REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4347 OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.3597 of 2009)

Satheedevi .......Appellant

Versus

Prasanna and another .......Respondents  

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal filed for setting aside order dated 21.7.2008 passed by the  

learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court  in Writ  Petition No.21820 of  

2008 whereby he declined to interfere with the direction given by Sub Judge,  

Palakkad (hereinafter described as ‘the trial Court’) to the appellant to pay  

court  fee  on  the  market  value  of  the  plaint  schedule  property  raises  an  

important  question  of  law relating  to  interpretation  of  Section  40  of  the  

Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959 (for short, ‘the Act’).

3. The  appellant  owned  9.98  acres  rubber  plantation.   She  executed  

power of attorney No.376/2006 in favour of her own daughter (respondent  

No.1 herein).  After sometime, respondent No.1 transferred the property to  

her husband (respondent No.2 herein) by registered sale deed No.1784/2007.  

The  appellant  filed  O.S.  No.231/2007  for  cancellation  of  the  power  of  

attorney by alleging that respondent No.1 had misused the same and sold the  

property  to  her  husband.   By  an  order  dated  21.5.2008,  the  trial  Court  

directed the appellant to pay court fees on the market value of the plaint  

schedule  property.   The  appellant  challenged  that  order  in  Writ  Petition  

No.17032/2008 (C) which was disposed of by the learned Single Judge of  

Kerala High Court vide his order dated 26.6.2008, the relevant portion of  

which reads as under:

“The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner  further  submitted that in view of the contentions raised in the plaint,  petitioner has to file an application for amendment of the plaint  modifying the relief sought for.  In the nature of the contentions  raised  in  the  plaint,  an amendment  of  the  relief  is  definitely  necessary,  as  found  by  the  learned  Sub  Judge.   In  such  circumstances, Writ Petition is disposed granting liberty to the  petitioner to amend the plaint and to pay the necessary court fee  payable on such pleading.  It is made clear that the fact that a  time limit is fixed by this Court will not prevent the court from  granting  amendment,  as  it  is  necessary  for  an  appropriate  adjudication of the dispute involved in the suit.  It is made clear  that the actual court fee payable by the plaintiff is to be decided  by the  trial  Court  afresh,  taking into  consideration the  relief  sought for in the plaint, in the light of the amendment of the  pleading.”

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4. In furtherance of the direction given by the High Court, the appellant  

applied  for  and  she  was  granted  permission  to  amend  the  plaint  and  to  

incorporate prayer for cancellation of the sale deed executed by respondent  

No.1 in favour of respondent No.2.   In the amended plaint, value of the  

property was shown as Rs.7,00,000/- and accordingly, the court fees was  

paid.   However  by  an  order  dated  3.7.2008,  the  trial  Court  directed  the  

appellant to pay court fee on the market value of the plaint schedule property  

which was assessed at Rs.12 lakhs per acre.

5. Writ Petition No.21820/2008 filed by the appellant against the above  

mentioned order was dismissed by the learned Single Judge, who referred to  

the  judgments  of  the  Division  Bench  in  Krishnan  Damodaran  v.  

Padmanabhan Parvathy (1972) Kerala Law Times 774,  P.K. Vasudeva  

Rao  v.  Hari  Menon AIR  1982  Kerala  35  and  Pachayammal  v.  

Dwaraswamy Pillai (2006) 3 Kerala Law Times 527 and held that in terms  

of Section 40 of the Act, the writ petitioner is required to pay court fees on  

market value of the property and not on the value specified in the sale deed.

6. Shri Bechu Kurian Thomas, learned counsel for the appellant argued  

that  the  interpretation  placed  by  the  trial  Court  and  the  High  Court  on  

Section 40 of the Act is ex facie erroneous and impugned order is liable to  

be set aside because that section does not provide for payment of court fee  

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on the market value of the property for which the document, which is subject  

matter of the suit, was executed.   Learned counsel emphasized that in terms  

of  Section  40(1),  court  fees  is  required  to  be  paid  on  the  value  of  the  

property  for  which  the  document  was  executed  and  submitted  that  the  

appellant had correctly paid the court fees as per the value of the property  

specified in the sale deed i.e., Rs. 7 lakhs.  In support of his arguments, the  

learned counsel relied upon the judgments of the learned Single Judges of  

Madras High Court in Andalammal v. B. Kannaiah (1971) 2 Madras Law  

Journal 205 and of Andhra Pradesh High Court in  Allam Venkateswara  

Reddy v. Golla Venkatanarayana and others AIR 1975 Andhra Pradesh  

122.

7. Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent  

argued that the expression ‘value of the property’ for which the document  

was executed means market value of the property and the same cannot be  

read as value specified in the document. Learned senior counsel submitted  

that different High Courts have, following the judgment of the Full Bench of  

Madras High Court in Kutumba Sastri v. Sundaramma AIR 1939 Madras  

462, consistently held that the market value of the property has to be taken  

into consideration for the purpose of payment of the court fees.  Learned  

senior  counsel  relied  upon  the  judgments  of  different  High  Courts  -  

Appikunju Meerasayu v. Meeran Pillai (1964) Kerala Law Times 895,  

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Uma Antherjanam v.  Govindaru  Namboodiripad  and others  (1966)  

Kerala Law Times 1046,  T. Tharamma v. T. Ramchandra Reddy and  

others AIR  1968  Andhra  Pradesh  333,  Sengoda  Nadar  v.  Doraiswami  

Gounder and others AIR 1971 Madras 380, Allam Venkateswara Reddy  

v.  Golla  Venkatanarayana  and  others (supra),  S.  Krishna  Nair  and  

another v. N. Rugmoni Amma AIR 1976 Madras 208 and Smt. Narbada  

v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162 and argued that the learned Single  

Judge did not commit any error by refusing to interfere with the order of the  

trial Court.  

8. We have considered the respective submissions.  Sections 7(1) (2) (3)  

(3A) (4), 25(a) (b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1) (3), 38, 40, 45 and 48 of the Act  

which have bearing on the issue raised by the appellant, read as under:

“7. Determination of market value  

(1) Save as otherwise provided, where the fee payable under  this  Act  depends  on  the  market  value of  any property,  such  value shall be determined as on the date of presentation of the  plaint.  

(2) The  market  value of  agricultural  land  in  suits  falling  under Section 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 or  48 shall be deemed to be ten times the annual gross profits of  such land where it is capable of yielding annual profits minus  the assessment if any made to the Government.

(3) The  market value of a building shall in cases where its  rental  value  has  been  entered  in  the  registers  of  any  local  authority, be ten times such rental value and in other cases the  actual market value of the building as on the date of the plaint.  

