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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8452 of 2003

PETITIONER: Sarva Shramik Sangh                                              

RESPONDENT: M/s. Indian Smelting & Refining Co. Ltd. & Ors.                                              

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/10/2003

BENCH: DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 4103 of 2002)

[With C.A. No. 8453/2003 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 4105/2002, C.A.  No.8454-8459/2003 (Arising out of S.L.P (C).20005-20010/2003 CC No. 625- 630/03, C.A. No.8460/2003 (Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 7210/2002, C.A.  No. 8461/2003 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.7151/2002, C.A. No.8462/2003  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.18341/2002, C.A.No. 8463/2003 (Arising out of  SLP(C) No.18521/2002)

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J

       Leave granted.

       Appellants contend that the view which was first expressed by this  Court in General Labour Union (Red flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad Mfg. And  Calico Printing Co. Ltd and Ors. (1995 Supp (1) SCC 175), subsequently  echoed in many cases including Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels  Ltd. and Anr. (2001 (2) SCC 381) and finally in CIPLA Ltd. v.  Maharashtra General Kamgar Union and Ors. (2001 (3) SCC 101) is legally  unsound and needs a fresh look.

       It was held in first of the three cases that the workmen have to  establish that they are workmen of the respondent-company before they  can file any complaint under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions  and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (in short the  ’Maharashtra Act’). Similar was the view expressed in Vividh Kamgar’s  case (supra) and CIPLA Ltd.’s case (supra).

       According to the appellants a fresh look is necessary in the  matter, as various relevant provisions were not kept in view when the  above decisions were rendered.

Ms. Indira Jaisingh, made leading submissions followed by Shri  V.A. Mohta,, Mr. Chander Udai Singh, Sr. Advocates and others on behalf  of the appellants, whereas Shri P.P. Rao. learned Senior Counsel  followed by Sarvashri D.A. Dave, B.R. Naik and Shekhar Naphade, Sr.  Advocates and  others responded on behalf of the respondents.  On behalf  of the appellants-workmen, relying upon Section 59 of the Maharashtra  Act, it was urged strenuously that the machinery under the said Act as  well as Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ’ID Act’) are co- extensive and equally wide and the scope of judicial determination under  both the Acts is the same and that therefore there was no warrant to  assume that the procedure envisaged under the Maharashtra Act is  summary.  While pursuing further the said stand it is claimed that in

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cases where the workmen seek to obtain a declaration that they were at  all times the workmen of the principal employer and the interposition of  contractor or engagement through him was neither bona fide nor genuine  but merely a camouflage designed to defeat the rights of the laborers  remedies are available under both the above enactments to be availed of  at the option and choice of the workman concerned under anyone or other,  though not under both.  It was also contended that Section 7 or Section  28 and 32 of the Maharashtra Act cannot be construed so as to keep out  of the purview of the Act, even an adjudication as to the existence of  relationship of the workmen vis-a-vis the principal employer not  withstanding that it is disputed or denied by the principal employer and  being a beneficial legislation meant to provide workmen a more  beneficial and expeditious additional remedy a liberal construction has  to be placed in furtherance of the avowed object.  Further, it is  contended that when more than one statute governed the situation the  provisions have to be harmoniously construed, giving each of them a full  play rationally without whittling down the scope of anyone of them,  keeping in view the basic principle that where there is no express bar  to a jurisdiction, ouster of jurisdiction could not be lightly inferred,  to avoid rendering provisions in a statute otiose or redundant.  Most  rational way of such an harmonious construction would therefore,  according to the appellants lead to the ultimate conclusions a) of  questions relating to abolition of contracts and consequential  absorption can be raised before Industrial Courts, though by virtue of  Section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970  (in short the ’Contract Labour Act’) the question relating to abolition  will be decided only by the Government and the Industrial Forums will  keep the matter pending, to finally dispose of the other issues after  the decision of Government under the said Act and b) the dispute  relating to the sham nature of the employment through contractor can be  raised under the Maharashtra Act or ID Act at the option or choice of  the workmen. The expression ’enquiry’ as appearing under the Maharashtra  Act is said to go far beyond the ’adjudication’ contemplated in  Industrial Law and therefore convey wider powers and jurisdiction.

