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PETITIONER: SARVA SHRAMIK SANGH, BOMBAY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: INDIAN HUME PIPE CO.  LTD.  AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/02/1993

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) KULDIP SINGH (J)

CITATION:  1993 SCR  (1)1050        1993 SCC  (2) 386  JT 1993 (4)    40        1993 SCALE  (1)596

ACT: Labour Law. Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947 : Sections 11  and  17-A(4)- Industrial Courts/Tribunals-Not bound by technical rules  of procedure-Award granting relief from a date anterior to date of   raising  dispute-Power  of-Exercise  of   such   power- correctness of-To be decided in the facts and  circumstances of each case.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant Union demanded payment of dearness  allowance to  the daily-rated workmen employed in the factory  of  the respondent  at  the  same  rate as was  being  paid  to  the monthly-rated  employees  with  effect  from  1.1.1964.  Ile matter  was  placed  before  the  Conciliation  Officer   on 15.11.1965 and thereafter before the Conciliation Board.  On 15.3.1967  the  Conciliation  Board  submitted  its  failure report   On  26.4.1968  the  appellant-Union   submitted   a Memorandum to the Government reiterating the said demand and claiming   the  benefit  from  15.11.1965.  The   Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal. The  Respondent-employer filed a Writ  Petition  challenging the  validity of the order of reference and the  High  Court set  aside  the  order  of  reference  by  consent   without prejudice to the rights of the Government for making a fresh reference. On  March  19,1973 the appellant-Union  submitted  a  demand claiming  the same relief with effect from  15.11.1965.  The Government  made a reference accordingly to  the  Industrial Tribunal  on  26.3.1973.  By its Award  dated  3.1.1977  the Tribunal directed the Respondent-employer to make payment of D.A.  at  the rate of 15% of the revised textile  rate  with effect from 1.1.1968. The  Respondent filed a Writ Petition before the High  Court challenging the Tribunal’s Award.  Unable to succeed  before a Single Judge, 1051 Respondent-preferred  an appeal and the Division Bench  held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award relief to the workmen  with effect from a date prior to the date on  which the  dispute  was  raised.   Being  aggrieved  by  the  said judgment, the appellant-union preferred the present appeal.

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On behalf of the appellant-Union it was contended that since it  has  been  agitating for grant of  D.A.  of  daily-rated workmen right from Nov. 1965, the Tribunal was justified  in awarding the same with effect from 1.4.1968. The Respondent contended that the demand dated 26.4 1968 was never  submitted to the Management, but was made  direct  to the  Government which made a reference and the same was  set aside by the High Court; and that a fresh dispute was raised on  193.73 and so the relief was rightly restricted  by  the High Court to be effective only from that date viz. 193.73. Allowing the appeal, this Court, HELD  : 1. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court is  supposed to  be  a  substitute forum to  the  Civil  Court.   Broadly speaking, the relief which the Civil Court could grant in an industrial   dispute  can  be  granted  by  the   Industrial Tribunal/Labour     Court.     Indeed     the     Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court is not bound by the Technical rules of procedure  which bind the Civil Court.  Therefore it  cannot be  said that the Industrial Tribunal  or for that matter  a Labour  Court   has no jurisdiction to grant relief  from  a date  anterior to the date on which the dispute  is  raised. It  is  one thing to say that the Tribunal has no  power  to grant such relief and it is an altogether different thing to say that in a given case it ought not to grant such  relief. Whether in a given case relief should be granted with effect from a date anterior to the date of raising the dispute is a matter  for  the  Tribunal  to  decide  in  the  facts   and circumstances of that case. [1055H; 1056A-D] G JK.   Cotton  Spining and Weaving Mills  v.  L.A.  Tribunal, (1963) 2 L.L.J. 436  AIR 1964 SC 737, relied on. 2.   The demand raised on 193.73 was not a fresh demand.  It was  reiteration  of  the  demand raised  its  far  back  as November 1965.  It is lot 1052 suggested  that the demand raised in November 1965  was  not raised  before,  or  submitted  to  the  Management.    