REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3568 OF 2005

SARUP SINGH & ANR.      …. Appellants

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR.       …. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3566 OF 2005

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3567 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. As  the  facts  and  issues  involved  are  similar  and  

interconnected, we propose to dispose of all the appeals by  

this common judgment and order. However, we may record

the facts of each of the cases separately and deal with the  

issues at one place as they are interconnected.

Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005  

2. This appeal arises out of the acquisition of land of Sarup  

Singh, the appellant herein, by issuing a notification under  

Section 4 of  the  Land Acquisition Act,  1894 [hereinafter  

referred to as “the Act”] on 09.10.1974. Possession of the  

land was taken on 03.12.1974 and the award was passed  

on 11.06.1975. As against the award passed by the Special  

Land  Acquisition  Collector,  Bhatinda  Cantonment,  a  

reference  case  was  filed  which  was  decided  by  the  

Reference Court on 31.07.1979. Finally, the matter came  

to be decided by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The  

High Court by an order dated 08.12.1982, determined the  

market value of the land and the appellants herein were  

also granted solatium at 15 per cent and also interest at 6  

per  cent  per  annum.  The  aforesaid  judgment  and  order  

passed by the High Court became final and binding as no  

appeal was brought to this Court thereafter.  

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3. Subsequently, however, the decree holders-appellants filed  

Civil  Miscellaneous Applications No. 1296 of 1985 under  

Sections 151 and 152 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for  

short  “C.P.C.”]  praying  for  solatium  and  interest  at  the  

enhanced rate as provided for by the amendment in the Act  

(by  way of  Act  68 of  1984)  which was given effect  from  

24.09.1984.  The  High  Court  allowed  the  said  

Miscellaneous  Petition  by  order  dated  17.02.1986  by  

passing an order enhancing the payment of solatium from  

15 per cent to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9  

per cent per annum for the first year after acquisition and  

15 per cent  per  annum thereafter  till  the date  of  actual  

payment of the enhanced amount of compensation.   

4. On the basis of the aforesaid order dated 17.02.1986, the  

appellants  filed  an  execution  application  before  the  

Additional  District  Judge,  Bhatinda.  The  execution  

application was dismissed by the Additional District Judge,  

Bhatinda by an order dated 30.08.2001 holding that the  

appellants  herein  are  not  entitled  to  enhanced  rate  of  

solatium and interest  as the award of  the Collector  and  

that of the reference court in their case was passed prior to  

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30.04.1982. The Additional District Judge further held that  

the order passed by the High Court under Sections 151  

and 152 of C.P.C. was without jurisdiction and as such a  

nullity.  

5. Being aggrieved by the said order,  the appellants herein  

filed a miscellaneous petition before the High Court which  

was registered as Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 and by  

the  impugned  order  dated  24.09.2002,  the  same  was  

dismissed upholding  the  order  passed by  the  Additional  

District  Judge,  Bhatinda  as  against  which  the  present  

appeal was filed.

Civil Appeal No. 3566 of 2005

6. This  appeal  arises  out  of  the  same  notification  dated  

09.10.1974,  as  that  of  Civil  Appeal  No.  3568  of  2005,  

issued  by  the  respondents  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  

proposing to acquire land belonging to one Chuhar Singh.  

Chuhar Singh died subsequently and therefore his sons,  

viz., Hardev Singh, Balwant Singh and Gurbachan Singh  

preferred claim on  the  basis  of  which  the  Special  Land  

Acquisition  Collector,  Bhatinda  Cantonment  gave  his  

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award  on  11.06.1975.  As  the  appellants  sought  for  

reference,  a  reference  case  was  registered  in  which  the  

Additional  District  Judge  passed  a  judgment  and  order  

dated 31.07.1979. The matter was taken to the High Court  

which was initially registered as RFA No. 10687 of 1980  

and  was  decided  on  30.07.1981.  After  which  a  Letters  

patent Appeal No. 128 of 1982 was filed which was decided  

on 18.12.1985 and the said was partly  allowed and the  

respondents were directed to pay solatium at the rate of 30  

per  cent  of  the  market  value  of  the  acquired  land  as  

determined by the court and also interest at the rate of 9  

per cent for the first year from the date of their possession  

by the Land Acquisition Collector and at the rate of 15 per  

cent thereafter till the date of actual payment of enhanced  

amount of compensation.  