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(3A) The market value of any property other than agricultural  land and building falling under sub-sections (2) and (3) shall be  the value it will fetch on the date of institution of the suit.

(4) Where the subject-matter of the suit is only a restricted or  fractional  interest  in  a  property,  the  market  value of  the  property shall  be deemed to be the value of the restricted or  fractional interest and the value of the restricted or fractional  interest shall bear the same proportion to the market value of  the absolute interest in such property as the net income derived  by the owner of the restricted or fractional interest bears to the  total net income from the property.  

25. Suits for declaration.– In a suit for a declaratory decree  or  order,  whether  with  or  without  consequential  relief,  not  falling under Section 26–  

(a) where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession  of  the  property  to which the declaration  relates,  fee shall  be  computed on the market value of the property or on rupees one  thousand whichever is higher;  

(b) where  the  prayer  is  for  a  declaration  and  for  consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference  to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half  of the market value of the property or on rupees one thousand,  whichever is higher;  

27. Suits for injunction.– In a suit for injunction–

(a) Where  the  reliefs  sought  is  with  reference  to  any  immovable property, and  

(i) where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property  is denied, or  

(ii) where an issue is framed regarding the plaintiff's title  to the property,  

fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the  property or on rupees five hundred, whichever is higher;  

29. Suits  for  possession  under  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1877.–   In a suit for possession of immovable property under  Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act,  1877 (Central  Act 1 of  

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1877), fee shall be computed on one-third of the  market value  of the property or on rupees one hundred and fifty, whichever is  higher.  

30. Suits for possession not otherwise provided for.–   In a  suit  for  possession  of  immovable  property  not  otherwise  provided for, fee shall be computed, on the market value of the  property or on rupees one thousand, whichever is higher.  

37. Partition suits  

(1) In a suit for partition and separate possession of a share  of  joint  family  property  or  of  property  owned,  jointly  or  in  common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession  of such property, fee shall be computed on the market value of  the plaintiff's share.  

(2) xxx xxx xxx

(3) Where,  in  a  suit  falling  under  sub-section  (1)  or  sub- section (2), a defendant claims partition and separate possession  of his share of the property, fee shall be payable on his written  statement computed on half the market value of his share or at  half  the  rates  specified in  sub-section  (2),  according as such  defendant  has  been  excluded  from  possession  or  is  in  joint  possession.  

38. Suits for joint possession.–  In a suit for joint possession  of  joint  family  property  or  of  property  owned,  jointly  or  in  common, by a plaintiff who has been excluded from possession,  fee  shall  be  computed  on  the  market  value of  the  plaintiff's  share.  

40. Suits for cancellation of decrees, etc.–  

(1) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other  property  having  a  money  value,  or  other  document  which  purports  or  operates  to  create,  declare,  assign,  limit  or  extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right,  title or  interest in money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be  computed on the  value of the subject-matter  of the suit,  and  such value shall be deemed to be--  

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if  the whole decree or  other  document is  sought  to be  cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which the  decree was passed or other document was executed;  

if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be  cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property.  

(2) If the decree or other document is such that the liability  under it cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to  a particular item of property belonging to the plaintiff or to the  plaintiff's share in any such property, fee shall be computed on  the value of such property, or share or on the amount of the  decree, whichever is less.  

Explanation.– A suit to set aside an award shall be deemed  to be a suit  to set  aside a decree within the meaning of this  section.  

45. Suits under the Survey and Boundaries Act.–In a suit  under Section 14 of the Madras Survey and Boundaries  Act,  1923, Section 13 of the Travancore Survey and Boundaries Act  of 1094, or Section 14 of the Cochin Survey Act, II of 1074, fee  shall  be  computed  on  one-half  of  the  market  value of  the  property affected by the determination of the boundary or on  rupees one thousand, whichever is higher.  

48. Interpleader suits.  

(1) In an interpleader suit, fee shall be payable on the plaint  at the rates specified in Section 50.  

(2) Where issues are framed as between the claimants, fee  shall  be payable  computed on the amount of the debt or the  money  or  the  market  value of  other  property,  movable  or  immovable,  which  forms  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.  In  levying such fee, credit shall be given for the fee paid on the  plaint; and the balance of the fee shall be paid in equal shares  by the claimants who claim the debt or the sum of money or the  property adversely to each other.  

(3) Value for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of  Courts shall be the amount of the debt, or the sum of money or  the market value of other property to which the suit relates.”

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9. Section 7 (iv), (iv-A) (as inserted by Madras Act of 1922) and (v) of  

the Court-fees Act, 1870 (for short, ‘the Court-fees Act’), which have been  

considered  in  various  judgments  of  Madras  High  Court  relied  upon  by  

learned counsel for the respondents reads as under:-

“7.  Computation  of  fees  payable  in  certain  suits.– The  amount  of  fee  payable  under  this  Act  in  the  suits  next  hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:–    ”  

xxx xxx xxx

(iv) In suits–  

for movable property of no market-value.–(a) for moveable  property where the subject-matter has no market-value, as, for  instance, in the case of documents relating to title, to enforce a right to share in joint family property.–(b) to  enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is  joint family property, for  a  declaratory  decree  and  consequential  relief.–(c)  to  obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief  is prayed, for an injunction.–(d) to obtain an injunction, for  easements.–(e)  for  a  right  to  some  benefit  (not  herein  otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and for accounts.–(f) for accounts– according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in  the plaint or memorandum of appeal; In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he  values the relief sought

(iv-A) In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or  other  property  having  a  money  value  or  other  document  securing  money  or  other  property  having  such  value,  the  valuation should be according to the value of the subject-matter  of the suit and such value shall be if the whole decree is sought  to be cancelled, the amount or value of the property for which  the decree was passed, and if a portion of the decree is sought  

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to  be  cancelled,  such  part  of  the  amount  or  value  of  the  property.  

