REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 763 of 2008

Satpal Singh   …Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This  appeal  has  been  preferred  against  the  Judgment  

and  Order  dated  7.03.2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 337-SB  

of 1994, by which the High Court has upheld the conviction  

Order of the Trial Court dated 20th/21st July, 1994 passed in  

Sessions  Trial  No.  21  of  1993,  however,  the  High  Court  

reduced the sentence from seven years to five years for the

offence  punishable  under  Section  376  of  the  Indian  Penal  

Code (hereinafter called as, “IPC”).   

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present  

case  are  that  the  alleged occurrence  of  rape  took place  on  

11.03.1993.  Rajinder Kaur (PW 15), the prosecutrix, and her  

brother Rajinder Singh (PW 16) had gone to fields for collecting  

cattle fodder.  Rajinder Singh had gone on a cycle and settled  

in a field at some distance from the field where Rajinder Kaur,  

the  prosecutrix,  had reached  to  cut/collect  the  grass.   The  

appellant, Satpal Singh, caught hold of her and out of fear, the  

sickle in her hand fell down.  The appellant took her to the  

nearby wheat field and raped her.  She raised an alarm and  

upon hearing the same, her brother, Rajinder Singh (PW 16),  

came running to the place of occurrence.  But by then, the  

appellant escaped from the scene.  The prosecutrix came to  

her house along with her brother and told her mother Smt.  

Balwant Kaur that she was raped by the appellant.  The father  

of the prosecutrix,  Balbir Singh (Complainant)  (PW 11),  was  

not present at home and he was informed about the incident  

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when he returned home in the evening.  Balbir Singh (PW 11),  

after  having  consultation  with  his  brother  Kulwant  Singh,  

went to Police Station, Shahbad.  However, the police officials  

on duty asked him to come on next day.  When Balbir Singh  

(PW 11) reached the Police Station on next day, he found that  

a Village Panchayat had already assembled there and efforts  

were made to compromise the matter.  However, Balbir Singh  

(PW 11),  agreed not to launch criminal proceedings in case,  

the  appellant  was fined to  the  tune of  Rs.  5000/-  and “be  

taken in procession after blackening his face and be paraded in  

the  village”.   Ultimately,  the  Panchayat  imposed fine  of  Rs.  

1100/- only on the appellant,  out  of  which Rs.  600/-  were  

donated in the Gurudwara and Rs. 500/- in the temple.  Being  

dissatisfied  with  the  dictate  of  the  Panchayat  and  running  

from  pillar  to  post  to  convince  the  Panchayat  members  to  

come  to  a  justifiable  solution,  Balbir  Singh  (PW  11),  

complainant,  approached  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  

Kurukshetra on 16.07.1993 i.e. after about four months of the  

date of incident.  On the instructions of the Superintendent of  

Police, Kurukshetra, an FIR was lodged against the appellant  

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and one ASI Ram Kumar on 16.07.1993 under Sections 376,  

201 and 217 IPC.  ASI Ram Kumar was arrayed as an accused  

for the reason that there had been allegations against him that  

he forced the matter to be compromised in order to screen the  

appellant from the crime.

3. Dr. Geeta Suri (PW 2), the Medical Officer, examined the  

prosecutrix on 17.07.1993.  According to her, as the alleged  

rape had taken place long ago, the vaginal swap could not be  

taken  and,  therefore,  there  was  no  possibility  to  prove  the  

alleged act of rape by way of medical report.  However, she  

opined that possibility of rape could not be ruled out.     

4. The charges were framed against the appellant and ASI  

Ram Kumar on 14.09.1993 under Sections 376, 201 and 217  

IPC.  Both the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.  

Thus,  the  trial  was  conducted  and  after  recording  the  

statements and considering the case in totality, the Trial Court  

convicted the appellant under Section 376 IPC and sentenced  

to seven years’ Rigorous Imprisonment and imposed fine to the  

tune  of  Rs.5000/-.  In  default  of  payment  of  fine,  he  was  

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directed  to  undergo  Rigorous  Imprisonment  of  six  months  

more.  However, ASI Ram Kumar stood acquitted.   

5. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred the appeal before  

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the High Court,  

vide impugned Judgment and Order dated 7.03.2007, upheld  

the conviction of the appellant, but considering the mitigating  

circumstances, reduced the sentence from seven years to five  

years.  Hence, this appeal.   