7. The  appellants  herein  filed  an  execution  application  for  

realization  of  the  balance  amount  in  pursuance  to  the  

order  of  the  High  Court  in  LPA  No.  128  of  1982  dated  

18.12.1985 which was rejected by the Additional District  

Judge,  Bhatinda by his order dated 30.08.2001 and the  

aforesaid  execution  applications  of  the  appellants  were  

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dismissed  by  holding  that  they  were  not  entitled  to  

enhanced rate of solatium and interest as the award of the  

Collector  and  that  of  the  reference  court  were  prior  to  

30.04.1982.  Additional  District  Judge,  Bhatinda  further  

held that the aforesaid order passed by the High Court is  

nullity in the eyes of law as the benefit of the order of the  

High  Court  dated  18.12.1985  cannot  be  given  to  the  

appellants  in  view  of  various  decisions  rendered  by  the  

Supreme Court.  

8. Being  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  judgment  and  order  

passed  by  the  Additional  District  Judge,  Bhatinda  the  

appellants filed Civil Revision which was registered as Civil  

Revision No. 6171 of 2001. The aforesaid matter was also  

heard along with the Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 filed  

by Sarup Singh and Gurdip Singh which was disposed of  

by  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  which  is  under  

challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 3568 and 3566 of 2005.

Civil Appeal No. 3567 of 2005

9. In this case, the lands of the appellants were acquired by  

Bhatinda Cantonment in the year 1976 and Special Land  

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Acquisition  Collector  of  Bhatinda  Cantonment  gave  his  

award on 18.06.1979. On an application being filed by the  

appellants  for  reference  the  same  was  referred  to  

Additional District Judge, Bhatinda and it was decided on  

31.7.1980.  Being  aggrieved  by  the  said  decision  of  the  

Additional  District  Judge,  Bhatinda appellants  filed  FRA  

No. 412 of 1981 before the High Court which was decided  

on  27.07.1983.  Still  aggrieved,  appellants  filed  Special  

Leave  Petition  No.  6701-23  of  1984  in  this  Court  

culminating  in  Civil  Appeal  Nos.  4132-65  of  1986.  This  

Court on 1.9.1986 decided the aforesaid appeals alongwith  

the Civil Appeal Nos. 5142-65 of 1986 and enhanced the  

compensation holding that the ends of justice require that  

compensation  shall  be  awarded to  the  appellants  at  the  

rate of Rs. 17/- per sq. yard upto the depth of 500 meter of  

the  acquired  and  at  the  rate  of  Rs.  10/-  per  sq.  yard  

beyond the depth of 500 meters. This Court also held that  

consequential payments would also be made on the basis  

of the aforesaid rate of compensation. Appellants then filed  

their  first  execution  application  before  the  Additional  

District  Judge  for  getting  said  enhanced  amount  which  

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was  accordingly  ordered  vide  order  dated  9.3.1998  but  

with regard to benefits of amended Sections, viz., 23(2) and  

28  of  the  Act,  it  rejected  the  prayer  of  the  appellants  

holding that since the award of the Collector was given on  

18.6.1979 and award of the Court was given on 31.7.1980,  

appellants  are  not  entitled  to  the  said  benefits.  

Respondents then filed revision before the High Court but  

the same was dismissed. Respondents then filed appeals  

before this Court and vide order dated 12.7.99, the matter  

was directed to be filed before the High Court.  

10.All  the  above-mentioned  three  appeals  were  listed  for  

hearing and we heard the learned counsel  appearing for  

the parties who have ably taken us through all the relevant  

documents on record and also placed before us the various  

decisions which may have a bearing on the issues raised in  

the present appeals.  

11.On the  basis  of  the  arguments  advanced  before  us  the  

following issues arise for our consideration: -

a) Whether  the  benefit  of  enhancement  in  the  rate  of  solatium  and  interest  as  introduced  by  the  Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be given to such  of  the  claimants  whose  cases  for  payment  of  

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compensation were finalized prior to coming into force  of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 98 of 1984?