(added by Madras Act of 1922)       

for possession of land, houses and gardens.– (v) In suits for  the possession of land, houses, and gardens – according to the  value of the subject-matter; and such value shall be deemed to  be– where the subject-matter is land, and–

(a) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share  of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or  forms part  of  such an estate  and is  recorded in the  Collector’s  register  as  separately  assessed  with  such  revenue; and such revenue is permanently settled – ten times the  revenue so payable;

(b) where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share  of an estate,  paying annual  revenue to Government,  or  forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid; and such revenue is settled, but not permanently –  five times the revenue so payable;

(c) where  the  land  pays  no  such  revenue,  or  has  been  partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with  any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, and net profits have arisen from the land during the year  next before the date of presenting the plaint –  fifteen times such net profits; but where no such net profits have arisen therefrom – the  amount at which the Court shall estimate the land with  reference  to  the  value  of  similar  land  in  the  neighbourhood;

(d) where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to  Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and  is  not  separately  assessed  as  above-mentioned  –  the  market-value of the land:”

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10. Before proceeding further, we may notice two well recognized rules  

of interpretation of statutes. The first and primary rule of construction is that  

the  intention  of  the  legislature  must  be  found in  the  words  used  by  the  

legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction, only then  

it  would  not  be  open  to  the  courts  to  adopt  any  other  hypothetical  

construction  on  the  ground  that  such  hypothetical  construction  is  more  

consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The words used in  

the  material  provisions  of  the  statute  must  be  interpreted  in  their  plain  

grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two  

constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the  

Act  can legitimately  arise  –  Kanai  Lal  Sur v.  Paramnidhi Sadhukhan  

1958 SCR 360.  The other important rule of interpretation is that the Court  

cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation because it has no power to  

do so.  The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words which are not  

therein it.  Even if there is a defect or an omission in the statute, the Court  

cannot correct the defect or supply the omission. – Union of India v. Deoki  

Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna  

Municipal Corporation (1966) 3 SCR 366.

11. Section 7 of the Act lays down different modes for determination of  

the market value of the property for the purpose of payment of court fee.  

Sub-section (1) of Section 7 begins with the expression “Save as otherwise  

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provided” and lays down that where the fee payable under the Act depends  

on the market value of any property, such value shall be determined as on  

the date of presentation of the plaint.  From the plain language of Section  

7(1), it is evident that it merely specifies the methodology for determination  

of the market value of the property where the court fee payable under some  

other  provisions of  the Act depends on the market  value of  the property  

which is subject matter of the suit.  Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48  

deal with different kinds of suit i.e., suits for declaration, suits for injunction,  

suits for possession under the Specific Relief Act, 1877, suits for possession  

not otherwise provided for, partition suits,  suits for joint possession, suits  

under the Survey and Boundaries Act and interpleader suits.  These sections  

provide  for  payment  of  court  fee  computed  on  the  market  value  of  the  

property.    Sub-section (2) of Section 7 lays down that the market value of  

the agricultural land in suits falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29,  

30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 and 48 shall be deemed to be ten times the annual  

gross  profits  of  such  land  where  it  is  capable  of  yielding  annual  profits  

minus the assessment, if any, made by the Government.  In terms of sub-

section (3), the market value of a building  in cases where its rental value has  

been entered in the registers of any local authority, shall be ten times such  

rental value and in other cases, the actual market value of the building as on  

the date of the plaint.  Clause (a) of sub-section (3) lays down that market  

value of any property other than agricultural land and building shall be the  

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value it will fetch on the date of institution of the suit.  Sub-section (4) lays  

down that where subject matter of the suit is only a restricted or fractional  

interest in a property, the market value of the property shall be deemed to be  

the value of the restricted or fractional interest.  Section 40 deals with suits  

for cancellation of decrees etc. which are not covered by other sections.  If  

this section is interpreted in the light of the expression `save as otherwise  

provided’  used  in  Section  7(1),  it  becomes  clear  that  the  rule  enshrined  

therein is a clear departure from the one contained in Section 7 read with  

Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48 which provide for payment of  

court  fee on the market value of the property.   In that sense,  Section 40  

contains  a  special  rule.   Section  40(1)  lays  down  that  in  a  suit  for  

cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value,  

or other document which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit  

or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest in  

money, movable or immovable property, fee shall be computed on the value  

of the subject matter of the suit and further lays down that such value shall  

be  deemed  to  be  if  the  whole  decree  or  other  document  sought  to  be  

cancelled,  the amount or value of the property for which the decree was  

passed or other document was executed.  If a part of the decree or other  

document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the  

property constitute the basis for fixation of court fee.  Sub-section (2) lays  

down that if the decree or other document is such that the liability under it  

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cannot be split up and the relief claimed relates only to a particular item of  

the  property  belonging  to  the  plaintiff  or  the  plaintiff’s  share  in  such  

property, fee shall be computed on the value of such property, or share or on  

the amount of the decree, whichever is less.  The deeming clause contained  

in the substantive part of Section 40(1) makes it clear that in a suit filed for  

cancellation  of  a  document  which  creates  any  right,  title  or  interest  in  

immovable property, the court fees is required to be computed on the value  

of the property for which the document was executed.  To put it differently,  

the value of the property for which the document was executed and not its  

market  value  is  relevant  for  the  purpose  of  court  fee.   If  the  expression  

`value of the subject matter of the suit’ was not followed by the deeming  

clause, it could possibly be argued that the word `value’ means the market  

value, but by employing the deeming clause, the legislature has made it clear  

that if the document is sought to be cancelled, the amount of court fee shall  

be  computed  on  the  value  of  the  property  for  which  the  document  was  

executed and not the market value of the property.  The words “for which”  

appearing  between  the  words  “property”  and  “other  documents”  clearly  

indicate that the court fee is required to be paid on the value of the property  

mentioned in the document, which is subject matter of challenge.   

12. If the legislature intended that fee should be payable on the market  

value of the subject matter of the suit filed for cancellation of a document  

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which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any  

present  or  future  right,  title  and  interest,  then  it  would  have,  instead  of  

incorporating the requirement of payment of fees on value of subject matter,  

specifically provided for payment of court fee on the market value of the  

subject matter of the suit as has been done in respect of other types of suits  

mentioned in Sections 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 and 48.  The legislature may  

have also, instead of using the expression “value of the property for which  

the document was executed”, used the expression “value of the property in  

respect  of which the document was executed”.  However,  the fact  of the  

matter is that in Section 40(1) the legislature has designedly not used the  

expression ‘market value of the property’.   

13. If the interpretation placed by the trial Court and the High Court on  

the expression “value of the property for which the document was executed”  

is accepted as correct then the word `value’ used in Section 40(1) of the Act  

will have to be read as `market value’ and we do not see any compelling  

reason to add the word `market’ before the word `value’ in Section 40(1) of  

the Act.

14. We  may  now advert  to  the  judgments  relied  upon  by  the  learned  

counsel for the parties and some other judgments of different High Courts in  

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which  Section  40(1)  of  the  Act  and  similar  provisions  of  other  State  

legislations have been interpreted.

