REPORTABLE

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.4162/2009   (Arising out of SLP© No.10005 of 2008)

Sarla Goel & Ors. ..Appellants

Versus

Kishan Chand Respondent

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  an  order  dated  12th of  

December, 2007 passed by a learned Judge of the High Court of  

Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Misc. (Main) No. 1103 of 2007, reversing  

the order dated 11th of July, 2007 passed by the Additional Rent  

Control Tribunal, Delhi in RCA No. 33 of 2007 direction eviction of  

the respondent from premises being no. 18/15, Mandir Wali Gali,  

Yusuf Sarai,  New Delhi – 110 016 (in short,  “the suit premises”)  

under Section 14(1)(a) read with Section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent  

Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).

3. Before we proceed further, it may be noted at the threshold  

that this is a case of  second default  and the respondent having  

1

once  availed  the  benefit  under  Section  14(2)  of  the  Act  is  not  

entitled to such benefit in case if it is held to be a second default.   

4. The facts are not in dispute. The respondent is a tenant in  

respect  of  the  suit  premises.  As  noted  herein  earlier,  it  is  not  

disputed that the respondent has already availed of the benefit of  

Section 14(2) read with Section 15 of the Act pursuant to an order  

dated  3rd of  December,  2001  passed  by  the  Additional  Rent  

Controller,  Delhi  in  Eviction  Case  No.  E-105  of  1999.   At  the  

present juncture, it may be mentioned that the appellants is now  

facing the charge of committing second default in payment of rent  

to the appellants in respect of the suit premises.  It is also not in  

dispute that a demand notice dated 31st of March, 2003 was served  

by  the  appellants  upon  the  respondent  intimating  that  the  

respondent  was in  arrears  of  rent  for  three  consecutive  months  

from January,  2003  onwards.   It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  on  

receipt  of  the  said  demand  notice  from  the  appellants,  the  

respondent had sent the arrears of rent for three months for the  

period from 1st of January, 2003 to 31st of March, 2003 by a money  

order dated 22nd of April, 2003.  It is also not in dispute that the  

appellants  had  refused  to  accept  the  money  order  and  

2

consequently,  the money was refunded to the respondent.   The  

case made out by the respondent was that he had duly complied  

with the provisions of the Act which was required to be done by him  

and therefore, it cannot be held that it was a case of second default  

whereas  the  case  of  the  appellants  either  before  the  Rent  

Controller or before the High Court was that on refusal to receive  

the money order by the appellants, the respondent ought to have  

taken  the  recourse  of  Section  27  of  the  Act  by  depositing  the  

aforesaid arrears of rent with the Rent Controller and he not having  

admittedly done so, was liable to be evicted from the suit premises  

on the ground of second default under Section 14(1)(a) read with  

proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act. Reliance was placed on behalf  

of the appellants before the High Court on a decision of this Court  

in Atmaram Vs. Shakuntala Rani [2005 (7) SCC 211].  The High  

Court,  by the impugned order,  however, held that in view of the  

admitted fact that as the rents were tendered by the respondent to  

the  appellants  and  the  appellants  having  refused  to  accept  the  

same, the respondent had duly complied with the provisions of the  

Act and, therefore, there was no second default on the part of the  

respondent and accordingly, no order for eviction could be passed  

on the aforesaid ground.   So far  as the decision in  Atmaram’s  

3

case (supra) is concerned, the High Court explained that the said  

decision cannot be said to have any application to the facts and  

circumstances of the present case as that was a case where the  

tenant had deposited a part of the arrears of rent under the Punjab  

Relief  of  Indebtedness  Act,  1934  and  his  defence  was  that  the  

amount that was deposited ought to have been treated as having  

paid to the landlord.  It was also explained by the High Court in the  

impugned order that in the aforesaid decision, this Court held that  

the deposit made under the Punjab Act could be of no avail to the  

tenant and since the deposit was not made under Section 27 of the  

Act,  the tenant  could not  claim the benefit  sought  by him.  The  

decision was also distinguished by the High Court in the impugned  

order that in that decision, the Supreme Court was only considering  

as to whether the deposits of arrears of rent under the Punjab Act  

could be treated as payment of rent to the landlord.  It was also  

observed that the tenant had not made any deposit and it was not  

his case that the arrears stood paid to the landlord.  The High Court  

further  held that  in  the present  case,  the tenant/respondent  had  

tendered the rent by money order, which the landlord admittedly  

had refused to receive.  So far as the interpretation of Section 27  

read with Section 14(1) (a) of the Act is concerned, the High Court  

4

said that this Section clearly says that the tenant would be entitled  

to protection if he either pays or tenders the arrears of rent within  

two months of the service of demand.  That is to say, the tenant  

was required to either tender or pay the rent to earn protection.  