       It was submitted that the Maharashtra Act is a complete code in  itself. If the forum provided therein can co-exist with the Tribunal  under the ID Act, it is essentially an alternative forum with additional  remedies. Definition of "workman" was by the logic of incorporation  and, therefore, the Tribunal under the ID Act alone can not held  competent to effectively decide the question whether the claimant in  reality was a workman or not. It was also submitted that this Court  erroneously proceeded on the footing as if the proceedings under the  Maharashtra Act are summary in nature.  

       Per contra, on behalf of the respondents- Management/establishments, it was contended that when three different  Benches of this Court have consistently taken the view that the basic  question as to existence of relationship of employer-employee is not  within the purview of the Maharashtra Act and the same hold the field  for over 10 years it would require very strong reasons for any one to  doubt the correctness of such a view and that the mere reason that there  may even be scope for another possible view, is no ground for  reconsideration of the earlier decisions as held by this Court in Keshav  Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax [1965(2) SCR 908 at pages 921,  928).   

       On the merits of the contentions raised on behalf of the  appellants while reiterating the plea that the principles laid down in  CIPLA’s case (supra) are unexceptionable and well merited having regard  to the scheme, purpose and object of the legislations under  consideration and legislative intent as expressed in the language of the  various provisions therein and do not call for any reconsideration,  merely because there was no reference to a particular provision or  other, wherein according to the respondents all relevant principles and

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criteria necessary for the purpose have been found effectively kept into  consideration.  According to the respondents the scope for the  Maharashtra Act is limited in nature and confined to consideration of  claims and grievances of unfair labour practices of certain kind by  prohibiting employer or union and employees from engaging in any unfair  labour practice and the existence of an undisputed or indisputable  relationship of employer-employee is an essential pre-requisite for the  labour or Industrial Court under the Maharashtra Act to entertain any  proceedings in respect of any grievance under the said Act.  Section 32  of the Maharashtra Act, it is urged is to be considered in the context  of Sections 26 and 27 read with the relevant entries in the Schedules in  these cases, particularly items 5, 6, 9 & 10 and in the absence of  accepted or existing relationship of employer-employee duly declared in  competent proceedings, neither Section 5 nor Section 7 or even Section  28 enabled a complaint to be entertained for consideration of such  grievances as are sought or permitted to be agitated under the  Maharashtra Act.

       The further plea on behalf of the respondents was that the scope  of adjudication under the ID Act is much wider in which all or any types  and nature of industrial disputes including claims for declaration of  status or relationship of "Master and Servant or Employer and Employee"  can also be agitated and determined and not under the Maharashtra Act.   Consequently, it is claimed that questions as to whether the contract  under which contract labour was engaged was a sham and nominal or a mere  camouflage and if so whether by piercing the veil they should be  declared to be really the employees of the principal employer are  matters which could be got referred to for adjudication by seeking a  reference under ID Act only and are totally outside the jurisdiction of  the Courts constituted under the Maharashtra Act.

       The decision of the Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of India  Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. (2001 (7)  SCC 1) in several paragraphs particularly paras 65, 108, 112, 113, 117,  125 makes the position clear that a dispute of the nature previously  projected has perforce to be adjudicated on the issue as to whether a  person was a workman under the employer.  