15. In Venkata Narasimha Raju v. Chandrayya AIR 1927 Madras 825,  

the Division Bench of Madras High Court interpreted Section 7 (v) (a) of the  

Court-fees Act as amended by Madras Act of 1922 and observed:

“One point raised is whether the market value of the property  should not be taken for the purpose of this valuation, or whether  the statutory value should be adopted.  We think the latter is the  proper course as there is nothing in the Act to show that the  market value is the value contemplated in S.7 (iv) (a).  When  there is in the Act itself a special rule as to valuing property in  suits for Court-fees, we think it is proper to take that method of  valuation in preference to any other  method to get the value  where there is no indication that any other method should be  adopted.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. In  Balireddi v. Khatipulal Sab AIR 1935 Madras 863, the learned  

Single Judge of the High Court considered the question whether in a suit for  

setting aside mortgage deeds and sale deeds, the plaintiff is required to pay  

court-fees on the market value of the property and answered the same in  

affirmative.  The learned Judge referred to two earlier judgments in Venkata  

Narasimha  Raju  v.  Chandrayya (supra)  and  Venkatasiva  Rao  v.  

Satyanarayanamurthi  AIR 1932 Madras 605 but disagreed with the ratio  

of those judgments and held:

“The amount of court-fee payable depends upon “the value of  the  subject-matter  of  the suit,”  that  is  what  the  section says.  

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Where a document securing money is sought to be cancelled,  the section goes on to say, that the value of the subject-matter  shall be deemed to be “the amount for which the document is  executed.”  In the case of a mortgage instrument therefore the  court-fee  has  to  be  computed  on  the  amount  for  which  the  instrument  is  executed,  in  other  words,  the  principal  amount  secured  by  it.   This  is  the  plain  effect  of  the  words  of  the  section, and I fail to see how the method of computation fixed  in S.7(v) can possibly be applied.   Now as regards the sale- deed, the question arises, is the value referred to in the section,  the actual value of the property, that is to say, its market value  or the artificial value prescribed by S.7 (v)?  The last mentioned  section deals with suits for possession and the legislature has  expressly  enacted  that  in  such  suits  the  value  shall  be  determined in a particular manner.  Cl. (iv-A) refers simply to  “the value of the property,” which means “value” as generally  understood, whereas Cl. (v) prescribes an artificial method of  valuation.  There is no reason to construe Cl. (iv-A) in the light  of Cl. (v) which deals with a specific matter; indeed, when the  legislature intends to prescribe an artificial method, it says so in  express terms, as Cl. (iv-c) also shows.  I am therefore of the  opinion that in the case of the sale-deeds, the amount of court- fee  payable  must  be  computed  on  the  market  value  of  the  properties with which they deal.”

17. In  Kutumba  Sastri  v.  Sundaramma (supra),  the  Full  Bench  of  

Madras High Court interpreted paragraph (iv-A) of Section 7 of the Court-

fees  Act.   The  Full  Bench referred to  the  earlier  judgments  in  Venkata  

Narasimha  Raju  v.  Chandrayya  (supra),  Venkatasiva  Rao  v.  

Satyanarayanamurthi  (supra),  Balireddi  v.  Khatipulal  Sab (supra)  and  

approved the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in  Balireddi v.  

Khatipulal Sab (supra) by making the following observations:

“We consider that the view taken by Venkatasubba Rao J. in 59  Mad 240 is preferable to that taken in 53 MLJ 267.  Para (iv-A)  deals with suits where it is necessary for the plaintiff to seek the  

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cancellation of a decree or of a deed.  Para (v) relates merely to  suits for possession.  In a suit for possession it is not always  necessary to set aside a decree or a document.  Where a suit is  merely for possession the Act says how the value of the subject- matter shall be arrived at.  When adding para (iv-A) to S.7 the  Legislature  did  not  say  that  in  a  suit  falling  within  the  new  paragraph the valuation of the subject-matter should be arrived  at in accordance with the method indicated in para (v). It said  that a suit within para (iv-A) should be valued according to the  value of the property, and the value of the property, unless there  is an indication to the contrary, must mean to its market value.  By the Amending Act of 1922 para (iv-C) was also amended.  Before the amendment, this paragraph provided that in a suit to  obtain  a  declaratory  decree  or  order  where  a  consequential  relief was prayed, the value should be according to the value of  the relief sought by the plaintiff.  The Amending Act inserted  the  Proviso  to  the  effect  that  in  a  suit  coming  under  this  paragraph in a case where the relief sought is with reference to  immovable property the valuation shall not be less than half the  value  of  the  immovable  property  calculated  in  the  manner  provided for by paragraph (v).  There the Legislature expressly  provided that the method of calculation was to be in accordance  with para (v) but in adding para (iv-A) no such direction was  given.  The court-fee is to be calculated on the amount or the  value of the property and to give the wording of para (iv-A) its  plain meaning the valuation must be the valuation based on the  market value of the property at the date of the plaint.”        

(emphasis supplied)

18. In  Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder  (1967) 80 Madras Law Weekly  

19 (SN), the learned Single Judge noted that in the earlier suit, the properties  

were valued at Rs.4000/-, referred to Section 40(1) of the Madras Court-fees  

and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, which is pari materia to the Section 40 of the  

Act and observed:

“…………that  as  the  decree  itself  specified  the  value of  the  property  it  will  fall  within  the  language  of  Section  40(1),  

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namely,  the  amount  or  value  of  the  property  for  which  the  decree was passed and ordered that the court-fee has to be paid  calculated on the sum of Rs.4000, which is the value given in  the decree, and not the market value of the properties on the  date of the filing of the plaint.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. In  Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai (1968) 83 Madras  

Law Weekly 789, another learned Single Judge examined the correctness of  

order passed by the Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli,  who had allowed the  

plaintiff to pay the court-fee for the cancellation of settlement deed on the  

value of the document i.e. Rs.3500/-.  While dismissing the revision filed by  

the defendants, the learned Judge referred to Section 40(1) of the Madras  

Act,  distinguished  the  Full  Bench  judgment  in  Kutumba  Sastri  v.  

Sundaramma (supra) and observed:

“It will be seen that the section provides for suits (1) relating to  cancellation of a decree for money, (2) cancellation of a decree  for other property having a money value, and (3) cancellation of  other document which purports or operates to create, declare,  assign, limit or extinguish rights in moveable or immoveable  property.  The sub-section provides that fee shall be computed  on the value of the subject matter of the suit.  Then it proceeds  to state how such value should be calculated.  It provides that if  the whole decree is sought to be cancelled, the amount or value  of the property for which the decree was passed should be taken  into account.  In the case of other document which purports or  operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish rights in  moveable or immoveable property, the value shall be deemed to  be the value of the property.  It is not clear as to whether the  words  “the  amount  or  value  of  the  property  for  which  the  decree  was  passed”  are  applicable  to  the  cancellation  of  a  document  which  creates  or  declares  rights  in  moveable  or  immoveable property.  In the case of suits for cancellation of  either documents, apart from suits for cancellation of a decree  

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for  money  or  other  property,  the  above  clause  would  be  certainly applicable.  This would mean that in the case of suits  for cancellation of  other  documents,  the value of the subject  matter of the suit shall be deemed to be the amount for which  the documents was executed.  It was submitted on behalf of the  defendants that even in the case of a suit  for cancellation of  other documents, the value shall be deemed to be the value of  the property.  But this contention would ignore the effect of the  words “value of the property for which the decree was passed”.  Even conceding that the value of the property should be taken  into account in suits for cancellation of other documents, there  are two modes provided for to compute the value of the subject  matter  of  the  suit,  (1)  the  value  of  the  property  and  (2)  the  amount for which the document was executed.

