellant, Exhibits B1 to B5

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were marked and RWs1 to 9 were examined.   The learned Judge trying  the election petition, held rightly that the initial burden was on the  election petitioner to substantiate his assertion that the appellant did not  belong to a Scheduled Tribe and was not entitled to contest from a  constituency reserved for Scheduled Tribes.   On the basis of Exhibits  A2 to A11 read with Exhibits A23, the oral evidence on the side of   election petitioner, the learned Judge held that the burden had shifted to  the appellant to show that he belonged to a Scheduled Tribe, namely, the  Konda Dora Tribe.   The learned Judge noticed that the appellant had not  adduced any documentary evidence to establish that he belonged to the  Konda Dora Tribe.   He held that the Gazetteer and the other historic  materials produced by the appellant, did not show that the family of the  appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe.   The oral evidence on the  side of the appellant was not sufficient to establish that the appellant  belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe.  On the other hand, there were a  series of documents executed by the members of the family of the  appellant and by the appellant containing an assertion that the family  was a ’Kshatriya’ family and the school leaving certificates of the  appellant and that of his paternal cousin, indicated that he and the  appellant were ’Kshatriyas’  and hence did not belong to a Scheduled  Tribe and since these assertions were admissions in the present case and  were not rebutted or shown to be a wrong by the appellant, it must be  held that the election petitioner had established that the appellant did not  belong to a Scheduled Tribe.   The learned Judge, therefore, allowed the  election petition and declared the election of the appellant from the  concerned constituency, void.    

15.             Learned senior counsel for the appellant made a strenuous  attempt to contend that the learned Judge of the High Court had wrongly  placed the burden of proof in the case.   We cannot agree.  The trial  judge has rightly proceeded on the basis that the initial burden was on  the election petitioner to establish his plea that the appellant did not  belong to a Scheduled Tribe.   Though in a prior statement, an assertion  in one’s own interest, may not be evidence, a prior statement, adverse to  one’s interest would be evidence.  In fact, it would be the best evidence  the opposite party can rely upon.  Therefore, in the present case, where  the appellant is pleading that he is a Konda Dora, the statement in the  series of documents, pre-constitution and post constitution, executed by  his ancestors and members of his family including himself describing  themselves as ’Kshatriyas’, would operate as admissions against the  interest of the appellant in the present case.  These admissions also  strengthened the admission of the appellant that in his school leaving  certificate also, he is described as a ’Kshatriya’ and his paternal uncle’s  son is also described as a ’Kshatriya’ in his school leaving certificate and  that uncle’s son was also held to be a ’Kshatriya’ on an enquiry made in  that behalf.   Therefore, in our view, the trial judge was correct in  holding that the election petitioner had discharged the initial burden  placed on him and the burden shifted to the appellant to establish that he  belonged to the ’Konda Dora’ Tribe.

16.             Appreciating the evidence on the side of the appellant, the  trial judge held that no document has been produced by him to show that  the appellant belonged to a Scheduled Tribe or that earlier, their claims  have been recognized as a Scheduled Tribe except the judgment in E.P.  13 of 1983.   The trial Judge having taken the view that the judgment in  E.P. 13 of 1983 would not operate as a res judicata and could not be  taken to be a judgment in rem, proceeded to hold that even though in that  case an election petitioner therein had failed to establish that the  appellant was not a Konda Dora, in the present case, the available  evidence indicated that the family of the appellant did not belong to the  Konda Dora Tribe.   The trial judge found that the evidence of RWs 1 to  9 was not adequate to establish that the appellant was a Konda Dora.    Having gone through the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 we also agree with the  trial judge that the evidence of RWs 1 to 9 is totally insufficient to  establish that the appellant belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe.  On a

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scrutiny of the evidence of PWs 1 to 8, also, we do not see anything in  their evidence that would justify our holding that the appellant has  established his claim.

17.             In this position, learned counsel for the appellant submitted  that the gazetteer and the historical documents produced on the side of  the appellant clearly showed that the appellant belonged to the Konda  Dora  Tribe.   We must say that the High Court has considered these  materials in detail and has found that even going by those materials the  best that could be said on behalf of the appellant was that the family of  the appellant, the Marangi family, belonged to Konda Raju caste, but the  very material relied by the appellant to show that he belonged to the  ’Konda Raju’ tribe, also showed that the tribe ’Konda Raju’ was  different from the tribe ’Konda Dora’.   In paragraphs 84 and 85 of his  judgment the trial judge has dealt with this aspect.   On going through  the detailed discussion therein and the materials read out to us by leaned  counsel for the appellant, it is not possible to hold that these documents  establish that the appellant belonged to the ’Konda Dora’ tribe.