       The relevant paragraphs so far as relevant read as follows:

"65.    The contentions of the learned counsel for the  parties, exhaustively set out above, can conveniently  be dealt with under the following two issues :  A. Whether the concept of automatic absorption of  contract labour in the establishment of the principal  employer on issuance of the abolition notification,  is implied in Section 10 of the CLRA Act; and  B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract labour  in connection with the work entrusted to him by a  principal employer, the relationship of master and  servant between him (the Principal employer) and the  contract labour, emerges.  108.    The next issue that remains to be dealt with is  :  B. Whether on a contractor engaging contract labour  in connection with the work entrusted to him by a  principal employer, the relationship of master and  servant between him (the principal employer) and the  contract labour emerges.  112.    The decision of the Constitution Bench of this  Court in Basti Sugar Mill’s case (supra), was given  in the context of reference of an industrial dispute  under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,  1947. The appellant-Sugar Mills entrusted the work of  removal of press-mud to a contractor who engaged the

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respondents therein (contract labour) in connection  with that work. The services of the respondents were  terminated by the contractor and they claimed that  they should be reinstated in the service of the  appellant. The Constitution Bench held :  "The words of the definition of  workmen in Section 2(z) to mean "any  person (including an apprentice)  employed in any industry to do any  skilled or unskilled, manual,  supervisory, technical or clerical work  for hire or reward, whether the terms of  employment be express or implied" are by  themselves sufficiently wide to bring in  persons doing work in an industry  whether the employment was by the  management or by the contractor of the  management. Unless however the  definition of the word "employer"  included the management of the industry  even when the employment was by the  contractor the workmen employed by the  contractor could not get the benefit of  the Act since a dispute between them and  the management would not be an  industrial dispute between "employer"  and workmen. It was with a view to  remove this difficulty in the way of  workmen employed by contractors that the  definition of employer has been extended  by sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(i). The  position thus is : (a) that the  respondents are workmen within the  meaning of Section 2(z), being persons  employed in the industry to do manual  work for reward, and (b) they were  employed by a contractor with whom the  appellant company had contracted in the  course of conducting the industry for  the execution by the said contractor of  the work of removal of press-mud which  is ordinarily a part of the industry. It  follows therefore from Section 2(z) read  with sub-clause (iv) of Section 2(i) of  the Act that they are workmen of the  appellant company and the appellant  company is their employer."  113.    It is evident that the decision in that case  also turned on the wide language of statutory  definitions of the terms "workmen" and "employer". So  it does not advance the case pleaded by the learned  counsel.  117.    We find no substance in the next submission of  Mr. Shanti Bhushan that a combined reading of the  definition of the terms contract labour,  establishment and workman would show that a legal  relationship between a person employed in an industry  and the owner of the industry is created irrespective  of the fact as to who has brought about such  relationship.  125(5). On issuance of prohibition notification under  Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment  of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial  dispute brought before it by any contract labour in  regard to conditions of service, the industrial

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adjudicator will have to consider the question  whether the contractor has been interposed either on  the ground of having undertaken to produce any given  result for the establishment or for supply of  contract labour for work of the establishment under a  genuine contract or is a mere ruse camouflage to  evade compliance of various beneficial legislations  so as to deprive the workers of the benefit  thereunder. If the contract is found to be not  genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract  labour will have to be treated as employees of the  principal employer who shall be directed to  regularise the services of the contract labour in the  concerned establishment subject to the conditions as  may be specified by it for that purpose in the light  of para 6 hereunder."            In view of the rival submissions it would be appropriate to take  note of the conclusions arrived at by this Court earlier.   First at  point of time is the General Labour Union’s case (supra). This Court,  inter alia, observed as follows:

       "The workmen have first to establish that they  are the workmen of the respondent-company before they  can file any complaint under the Act. Admittedly,  this has not been done. It is open for the workmen to  raise an appropriate industrial dispute in that  behalf if they are entitled to do so before they  resort to the provisions of the present Act".             

       In V. Kamgar’s case (supra) it was, inter alia, observed as  follows:                  "At this stage it must be mentioned that this  Court has also in the case of General Labour Union  (Red Flag), Bombay v. Ahmedabad Mfg. And Calico  Printing Co. Ltd. held that where the workmen have  not been accepted by the company to be its employees,  then no complaint would lie under the MRTU and PULP  Act. We are in full agreement with the above- mentioned view.