AND

b) Whether the judgment and order given by the High  Court  enhancing  the  quantum of  compensation  by  giving benefit of enhanced solatium from 15 per cent  to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9 per  cent per annum in view of the Amendment Act of 68  of 1984 could be negated by the Court of Additional  District Judge, Bhatinda while acting as an Executing  Court and whether the Executing Court of Additional  District  Judge,  Bhatinda  could  go  behind  the  judgment and decree passed by the High Court?

12.In order to answer the aforesaid two issues which arise for  

our  consideration,  we  need  to  point  out  that  the  Land  

Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be amended by virtue of the  

Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The said amendment became  

effective from 24.09.1984. By the aforesaid Amendment Act  

of  68  of  1984,  amendments  were  brought  in  to  the  

provisions of Section 23, in that provisions of Sub-Section  

23 1(A) and Sub-Section 23 (2) were inserted and added,  

which read as follows: -

“Section 23 - Matters to be considered in determining  compensation […]

[…] [(1A) In addition to the market value of the land  above provided, the Court shall in every case award   an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum  per  annum  on  such  market-value  for  the  period  commencing on and from the date of the publication of   

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the  notification  under  section  4,  sub-section  (1),  in  respect of such land to the date of the award of the   Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,   whichever is earlier.

Explanation.-In  computing  the  period  referred  to  in  this sub-section, any period or periods during which   the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were   held up on account of any stay or injunction by the   order of any court shall be excluded.

(2)  In  addition  to  the  market-value  of  the  land  as  above provided, the court shall in every case award a  sum of [thirty  per  centum on such  market-value,  in  consideration  of  the  compulsory  nature  of  the  acquisition.]”

13.Similarly, an amendment was brought in to the provisions  

of  Section 34 by way of  Amendment  Act  of  68 of  1984,  

which deals with the quantum of compensation of interest  

to be paid to the claimants.  In the  said section interest  

became payable on amendment at 9 per cent per annum  

for  the  period  of  first  one  year  from the  date  on which  

possession was taken, and thereafter, at the rate of 15 per  

cent per annum on expiry of the period of one year on the  

amount of  compensation.  The aforesaid amendment  was  

made effective  by the  amending Act  of  68 of  1984 from  

24.09.1984.  

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14.We may also refer to the provisions in Sub-Sections 30 (1)  

& 30 (2) of the Act of 68 of 1984 regarding application of  

the provisions of the aforesaid amendment to proceedings  

pending on or after 30.04.1982 which read as follows: -

“30. Transitional Provisions –  

(1) The Provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of  the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section   15 of  this  Act,  shall  apply, and shall be deemed to   have applied, also to, and in relation to:

(a)  every proceeding for the  acquisition  of  any land  under  the  principal  Act  pending on  the  30th day  of  April,  1982  [the  date  of  introduction  of  the  Land  Acquisition  (Amendment) Bill,  1982, in the House of   the People], in which no award has been made by the   Collector before that date.

(b)  every proceeding for the  acquisition  of  any land  under  the  principal  Act  commenced after  that  date,   whether  or  not  an  award  has  been  made  by  the  Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.  

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and  Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause   (b)  of  Section  15  and  Section  18  of  this  Act   respectively,  shall  apply,  and  shall  be  deemed  to  have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award   made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed   by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against   any such award under the provisions of the principal   Act  after  the  30th day  of  April,  1982  [the  date  of   introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,   1982,  in  the  House  of  the  People]  and  before  the   commencement of this Act..”

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15.The  aforesaid  amended provisions  and  their  application  

came to be considered in various decisions of this Court.  

Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of  

Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs.  

Etc. reported  in  (1989)  2  SCC 754.  This  Court  in  the  

aforesaid case was called upon to determine as to which  

awards,  references  and/or  appeals  would  be  entitled  to  

avail  of  the  enhanced  rates  of  interest  by  virtue  of  the  

Amendment of 1984. In adjudicating the matter, this Court  

clearly held that the  award made by the Collector under  

Section 11 of the Act made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-

1984, i.e., the dates of introduction of the Land Acquisition  

Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People and that  

of  commencement  of  operation  of  the  Land  Acquisition  

(Amendment) Act, 1984 respectively, will be entitled to the  

enhanced  rates  under  the  Amendment.  This  Court  also  

held that an award made by the Principal Civil  Court of  

Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on  

a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of  

the Act between the aforesaid dates would also be entitled  

to  the  same,  even though it  be  upon reference from an  

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award made before 30-4-1982,.  in which this Court held  