Even otherwise, the demand raised on 193.73  -  assuming that  it was a fresh demand  was for extending the said benefit with effect from an anterior date namely, 15.11.1965. It was  the said demand    which  was referred by the Government to  the Tribunal.   There  is no reason why the Tribunal  could  not have  awarded relief from the date earlier than 1973  if  it found that such a demand was justified and warranted in  the facts  of  that  case.  Actually the  Tribunal  granted  the benefit ,Kith effect from 1.1.1968 only and not with  effect from 15.11.1965 as demanded by the workmen. [1059H; 1060A-C] Jhagrakhand Collieries (Private) Ltd. and another v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad and others, 1960 (2) Labour Law Journal 71; Workmen New Egerton Woollen Mills  v. New  Egerton Woollen Mills and others, 1969 (2) LIJ 782  and Workmen  of  National Tobacco Co, of India Ltd.  v.  Messers National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. (Civil Appeal) No. 852 of 1966 disposed of on 18.10.1968 by S.C., distinguished. 3.   The  High  Court’s  order  setting  aside  the  earlier reference  does not say that the fresh dispute that  may  be raised  should  claim  the benefit only  from  the  date  of raising, the fresh dispute.  The order indeed says that  the fresh dispute to be raised was to be "in respect of the same demand-"  Now  the words "same demands" mean the  very  same being  raised  by the workmen from  November  1965  onwards. Tile said order of the High Court cannot be read as imposing or  implying any restriction upon the workmen to  limit  the benefit claimed by them only from the date of raising of the fresh  demand.   It was perfectly open to them  to  raise  a

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demand,  subsequent to the said order, claiming the  benefit with effect from a date anterior to the date of raising  the demand. [1060F-G] The  Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v. The  Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat & Ors., [1968] 1 SCR 515, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3715 (NL) of 1-984. From  the  judgment and Order dated 1.9.1982 of  the  Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 247 of 1977 in Misc.  Petition  No. 627 of 1977. V.J.  Francis,  V. Subramanian and P. Padma  Kumar  for  the Appel- 1053 lant. G.B. Pai, P. Ramaswami and H.S. Parihar for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. This appeal is preferred by the Labour Union,  Sarva Shramik Sangh, Bombay against the judgment  of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court allowing Writ Appeal No.   247  of  1977.   The  appeal  was  preferred  by   the respondent-employer.  The Indian Hume Pipe Company  Limited, against  the Judgment of a learned Single  Judge  dismissing the  Writ Petition preferred by it (Management) against  the Award of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay.  The main question arising for decision in this appeal pertains to the power of the  Industrial Tribunal to award relief with effect from  a date  anterior  to the date of raising the  dispute  by  the Labour Union. On  2.11.65  the  appellant-Union  submitted  a  demand  for payment  of  dearness allowance to the  daily-rated  workmen employed at the respondents Wadala Factory at the same  rate as is paid to the monthly-rated employees, with effect  from 1.1.1964. On 15.11.1965 these demands were placed before the Conciliation Officer and thereafter before the  Conciliation Board.   On 15.3.1967 the Conciliation Board  submitted  its failure report.  It appears that the recommendations of  the Central Wage Board were awaited at that time and the company agreed  to implement the final recommendations of  the  said Board  as accepted by the Central Government.  On  26.4.1968 the  appellant-Union  submitted  a  memorandum  before   the Government  reiterating the said demand.  They  claimed  the said  benefit with effect from 15.11.1965. On  5.7.1968  the Government  referred  the  said dispute  to  the  Industrial Tribunal.  In November, 1968 the respondent-company filed  a Writ  Petition  in  the Bombay High  Court  challenging  the validity  of the order of reference.  On 27.2.1973 the  High Court disposed of the Writ Petition in the following  terms: "By consent the order Exhibit-C dated 5.7.1968 is set  aside without prejudice to the rights of the respondents to  refer fresh  dispute in respect of the same demands  according  to law." On  19.3.1973  the  appellant  submitted  a  demand  to  the management  claiming the very same relief with  effect  from 15.11.1965. On the basis of the said demand, the  Government made a reference to the Industrial 1054 Tribunal,  Bombay, on 26.3.1973. The dispute referred  reads as follows: "All  the  daily rated workman from Wadala  factory  of  the company should be paid dearness allowance at the same  scale that  is  given to monthly rated staff of the  factory  with