       The provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act can  only be enforced by persons who admittedly are  workmen. If there is dispute as to whether the  employees are employees of the company, then that  dispute must first be got resolved by raising a  dispute before the appropriate forum. It is only  after the status as a workmen is established in an  appropriate forum that a complaint could be made  under the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act.          

       Then comes the last of the cases i.e. CILPA’s case (supra) where  detailed analysis have been made of the legal position. In paras 8 and 9  and 10 it was observed as under:

       "8. But one thing is clear- if the employees  are working under a contract covered by the Contract  Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act then it is  clear that the Labour Court or the industrial  adjudicating authorities cannot have any jurisdiction  to deal with the matter as it falls within the  province of an appropriate Government to abolish the

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same. If the case put forth by the workmen is that  they have been directly employed by the appellant  company but the contract itself is a camouflage and,  therefore, needs to be adjudicated is a matter which  can be gone into by appropriate Industrial or Labour  Court.  Such question cannot be examined by the  Labour Court or the Industrial Court constituted  under the Act. The object of the enactment is,  amongst other aspects, enforcing provisions relating  to unfair labour practices. If that is so, unless it  is undisputed or indisputable that there is employer- employee relationship between the parties, the  question of unfair practice cannot be inquired into  at all. The respondent Union came to the Labour Court  with a complaint that the workmen are engaged by the  appellant through the contractor and though that is  ostensible relationship the true relationship is one  of master and servant between the appellant and the  workmen in question. By this process, workmen  repudiated their relationship with the contractor  under whom they are employed but claim relationship  of an employee under the appellant.  That exercise of  repudiation of the contract with one and  establishment of a legal relationship with another  can be done only in a regular Industrial  Tribunal/Court under the ID Act.   

9.      Shri K.K. Singhvi, the learned Senior Advocate  appearing for the respondent, submitted that under  Section 32 of the Act the Labour Court has the power  to "decide all matters arising out of any  application or complaint referred to it for decision  under any of the provisions of the Act."  Section 32  would not enlarge the jurisdiction of the court  beyond what is conferred upon it by other provisions  of the Act.  If under other provisions of the Act the  Industrial or the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to  deal with a particular aspect of the matter, Section  32 does not give such power to it.  In the cases at  hand before us, whether the workman can be stated to  be the workman of the appellant establishment or not,  it must be held that the contract between the  appellant and the second respondent is a camouflage  or bogus and upon such a decision it can be held that  the workman in question is an employee of the  appellant establishment.  That exercise, we are  afraid, would not fall within the scope of either  Section 28 or Section 7 of the Act. In cases of this  nature where the provisions of the Act are summary in  nature and give drastic remedies to the parties  concerned elaborate consideration of the question as  to relationship of employer-employee cannot be gone  into.  If at any time the employee concerned was  indisputably an employee of the establishment and  subsequently it is so disputed, such a question is an  incidental question arising under Section 32 of the  Act.  Even the case pleaded by the respondent Union  itself is that the appellant establishment had never  recognized the workmen mentioned in Exhibit ’A’ as  its employees and throughout treated these persons as  the employees of the second respondent. If that  dispute existed throughout, we think, the Labour  Court or the Industrial Court under the Act is not  the appropriate court to decide such question, as  held by this Court in General Labour Union (Red Flag)

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v. Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. (1995  Supp (1) SCC 175), which view was reiterated by us in  Vividh Kamgar Sabha v. Kalyani Steels Ltd. (2001 (2)  SCC 381).

10.     However, Shri Singhvi very strenuously  contended, by adverting to the scope of the Payment  of Wages Act, 1936 and the scope of Section 33-C(2)  of the Industrial Disputed Act, that these questions  can be gone into by the courts and, in this context,  he relied upon the decision of the High Court of  Bombay in Vishwanath Tukaram v. G.M. Centeral Rly.,  V.T. In determining whether the wages had been  appropriately paid or not, the authority under the  Payment of Wages Act was held to have jurisdiction to  decide the incidental question of whether the  applicant was in the employment of the railway  administration during the relevant period.  It means  that at one time or the other the employee concerned  was indisputably in employment and later on he was  found to be not so employed and in those  circumstances, the court stated that it was an  incidental question to be considered."                      