Mr. Venugopalachari, learned counsel for the petitioners,  submitted  that  this  view is  opposed  to  the  one  taken  in  the  decision  in  Kutumba  Sastri  v.  Sundaramma  where  the  Full  Bench  held  that  in  a  suit  for  cancellation  of  a  deed  of  conveyance the valuation must be the valuation based on the  market value of the property at the date of the plaint.  The Full  Bench was considering the question as to the Court fee payable  in  a  suit  for  cancellation  of  a  deed  of  conveyance  and  for  possession of the property covered by the deed.  The court held  that the plaintiff should value his relief in accordance with the  provisions of S.7(4)(A), and not according to S.7(V) of the old  Court  fees  Act,  1870.   After  referring  to  the  difference  of  opinion between the various decisions, the Full Bench preferred  the view taken in Bali Reddi v. Khatifulal Sab 59 Mad. 240,  followed in Venkatakrishniah v.  All  Sahib 48 L.W. 277.   S.  7(4-A),  of the old Act is slightly differently worded and it runs  as follows:-

“In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other  property  having  a  money  value,  or  other  document  securing  money  or  other  property  having  such  value,  according to the value of the subject matter of the suit,  and such value shall be deemed to be— if  the whole decree or other document is sought to be  cancelled,  the  amount or  the  value of  the  property  for  which  the  decree  was  passed  or  the  other  document  executed,

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if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be  cancelled,  such  part  of  the  amount  or  value  of  the  property”.

It will be seen that the above section relates to a suit for  cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a  money  value,  or  other  document  securing  money  or  other  property having such value.  There was some doubt whether the  third part  of  the section relating to either  document securing  money  would  include  sales.   In  Balireddy  v.  Badul  Sabar,  Venkatasubba  Rao,  J.  referring  to  his  earlier  decision  in  Doraiswami  v.  Thangavelu  held that  sale  deeds  would come  within the meaning of this section.  Whether this sub-section  includes sale deeds or need not detain us, as S. 40(1) of Madras  Act  XIV of  1955 is  differently  worded and there  can  be no  doubt that it brings within its purview sale deeds as it relates to  other documents which purports or operates to create, declare,  assign, limit or extinguish any right in moveable or immoveable  property,  S.  7(iv-A)  of  the  old  Act  states  that  the  value  be  deemed to be “if the whole decree or other document is sought  to  be cancelled,  the amount or  the value of  the  property for  which the decree was passed or the other document executed”.  The  same  words  are  used  in  S.  40(1)  of  the  new  Act.   In  construing this sub-clause in S. 7(iv-A) of the old Act, the Full  Bench  pointed  out  in  the  decision  cited  above  that  the  suit  within  the  meaning  of  the  above  section  should  be  valued  according  to  the  value  of  the  property,  unless  there  is  an  indication to the contrary, must mean its market value.  It may  be  noted  that  the  court  was  considering  the  value  of  the  property and does not appear to have taken note of the words  “the other document executed”.

As already pointed out, S. 7(iv-A) of the Old Act as well  as S. 40(1) of the present Act deal with suits for cancellation of  a decree for money, cancellation  of a decree for other property  having a money value and suit for cancellation other document.  In the case of other documents, the clause “the amount or the  value of the property for which the decree was passed” cannot  be held to be applicable and the only clause that can be properly  applied is only the value for which the document was executed.  In the third category in S. 40(1), to the words `other document,  the words `which purports or operates to create, declare, assign,  limit or extinguish’ rights in moveable or immoveable property  

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are  included.   Obviously  in  suits  for  cancellation  of  other  documents referred to in S. 40(1) of the new Act the valuation  should  be  the  value  of  the  other  document  executed.   In  Balireddy v. Abdul Satar the court refers to the section which  says that the value of the subject matter shall be deemed to be  the  amount  for  which  the  document  is  executed.   But  it  confined its discussion to the actual value of the property and  held that it referred only to the market value.  This decision also  does not refer to the valuation of the document on the basis of  the amount for which the document is executed.”

(emphasis supplied)

20. In  Appikunju  Meerasayu  v.  Meeran  Pillai (supra),  the  learned  

Single Judge of Kerala High Court relied on the judgment of Madras High  

Court  in  Narasamma  v.  Satyanarayana  AIR  1951  Madras  793  and  

observed:

“As I have pointed out earlier, the emphasis in S.40(1) of the  Court Fees Act is regarding the subject matter of this suit and in  respect of that subject matter which admittedly is immovable  property it will have to be valued on the amount or valued as  the property which was no doubt covered by the decree in O.S.  21/1125.  But the value or amount must certainly be the market  value as on the date of the filing of the suit.”

The same view was reiterated by another learned Single Judge of the  

Kerala High Court in  Uma Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad  

and others (supra).

21. In Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and others (supra), the  

learned Single Judge of Madras High Court referred to earlier judgments but  

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disagreed with the view expressed by the other  learned Single Judges in  

Navaraja  v.  Kaliappa  Gounder (supra)  and  Arunachalathammal  v.  

Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) and followed the ratio of Full Bench judgment  

by recording the following observations:

“With  respect,  I  need hardly  add that  this  is  not  the  correct  reading of the Full Bench decision. He has concluded by stating  that  obviously  in  suits  for  cancellation  of  "other  documents"  referred to in Section 40 (1) of the present Act, the valuation  should  be  the  value  of  the  other  document  executed.  I  have  already pointed out that in the documents just as in the case of  decrees, the distinction is between those that dealt with money  and those that dealt with property. The amount mentioned in the  decree or the document is relevant only when the question is  with  regard  to  the  decree  for  money  or  document  securing  money. But in the case of decrees or documents dealing with  property of money value, the value of the subject-matter of the  suit should be computed on the value of the property for which  the decree was passed or the document was executed. I need not  repeat that the valuation in respect of the property dealt with by  the decree or document should be the market value and such a  market value should be as on the date of suit.”