While  interpreting  the  word  “Neither”  and  “Nor”,  the  High  Court  

observed that these words leave no manner of doubt that if there  

was  a  valid  tender  of  rent  within  two  months  of  the  notice  of  

demand, the tenant would be protected.   

5. In this way, the High Court had observed that it was not the  

case of a second default and therefore reversed the order of the  

Rent Control Tribunal and directed that no order of eviction could  

be passed as this was not a case of second default.   

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.  We have  

also  examined the relevant  provisions of  the  Act,  namely,  Delhi  

Rent Control Act and also the materials on record.  After having  

examined the provisions of the Act as well as the impugned order  

and also the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, the only question  

that has arisen before us to decide in this appeal is whether the  

tenant/respondent had defaulted in payment of rent inasmuch as  

he  had  not  deposited  the  rent  with  the  Rent  Controller  for  the  

5

aforesaid period after the refusal by the landlord/appellants in the  

manner  required  by  law.   In  order  to  decide  this  question,  we,  

therefore,  feel  it  appropriate  at  this  stage  to  reproduce  Section  

14(1) read with Section 14(2) of the Act, Section 15 of the Act as  

well as Section 27 of the Act, which are required to be considered  

by us in this appeal.   

Section 14 of the Act runs as under :-

Section 14 - Protection of tenant against eviction

(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other  law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of  any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of  the landlord against a tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in  the  prescribed  manner,  make  an  order  for  the  recovery  of  possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds  only, namely: --

(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of the  arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within two months  of the date on which a notice of demand for the arrears of rent has  been  served  of  him  by  the  landlord  in  the  manner  provided  in  section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882);

(b) ……………

(c) ……………

6

(d) …………..

(e) ……………

(f) ……………

(g) ………….

(h) …………..

(i) ……………

(j) ………….

(k) ………..

(l) ……………..

(2) Omitted as not required.   

Section 14(2) runs as under :-

No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall  be  made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub- section (1) if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by  section 15:

Provided that no tenant shall be entitled to the benefit under this  sub-section, if, having obtained such benefit once in respect of any  premises, he again makes a default in the payment of rent of those  premises for three consecutive months.

Section 15 of the Act runs as under :-

Section  15  -  When  a  tenant  can  get  the  benefit  of  protection against eviction

(1)  In  every  proceeding  of  the  recovery  of  possession  of  any  premises on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 14, the Controller shall, after giving the parties  an opportunity of being heard, make an order directing the tenant to  pay to the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month  

7

of the date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate of rent at  which it was last paid for the period for which the arrears of the rent  were  legally  recoverable  from  the  tenant  including  the  period  subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in  which payment or deposit is made and to continue to pay or deposit,  month by month, by the fifteenth of each succeeding month, a sum  equivalent to the rent at that rate.

(2)  If,  in  any  proceeding  for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  any  premises on any ground other than that referred to in sub-section  (1), the tenant contests the claim for eviction, the landlord may, at  any stage of the proceeding, make an application to the Controller  for an order on the tenant to pay to the landlord the amount of rent  legally recoverable from the tenant and the Controller may, after  giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, make an order in  accordance with the provisions of the said subsection.

(3)  If,  in  any  proceeding  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)  or  sub- section (2), there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by  the tenant, the Controller shall, within fifteen days of the date of the  first hearing of the proceeding, fix an interim rent in relation to the  premises to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions  of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), as the case may be until the  standard  rent  in  relation  thereto  is  fixed  having  regard  to  the  provisions of this Act, and the amount of arrears if any, calculated  on the basis of the standard rent shall be paid or deposited by the  tenant within one month of the date on which the standard rent is  fixed or such further time as the Controller may allow in this behalf.

(4)  If,  in  any  proceeding  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)  or  sub- section (2),  (here is  any dispute  as to  the person or  persons  to  whom the rent is payable, me Controller may direct the tenant to  deposit with the Controller the amount payable by him under sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), as the case may  be, and in such a case, no person shall be entitled to withdraw the  amount in deposit until the Controller decides the dispute and makes  an order for payment of the same.

(5) If the Controller is satisfied that any dispute referred to in sub- section (4) has been raised by a tenant for reasons which are false  or frivolous, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to  be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application.