6. Sh.  Abhinav  Ramakrishna,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant,  has raised only two issues namely;  (a)  that there  

has  been  inordinate  delay  in  lodging  the  FIR  and  the  

prosecution could not furnish any explanation for the same  

and; (b) that the prosecutrix was major and the Courts below  

have recorded a wrong finding of fact that she was a minor.  

The prosecutix and the  appellant  had been studying in the  

same school.   They  knew each other  and it  was  a  case  of  

consent.  The appellant has falsely been enroped in the crime  

just to extract certain amount of money from him.  The appeal  

deserves to be allowed.   

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7. On the other  hand, Sh. Rajeev Gaur ‘Naseem’,  learned  

counsel for the respondent-State, has vehemently opposed the  

appeal  contending  that  the  prosecutrix  was a  minor  at  the  

time of the incident and even if, she was a major, there was no  

consent of  the prosecutrix for  sexual intercourse.  More so,  

there had been no demand of money by the prosecutrix or her  

father, Balbir Singh (PW 11).  The delay occurred because of  

the intervention of the Village Panchayat and non-cooperation  

of  the  Police  officials.   The  Panchayat  did  not  agree  to  the  

suggestion  of  Balbir  Singh  (PW 11),  that  the  appellant  “be  

taken in procession after blackening his face and paraded in  

the village.”  The complainant approached the Superintendent  

of Police, Kurukshetra.  Thus, no fault can be found with the  

prosecution  case  as  delay  in  lodging  FIR  stood  explained.  

Appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.   

8. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  

learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

9. In the instant case, admittedly, the FIR was lodged after  

about four months of the commission of offence and that was  

done  on  the  instructions  of  the  Superintendent  of  Police,  

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Kurukshetra.  There is ample evidence on record to show that  

the Panchayat had intervened on the next day of the incident  

and it  pressurised the complainant  to compromise the case  

and settle it  outside the Court.   The Panchayat met several  

times  and  ultimately  imposed  a  fine  of  Rs.1100/-  on  the  

appellant,  out  of  which  the  appellant  deposited/donated  

Rs.600/-  and  Rs.  500/-  in  Gurudwara  and  Temple  

respectively,  and  obtained  receipts  also.   The  receipts  had  

been produced before the trial Court by Piara Singh (PW 6).  

However,  Balbir  Singh  (PW  11),  complainant,  had  been  

demanding  that  “the  appellant  be  fined  to  the  tune  of   

Rs.5000/- and be taken in the procession after blackening his   

face and be paraded in the village”.  It was not accepted by the  

Panchayat,  therefore,  the  complainant  had  raised  the  

grievance before the Superintendent of Police, Kurukshetra.   

10. Maya Ram, Sarpanch, Village Dhantori, was examined as  

PW8 and was declared hostile.  However, in the examination-

in-chief, he stated as under :-

“A Panchayat was convened to settle this   issue.  Members of Panchayat assembled  

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from  four-five  villages  including  the   relatives  of  both  the  parties.   This  dispute/issue  was  settled  by  the   Panchayat  by  imposing  the  fine  of   Rs.1100/- on Satpal Singh.”    

11. Balbir  Singh  (PW  11)  has  stated  that  he  went  to  the  

Police Station on the same day.  His statement was recorded  

there and was asked by the Munshi to come on the next day.  

When on the next day, he went to the Police Station at about  

8.00-8.30  a.m.  along  with  his  daughter  Rajinder  Kaur,  the  

prosecutrix,  and  brother,  he  noticed  15-20  persons  from  

different  villages,  including a few from his  village,  who had  

advised him to settle the matter for the reason that he had to  

marry  his  daughter.   They  had also  advised  not  to  get  his  

daughter medically examined as it would be a hurdle for him  

in  arranging  her  marriage.   But  the  complainant  did  not  

accept their suggestion and approached the higher authorities.  