Reference has also been made to Sections 27, 28, 29 (d) and 32 of  the Maharashtra Act. While Section 27 deals with prohibition on engaging  in unfair labour practices, Section 28 empowers filing of a complaint.  Any union or an employee or an employer or any investigating agency has  the locus to file a complaint. Section 29 (d) categorises parties on  whom order of Court is binding. Great emphasis was laid on Section 32 of  the Maharashtra Act by the appellant to contend that matters connected  with the dispute can be gone into under the provision. The expression  "all matters arising out of" clearly emphasizes that it has  connections, and not that it is the basic issue.  There is a gulf of  difference between a basic issue and something connected with or arising  of the application.  In Rex v. Basudev (1950 FC 67), it was observed  that the connection contemplated must be real and proximate not far  fetched or problematical.  By no logic it can be a substitute of the  other.  "In connection with any assessment" (Canada: Income War Tax Act  R.S.C. 1927 (C.97)S.66) has been interpreted as "having to do with" in  Re Nanaino Community Hotel (1945) 3 D.L.R. 225. The basic question which  was raised also in CIPLA’s case (supra) relates to the existence of the  relationship, and of any dispute connected with that. For getting  protection under the Maharashtra Act, it has first to be established  that the complainant is an employee of a person under whom he claims to  be an employee, and against whom he files a complaint. In other words,  the determinative question is can anybody who is not an ’employee’ of or  under a person against whom a grievance is sought to be made file a  complaint under the Act and the answer is inevitably ’No’. The  fundamental issue therefore is whether the complainant is an employee of  the person against whom a complaint is made under the Maharashtra Act  and if there is a dispute, he has to establish it, first before the  appropriate forum designated for adjudication of such industrial  disputes. Section 32 does not aid the appellant in the sense that it is  not a matter arising out of the application, when the pre-existing  relationship of employer-employee is a must and an essential pre- requisite. It is the core issue on which only the very locus to make a  complaint can at all be claimed. A person who does not answer the  description has no legal locus to file a complaint. A jurisdictional  fact is one on the existence or otherwise of which depends assumption or  refusal to assume jurisdiction by a court, tribunal or the authority.  Said fact has to be established and its existence proved before a Court  under the Maharashtra Act can assume jurisdiction of a particular case.  If the complaint is made prima facie accepting existence of the

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contractor in such a case what has to be first established is whether  the arrangement or agreement between the complainant and the contractor  is sham or bogus. There is an inherent  admission in such a situation  that patently the arrangement is between the complainant and the  contractor and the claim for a new and different relationship itself is  a disputed fact. To put it differently, the complainant seeks for a  declaration that such arrangement is not a real one but something which  is a façade. There is no direct agreement between the complainant and  the principal employer and one such is sought to be claimed but not  substantiated in accordance with law. The relief in a sense relates to a  legal assumption that the hidden agreement or arrangement has to be  surfaced. Entries 5, 6, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of Maharashtra Act read  as follows:

"5- To show favouritism or partiality to one set of  workers, regardless of merits.

6.      To employ employees as "badlis", casuals or  temporaries and to continue them as such for years,  with the object of depriving them of the status and  privileges of permanent employees.  

9.      Failure to implement award, settlement or  agreement.

10.     To indulge in act of force or violence".  

The ID Act is undisputedly a comprehensive statute which provides  for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The term  ’industrial dispute’ as defined in Section 2(k) is of a wide amplitude  and can encompass the nature of dispute raised by the complainant. The  Contract Labour Act is also a self-contained legislation aiming at  regulations and abolition of contract labour. What is conferred under  Section 18 of the said Act is to be exercised having regard to the  relevant factors which are mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) of sub- section (2) thereof. It is significant that both the ID Act and the  Contract Labour Act were in existence and operation when the Maharashtra  Act was enacted. The method of availing benefit of the Contract Labour  Act is indicated in Gujarat Electricity Board, Thermal Power Station,  Ukai, Gujarat v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. (1995 (5) SCC 27) where it  was specifically held by this Court that the status of erstwhile  contract labourers can only effectively be determined under the ID Act.  