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retrospective  effect  from 15th November 1965 i.e.  at  the rate given below. Slab Salary    D.A. index 311           Variation for                to 320                    10 points Up to Rs. 100  65% of basic salary or           revised textile scalefor--         5%           all days of month whi-           chever is higher. Rs. 101 to 200      30%                       2% Rs. 201 to 300      15%                       1% Rs. 310 and above   10%                       1%" On  3.1.1977 the Tribunal made its award.  It directed  that "all  the  daily-rated workmen from Wadala  Factory  of  the Company should be paid dearness allowance at the rate of 15% of  the revised textile rate with effect from  1st  January, 1968.   The  Company  is further directed  to  pay  all  the arrears to these workmen within two months from the date  of the publication of the award.  Award accordingly.  No  order as to costs." The Management questioned the validity of the said award  by way   of   a  writ  petition  in  the  Bombay   High   Court (Miscellaneous  Petition No. 627 of 1977).  On  15.6.1977  a learned  Single  Judge dismissed the Writ  Petition  holding that  the error if any, in the award of the Tribunal is  not an  error  of jurisdiction calling  for  interference  under Article  226  of the Constitution.  The  respondent  company preferred  an appeal which was disposed of by  the  Division Beneh under its Judgment and Order dated 1.9.1992,  impugned herein.   The Division Bench affirmed the award except  with respect to the date from which the relief was granted by the Tribunal.   The Division Bench was of the opinion  that  the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award relief to the  workmen with  effect  from  a date prior to the date  on  which  the dispute  was  raised.   Inasmuch as the  dispute  which  was referred  by the Government to the Industrial  Tribunal  and which  resulted  in  the award in  question  was  raised  on 19.3.1973,  the Division Bench held that the relief  can  be granted only from 19.3.73 but not from an anterior  1055 date.  The  Division  Bench was of  the  opinion  that  this restriction  on the power of the Industrial  Tribunal  flows from  the decisions of this Court, to which we  shall  refer presently.   The correctness of the said view is  questioned in this appeal. Mr.  V.J.  Francis, the learned counsel for  the  appellant- Union  submitted  that inasmuch as the  appellant-Union  had been agitating for grant of D.A. to the daily-rated  workmen at  Wadala Factory at the same rate at which it is  paid  to monthly-rated  workmen,  right  from  November,  1965,   the Tribunal was justified in awarding the relief from 1.4.1968. The  restriction perceived by the Division Bench is  neither sanctioned  by  law  nor does it  flow  from  the  decisions referred to by the Division Bench.  On the other hand,  Shri G.B.Pai, the learned counsel for the respondent-company sup- ported  the reasoning and conclusion of the Division  Bench. Learned counsel submitted that an industrial dispute  arises only when the workmen raise a particular dispute before  the Management.  No Industrial dispute can be said to arise when a dispute is raised by workmen not before the Management but before  the.  Government.  The learned counsel contended  on the  above  basis  that  the  so-called  dispute  which  was referred  by  the  Government on the  earlier  occasion  (on 15.7.1968)  was not an industrial dispute, inasmuch  as  the basis  of the said reference, namely the demand  of  workmen dated 26.4.1968, was never submitted before the  Management,

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it  was submitted directly to the Government and  Government alone.  The said reference was, therefore, questioned by the Management  in  the Bombay High Court and it was  agreed  by both  the  parties before the High Court that the  order  of reference be set aside and the Union be left free to raise a fresh dispute.  Accordingly the Union raised a fresh dispute on  19.3.1973. No doubt this demand was for payment  of  the said   D.A.  with  effect  from  15.11.1965,  even  so   the Tribunal’s power is limited to grant of relief only from the date of raising of industrial dispute.  The learned  counsel submitted  that  more than one decision of  this  Court  has affirmed the said view. We  find it difficult to agree with Shri Pai.  In  principle we  find no basis for the said contention.   The  Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for any such limitation.   