12. Both  the  courts  below  have  considered  this  aspect  at  

length  and  reached  the  conclusion  that  delay  occurred  

because of the intervention of the Panchayat, as the Panchayat  

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had insisted to compromise the case, rather than moving the  

investigating machinery.  The High Court observed as under :-

“It was a case where the life of a young  child of the complainant was at stake.  A  tendency on the part of the villagers or the   parents of a young child, who is ravished,   would normally be to save the honour of   the  child  as  first  priority.   The  respectables  in  the  village  could  be  expected  to  intervene  in  this  matter  to  seek  compromise,  so  as  to  avoid  the  stigma  for  a  young  girl.   An  innocent  complainant, even admitted that he would  not  have  got the  case registered in case  the panchayat had agreed to impose fine  as suggested by him and if the panchayat   had paraded the  appellant  with  blacken  face  as  proposed  by  him.   This  would  rather reflect that the witness was truthful   besides  being  innocent  villager,  who  despite  being  subjected  to  intricacies  of   the court proceedings, did not resile from  the true accounts of events that had taken   place.”         

13. In a rape case the prosecutrix remains worried about her  

future. She remains in traumatic state of mind. The family of  

the  victim  generally  shows  reluctance  to  go  to  the  police  

station because of society’s attitude towards such a woman. It  

casts doubts and shame upon her rather than comfort  and  

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sympathise  with  her.  Family  remains  concern  about  its  

honour and reputation of the prosecutrix. After only having a  

cool thought it is possible for the family to lodge a complaint in  

sexual  offences.  (Vide  Karnel  Singh Vs.  State of  M.P. AIR  

1995 SC 2472; and  State of Punjab Vs. Gurmeet Singh &  

Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393).    

14. This  Court  has  consistently  highlighted  the  reasons,  

objects and means of prompt lodging of FIR.  Delay in lodging  

FIR  more  often  than  not,  results  in  embellishment  and  

exaggeration,  which  is  a  creature  of  an  afterthought.   A  

delayed  report  not  only  gets  bereft  of  the  advantage  of  

spontaneity,  the  danger  of  the  introduction  of  a  coloured  

version, an exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted  

story  as  a  result  of  deliberations  and  consultations,  also  

creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity.  Thus, FIR is  

to  be  filed  more  promptly  and  if  there  is  any  delay,  the  

prosecution  must  furnish  a  satisfactory  explanation  for  the  

same  for  the  reason  that  in  case  the  substratum  of  the  

evidence given by the complainant/informant is found to be  

unreliable,  the  prosecution  case  has  to  be  rejected  in  its  

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entirety. [vide State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. M. Madhusudhan  

Rao (2008) 15 SCC 582].   

15. However, no straight jacket formula can be laid down in  

this regard.  In case of sexual offences, the criteria may be  

different altogether.  As honour of the family is involved, its  

members have  to  decide  whether  to  take  the matter  to  the  

court or not.  In such a fact-situation, near relations of the  

prosecutrix may take time as to what course of action should  

be adopted.  Thus, delay is bound to occur.  This Court has  

always  taken  judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  “ordinarily  the  

family of the victim would not intend to get a stigma attached to   

the  victim.  Delay in lodging the  First  Information  Report  in a  

case of this nature is a normal phenomenon” [vide Satyapal Vs.  

State of Haryana  AIR 2009 SC 2190].       

16. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Prem Singh AIR 2009  

SC  1010,  this  Court  considered  the  issue  at  length  and  

observed as under :-  

“So far as the delay in lodging the FIR is   concerned, the delay in a case of sexual   assault, cannot be equated with the case  involving other offences. There are several   factors  which  weigh  in  the  mind  of  the  

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prosecutrix  and  her  family  members  before coming to the police station to lodge  a complaint.  In  a tradition bound society  prevalent in India, more particularly, rural   areas,  it  would be quite  unsafe to throw  out  the  prosecution  case  merely  on  the  ground that there is some delay in lodging  the FIR.”

17. Thus, in view of the above, the delay in lodging FIR in  

sexual offences has to be considered with a different yardstick.

18. If  the  instant  case  is  examined  in  the  light  of  the  

aforesaid settled legal  proposition,  we are  of  the  considered  

opinion  that  the  delay  in  lodging  the  FIR  has  been  

satisfactorily explained.   

19. So far as the issue as to whether the prosecutrix was a  

major or minor, it has also been elaborately considered by the  

courts below.  In fact, the School Register has been produced  

and  proved  by  the  Head  Master,  Mohinder  Singh  (PW  3).  

According to him, Rajinder Kaur (PW 15), the prosecutrix, was  

admitted  in  Government  School,  Sharifgarh,  Dist.  

Kurukshetra  on  2.05.1990  on  the  basis  of  School  Leaving  

Certificate  issued by Government  Primary  School,  Dhantori.  