As noted above, considerable emphasis was laid on the fact that  Section 59 of the Maharashtra Act was not noticed in CIPLA’s judgment. A  bare reading of the said provision makes it clear that no proceeding  under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 or the ID Act shall be  entertained when proceedings in respect of any matter falling within the  purview of the Maharashtra Act is already instituted. A complaint in  which relief is sought for a declaration of a status as a direct  employee of the principal employer and other consequential reliefs in  terms of benefits and conditions of service applicable to workers  directly employed by the principal employer is not a matter  which falls  within the purview of the Maharashtra Act. Therefore, Section 59 has no  application in such a case. Under the Maharashtra Act the Designated  Court decides the complaint as provided under Sections 5 and 7 of the  said Act. For the purpose of deciding the complaint enquiry under  Section 30(3) of the said Act read with Section 28 is contemplated. The  power to decide the complaint revolves round the question whether  ingredients for constituting unfair labour practice exist or not.  However, the power of adjudication under the ID Act is not circumscribed  by the existence or non-existence of unfair labour practice and goes far

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beyond it.  

  The meaning and intention of the legislature, which must govern  the interpretation of a provision in a statute, have to be ascertained  not only from the language in which it is clothed but also by  considering its nature, its design and the consequences, which would  follow in construing it either way.  Reports of Commissions or Inquiry  Committees preceding the introduction of a Bill for the enactment have  been always viewed as providing evidence of the historical facts or of  surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil intended to be remedied  and at times even for interpreting the Act, as external aids to  construction of the Act (vide R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay [1984(2) SCC  183 @ 214) and Mithilish Kumar vs. Prem Bihari Khare [1989 SC 1247 @  1252] and Shriram Chits & Investments (P) Ltd. vs. U.O.I. [1993 SC 2063  @ 2066, 2080].  The report of the Committee on unfair labour practices  which preceded the Maharashtra Act, while noticing the fact that the  expression ’unfair labour practices’ was being used in all fields and  areas connected with industrial relations in a wider sense and loosely  worded manner and not always to mean certain activities connected with  collective bargaining, sought to enumerate the types of such practices  as were illustrated during course of enquiries by the employees and  their organizations, unions and also individual workers or groups of  individual workers and specifically states that "after a careful  scrutiny, we have selected only a few of them because we are of the view  that the net of unfair labour practices should not be cast too wide."   As the preamble to the Maharashtra Act would recite, the State  Legislature after taking into consideration the report of the Committee,  thought fit to decide among other things to define and provide for the  prevention of certain unfair labour practices and to constitute courts  for carrying out the purposes of according recognition to trade unions  and for enforcing in that context the provisions relating to unfair  practices.  The fact that there were in existence and force, at that  point of time several related laws such as ID Act, Contract Labour Act,  Bombay Industrial Relations Act, etc. and the provisions of the  Maharashtra Act was not to be in derogation of those laws cannot also be  overlooked in trying to understand and interpret the provisions in  question, and the issue now the subject matter of these appeals.

       As pointed out supra the main grievance voiced is about the so- called omission to specifically notice Section 59 while rendering the  decision in Ciplas case (supra).  Section 59 reads as follows:

"59. Bar of proceeding under Bombay or Central  Act:- If any proceeding in respect of any matter  falling within the purview of this Act is  instituted under this Act, then no proceeding  shall at any time be entertained by any  authority in respect of that matter under the  Central Act or, as the case may be, the Bombay  Act; and if any proceeding in respect of any  matter within the purview of this Act is  instituted under the Central Act, or as the case  may be, the Bombay Act, then no proceedings  shall at any time be entertained by the  Industrial or Labour Court under this Act."