The definition of the expression "industrial dispute" in  Clause (K)  of  Section-2  of the Act does  not  contain  any  such limitation.   We  are unable to see on what basis  can  such restriction  be inferred or implied.  It must be  remembered that the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court 1056 is  supposed  to be a substitute forum to the  Civil  Court. Broadly  speaking,  the relief which the Civil  Court  could grant  in  an  industrial  dispute can  be  granted  by  the Industrial  Tribunal/Labour  Court.  Indeed  the  Industrial Tribunal/Labour  Court  is not bound by technical  rules  of procedure  which  bind  the Civil  Court.  (See  J.K  Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. L.A. Tribunal, 1963 (2) L.L.J. 436/444   AIR 1964 SC 737) In such circumstances we  see  no justification  for holding that the Industrial Tribunal   or for that matter a Labour Court  has no jurisdiction to grant relief from a date anterior to the date on which the dispute is  raised.   Take a case where the Labour  Union  raises  a dispute  on a particular date but says that the said  relief should  be granted from an anterior date.  We see no  reason why the Industrial Tribunal should be held to have no  power to grant relief with effect from such anterior date if it is found to be warranted by the facts and circumstances of  the case.   Here  it is necessary to emphasize  the  distinction between the existence of power and its exercise.  It is  one thing  to say that the Tribunal has no power to  grant  such relief  and it is an altogether different thing to say  that in  a given case it ought not to grant such relief.  We  are only  emphasizing the aspect of power.  Whether in  a  given case  relief  should  be granted with  effect  from  a  date anterior to the date of raising the dispute is a matter  for the  Tribunal  to decide in the facts and  circumstances  of that case. Now  let  us  examine whether any  decision  of  this  Court supports  Mr. Pai’s contention.  The first  decision  relied upon by him is in Jhagrakhand Collieries (Private) Ltd.  and another v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal.   Dhanbad and   others,   1960  (2)  Labour  Law  Journal   71.    The observations relied upon are at page 77 of the Report  which read thus:               "Besides, the Appellate Tribunal has failed to               consider the fact that the present demand  was               made  for  the first time in  September  1952.               The  industrial tribunal had  considered  this               question   and  had  definitely   found   that               notwithstanding   the   suggestion   by    the               respondents  to  the  contrary  there  was  no               reliable  evidence  to show that  this  demand               had-been  specifically and clearly made  prior               to 27 September 1952.  Now, if the respondents

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             did not make a specific claim until  September               1952  it  would not be fair or just  to  allow               them  the  benefit  of  the  present  increase               directed  by the award even prior to the  date               of the demand."  1057 We  do not think that the above observations can be read  as imposing a limitation, of the nature contended for Mr.  Pai, upon  the power of the tribunal.  All that is said  by  this Court in the said case is that inasmuch as the demand itself was  raised  in September 1952 and no such demand  was  ever made  prior to September 1952, it was not "fair or just"  to grant  relief with effect from a date anterior to  September 1952. The  next decision relied upon is in Workmen of New  Eqerton Woollen Mills v. New Eqerton Woollen Mills and others,  1969 2 LLJ 782.  The passage relied upon from this decision is at page 791.  It reads:               "As regards the date on which the award should               come  into  force, industrial  tribunals  have               treated the date of demand and the date of the               award  as two extreme points.  The  tribunals,               however,   have   discretion   to   fix    any               intermediate    date   depending   upon    the               circumstances of each case.  As has been  said               more than once, this Court would be  reluctant               to  interfere  with  the  date  fixed  by  the               tribunal  if  it has been done in  the  proper               exercise  of its discretion.  In  the  present               case  the  tribunal felt that in  fairness  to               both the parties the intermediate date, namely               1  November 1963, When it passed  its  interim               award was the proper date from which the award               should  come into operation.  