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PETITIONER: SARPANCH, LONAND GRAMPANCHAYAT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMGIRI GOSAVI & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/04/1967

BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. BENCH: BACHAWAT, R.S. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  222            1967 SCR  (3) 774  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC 171  (16)

ACT: Minimum Wages Act, 1948 s. 20(1) and (2)-Authority under  s. 20(2)   exercising   discretion   condoning    delay-Whether circumstances  justified interference by superior  court  in exercise of discretion.

HEADNOTE: On  March 19, 1963 the first respondent, on behalf  of  some employees  of  the Grampanchayat, applied to  the  authority appointed under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, for a  direction upon the Grampanchayat to pay to the  employees certain overtime wages, etc. The  Authority  found  that  since  January  2,  1961,   the employees  had  been  making complaints  to  the  Government authorities ’regarding nonpayment of overtime wages and as a result,  directions  were  given from time to  time  by  the Government  Officers  concerned to the appellant  to  comply with   the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  the  rules   made thereunder;  that  the officers assured the  employees  from time  to time that the matter was receiving their  attention and the employees, relying upon these assurances,  refrained from  making the application within six months  as  required under  the  first  proviso to s. 20(2).   By  its  order  of September  18, 1963, in exercise of the power conferred  by, the  second  proviso  to s. 20(2)  the  authority  therefore condoned  the delay in the filing of the application on  the ’ground  that  the  employees had remained  in  the  honest though mistaken belief that relief would ’be granted to them through the intervention of the officers and ’held that  the application  should be entertained in respect of the  claims for  the period Subsequent to January 1, 1961.   A  petition challenging  this order under Art. 227 of  the  Constitution was summarily dismissed by the High Court. On appeal to this Court, HELD  :  The  expression "sufficient cause"  in  the  second proviso  to  s.  20(2)  should  receive  the  same   liberal interpretation as in s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.   It was not shown that in condoning the delay the Authority  had acted  arbitrarily  or  capriciously or  in  excess  of  its jurisdiction Pr that it committed any error apparent on  the

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face  of the record.  This Court could not  interfere  under Art.  136 merely because it might take a different  view  of the  facts and exercise its discretion differently. 1776  B; 777 C-D] Case law referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November 20, 1963 of the Bombay High Court in Special  Civil Application No. 1886 of 1963. H. It. Gokhale and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. 775 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bachawat, J. On March 19, 1963 respondent No. 1 on behalf of 36  employees  of the Lonand Grampanchayat  applied  to  the Authority  appointed under s. 20(1) of the.   Minimum  Wages Act,  1948 for a direction upon the Grampanchayat to pay  to the  employees  overtime  wages and damages.   A  number  of employees claimed overtime wages from October 23, 1960 for a period of two years two months, and nine days.  One employee claimed  wages for a period of seven years and nine  months, one  claimed wages for six years and ten months and  another claimed wages for three years.  By an order dated  September 18,  1963 the Authority held that the application should  be entertained  in  respect  of  the  claims  for  the   period subsequent   to  January  1,  1961  as  the  employees   had sufficient  cause for not making the application within  the prescribed  period  of six months.  A  petition  challenging this order under Art. 227 of the Constitution was  summarily dismissed  by the Bombay High Court.  From the order of  the High  Court,  the present appeal has been filed  by  special leave. An  application  for  a direction on  the  employer  to  pay minimum  wages and other amounts payable under  the  Minimum Wages  Act  may  be made under s. 20(2) of the  Act  to  the Authority appointed under s. 20(1).  The first proviso to s. 20(2)  requires  that  "every  such  application  shall   be presented  within  six months from the, date  on  which  the minimum wages or other amount became: payable".. The  second proviso to s. 20(2) is in these terms               "Provided further that any application may  be               admitted  after the said period of six  months               when  the  applicant satisfies  the  Authority               that  he had sufficient cause for  not  making               the application within such period." The Authority has a discretion to condone the delay in  pre- senting  the application provided sufficient cause  for  the entire delay is shown to its satisfaction.  This  discretion like  other  judicial  discretion  must  be  exercised  with vigilance   and  circumspection  I  according  to   justice, commonsense, and sound judgment.  The discretion is to  know through law what is just, see Keighley’s case(1). The  wording  of  the  second  proviso  is  similar  to  the provisions,  of  s.  5 of the  Indian  Limitation  Act.   In Krishna v. Chathappan (2) the Madras High Court indicated in the  following passage how the discretion under s. 5  should be exercised               "We  think that section 5 gives the  Courts  a               discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is               to. be exercised in the way in which  judicial               power and discretion ought to be