       Section 7 reads as follows:

"7. Duties of Labour Court:- It shall be the  duty of the Labour Court to decide complains  relating to unfair labour practices described in  item 1 of Schedule IV and to try offences

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punishable under this Act."

       Section 28 reads thus:

"28. Procedure for dealing with complaints  relating to unfair labour practices: -(1) Where  any person has engaged in or is engaging in any  unfair labour practice, ten any union or any  employee or any employer or any Investigating  Officer may, within ninety days of the  occurrence of such unfair labour practice, file  a complaint before the Court competent to deal  with such complaint either under section 5, or  as the case may be, under section 7, of this  Act:

Provided that, the Court may entertain a  complaint after the period of ninety days from  the date of the alleged occurrence, if good and  sufficient reasons are shown by the complainant  for the late filing of the complaint.  

(2) The Court shall take a decision on every  such complaint as far as possible within a  period of six months from the date of receipt of  the complaint.

(3) On receipt of a complaint under sub-section  (1), the Court may, if it so considers  necessary, first cause an investigation into the  said complaint to be made by the Investigating  Officer, and direct that a report in the matter  may be submitted by him to the Court, within the  period specified in this direction.

(4) While investigating into any such complaint,  the Investigating Officer may visit the  undertaking, where the practice alleged is said  to have occurred, and make such enquiries as he  considers necessary.  He may also make efforts  to promote settlement of the complaint.

(5) The Investigating Officer shall, after  investigating into the complaint under sub- section (4) submit his report to the Court,  within the time specified by it, setting out the  full facts and circumstances of the case, and  the efforts made by him in setting the  complaint.  The Court shall, on demand and on  payment of such fee as may be prescribed by  rules, supply a copy of the report to the  complainant and the person complained against.

(6) If, on receipt of the report of the  Investigating Officer, the Court finds that the  complaint has not been settled satisfactorily,  and that facts and circumstances of the case  require, that the matter should be further  considered by it, the Court shall proceed to  consider it, and give its decision.

(7) The decision of the Court, which shall be in  writing, shall be in the form of an order.  The  order of the Court shall be final and shall not

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be called in question in any civil or criminal  court.

(8) The Court shall cause its order to be  published in such manner as may be prescribed.   The order of the Court shall become enforceable  from the date specified in the order.

(9) The Court shall forward a copy of its order  to the State Government and such officers of the  Stat e Government as may be prescribed."

       Section 32 reads as hereunder:

"32. Power of Court to decide all connected  matters:- Notwithstanding anything contained in  this Act, the Court shall have the power to  decide all matters arising out of any  application or a complaint referred to it for  the decision under any of the provisions of this  Act. "

       Inferentially, from the above it is sought to be asserted that  there is a statutory recognition in Section 59 as to the entitlement of  a worker, at his option or choice to have recourse to anyone of the  statutory remedies under the different Acts and therefore all and every  question relating to the redress sought including as to whether a person  is an ’employee’ can also be decided by the Courts under the Maharashtra  Act.  This too general and wide assertion completely overlooks the  stipulation made, "If any proceeding in respect of any matter falling  within the purview of this Act is instituted" in the said provision.   As to what matters fall within the purview of the Act is to be found  outside Section 59 and there is no such indicator, in this regard in  Section 59 itself.  That was, what has been specifically, elaborately  and analytically found dealt with in CIPLA’s case (supra) by the learned  Judges and mere non-mention of Section 59 in the judgment is no  justification to contend that they were either unaware of it or that a  relevant and necessary provision which ought to have been considered has  been overlooked, which if had been adverted to the result would or ought  to be different from the one taken, in that case.  We have carefully  gone through the construction placed upon the statutory provisions  noticed and conclusions drawn as to the class or category of matters  which only would fall within the purview of the Maharashtra Act and the  necessity for any complainant to answer the description, as a condition  precedent, to be or having been treated by the employer as his  ’employee’ and the relationship of employee and employer with the  employer against whom any such complaint of unfair labour practice is  made and relief therefor is sought is beyond controversy and common case  or accepted position and that we are in respectful agree with the same.   The interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Act  appears to be in tune with the legal sense of the words construed in the  context of the statute and the jurisdiction of the authorities  constituted thereunder.  Such a construction paves way for avoiding  uncertainty as well as possible inconsistency or expression of  contradictory views when more than one group chose to avail different  forums for similar kind of relief and therefore could not be said to  have resulted in serious injustice, hardship or anomaly to warrant the  countenance of a different view.  A careful, critical and analytical  scrutiny of the various provisions which consciously and conspicuously  use the words ’employee’ and ’employer’ in all the relevant provisions  would postulate the pre-existing relationship of such employee and  employer being an accepted/acceptable fact.  Consequently, the question  of ousting the jurisdiction of an assumed and unfound jurisdiction to be