22. In  S.  Krishna Nair  and another  v.  N.  Rugmoni Amma (supra),  

another  learned  Single  Judge  followed  the  ratio  of  Sengoda  Nadar  v.  

Doraiswami  Gounder  and  others (supra)  and  held  that  in  a  suit  for  

cancellation of decree, the property is to be valued under Section 40(1) of  

the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and the court fee  

is required to be paid on the market value of the property as on the date of  

the plaint.  

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23. In  Krishnan Damodaran v.  Padmanabhan Parvathy (supra),  the  

Division  Bench  of  Kerala  High  Court  reiterated  the  views  expressed  in  

Kutumba  Sastri  v.  Sundaramma (supra),  Appikunju  Meerasayu  v.  

Meeran Pillai (supra) and  Sengoda Nadar v. Doraiswami Gounder and  

others (supra) and held that court fee is payable on the market value of the  

property  covered  by  the  document  and not  on the  basis  of  the  valuation  

given in the document.  

24. In P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon (supra), the Division Bench of  

the Kerala High Court held as under:

“True,  as  contended  for  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff-revision  petitioner,  S.40  nowhere  uses  the  expression  ‘market  value’.  But  it  is  clear  therefrom that  the legislative  intent  is  to levy  court-fee on the just equivalent in money of the ‘other property’  comprised  in  the  decree  or  portion  thereof  sought  to  be  set  aside;  or  dealt  with  in  the  ‘other  document’  or  part  thereof  sought to be cancelled.  The section opens by saying that ‘in a  suit  for cancellation of a decree for money or other property  having  a  money  value’  (emphasis  supplied)  ‘fee  shall  be  computed  on  the  value  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  suit’.  ‘Money  value’  of  a  property  is  its  worth  in  terms  of  the  currency  of  the  land  or  in  other  words,  is  such  money- equivalent thereof in open market; and not any amount less than  that as where it is overvalued at a fancy-price.  It cannot be that  when, what is sought to be cancelled is a decree or part thereof  for ‘other property’, i.e. property other than money, the value of  such  property  for  computation  of  court-fees  is  its  ‘money- value’, and when, what is sought to be cancelled is a document  or part thereof in respect of ‘other property’, the value of such  property for such computation is not its ‘money-value’.  Value  of the subject matter, namely, value of the ‘other property’ in  both cases is its money-value.

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The object of the second and the third paras in sub-section (1)  of S.40 is not to introduce any fiction but to provide for two  situations, namely, (i) where the decree or the document as a  whole is sought to be cancelled and (ii) where only part thereof  is sought to be cancelled.  In the first situation, the value of the  subject matter is the amount for which the decree was passed or  the  document  was  executed;  or  the  value  of  the  property  concerning which the decree was passed or the document was  executed. In the second class of cases, the value of the subject  matter  of  the  suit  is  such  part  of  the  amount  for  which  the  decree was passed or the document was executed, in respect of  which  part,  the  decree  or  the  document  is  sought  to  be  cancelled; or the value of such part of the property concerning  which the decree was passed or the document was executed, in  respect of which part, the decree or the document is sought to  be cancelled.

Section 40(1) has to be read as a whole.  So read: (A) when the  suit  is  for  cancellation  of  a  decree  or  other  document  for  money, then the value of the subject-matter of the suit will be:-  (i) the whole amount for which the decree was passed or the  document was executed, if what is sought to be cancelled is the  whole of the decree or the whole of the document; and (ii) such  part  of  the  amount  for  which  the  decree  was  passed  or  the  document was executed, if only part of the decree or part of the  document is  sought to be cancelled;  (B) when the suit  is  for  cancellation  of  a  decree  or  other  document  for  a  property  having money-value, then, the value of the subject-matter of the  suit will be:- (i) if the whole of the decree or the document is  sought to be cancelled – the value of the property covered by  the decree or the document; and (ii) if only part of the decree or  of the document is to be cancelled; value of such part of the  property  in  respect  of  which  the  decree  was  passed  or  the  document  was  executed  and  to  which  extent  such  decree  or  such document is to be cancelled.  We are not impressed with  the  submission  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  the  expressions ‘the value of the property for which the decree was  passed or other document was executed’ and ‘the value of the  property  in  respect  of  which the  decree  was passed or  other  document  was  executed’  for  the  purpose  of  computation  of  court-fees.  The scheme of S.40 is to make court-fees leviable  on the sum of money or portion thereof, when what the plaintiff  seeks is to get rid of his obligation and liability therefor or part  

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thereof  under  a  decree  passed  or  a  document  executed  by  cancellation  thereof,  and  on  the  money-equivalent  of  the  property or portion thereof, when what he seeks to get rid of is  his obligation and liability in relation to that property or portion  thereof under a decree passed or a document executed in respect  of it by cancellation thereof.”

25. In  R. Rangiah v. Thimma Setty (1963) 1 Mysore Law Journal 67,  

the Division Bench of Mysore High Court interpreted Section 4(iv)(A) of  

Mysore Court Fees Act, which is substantially similar to Section 40 of the  

Act and held that:

“Now, one thing which is very clear from the paragraphs 1 & 2  of S.4 (iv) A is that in a suit brought for the cancellation of a  document executed for  the purpose of  securing property,  the  Court Fee payable is on the value of such property.  Although  those paragraphs do not refer in terms to the market value of the  property, as some of the other parts of the Act do, I have no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  the  word  ‘value’  occurring  in  those  paragraphs  has  reference  to  no  other  value  than  the  market  value.  The word ‘value’ when it occurs in an enactment like  the Court Fees Act,  has to my mind, particularly known and  definite meaning.  That word has reference to the price which  the property will fetch when exposed to the test of competition.

Mr.  Gopivallabha  Iyengar  had  to  admit  that  the  word  ‘value’  occurring  in  the  first  paragraph  would  have  to  be  understood as the market value if paragraphs 2 and 3 did not  exist in S.4(iv) A.  If, therefore, the word ‘value’ occurring in  the  first  paragraph  means  market  value,  I  see  nothing  in  paragraphs  2  and  3  on  which  Mr.  Gopivallabha  Iyengar  strongly relied which can persuade me to take the view that the  word  ‘value’  occurring  in  the  first  paragraph  which,  as  ordinarily  understood,  is  the  market  value,  should  be  understood differently.