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In the School Register, her date of birth has been recorded as  

13.02.1975.  The question does arise as to whether the date of  

birth recorded in the School Register is admissible in evidence  

and  can  be  relied  upon  without  any  corroboration.   This  

question  becomes  relevant  for  the  reason  that  in  cross-

examination, Sh. Mohinder Singh, Head Master (PW 3),  has  

stated that the date of birth is registered in the school register  

as  per  the  information  furnished  by  the  person/guardian  

accompanying  the  students,  who  comes  to  the  school  for  

admission and the school authorities do not verify the date of  

birth by any other means.         

20. A document is admissible under Section 35 of the Indian  

Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called as ‘Evidence Act’)  being  

a public document if prepared by a government official in the  

exercise of his official duty. However, the question does arise  

as what is the authenticity of the said entry for the reason that  

admissibility of a document is one thing and probity of it is  

different.  

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21. In  State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Radha Krishna Singh &  

Ors. AIR  1983  SC  684, this  Court  dealt  with  a  similar  

contention and held as under:–

“Admissibility of a document is one thing  and  its  probative  value  quite  another  -   these two aspects cannot be combined. A  document may be admissible and yet may  not carry any conviction and weight of its   probative value may be nil.. . . . . Where a report is given by a responsible  officer,  which  is  based  on  evidence  of   witnesses  and  documents  and  has  “a  statutory  flavour  in  that  it  is  given  not  merely  by  an  administrative  officer  but  under  the  authority  of  a  Statute,  its   probative value would indeed be very high  so as to be entitled to great weight. The probative value of documents which,   however  ancient  they  may  be,  do  not  disclose  sources  of  their  information  or  have  not  achieved  sufficient  notoriety  is  precious little.”

22. Therefore,  a  document  may  be  admissible,  but  as  to  

whether the entry contained therein has any probative value  

may  still  be  required  to  be  examined  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances  of  a  particular  case.  The  aforesaid  legal  

proposition stands fortified by the judgments of this Court in  

Ram Prasad Sharma Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 326;  

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Ram  Murti  Vs.  State  of  Haryana AIR  1970  SC  1029;  

Dayaram & Ors. Vs. Dawalatshah & Anr. AIR 1971 SC 681;

Harpal  Singh & Anr.  Vs.  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh AIR  

1981  SC 361;  Ravinder  Singh Gorkhi   Vs.  State  of  U.P.  

(2006) 5 SCC 584;  Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand &  

Anr.   (2008) 13 SCC 133;  Desh Raj Vs. Bodh Raj  AIR 2008  

SC 632; and Ram Suresh Singh Vs. Prabhat Singh @Chhotu  

Singh & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 681.  In these cases, it has been  

held that even if the entry was made in an official record by  

the concerned official in the discharge of his official duty, it  

may have weight  but still  may require  corroboration by the  

person on whose information the entry has been made and as  

to whether the entry so made has been exhibited and proved.  

The standard of proof required herein is the same as in other  

civil and criminal cases.  

Such entries may be in any public document, i.e. school  

register, voter list or family register prepared under the Rules  

and Regulations etc. in force, and may be admissible under  

Section  35  of  the  Evidence  Act  as  held  in  Mohd.  Ikram  

Hussain Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1625; and  

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Santenu Mitra Vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1999 SC 1587.  

23. There may be conflicting entries in the official document  

and in such a situation, the entry made at a later stage has to  

be accepted and relied upon. (Vide Shri Raja Durga Singh of  

Solon Vs. Tholu & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 361).  

24. While dealing with a similar issue in Birad Mal Singhvi  

Vs.  Anand Purohit AIR 1988 SC 1796, this  Court  held  as  

under:–

“To  render  a  document  admissible   under Section 35, three conditions must be  satisfied,  firstly,  entry  that  is  relied  on  must  be one in a public  or  other official   book, register or record, secondly, it must  be  an  entry  stating  a  fact  in  issue  or   relevant fact, and thirdly, it must be made  by  a  public  servant  in  discharge  of  his  official  duty,  or  any  other  person  in  performance of  a duty specially  enjoined  by law. An entry relating to date of birth   made in the school register is relevant and  admissible  under  Section  35  of  the  Act,   but entry regarding to the age of a person  in  a  school  register  is  of  not  much  evidentiary value to prove the age of the  person in the absence of the material  on  which the age was recorded.”