as follows: -

“31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to  be  clear  that  the  award  made  by  the  Collector   referred to here is the award made by the Collector   under Section 11 of  the  parent Act,  and the  award   made by the Court is the award made by the Principal   Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of   the  parent  Act  on  a  reference  made  to  it  by  the   Collector  under  Section  19 of  the  parent  Act.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  benefit  of  the  enhanced  solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an  award made by the Collector between 30-4-1982 and  24-9-1984.  Likewise  the  benefit  of  the  enhanced  solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of  an award made by the Court between 30-4-1982 and  24-9-1984, even though it be upon reference from an  award made before 30-4-1982.

On the  question of  appeals  to the High Court  or Supreme  

Court, however, this Court adopted a different stand. It held:-

32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words  “or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme  Court on appeal against any such award?” Are they  limited,  as  contended by the  appellants,  to  appeals   against an award of the Collector or the Court made  between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, or do they include  also,  as  contended  by  the  respondents,  appeals   disposed  of  between  30-4-1982  and  September   24,1984  even  though  arising  out  of  awards  of  the  Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are   of  opinion  that  the  interpretation  placed  by  the  appellants should be preferred over that suggested by  the  respondents.  The  submission  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  is  that  the  words  ‘any  such  award’   mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and  carry  no  greater  limiting  sense;  and  that  in  this   

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context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order  in appeal is an appellate order made between 30-4- 1982  and  24-9-1984  —  in  which  case  the  related   award of the Collector or of the Court may have been  made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words ‘any  such  award’  cannot  bear  the  broad  meaning  suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. […]  The words  ‘any  such  award’  are  intended  to  have   deeper significance, and in the context in which those   words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are   intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or  Court  between  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984.  In  other   words  Section  30(2)  of  the  Amendment  Act  extends  the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where   the award by the Collector or by the Court is made  between  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984  or  to  appeals   against such awards decided by the High Court and  the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High  Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9- 1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the  award by the Collector or by the Court should have  been  made  between  30-4-1982  and  24-9-1984  […]   [T]o  our  mind  it  must  necessarily  intend  that  the  appeal  to  the  High  Court  or  the  Supreme Court,  in   which the benefit  of  the enhanced solatium is to be  given,  must  be  confined  to  an  appeal  against  an   award  of  the  Collector  or  of  the  Court  rendered  between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.

[...]  34.  Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  has  strenuously  relied  on  the  general  principle  that  the   appeal  is a rehearing of the original  matter,  but we   are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking   that  principle.  [...]  If  the  proceeding  has terminated  with the award of the Collector or of the Court made   between  the  aforesaid  two  dates,  the  benefit  of   Section  30(2)  will  be  applied  to  such  award  made  between  the  aforesaid  two  dates.  If  the  proceeding  has  passed  to  the  stage  of  appeal  before the  High  Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when  the  benefit  of  Section  30(2)  will  be  applied.  But  in  every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court   

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must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9- 1984.”

16.This decision of the Court, passed by a Bench of 5 Judges,  

squarely applies to the appeals in this case, and makes it  

amply  clear  that  the  award  of  the  Land  Acquisition  

Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must have been  

made between the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e., between  

30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.

17.The applicability of the Amendment Act to a proceeding of  

the aforesaid nature was made clear by the Act of 18 of  

1984 by enacting the provision of Section 30(2). In all the  

appeals before us,  the award of the Collector and that of  

the  reference  court  in  their  case  was  passed  prior  to  

30.04.1982. Therefore, the said amendment brought in by  

the Act of 18 of 1984 to the concerned provisions could not  

have been made applicable to the proceeding of the present  

cases. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the High  

Court giving the benefit provided by under the Amendment  

Act of 68 of 1984, viz., Section 23(1A) and 23(2) and the  

amended  provision  of  Section  34  of  the  Act,  cannot  be  

made applicable in the cases of the appellants herein.

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18.In so far as the second issue is concerned, it is true that  

the executing court cannot go behind the decree and grant  

interest  not  granted  in  the  decree  as  submitted  by  the  

counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants in  the  light  of  the  

decision  rendered  by  this  Court  in  State  of  Punjab  &  

Others v. Krishan Dayal Sharma reported in  AIR 1990  

SC 2177.