18.             As against the admissions contained in Exhibits A2 to A11  and the evidence furnished by the other documents produced on behalf  of the election petitioner, no positive evidence could be adduced by the  appellant to show that he belonged to the Konda Dora Tribe.  He relied  on a caste certificate issued to him under the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled  Castes Scheduled Tribe and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of  Community  Certificate Act, 1993 in support of his claim.  The trial  judge found that there was no due enquiry on the application of the  appellant for the issue of a caste certificate as prescribed under this Act,  and the certificate was issued to him based on a recommendation made  the same day as the date of the application, by the concerned authority.   On an appreciation of the evidence of CW1 in the light of Ex. C.1 to  C.10 the trial judge found that even the application for issuance of the  certificate was filled up by the official concerned after obtaining the  signature of the applicant therein, the appellant, in a blank form and the  certificate was issued without following the proper procedure.   CW1 in  fact  confessed in the court that the certificate was issued because he was  told that in view of the decision in E.P. 13 of  1983 he was bound to  issue the certificate asked for by the appellant.   On going through the  evidence of CW1 and on scrutinizing Exhibits C1 to C10 and the  reasoning adopted by the trial judge, we are satisfied that the trial judge  was fully justified in discarding the caste certificate relied on by the  appellant.

19.             The evidence of the appellant examined as RW1 clearly  shows that the family of the appellant had always considered itself to  belong to a superior strata of society and as a ruling or satrap family.   The title of ’Satrucharala’, conqueror of enemies, had been conferred on  an ancestor of the appellant and the members of the family were using  that title.  The evidence of PWs 1 to 8 and RWs 1 to 9 shows that most  of the practices followed by the family differed from that of ’Konda  Doras’.  In fact, learned counsel for the appellant could only emphasis  that there was no evidence to show that ’Homa’ and ’Saptapadi’, the  essentials of a ’Kshatriya’ marriage were being performed in the  marriages in the family.  But learned counsel could not contradict that  the male members were having thread ceremony.  No doubt, mere  assertion or a claim by a tribal that he is a ’Kshatriya’ cannot make him a  ’Kshatriya’.  But what is involved here is a series of  assertions which  are admissions in terms of the Evidence Act and other evidence that  tribal customs differed from the practices of the family of the appellant.   The position in V.V. Giri Vs. Dippala Suri Dora and ors. [(1960) 1  SCR 426] differs, in that, in that case, Dora was admitted to be originally  a tribal and what was asserted was that subsequently, he had become a  ’Kshatriya’, having adopted their customs and practices. That is not the

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case here and there is no admission in this case that the family of the  appellant originally was tribal.  Evidence in the case on hand also  indicates that the family of the appellant had marital relationship mostly  with the Zamindar families outside the present State of Andhra Pradesh  and their way of life was also not that of the tribals.  No positive  acceptable evidence could also be adduced to show that the family  entered into marital relationship with ’Konda Dora’ tribals.  The  evidence also shows that the family of the appellant did not have any  close relationship with the Konda Doras of the locality.   The admissions  of RW.1 show that quite a few of the customs the family was following  had no relations to the customs generally followed by the Konda Dora  Tribe and some of the practices clearly differed from that of the tribe and  was more consistent with the practices followed by Kshatriya and higher  castes.   The trial judge has carefully analysed these aspects and we do  not see any justification in differing from his appreciation of the oral as  well as documentary evidence in the case.    

20.             In a sense, the appellant wants the best of two worlds.   Though, he would like to contest from a constituency reserved for the  Scheduled Tribes, he would want to lead the life of a forward caste and  have the trappings of that caste.  The purpose of reservation of  constituencies is to ensure representation in the legislatures to such tribes  and castes who are deemed to require special efforts for their upliftment.  The person seeking election from such constituencies must be the true  representative of that tribe.  The evidence shows that the appellant could  not be considered to be a true representative of a tribe included in the  Presidential Order deserving special protection.   

21.             What we are left with is the high evidentiary value that may  be attached to the judgment in E.P. 13 of 1983.  It is true that some of  the documents produced in the present election petition, were also  available before the judge assigned to try the previous case.  But  ultimately the conclusion in the previous case was based on an  appreciation of the evidence adduced in that case.  Some evidence may  be common.  But, since it is not possible to accept the contention that the  earlier judgment is a judgment in rem or that it would operate as res  judicata, we can at best proceed on the basis that on an earlier occasion,  it was adjudicated that he was not shown to be disqualified to contest  from a reserved constituency.  But as emphasized by learned counsel for  the election petitioner-respondent, that was a conclusion arrived at based  on an appreciation of the evidence in that case and once that judgment  could not be held to be a judgment in rem binding on the whole world or  a judgment that bars the trial of the issue in the present election petition  or would operate as res judicata between the parties, that judgment by  itself is not sufficient to rebut the evidence available in the present case  based on which the finding has been rendered.   

22.             Thus, on the whole, on a re-appreciation of the pleadings  and the evidence in the case, in the light of the law governing the matter,  we are satisfied that the decision of the trial court does not call for any  interference.  We, therefore, confirm the decision of the trial court and  dismiss this appeal with costs.