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25. A Constitution Bench of this Court, while dealing with a  

similar  issue  in  Brij  Mohan  Singh  Vs.  Priya  Brat  Narain  

Sinha & Ors. AIR 1965 SC 282, observed as under:–

“The  reason  why  an  entry  made  by  a  public servant in a public or other official  book, register,  or record stating  a fact in  issue  or  a  relevant  fact  has  been  made  relevant  is  that  when  a  public  servant  makes  it  himself  in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duty,  the  probability  of  its  being  truly and correctly recorded is high. That   probability is reduced to a minimum when  the public servant himself is illiterate and  has to depend on somebody else to make  the entry. We have therefore come to the  conclusion that the High Court is right in  holding that the entry made in an official  record  maintained  by  the  illiterate   Chowkidar,  by  somebody  else  at  his  request does not come within Section 35 of   the Evidence Act.”

26. In Vishnu Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006) 1 SCC 283,  

while dealing with a similar issue,  this Court  observed that  

very often parents furnish incorrect date of birth to the school  

authorities to make up the age in order to secure admission  

for  their  children. For determining the age of  the child,  the  

best evidence is of his/her parents, if it is supported by un-

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impeccable documents. In case the date of birth depicted in  

the  school  register/certificate  stands  belied  by  the  un-

impeccable evidence of reliable persons and contemporaneous  

documents  like  the  date  of  birth  register  of  the  Municipal  

Corporation,  Government  Hospital/Nursing  Home  etc,  the  

entry in the school register is to be discarded.  

Thus,  the  entry  in  respect  of  age  of  the  child  seeking  

admission,  made  in  the  school  register  by  semi-literate  

chowkidar at the instance of a person who came along with  

the child having no personal knowledge of the correct date of  

birth, cannot be relied upon.   

27. Thus, the law on the issue can be summerised that the  

entry  made  in  the  official  record  by  an  official  or  person  

authorised  in  performance  of  an  official  duty  is  admissible  

under Section 35 of the Evidence Act but the party may still  

ask the Court/Authority to examine its probative value.  The  

authenticity  of  the  entry  would  depend  as  on  whose  

instruction/information such entry stood recorded and what  

was  his  source  of  information.   Thus,  entry  in  school  

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register/certificate  requires to be proved in accordance with  

law. Standard of proof for the same remains as in any other  

civil and criminal case.   

28. In case, the issue is examined in the light of the aforesaid  

settled  legal  proposition,  there  is  nothing  on  record  to  

corroborate the date of birth of the prosecutrix recorded in the  

School Register.  It is not possible to ascertain as to who was  

the person who had given her date of birth as 13.02.1975 at  

the time of initial admission in the primary school.  More so, it  

cannot  be  ascertained  as  who  was  the  person  who  had  

recorded  her  date  of  birth  in  the  Primary  School  Register.  

More  so,  the  entry  in  respect  of  the  date  of  birth  of  the  

prosecutrix  in  the  Primary  School  Register  has  not  been  

produced and proved before the Trial Court.  Thus, in view of  

the above, it cannot be held with certainty that the prosecutrix  

was a major.   

Be  that  as  it  may,  the  issue  of  majority  becomes  

irrelevant  if  the  prosecution  successfully  establishes  that  it  

was not a consent case.   

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29. It can be held that a woman has given consent only if she  

has  freely  agreed  to  submit  herself,  while  in  free  and  

unconstrained possession of her physical and moral power to  

act in a manner she wanted.  Consent implies the exercise of a  

free and untrammeled right to forbid or withhold what is being  

consented  to,  it  always  is  a  voluntary  and  conscious  

acceptance of  what  is  proposed to be done by another  and  

concurred in by the former.  An act of helplessness on the face  

of inevitable compulsions is not  consent in law.  More so, it is  

not  necessary  that  there  should  be  actual  use  of  force.   A  

threat or use of force is sufficient.   

30. The concept of ‘Consent’ in the context of Section 375 IPC  

has to be understood differently, keeping in mind the provision  

of Section 90 IPC, according to which a consent given under  

fear/coercion  or  misconception/mistake  of  fact  is  not  a  

consent  at  all.   Scheme  of  Section  90  IPC  is  couched  in  

negative terminology.  Consent is different from submission.  