Paragraph 2 does no more than to merely provide that, if  a document is sought to be cancelled in its entirety, the Court  Fee is  payable  on the  value of  the whole  of  the  property in  

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respect of which the document is executed.  Likewise paragraph  3 merely provides that where the cancellation sought is a partial  cancellation,  Court  Fee  is  payable  only  on  the  value  of  the  property in respect of which cancellation is sought.  It is for that  purpose that the words “value shall be deemed to be” are used  by the Legislature in the first paragraph of the clause and not  for the purpose of assigning to the word ‘value’ occurring in the  first paragraph a meaning different from that which has to be  ordinarily given to it.

It is no doubt true that the second paragraph of S.4(iv) A  directs  that  the  Court  Fee  payable  in  a  suit  brought  for  the  cancellation of a document is the Court Fee on the value of the  property ‘for which’ the document was executed.  Ordinarily  the expression ‘for which’ occurring in that  paragraph might  have justified the interpretation that the amount on which the  Curt Fee has to be paid is the amount specified in the document.  But, that, that would not be correct way of understanding those  words occurring in paragraph 2 of that clause is clear from the  fact that S.4(iv) A does not provide merely for cancellation of a  document executed for a specified consideration such as a sale  deed, but also provides for the payment of Court Fee even in  suits brought for cancellation of other documents such as a deed  of settlement, a gift deed or a trust deed.  In the latter category  of cases it would not be appropriate to regard those documents  as executed for a consideration or a specified amount and those  cases would not be cases in which there would be any value  ‘for which the document is executed.

The  second  paragraph  which  requires  the  payment  of  Court  Fee  on  the  value  of  the  property  ‘for  which’  the  document was executed, does not, when properly understood,  direct the payment of such Court Fee on the value for which the  document was executed, but on the value of the property for  which it was executed.  In other words, the words ‘for which’  occurring in that paragraph do not refer to the value but to the  property to which the document relates.  The words ‘for which  occurring in that paragraph, in my opinion, mean ‘for securing  which’, so that what that paragraph directs is the payment of  Court Fee on the value of the property for securing which the  document is executed.

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That, that is the correct interpretation is indicated by the  word ‘securing’ occurring in the first paragraph of the clause in  the context of a document of which cancellation is sought.

It therefore follows that what is relevant for the purpose  of S.4(iv) A is not the value of the property specified in the  document but its real and actual value when the suit is brought.  It is on that value that the Court fee has to be paid if the suit is  for  the  cancellation  of  a  document  recording  a  transaction  involving such property.”      

26. In  Pachayammal  v.  Dwaraswamy Pillai  (supra),  another  Division  

Bench of Kerala High Court interpreted Sections 7 and 40 of the Act and  

held:

“Section  7  of  the  Act  though  deals  with  determination  of  market  value,  it  starts  with  a  saving  clause.  A  reading  of  Section 7(1) makes it clear that if there is a specific provision in  the  Act  for  valuing  the  suit,  the  Sub-sections  (2)  to  (4)  of  Section 7 can have no application. According to the counsel for  the  petitioners,  Section  40  is  an  independent  provision  for  valuation of suits for cancellation of decrees and documents and  in view of Section 7(1), market value of the property is not a  criteria at all. Whenever market value of the property is to be  taken  into  account,  it  is  specifically  stated  in  the  statute.  Sections 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 45 & 48 etc, specifically  provide that market value of the property involved in the suit is  to  be taken  as  basis  for  valuation.  But,  the  word  'market'  is  conspicuously absent in Section 40. When the section is plain  and unambiguous, courts should not venture to add words to it  to give an entirely different scope to the said provisions never  intended  by  the  legislature.  Therefore,  it  was  argued  that  concept of "market value of the property' cannot be brought into  Section  40.  Learned  Counsel  invited  our  attention  to  the  decisions of the Apex Court in Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit  and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors (2001) 4 SCC 534  (Paragraph  26)  and  Padma Sundara  Rao  (Dead)  and Ors.  v.  State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 (Paragraphs 14 and  15).  It is true that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or  

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unambiguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one  meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning  irrespective of consequences. The rule stated by TINDAL, C.J.  in Sussex Peerage case, (1844) 11 Cl & F 85, p. 143) is in the  following form: "If the words of the statute are in themselves  precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than  to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The  words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent  of the lawgiver”.

Here, the question is what is clearly stated in Section 40 as the  criteria  for  valuation  of  suit  filed  for  cancellation  of  a  document. Section 40 of the Act mandates that if a suit is filed  for  cancelling  a  document  which  creates,  assigns  or  extinguishes  the  right,  title  or  interest  in  an  immovable  property, if the whole document is to be cancelled, the value of  the property for which the document was executed and if plaint  is only to cancel part of the document, such part of the value of  property for which document was executed is the basis for suit  valuation. Therefore, value depends on the value of property for  which document was executed and sought to be cancelled and  not the value mentioned in the document. Here, a gift deed is  sought to be cancelled. Then on a plain meaning of Section 40,  suit should be valued at the value of the property for which gift  deed was executed and not the value of the document or value  mentioned in the document. If a gift  deed is executed out of  love and affection, which is a valid consideration, suit valuation  depends upon not on estimation of value of love and affection  or null value, but, on the value of the property covered by the  gift deed. Then the question is what is the value of property at  the  time  of  filing  the  suit.  In  legal  terms  value  of  property  means  market  value  of  property  and  when  valuation  is  considered with regard to suit valuation, it can only be market  value of property at the time of filing the suit and nothing else.  Section 7(1) clearly states that except otherwise provided, court  fee  payable  under  the  Act  depends  on  the  market  value  determined on the date of presentation of plaint.  No contrary  indication is made in Section 40.”

27. In Smt. Narbada v. Smt. Aashi AIR 1987 Rajasthan 162, the learned  

Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court  followed the ratio  of the  Division  

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Bench of Kerala High Court in P.K. Vasudeva Rao v. Hari Menon (supra)  

and held that in a suit for cancellation of decree, the court fee is required to  

be paid on the market value of the property.

