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PETITIONER: SAT PAL @ SADHU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/08/1992

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1218            1992 SCR  (3) 898  1992 SCC  (4) 172        JT 1992 (4)   530  1992 SCALE  (2)203

ACT:      Indian Penal Code, 1860:      Sections 53-A, 55 and 302-Imprisonment for  life-Nature of-Whether  rigorous imprisonment-No formal order issued  by appropriate  Government commuting sentence under Section  55 IPC or Section 433 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code for  a term not exceeding 14 years- Whether a life convict entitled to be released before 14 years of actual imprisonment.      Criminal Procedure Code, 1973:      Sections  433 (b) and 433 (A)- Life  convict-Completing 13  1/2  years actual imprisonment and total  period  of  17 years imprisonment, including remissions-Whether entitled to be released on the ground that Government must be deemed  to have commuted his sentence to 14 years.

HEADNOTE:      The  petitioner, a life convict, having been  sentenced to  undergo  imprisonment for life, for  the  offence  under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, filed a Writ Petition  before this Court challenging his continued detention in jail,  and sought  an  order in the nature of habeas  corpus,  claiming that  he  has  served  more than  the  maximum  sentence  of imprisionment prescribed under law and should, therefore, be released.   According  to the petitioner, he  had  undergone about 13 years and six months actual imprisonment and  total period  of  imprisonment including remissions came  to  more than  17  years,  and since he had undergone  more  than  14 years, sentence including remissions, and the said  sentence was  got  executed in jail custody in the form  of  rigorous imprisonment, the Government must be deemed to have commuted his  sentence to 14 years, either under Section  55,  Indian Penal  Code,  1860  or Section 433  (b),  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1973,  notwithstanding that no formal  order  in that behalf was made by the State Government and as such his continued detention in jail was illegal and he was  entitled to be released forthwith. It was contended that the law laid down in Naib Singh v. State of Punjab &                                                     899      Ors.,  [1983]  2 SCC 454, needed reconsideration  by  a larger Bench.      Dismissing the Writ Petition, this Court.

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    HELD:  1.1.  Admittedly, the petitioner’s sentence  has not been remitted fully nor commuted for imprisonment for  a term  not exceeding 14 years either under Section 55 of  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 or under Section 433 (b) of the Code of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the appropriate  Government. Merely  because  the petitioner has undergone 13  1/2  years actual rigorous imprisonment and a total period of 17  years imprisonment, including remissions, the Government cannot be deemed  to have commuted his sentence, either under  Section 55  of the Indian Penal Code or Section 433 (b) of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure.  In the absence of a specific  order in this behalf by the appropriate Government, the petitioner is not entitled to be released.  [900E-F, 901E]      1.2.  It is the settled law that in view of Section 53- A, Indian Penal Code, 1860, inserted by the Amending Act  of 1955,  the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed  on  or after  January  1,  1956 is executable in  jails,  that  the nature  of  punishment  required  to  be  suffered  under  a sentence   of   ‘imprisonment   for   life’   is    rigorous imprisonment;  that since Section 53 A  (2),  transportation for a term has been equated to rigorous imprisonment for the same   term,  by  necessary  implication  the  sentence   of ‘transportation  for life’, now substituted by ‘imprisonment for  life’  by Section 53-A(1) which is awardable  for  more serious,  or  more grave or more heinous  crimes  must  mean rigorous imprisonment for life, that is to say, it cannot be anything  but rigorous; and that it is not  necessary  that, while  passing  the  sentence of  imprisonment  for  life  a criminal court should clarify the exact nature of punishment intended  to be inflicted on the accused.  [902F-H,  903A-B, 901E]      Naib Singh v. State of Punjab and others, [1983] 2  SCC 454, relied on.      Kishori  Lal  v.  Emperor, AIR 1945  PC  64  and  Gopal Vinayak  Godse  v. State of Maharashtra, [1961] 3  SCR  440, referred to.      1.3.   The  reasoning  and conclusions  given  in  Naib Singh’s  case  are  correct and there  is  no  justification whatsoever  to  refer the points decided in that case  to  a larger Bench.  [903F]                                                    900