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             (1)  10 Coke’s Rep. 139, 140=77 E. R.  11  34,               1136.               L9Sup CI/67- 5               (2) I. L. R. 13 Mad. 269-               7 76               exercised  upon  principles  which  are   well               understood;   the  words   "sufficient   cause               receiving  a  liberal construction  so  as               to advance substantial justice when no  negli-               gence  not inaction nor want of bona fides  is               imputable to the appellant."’ This  decision  received-the  approval,  of  this  Court  in Dinabandhu  Sahu  v.  Jadumoni Mangaraj  and  others(1)  and Ramlal,  Motilal and Chhotetal v. Rewa  Coalfields  Ltd.(2). The  words  "sufficient cause" in the second proviso  to  s. 20(2) should receive a similar liberal construction. No appeal lies from an order of the Authority, under s.  20. But the High Court is vested                  with the power of judicial superintendence over the tribunal under Art. 227 of  the  Constitution.  This power is not,greater  than  the power  under  Art.  226 and is limited to  seeing  that  the tribunal  functions within the limits of its authority,  see Nagendra Nath Bora and another v.  The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and others(3).  The High  Court will  not review the discretion of the Authority  judicially exercised,  but  it- may interfere if the  exercise  of  the discretion  is  capricious or perverse or ultra  vires.   In Sitaram   Ramcharan,   etc.   v.  M.   N.   Nagarshana   and others(4)this  Court  held  that a finding of  fact  by  the authority under the similarly worded second proviso to s. 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 could not be challenged in a petition under Art. 227.  The High Court may refuse  to interfere. ,under Art. 227 unless there is grave miscarriage age of justice. In the, present case, the Authority found that since January 2,  1961  the  employees  were  making  complaints  to   the government  authorities,regarding  non-payment  of  overtime wages.   On  January  2, 1961 the  employees  wrote  to  the Inspector, Minimum Wages, government labour office,  Sangli, complaining  of overtime work and asking for  directions  on the  appellant to comply with the provisions of the  Minimum Wages Act.  A reminder was sent to him on January 11, 1961. On January 18, 1961 the Inspector wrote that the matter was being followed up.  On April 22, 1961 the Inspector  visited Lonand  and  directed  the appellant  to comply  with  the provisions  of  the  Minimum Wages Act and  the  rules  made -thereunder.   On April 26, 1961 the Inspector  communicated this  direction  to the employees.  On January 1,  1962  the employees  lodged  a complaint of- overtime  work  with  the Commissioner, Poona Division, and asked for a direction  for payment  of the arrears of overtime wages.  On  January  3, 1962 the Commissioner wrote to the employees that the matter was receiving attention and their application had been  sent to  the,  Collector  of  Satara  for  disposal.   Later   in August/September 1962 and early 1963-the (1)  [1955] 1 S. C. R. 140, 146. (3)  [1958] S. C. R. 1240, 1272. (2) [1962] 2 S. C. R. 762, 767. (4) [1960] 1 S. C. R. 875, 884. 777 Block Development Officer came to Lonand and made inquiries. The.  revenue  officers appointed as  inspectors  under  the government  notification  dated May 4,,1955  are  under  the administrative  control of Commissioner and Collector.   The inspectors  have no power to give relief under s. 20(2)  but

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they  have large powers of supervision and control under  s. 19 of the Act.  The employees relied    upon the  assurances of  the  inspectors and their superiors  that  proper  steps would,  be  taken for the remedy of their  grievances and relying  upon those assurances, they refrained  from  taking steps  under  s.. 20(2) of the  Minimum.Wages  Act..  Having regard  to all the circumstances of the case, the  employees were  not  guilty of inaction or negligence and  the  entire delay in presenting the application was due to their  honest though  mistaken belief that the relief of,  overtime  wages would  be  granted to them through the intervention  of  the inspectors  and  their superior officers.  It is  not  shown that in condoning the delay the Authority acted, arbitrarily or capriciously or in excess of its jurisdiction or that  it committed any error apparent on the face of the record.  In the  application under 20(2) some of the’ employees  claimed overtime wages for       periods  prior to January 1,  1961. The  Authority declined to condone the delay in  respect  of claims  for  the  period prior to January  1,  1961.   On  a careful   consideration  of  the  relevant  materials,   the Authority condoned the delay in respect of claims subsequent to January 1, 1961 only.  The Court cannot interfere  merely because  it  might take a different view of  the  facts  and exercise  the discretion differently. it is not  shown  that the impugned order led to grave miscarriage of justice.  The High  Court refused to interfere under Art. 227.   We  think that  this  is not a fit case for interference by  us  under Art. 136. The  appeal  is dismissed.    There will be no order  as  to costs. K. P. S.                       Appeal    dismissed. 778