[Vide  Uday  Vs.  State  of  Karnataka  AIR 2003  SC  1639;  

Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar Vs. State of Bihar AIR 2005 SC  

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203; and  Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs. State of A.P.  (2006) 11  

SCC 615.]   

31.  In the State of H.P. Vs. Mange Ram AIR 2000 SC 2798,  

this Court, while considering the same issue, held as under :-

“Submission of the body under the fear of   terror cannot be construed as a consented  sexual  act.  Consent  for  the  purpose  of  Section  375 requires  voluntary  participation not only after the exercise of   intelligence based on the knowledge of the   significance and moral  quality  of  the  act   but after having fully exercised the choice  between the resistance and assent.”

32. Rajinder Kaur (PW 15), the prosecutrix, has deposed that  

the sickle in her hand had fallen down out of fear when the  

appellant caught hold of her.  She had given teeth bites and  

broken the buttons of the shirt  of the appellant in order to  

rescue herself from his clutches.  She raised a hue and cry  

and her brother, Rajinder Singh (PW 16), who was working in  

another  field  at  some  distance,  came  to  the  spot.   The  

prosecutrix  has  also  been  examined  under  Section  164  of  

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, wherein she had deposed  

in respect of the resistance also.  She stood the test of cross-

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examination with reasonable certainty.  Her version also got  

support from the medical evidence of Dr. Geeta Suri (PW 2),  

who had opined that possibility of rape with the prosecutrix  

could not be ruled out.   

33.   The  Trial  Court  considered  the  issue  of  consent  at  

length and recorded the following findings :-

“There is positive and cogent evidence in  the  statement  of  Mst.  Rajinder  Kaur  (PW15) as also in her statement Ex.PS/2  that  resistance was offered by her.  She  even  makes  out  a  case  that  she  could  have  even  used  sickle  in  offering  resistance but it had fallen away from her  hands on the doll.       

34. The  High  Court  dealt  with  the  issue  and  made  the  

following observations :-

“The aspect of consent introduced by the   appellant’s counsel as an alternative plea  would  also not stand  the  test  of  judicial   scrutiny.   When analysed in the  light  of   evidence  given  by  prosecutrix  and  other   PWs, it would show that prosecutrix had  offered resistance,  so  much  as  that  she  had pulled the buttons of the shirt of the  appellant and had given him teeth bites.   She  had  also  raised  alarm,  which  had  attracted her brother, who was present in  

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the nearby fields.  The aspect of consent  introduced  by  taking  advantage  of  the  appellant  being  a  student  of  the  same  school  where  the  prosecutrix  was   studying,  was  rightly  discarded  by  the  trial  court……it  may  also  need  a  notice   that  such a plea was  only raised in the   alternative  as  otherwise  plea  of  denial   alone  was  earlier  raised.   Defence  has,   without  success,  tried  to  encash  the  aspect  of  settlement,  which  was   negotiated  during  the  panchayat   meetings.”  

35.  Thus,  in  view of  the  above,  we are  of  the  considered  

opinion that in such a fact-situation, the question of drawing  

an inference that it could be a case of consent does not arise  

at all.  There was resistance by the prosecutrix and thus, it  

cannot, even by a stretch of imagination, be held that she had  

voluntarily participated in the sexual act.  There had been no  

enmity between the two families, and, therefore, there could be  

no reason for  the  prosecutrix  and her  family  to enrope the  

appellant falsely in a case where the honour of the family itself  

remains  on stake  and the prosecutrix  has to  suffer  mental  

agony throughout her life. We should be alive to the fact that  

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rape  not  only  distracts  the  personality  of  the  victim  but  

degrades  her  very  soul.   Prosecutrix  generally  faces  

humiliation and is being harassed by the defence in her cross-

examination  during  the  trial.   Any  kind  of  unwarranted  

suggestion  can  be  put  to  her.   In  the  instant  case,  the  

appellant in his statement under Article 313 Cr.P.C. did not  

hesitate to label the prosecutrix as “Vagabond”.   He further  

stated that he had falsely been enroped in the case “with the  

connivance of police in order to extort money”.       

36. In the totality of the circumstances, we do not find any  

force  in  the  appeal.   It  lacks  merit  and  is  accordingly  

dismissed.   

  …………………………………J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

…………………………………J.  (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

New Delhi,  July 28, 2010

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