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition  (CRL.) No.1385 of 1991.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      B.S. Malik and Ashok Kumar Sharma for the petitioner.      Ms. Asha and Ms. Indu Malhotra for the respondents.      The Judgement of the Court was delivered by      KULDIP  SINGH,J. Sat Pal alias Sadhu,  the  petitioner, has  challenged  his  continued detention  in  jail  and  is seeking  an  order in the nature of habeas  corpus  claiming that  he  has  served  more than  the  maximum  sentence  of imprisonment prescribed under law and should, therefore,  be released.      The petitioner was arrested on March 27, 1978 in a case registered  under  Section 302 Indian Penal  Code.   He  was convicted  on August 16, 1978 and was sentenced  to  undergo imprisonment  for life.  According to the petitioner he  has undergone about 13 years and six months actual  imprisonment and total period of imprisonment including remissions  comes to more than 17 years.  Admittedly his sentence has not been remitted fully nor commuted for imprisonment for a term  not

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exceeding 14 years either under Section 55 Indian Penal Code or  under Section 433B Code of Criminal Procedure,  1973  by the appropriate government.  However, the petitioner’s  case is  that  he  has  undergone more  than  14  years  sentence including  remissions  and since the said sentence  was  got executed   in   jail  custody  in  the  form   of   rigorous imprisonment,   the  government  must  be  deemed  to   have commuted  his sentence to 14 years either under  Section  55 Indian  Penal  Code  or  Section  433(B)  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 notwithstanding that no formal order in that behalf  was  made by the State Government and  as  such  his continued detention in jail is illegal and he is entitled to be  released forthwith.  The argument has been  advanced  by Mr.  Balwant  Singh  Malik,  the  learned  counsel  for  the petitioner on the following grounds:-           [1]   "Imprisonment  for  life"  as  one  of   the          punishments  substituted  for  "transportation  for          life"  in  Section 53 of the Indian Penal  Code  by          Amending   Act  26  of  1955.    No   corresponding          amendment has been made in the Code of Criminal                                                         901          Procedure, 1973 and there is no provision under the          Code   for  the  execution  of  the   sentence   of          "imprisonment  for  life",  In the absence  of  any          provision    for   executing   the   sentence    of          "imprisonment   for  life"  in the  Code  of  Civil          Procedure the detention of life convicts in  prison          is unlawful  and illegal and as such the government,          in order to legalise detention, has necessarily  to          commute life sentence under Section 55 Indian Penal          Code or Section 433 (B) Code of Criminal Procedure,          1973  to  one of the rigorous  imprisonment,  which          under  the said provisions cannot legally exceed  a          terms of 14 years.  The petitioner having completed          14 years, he is entitled to be released.          [II]  The sentence of "life imprisonment"  has  not          been defined either under the Indian Penal Code  or          under any other law.  It is no where provided  that          a   life   convict   has   to   undergo    rigorous          imprisonment.   The Government by causing the  life          convicts to be dealt with as a prisoner sentence to          rigorous  imprisonment  must  be  deemed  to   have          commuted  sentence  of imprisonment for life  to  a          sentence of rigorous imprisonment under Section  55          Indian  Penal  Code  or Section  433  (B)  Code  of          Criminal  Procedure, 1973 for a term not  exceeding          14 years.      The  arguments  advanced by the learned  counsel  stand concluded against him by the judgement of this court in Naib Singh  v. State of Punjab and others, [1983] 2 SCC 454.   In the said case Naib Singh challenged his continued  detention in jail on the following grounds:-          "In regard to the sentence of life imprisonment the          place  where it has to be executed or  carried  out          has  to  be  appointed  under  Section  32  of  the          Prisoners  Act,  1900, and since  the  sentence  of          ‘imprisonment  for  life’  like  the  sentence   of          ‘transportation of life’ could be executed only  by          way  of  banishment or exile by the  convict  being          ‘removed  to  the place or places’ required  to  be          appointed by the State Government under Section  32          of  the  Prisoners Act, the  executing  authorities          were  obliged to ‘execute’ or ‘carry out’ the  said          sentence in jail indirectly by way of commuting  if          for  imprisonment of either description for a  term