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otherwise existing, does not at all arise.

       The common thread passing through all these judgments is that the  threshold question to be decided is whether the industrial dispute could  be raised for abolition of the contract labour system in view of the  provisions of the Maharashtra Act. What happens to an employee engaged  by the contractor if the contract made is abolished is not really  involved in the dispute. There can be no quarrel with the proposition as  contended by the appellants that the jurisdiction to decide a matter  would essentially depend upon pleadings in the plaint. But in a case  like the present one, where the fundamental fact decides the  jurisdiction to entertain the complaint itself the position would be  slightly different. In order to entertain a complaint under the  Maharashtra Act it has to be established that the claimant was an  employee of the employer against whom complaint is made, under the ID  Act. When there is no dispute about such relationship, as noted in  paragraph 9 of CILPA’s case (supra) the Maharashtra Act would have full  application.  When that basic claim is disputed obviously the issue has  to be adjudicated by the forum which is competent to adjudicate. The  sine qua non for application of the concept of unfair labour practice is  the existence of a direct relationship of employer and employee. Until  that basic question is decided the forum recedes to the background in  the sense that first that question has to be got separately adjudicated.  Even if it is accepted for the sake of arguments that two forums are  available, the Court certainly can say which is the more appropriate  forum to effectively get it adjudicated and that is what has been  precisely said in the three decisions. Once the existence of contractor  is accepted, it leads to an inevitable conclusion that a relationship  exists between the contractor and the complainant. According to them,  the contract was a façade and sham one which has no real effectiveness.  As rightly observed in CIPLA’s case (supra), it is the relationship  existing by contractual arrangement which is sought to be abandoned and  negated and in its place the complainant’s claim is to the effect that  there was in reality a relationship between the employer and the  complainant directly. It is the establishment of the existence of such  an arrangement which decides the jurisdiction. That being the position,  CIPLA’s case (supra) rightly held that an industrial dispute has to be  raised before the Tribunal under the ID Act to have the issue relating  to actual nature of employment sort out. That being the position, we  find that there is no scope for re-considering CIPLA’s case (supra), the  view which really echoed the one taken about almost a decade back.           That apart, as held by a seven member Constitution Bench judgment  of this Court in Keshav Mills’s case (supra), though this Court has  inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, it  would at the same time be reluctant to entertain such pleas unless it is  satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so and  not undertake such an exercise merely for the asking or that the  alternate view pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable.  For the reasons stated supra, we are of the view that the decision in  CIPLA’s case (supra) was taken not only in tune with the earlier  decisions of this Court in General Labour Union (Red Flag) Bombay’s case  (supra) and Vividh Kamgar Sabha’s case (supra) but  quite in accordance  with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature  had in view and the purpose sought to be achieved by the Maharashtra Act  and consequently, there is no scope or necessity to reconsider the  question once over again by a larger Bench.  

That being the position, these appeals are without merit and  deserve dismissal. Costs made easy.         

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