The  ground  for               selecting this date was that according to  the               tribunal  the prices of commodities  began  to               rise  steeply in this region from  that  date.               That  ground has not been controverted by  any               material  to the contrary.  There can,  there-               fore,   barely   be   any   ground   for   our               interference." The  said  passage  can  not be  understood  as  imposing  a limitation  upon the power and jurisdiction of the  Tribunal nor can it be understood as holding that the Tribunal has no power to grant relief with effect from the date earlier than the  date  of demand.  The observations  aforesaid  must  be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case.  The question  raised  now was not raised or considered  by  this Court  in  the said decision.  It does not appear  that  the workmen had claimed a particular benefit with effect from  a date earlier to the date of raising the dispute nor does  it appear  that the Government had referred any such claim  for adjudication  by  the  Tribunal.  In this case,  it  may  be remembered, not only the demand 1058 raised  on 19.3.73 was for extending the said  benefit  with effect from 15.11.1965, the reference by government was also in  the same terms.  In the circumstances, the reference  to the  practice of Industrial Tribunals can not be  understood as  a  legal proposition that the Tribunal has no  power  or jurisdiction to grant relief with effect from a date earlier to  the date of demand even where such demand is raised  and referred  to it by government.  It needs no emphasis that  a Judgment  should be understood in the light of the facts  of that  case and no more should be read into it than  what  it

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actually says. The third decision relied upon is an unreported decision  of this Court in Workmen of National Tobacco Co. of India  Ltd. v.  Messrs National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd. (Civil  Appeal No. 852 of 1966 disposed of on 18.10.1968). The Judgment was delivered  by  Bhargava,  J. on behalf of  J.M.  Shelat,  J. himself  and C.A. Vaidialingam.  J. The observations  relied upon occur towards the end of the judgment and read thus:               "Apart from these points forming the  subject-               matter  of  various issues,  a  general  point               argued  on  behalf of the Union was  that  the               Tribunal   should   have   made   the    award               enforceable  retrospectively  at  least   with               effect  from the date of the reference of  the               dispute  by  the Government to  the  Tribunal.               This Court has, in a number of cases,  consis-               tently  held  that the question of  making  an               award retrospective is in the discretion of  a               Tribunal, with the limitation that a  Tribunal               will  be committing an error if it  makes  the               award  effective from a date earlier than  the               date  of  demand  on the basis  of  which  the               industrial   dispute   is  referred   to   the               Tribunal.  This Court does not interfere  with               the   discretion  exercised  unreasonably   or               arbitrarily.  In the present case, considering               the   circumstance  that  there  will   be   a               considerable   increase  in  the   burden   of               expenditure on the Company as a result of  the               revision  of  wage  scales and  the  rates  of               dearness  allowance, the Tribunal has  decided               that the award should be effective with effect               from the usual date when it comes into  force,               i.e.,   one  month  after  the  date  of   its               publication  by  the Government.  As  we  have               just   indicated,  the  Tribunal   gave   this               direction  because of the increased burden  on               the Company which would become               1059               unbearably heavy if the Company is directed to               make  payments for a number of past years  for               which  accounts  have already been  closed  by               making  the award retrospective from the  date               of reference.  The discretion exercised by the               Tribunal cannot be said to be arbitrary or un-               reasonable,  so  that we find  no  ground  for               interfering with the award on this point." The  learned  judge  says in the first  instance  that  "the question  of  making  an  award  retrospective  is  in   the discretion of the Tribunal" but then qualifies it by  saying that  "the Tribunal will be committing an error if it  makes the  award  effective from a date earlier than the  date  of demand  on  the  basis of which the  Industrial  dispute  is referred  to  the  Tribunal".  