19.But, if a decree is found to be nullity, the same could be  

challenged and interfered with at  any subsequent  stage,  

say,  at  the  execution  stage  or  even  in  a  collateral  

proceeding. This is in view of the fact that if a particular  

Court  lacks  inherent  jurisdiction  in  passing  a  decree  or  

making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court  

would be without jurisdiction and the same is non-est and  

void ab initio.

20.The aforesaid position is well-settled and not open for any  

dispute as the defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very  root  

and authority of the Court to pass decree which cannot be  

cured by consent or waiver of the parties. This Court in  

several decisions has specifically laid down that validity of  

any such decree or order could be challenged at any stage.  

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In  Union  of  India  v.  Sube  Ram & Others reported  in  

(1997) 9 SCC 69 this court held thus:  

“5. […] here is the case of entertaining the application   itself;  in other  words,  the  question  of  jurisdiction  of   the court. Since the appellate court has no power to   amend  the  decree  and  grant  the  enhanced  compensation by way of solatium and interest under  Section 23(2) and proviso to Section 28 of the Act, as   amended  by  Act  68  of  1984,  it  is  a  question  of   jurisdiction  of  the  court.  Since  courts  have  no  jurisdiction, it is the settled legal position that it is a   nullity and it can be raised at any stage.”

21.In yet another case of  Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Others v.  

Kashinath  Janardhan  Trade  &  Anothers reported  in  

(1983)  3  SCC  437 this  Court  has  held  that  when  a  

Tribunal  of  limited  jurisdiction  erroneously  assumes  

jurisdiction  by  ignoring  a  statutory  provision  and  its  

consequences  in  law  on  the  status  of  parties  or  by  a  

decision  are  wholly  unwarranted  with  regard  to  the  

jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and its validity  

can be raised in collateral proceeding.

22.In  Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others v. Yadav Sadashiv  

Mule (Dead) Through Lrs. & Others reported in (2004) 8  

SCC 706 this Court stated thus:  

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“9.  The  main  question  which  arises  for  our  consideration  is  whether  the  decree  passed  by  the   trial court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our  opinion,  the  law  on  the  point  is  well  settled.  The  distinction  between  a  decree  which  is  void  and  a  decree which is wrong,  incorrect,  irregular  or not in   accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored.  Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a  decree or making an order, a decree or order passed  by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est   and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court   goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very  authority  of  the  court to  pass a decree or make an  order. Such defect has always been treated as basic   and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a  court  or  an  authority  having  no  jurisdiction  is  a  nullity.  Validity  of  such  decree  or  order  can  be  challenged  at  any  stage,  even  in  execution  or  collateral proceedings.”

23.In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs. v.  

Jasjit Singh & Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 this  

Court stated thus:  

“18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court   without  jurisdiction  on  the  subject-matter  or  on  the   grounds on which the decree made which goes to the  root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a  coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is   a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up  whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon   as  a  foundation  for  a  right,  even  at  the  stage  of   execution  or  in collateral  proceedings.  The defect of   jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to  pass  decree  which  cannot  be  cured  by  consent  or  waiver of the party. ………….”

24.In the present cases the judgment and order passed by the  

High  Court  before  the  amendment  Act  of  68  of  1984  

became final and binding as no appeal was brought to this  

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Court thereafter. However,  consequent to the Amendment  