28. In  Andalammal v. B. Kanniah  (1971) II Madras Law Journal 205,  

the learned Single Judge considered the question relating to court fee in the  

context of a suit filed for cancellation of a settlement deed on the ground that  

the  same  had  been  procured  by  fraudulent  misrepresentation.   In  the  

settlement deed, the property was valued at Rs.10,000/-.  The learned trial  

Court held that the suit should be valued on the market value of the property  

as  on the  date  of  plaint  and not  on the basis  of  the value of  suit  in the  

settlement deed and accordingly directed the plaintiff to pay deficit court fee  

after furnishing the market value of the property.  The learned Single Judge  

referred to Section 40 of the Madras Act and held:

“It is important to mark the words “the amount or value of the  property  for  which  the  document  was  executed”.   If  the  Legislature had said “the amount or value of the property in  respect  of  which  the  document  was  executed”,  it  would  be  reasonable to hold that the basis shall be the market value of the  property, regardless of what the document says it is.  But as the  section refers to “the amount or value of the property for which  the document was executed”, the legislative intent is clear that  the basis for the purpose of valuation shall be the amount or  value  mentioned  in  the  document  itself.   Evidently,  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  is  that  when  a  person  seeks  to  cancel a document executed by himself, he shall pay Court-fee  upon the value which he has chosen to put upon the property in  the document he seeks to cancel.  The word “value” ordinarily  connotes  the  price  set  on  a  thing,  and  when the  Legislature  

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directs that the value of the subject-matter shall be deemed to  be the amount or value of the property for which the document  was executed, I see no warrant for ignoring the plain language  or the section and holding that the value shall  be the market  value of  the  property.   In  fact,  the Legislature  has expressly  used the words “market value” in twelve other sections of the  Act in contra distinction to the word “value” used in section  40(1) of the Act.  I, therefore, hold that the Court-fee paid by  the  petitioner  upon the basis  of  the value of  the  property as  given in the settlement deed is correct.”

29. In  Allam Venkateswara  Reddy  v.  Golla  Venkatanarayana AIR  

1975  A.P.  122,  a  learned  Single  Judge  of  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  

construed Section 37 of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and Suits Valuation  

Act, which is pari materia to Section 40 of the Act, and held:

“Section 37(1) contemplated two kinds of suits, viz. suits for  cancellation  of  decrees,  whether  they  are  for  money  or  for  property  having  a  money  value  and suits  for  cancellation  of  documents creating or extinguishing rights whether in money,  movable or immovable property.  It is stated therein that for the  purpose  of  payment  of  court-fee  in  the  suit  the  fee  shall  be  computed on the basis of the value of the subject-matter of the  suit and that such value shall be deemed to be the one indicated  in clause (a) of Section 37(1) wherein it is mentioned that if the  whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the  amount  or  value  of  the  property  for  which  the  decree  was  passed or other document was executed shall be deemed to be  the value for computation of court-fee .  From this it  is very  clear that for cancellation of a document regarding a property  the  value  shall  be  deemed  to  be  the  amount  for  which  the  document regarding a property the value shall be deemed to be  the amount for which the document sought to be cancelled was  executed with regard to the property.    In the present case, the  two  sale  deeds  in  question  were  executed  for  a  sum  of  Rs.18,000/-.   Therefore,  the  court-fee  has to  be paid  on that  amount and not on the present market value of the properties  which are the subject-matter of the two sale deeds.  A reading  of  Section  37  does  not  show  that  the  court-fee  has  to  be  

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computed  on  the  basis  of  the  present  market  value  of  the  document sought to be cancelled.”

30. In view of our analysis of the relevant statutory provisions, it must be  

held that the judgments of the Division Bench of Madras High Court and of  

the  learned Single  Judges in  Venkata Narasimha Raju v.  Chandrayya  

(supra),  Navaraja v. Kaliappa Gounder  (supra),  Arunachalathammal v.  

Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra) and  Andalammal v. B. Kanniah (supra) as  

also the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court  

in  Allam Venkateswara  Reddy  v.  Golla  Venkatanarayana  (supra) lay  

down correct law.  In the first of these cases, the Division Bench of Madras  

High Court rightly observed that when there is a special rule in the Act for  

valuing the property for the purpose of court fee, that method of valuation  

must be adopted in preference to any other method and, as mentioned above,  

Section  40  of  the  Act  certainly  contains  a  special  rule  for  valuing  the  

property for the purpose of court fee and we do not see any reason why the  

expression  `value  of  the  property’  used  in  Section  40(1)  should  be  

substituted with the expression `market value of the property’.  

31. The judgment of the learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in  

Balireddi   v.  Khatipulal  Sab (supra),  which  was  approved  by  the  Full  

Bench of that Court  in  Kutumba Sastri v.  Sundaramma  (supra)  turned  

primarily on the interpretation of Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fee Act as  

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amended by Madras Act which refers to the value of the property simpliciter  

and the Court interpreted the same as market value.  Neither the learned  

Single Judge nor the Full Bench were called upon to interpret a provision  

like Section 40 of the Act.  Therefore, the ratio of those judgments cannot be  

relied  upon  for  the  purpose  of  interpreting  Section  40  of  the  Act.   In  

Arunachalathammal  v.  Sudalaimuthu Pillai (supra),  the  learned Single  

Judge rightly  distinguished the judgment of the Full  Bench by making a  

pointed reference to the language employed in Section 40(1) of the Madras  

Act  No.XIV  of  1955,  which  is  identical  to  Section  40  of  the  Act.   In  

Sengoda  Nadar  v.  Doraiswami  Gounder  and  others (supra)  and  S.  

Krishna  Nair  and  another  v.  N.  Rugmoni  Amma (supra),  the  other  

learned Single Judges did not correctly appreciate the ratio of the judgment  

of the coordinate Bench in  Arunachalathammal v. Sudalaimuthu Pillai  

(supra) and distinguished the same without assigning cogent reasons.  We  

may  also  observe  that  if  the  learned  Single  Judges  felt  that  the  view  

expressed  by  the  co-ordinate  Bench was not  correct,  they  ought  to  have  

referred  the  matter  to  the  larger  Bench.   The judgments  of  the  Division  

Benches of Kerala High Court in Krishnan Damodaran v. Padmanabhan  

Parvathy (supra),  P.K.  Vasudeva  Rao  v.  Hari  Menon (supra)  and  

Pachayammal  v.  Dwaraswamy Pillai  (supra)  and of  the  learned  Single  

Judges  in  Appikunju  Meerasayu  v.  Meeran  Pillai (supra)  and  Uma  

Antherjanam v. Govindaru Namboodiripad and others (supra) also do  

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not lay down correct law because the High Court did not appreciate that the  

legislature has designedly used different language in Section 40 of the Act  

and the term ‘market value’ has not been used therein.  The same is true of  

the judgments of the learned Single Judges of Mysore and Rajasthan High  

Courts noticed hereinabove.

32. In  the  result,  the  appeal  is  allowed.   The  impugned  order  of  the  

learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court as also the order passed by the  

trial Court directing the appellant to pay court fee on the market value of the  

property, in respect of which the sale deed was executed by respondent No.1  

in  favour  of  respondent  No.2,  are  set  aside.   The  trial  Court  shall  now  

proceed with  the  case  and decide the  same in accordance with  law.  The  

parties are left to bear their own costs.

....….………………….…J.       [G.S. Singhvi]

     ……..…..………………..J.       [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi May 07, 2010.

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