No provision of  law  or  any principle  is cited in support of the said observation.   Be that  as  it  may,  it is significant  to  notice  that  the question  which arises in the case before us did  not  arise consideration  before the said Bench.  The argument for  the Labour Union in that case was that "the Tribunal should have made  the  award enforceable retrospectively at  least  with effect from the date of the reference of the dispute by  the Government  to the Tribunal".  No contention was urged  that the  award should be made effective from a date anterior  to the date of raising the dispute nor does it appear that that was  a case where the demand raised by the workmen  was  for

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extending  the  benefit with effect from an  anterior  date. Therefore, there was no occasion for this Court to  consider the  question  now raised.  When the issue relating  to  the power  of  the Tribunal to grant a relief  or  benefit  with effect  from  a  date anterior to the date  of  raising  the dispute was not at all raised or considered by the Court, it would  not  be  proper  to read  the  said  observations  as negativing  the said contention.  We are, therefore, of  the considered  opinion that the observations aforesaid  do  not support the contention urged by Shri Pai. So  far as the facts of the present case are  concerned,  it must  be  remembered that the Labour Union had  raised  this dispute  with  the  Management as  far  back  as  2.11.1965. Conciliation  was taken up by Conciliation Officer  and  the Conciliation  Board.  The Board had reported failure as  far back as 15.3.1967. It is the said demand which was raised by the Union in its Memorandum dated 26.4.1968 on the basis  of which  a  reference  was  made  by  the  Government  to  the Industrial  Tribunal on 5.7.1968. Even when a  fresh  demand was raised on 19.3.1973 the demand was that the  daily-rated workmen should be given the benefit claimed by 1060 them with effect from 15.11.1965. Thus the demand raised  on 19.3.73  was not a fresh demand.  It was reiteration of  the demand  raised  as  far back as November 1965.   It  is  not suggested  that the demand raised in November 1965  was  not raised  before or submitted to the Management.  Even  other- wise,  the demand raised on 19.3.73  assuming that it was  a fresh demand  was for extending the said benefit with effect from  an anterior date namely, 15.11.1965. It was  the  said demand which was referred by the Government to the Tribunal. We  see  no reason why the Tribunal could not  have  awarded relief from the date earlier than 1973 if it found that such a  demand  was justified and warranted in the facts  of  the case  Actually the Tribunal granted the benefit with  effect from  1.1.1968 only and not with effect from  15.11.1965  as demanded by the Workmen. Mr.  Pai  then  contended that the  order  of  reference  to Industrial  Tribunal made on 5.7.1968 was questioned by  the Management  by  way of a Writ Petition in  the  Bombay  High Court  and that the said Writ Petition was allowed  under  a consent  order,  whereunder the workmen agreed  to  raise  a fresh  dispute.   He submits that a fresh  dispute  means  a dispute  claiming  benefit only from the date on  which  the dispute  is  raised.  We see no basis  for  such  restricted understanding.  The order of the Court in Writ Petition  708 of 1968 reads as follows:               "Order  dated  5.7.1968 is set  aside  without               prejudice to the rights of the respondents  to               refer  fresh  dispute in respect of  the  same               demands according to Law." Firstly, it may be noticed that the order does not say  that the  fresh  dispute  that may be  raised  should  claim  the benefit  only  from the date of raising the  fresh  dispute. Secondly,  and  more importantly, the order  says  that  the fresh dispute to be raised was to be "in respect of the same demands".  Now the words "same demands" mean the  very  same demand  which was being raised by the workmen from  November 1965  onwards.  We are, therefore, unable to read  the  said order  of  the  High  Court  as  imposing  or  implying  any restriction upon the workmen to limit the benefit claimed by them only from the date of the raising of the fresh  demand. It was perfectly open to them to raise a demand,  subsequent to  the said order, claiming the benefit with effect from  a date anterior to the date of raising the demand.