in the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants had filed civil  

miscellaneous  applications  for  the  grant  of  30  per  cent  

solatium and 9 per cent interest for first year and 15 per  

cent  interest  thereafter. This  Court  has  also  held  in  a  

catena of decisions that a decree once passed and which  

has  become  final  and  binding  cannot  be  sought  to  be  

amended by filing petition under  Sections 151 and 152,  

C.P.C. In the case of  Union of India v. Swaran Singh &  

Others reported  in  (1996)  5  SCC  501 this  Court  held  

thus:-  

“8. The question then is whether the High Court has  power  to  entertain  independent  applications  under  Sections  151  and  152  and  enhance  solatium  and  interest  as  amended  under  Act  68  of  1984.  This  controversy is no longer res integra. In State of Punjab  v.  Jagir  Singh  and  also  in  a  catena  of  decisions  following thereafter in Union of India v. Pratap Kaur;   State  of  Maharashtra  v.  Maharau  Srawan  Hatkar;   State  of  Punjab  v.  Babu  Singh;  Union  of  India  v.   Raghubir  Singh  and  K.S.  Paripoornan  v.  State  of   Kerala, this Court has held that the Reference Court  or  the  High  Court  has  no  power  or  jurisdiction  to   entertain  any  applications  under  Sections  151  and  152 to correct any decree which has become final or   to  independently  pass  an  award  enhancing  the   solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984.  Consequently, the award by the High Court granting  enhanced solatium at  30% under  Section  23(2)  and  interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the date of   taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% till   date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under  Act  68  of  1984  is  clearly  without  jurisdiction  and,   therefore, a nullity. The order being a nullity, it can be   challenged  at  any  stage.  Rightly  the  question  was   raised in execution. The executing court allowed the  

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petition  and  dismissed  the  execution  petition.  The  High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing  the  revision  and  setting  aside  the  order  of  the   executing court.”

25.In the case of  Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead) by  

Lrs. Reported in (1995) 5 SCC 585 held as follows: -

“4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has  considered the scope of the power of the High Court  under  Sections  151  and  152,  CPC and  also  under   Section 13-A of the Act. This Court has held that once  the civil court made an award as per law then in force  which became final and that there is no error of law  as  on  that  date.  Subsequent  amendment  does  not   give power  to  the  court  to  amend the  decree under  Sections 151 and 152, CPC. This was held in State of   Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar and Union  of India v. Pratap Kaur. In Maharau Srawan Hatkar   case  this  Court  held  that  the  civil  court  lacked  inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to  entertain an application to award additional benefits  under  the  Amendment  Act  68  of  1984.  The  facts   therein were that the award had become final and the  Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24- 9-1984. The respondents made an application under  Sections  151  and  152,  CPC  to  award  enhanced  solatium  and  additional  benefits  etc.  and  the  civil   court allowed and granted the same. In that context,   considering the civil court’s power under Sections 151  and 152, CPC, this Court laid the above law.”

26.In the case of  Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. & Another  

reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 this  Court  described the  

scope of Section 152, C.P.C. thus:  

“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical   or  arithmetical  mistakes  in  judgments,  decrees  or   orders  of  errors  arising  therein from any accidental   slip  or  omission.  The  exercise  of  this  power   contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of   

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its  ministerial  actions  and  does  not  contemplate  of  passing  effective  judicial  orders  after  the  judgment,   decree  or  order.  The settled  position  of  law is  that   after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the   court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus  being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments,   decrees  and  orders  earlier  passed.  The  corrections  contemplated  are  of  correcting  only  accidental   omissions  or  mistakes  and  not  all  omissions  and  mistakes  which  might  have  been committed  by the   court  while  passing  the  judgment,  decree  or  order.   The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the   merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152  for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is   to file appeal or review application. It implies that the   section  cannot be pressed into service to correct an   omission which is intentional, however erroneous that   may  be.  It  has  been  noticed  that  the  courts  below  have  been  liberally  construing  and  applying  the  province of  Sections  151 and  152 of  the  CPC even  after  passing  of  effective  orders  in  the  lis  pending  before  them.  No  court  can,  under  the  cover  of  the  aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of   its original judgment, decree or order. ………….”

27.There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it has  

also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High  

Court cannot be taken as precedence for perpetrating such  

wrong. In the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Ram  

Kumar  Mann reported  in  (1997)  3  SCC  321 held  as  

follows: -  

“3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken   by the High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the  respondent had voluntarily resigned from the service  

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and the resignation was accepted by the Government  on 18-5-1982. On and from that date, the relationship   of  employer  and  the  employee  between  the   respondent  and the  State  ceased and thereafter  he  had no right, whatsoever, either to claim the post or a   right to withdraw his resignation which had already  become  effective  by  acceptance  on  18-5-1982…The  doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence  of  an  enforceable  right.  He  was  discriminated  and  denied equality  as  some similarly  situated  persons  had  been  given  the  same  relief.  Article  14  would   apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out  to  equals  and  similarly  circumstanced  without  any  rational  basis  or  relationship  in  that  behalf.  The  respondent has no right,  whatsoever and cannot be  given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of   withdrawal  of  resignation.  The  High  Court  was  wholly  wrong  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  there  was  invidious  discrimination.  If  we  cannot  allow a  wrong  to  perpetrate,  an  employee,  after  committing   mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service  and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is  reinstated  into  the  service.  Can  a  similarly   circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14  for reinstatement?  The answer  is obviously “No”..  A  wrong  decision  by the  Government  does not  give  a  right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or  equality. Two wrongs can never make a right. Under  these  circumstances,  the  High  Court  was  clearly  wrong in directing reinstatement of the respondent by  a mandamus with all consequential benefits.”