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        not  exceeding  14 years under Section 55,  IPC  or          Section 433(b), CrPC, 1973.  In other words in the                                                        902          absence  of any proper authority of law  warranting          the detention and execution of the sentence of such          life  convict in jail, his detention in  such  jail          custody  will  have to be regarded as  illegal  and          unlawful.          Nature   of  sentence  of  life   imprisonment   is          undefined  and it is not necessarily rigorous;  but          because  the  petitioner was made  to  undergo  his          sentence of life imprisonment in jail and that  too          in   rigorous  manner  for  more  than   14   years          (inclusive  of remissions) his sentence  should  be          deemed   to  have  been  commuted  by   the   State          Government  either under Section 55, IPC  or  under          Section 433 (b),  CrPC, 1973 without a formal order          in that behalf and he be released forthwith."      This Court rejected both the contentions and  dismissed the  petition.  V.D. Tulzapurkar, J speaking for  the  Court held as under:-          Under Section 32 of the Prisoners Act a sentence of          transportation either for a term or for life  could          be and a sentence of life imprisonment can be  made          executable  in  local jails  by  constituting  such          jails as the ‘places’ within the meaning of Section          32  under orders of the State  Governments.   Apart          from  Section 32 of the Prisoners Act, Section  383          of  CrPC, 1898 and Section 418 of CrPC,  1973  also          contain  the  necessary legal authority  and  power          under  which  a  criminal court can  by  issuing  a          warrant  direct the execution or carrying out of  a          sentence of life imprisonment in local jails.  Even          since  the sentence of transportation either for  a          term or for life became executable in jails  within          the  country and the same position must  obtain  in          regard  to  persons sentenced to  imprisonment  for          life  on  and  after January 1,  1956  in  view  of          Section  53-A, IPC inserted by the Amending Act  26          of 1955.          The  nature of punishment required to  be  suffered          under   a  sentence  of  ‘imprisonment  for   life’          awardable on and after January 1, 1956  is rigorous          imprisonment.     Earlier    the    sentence     of          transportation either for life or for a term  meant          rigorous  imprisonment in the sense of exaction  of          hard labour from the convict.  Since under  Section          53  A  (2)  transportation for  a  term   has  been          equated to rigorous imprisonment for the same term,                                                      903          by   necessary   implication   the   sentence    of          ‘transportation  for  life’,  now  substituted   by          ‘imprisonment  for life’ by Section 53-A(1),  which          is  awardable  for more serious, or more  grave  or          more heinous crimes must mean rigorous imprisonment          for life, that is to say it cannot be anything  but          rigorous.          It is not necessary that while passing the sentence          of  imprisonment for life a criminal  court  should          keep in view the provisions of Section 60, IPC  and          choose  one or the other form so as to clarify  the          exact nature of punishment intended to be inflicted          on    the   accused.    A    distinction    between          ‘imprisonment   for life’ and ‘imprisonment  for  a          term’  has  been maintained in the  Penal  Code  in

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        several  of its provisions.  Moreover, whenever  an          offender is punishable with ‘imprisonment which may          be  of  either description’ within the  meaning  of          Section  60  and therefore, that section  would  be          inapplicable".      It  is  not  disputed by the learned  counsel  for  the petitioner  that  the judgement in Naib Singh’s  case  is  a complete  answer  to  his arguments but  he  has  vehemently argued  that the said judgement needs reconsideration  by  a larger  Bench.  The learned counsel also made an attempt  to challenge the correctness of the privy counsel judgement  in Kishori Lal v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64 and of this Court  in Gopal  Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, [1961]  3  SCR 440.   Both these judgements have been relied upon  by  this Court in Naib Singh’s case.      We  have carefully read the judgement of this Court  in Naib   Singh’s   case   and  have   given   our   thoughtful consideration to the points dealt with and decided  therein. We respectfully agree with the reasoning and the conclusions reached  by  this Court in the said judgement.   We  see  no justification whatsoever to refer the points decided in Naib Singh’s case to a larger Bench.  We , therefore, dismiss the writ petition. N.P.V.                                   Petition dismissed.                                                        904