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Mr. Pai then submitted that the demand raised by the workmen on 26.4.1968   cannot be said to raise an industrial dispute inasmuch as an in-  1061 dustrial dispute arises only when the demand is submitted to the  Management.   A  demand by  workmen  addressed  to  the Government  can never constitute, an industrial dispute,  he submits.   He,  therefore,  says that the  Tribunal  had  no jurisdiction to award the benefit with effect from 1.4.1968. Reliance  is placed upon the decision of this Court  in  The Sindhu  Resettlement  Corporation  Lid  v.,  The  Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat & Ors., [1968] 1 SCR 515.  In that  case the contention urged by the Management was that inasmuch  as the  workmen  did  not raise any  dispute  with  respect  to reinstatement and because the dispute raised by them related only to payment of retrenchment compensation, the Government had  no  power  or  justification  for  making  a  reference relating  to reinstatement.  It is in that  connection  that the  following observations, relied upon by Shri  Pai,  were made.               "If  no  dispute  at all  was  raised  by  the               respondents  with the management, any  request               sent by them to the Government would only be a               demand  by them and not an industrial  dispute               between   them   and   their   employer,   Ai,               industrial  dispute,  as defined,  must  be  a               dispute   between  employers  and   employers,               employers   and  workmen,  and   workmen   and               workmen.   A  mere  demand  to  a  Government,               without a dispute being raised by the  workmen               with   their   employer,  cannot   become   an               industrial dispute.  Consequently the material               before  the Tribunal, clearly showed  that  no               such  industrial dispute, as was purported  to               be  referred  by the State Government  to  the               Tribunal,   had  ever  existed   between   the               appellant  Corpn. and the respondents and  the               State   Government  in  making  a   reference,               obviously  committed  an error in  basing  its               opinion on material which was not relevant  to               the formation of opinion.  The Government  had               to come an opinion that an industrial  dispute               did  exist  and  that opinion  could  only  be               formed  on the basis that there was a  dispute               between  the  appellant  and  the  respondents               relating  to  reinstatement.   Such   material               could  not  possibly exist when, as  early  as               March  and  July, 1958, respondent No.  3  and               respondent  No.  2 respectively  had  confined               their  demands to the management to  retrench-               ment  compensation only and did not  make  any               demand  for reinstatement, On these facts,  it               is  clear  that  the  reference  made  by  the               Government was not competent.  The only               1062               reference that the Government could have  made               had  to be related to payment of  retrenchment               compensation which was the only subject matter               of  dispute  between  the  appellant  and  the               respondents." It is evident from a reading of the above para that the only dispute raised by the workmen before the Management  related to   retrenchment   compensation,  which  means   that   the industrial  dispute  thus arising was confined only  to  the payment of retrenchment compensation.  The Workmen had never

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demanded   reinstatement  before  the   Management.    They, however,   made   a  demand  for  reinstatement   in   their representation/demand  made  before the Government  and  the Government referred the dispute relating to reinstatement to the  Tribunal.   It is in the above circumstances  that  the said  observations  were made.  In this case,  however,  the demand  in  question was raised by the  workmen  before  the Management  as far back as November 1965.  Conciliation  was attempted but failed.  It is then that the workmen submitted a  demand  before the Government and the Government  made  a reference on 5.7.1968. That reference was no doubt set aside by  the High Court but we do not know the basis of the  said decision.   Be  that as it may, the fact  remains  that  the workmen  were  left  free  to raise  a  fresh  dispute  with reference to the "same demands", which they actually did  on 19.3.1973.    They    expressly    claimed    the    benefit retrospectively  from 15.11.1965. We are, therefore,  unable to see how the Observations in Sindhu help the Management in this case. For  the  above  reasons, we are of  the  opinion  that  the Division Bench was not right in holding that the  Industrial Tribunal  had  no power to grant the relief claimed  by  the Workmen  with effect from a date anterior to 19.3.1973  (the date  on which the fresh demand was raised)  notwithstanding the  fact  that  the said demand  specifically  claimed  the benefit  from an anterior date i.e. 15.11.1965,  and.  which demand was referred to it by the Government. For  the  above  reasons,  the appeal  is  allowed  and  the Judgment and Order of the Division Bench of the Bombay  High Court in appeal No. 247 of 1977 dated 1.9.1992 is set aside. The Writ Petition filed by the Management in the Bombay High Court  questioning the award dated 3.1..1977  is  dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. G.N. Appeal allowed. 1063