28.In the case of  State of Bihar & Others v. Kameshwar  

Prasad Singh & Another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 this  

Court held thus: -

“30.  The  concept  of  equality  as  envisaged  under  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  is  a  positive  concept  

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which  cannot  be  enforced  in  a  negative  manner...   Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or  illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the  plea  of  equality  as  enshrined  in  Article  14  of  the   Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High  Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465, para 9) “Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within   the  equality  clause  this  concept  nor  Article  226  empowers  the  High  Court  to  enforce  such  claim  of  equality  before  law.  If  such  claims  are  enforced,  it   shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate   an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending  similar  benefits  to  others.  Before  a  claim  based  on  equality clause is upheld, it  must be established by  the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has  been denied to  him,  while  it  has  been extended to   others  and  in  this  process  there  has  been  a  discrimination.”

Again in  Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v.  Daulat  

Mal  Jain reported  in  1996  (7)  SCALE  135  this  Court  

considered the scope  of  Article  14 of  the  Constitution and  

reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality  

holding: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 28)

“Suffice it  to  hold that  the  illegal  allotment founded  upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to  some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal  premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or   perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised.  In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to  perpetuate  the illegalities.  Thus considered, we hold  that the High Court was clearly in error in directing  the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.”

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31.  In  State  of  Haryana  v.  Ram Kumar  Mann  this   Court observed: (SCC p. 322, para 3) “The  doctrine  of  discrimination  is  founded  upon  existence  of  an  enforceable  right.  He  was   discriminated and denied equality as some similarly   situated  persons  had  been  given  the  same  relief.  Article  14  would  apply  only  when  invidious  discrimination  is  meted  out  to  equals  and  similarly   circumstanced  without  any  rational  basis  or  relationship  in  that  behalf.  The  respondent  has  no  right,  whatsoever  and  cannot  be  given  the  relief   wrongly given to them, i.e.,  benefit of withdrawal  of   resignation.  The  High  Court  was  wholly  wrong  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  there  was  invidious  discrimination.  If  we  cannot  allow  a  wrong  to   perpetrate,  an  employee,  after  committing   misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service  and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is  reinstated  into  the  service.  Can  a  similarly   circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14  for reinstatement? The answer is obviously ‘No’. In a  converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong  but  the  wrong  order  cannot  be  the  foundation  for  claiming equality for enforcement of the same order.   As  stated  earlier,  his  right  must  be  founded  upon  enforceable  right  to  entitle  him  to  the  equality   treatment  for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision  by the Government does not give a right to enforce the  wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs  can never make a right.”

29.In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, when  

we examine the facts  of  the  present cases it  is  patently  

obvious that the reference case and the matter of payment  

of  compensation  to  the  appellants  became  final  and  

binding after the award was passed and the judgment was  

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pronounced by the reference court and further by the High  

Court and thereafter, no appeal having been filed in this  

Court.  Such  a  judgment  and  decree  which  has  become  

final  and  binding  could  not  have  been reopened  by  the  

High Court on the basis of revision applications filed under  

Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C.  

30.In  view  of  the  two  issues  that  we  have  discussed  and  

elaborated herein,  we are of the considered opinion that  

the executing court as also the High Court were justified in  

holding that the orders passed by the High Court granting  

enhanced solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of  

1984 is without jurisdiction and a nullity.  

31.We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals. The orders  

passed  by  the  executing  court  and  the  High  Court  are  

found  to  be  legal,  valid  and  justified.  We,  accordingly,  

dismiss all these appeals, but, we leave the parties to bear  

their own costs.

............................................J         [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

............................................J         [ Anil R. Dave ]

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New Delhi November 25, 2010.

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