(6) If a tenant makes payment or deposit as required by sub-section  (1) or subsection (3), no order shall be made for the recovery of  

8

possession on the ground of default in the payment of rent by the  tenant, but the Controller may allow such costs as he may deem fit  to the landlord.

(7) If a tenant fails to make payment or deposit as required by this  section, the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be  struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application.

7. Chapter IV of the Act deals with Deposit of Rent.   

Section 26 of the Act clearly says that if rent is paid, receipt of the same  

must be given by the landlord.  Now, the important Section is Section 27  

of the Act, which runs as under :-

8. Section 27 - Deposit of rent by the tenant

(1) Where the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by  the tenant within the lime referred to in section 26 of refuses  or neglects to deliver a receipt referred to therein or where  there is a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom  the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such rent with the  Controller in the prescribed manner:

[Provided that in cases where there is a bona fide doubt as to  the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant  may remit such rent to the Controller by postal money order.]

(2) The deposit shall be accompanied by an application by the  tenant containing the following particulars, namely: --

(a)  the  premises  for  which  the  rent  is  deposited  with  a  description sufficient for identifying the premises;

(b) the period for which the rent is deposited;

(c)  the name and address  of  the landlord  or  the person or  persons claiming to be entitled to such rent;

9

(d) the reasons and circumstances for which the application for  depositing the rent is made;

(e) such other particulars as may be prescribed.

(3) On such deposit of the rent being made, the Controller shall  send  in  the  prescribed  manner  a  copy  or  copies  of  the  application to the landlord or persons claiming to be entitled to  the rent with an endorsement of the date of the deposit.

(4) If an application is made for the withdrawal of any deposit  of rent, the Controller shall, if satisfied that the applicant is the  person entitled to receive the rent deposited, order the amount  of the rent to be paid to him in the manner prescribed:

Provided that no order for payment of any deposit of rent shall  be  made  by  the  Controller  under  this  sub-section  without  giving all persons named by the tenant in his application under  sub-section (2) as claiming to be entitled to payment of such  rent  an opportunity  of  being heard and such order  shall  be  without prejudice to the rights of such persons to receive such  rent being decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(5) If at the time of filing the application under sub-section (4),  but not after the expiry of thirty days from receiving the notice  of deposit, the landlord or the person or persons claiming to be  entitled to the rent complains or complain to the Controller that  the statements in the tenant's application of the reasons and  circumstances which led him to deposit the rent are untrue, the  Controller,  after  giving  the  tenant  an  opportunity  of  being  heard, may levy on the tenant a fine which may extend to an  amount equal to two months' rent, if the Controller is satisfied  that the said statements were materially untrue and may order  that a sum out of the fine realised be paid to the landlord as  compensation.

(6) The Controller  may, on the complaint of  the tenant and  after giving an opportunity to the landlord of being heard, levy  on the landlord a fine which may extend to an amount equal to  two months' rent, if the Controller is satisfied that the landlord,  without any reasonable cause, refused to accept rent though  

10

tendered to him within the time referred to in section 26 and  may further order that a sum out of the fine realised be paid to  the tenant as compensation.”

9. Relying on the aforesaid decision, which has been explained  

by the High Court in the impugned order namely Atmaram’s Case  

(Supra), learned counsel Mr. Arvind Kumar Gupta contended that  

in view of the mandatory provisions under Section 27 of the Act,  

which clearly says that if the rent is refused to be accepted by the  

landlord  and  as  the  procedure  to  be  adopted  by  the  tenant  for  

payment of rent has been specifically provided in Section 27 of the  

Act and that  procedure was not  followed by the appellants after  

refusal by the landlord to accept the rent for the aforesaid period,  

that is to say, after such refusal, the tenant had not deposited the  

rent  in  compliance  with  Section  27  of  the  Act  with  the  Rent  

Controller, it must be held that the tenant had defaulted in payment  

of rent by not depositing the rent, therefore it was a case of second  

default which entails the tenant of eviction.  Strong reliance once  

again was placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the  

decision in Atmaram’s case (Supra).   

11

10. Mr.Gandhi,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent, however, refuted the submission made by the learned  

counsel for the appellants.  He has drawn our attention to Section  

27 of the Act and submits that Section 27 cannot be said to be  

mandatory in nature and only an obligation has been created on  

the tenant either to pay the rent or tender or to deposit the same  

with  the Rent  Controller.  In  the present  case,  admittedly,  tenant  

had tendered the rent to the landlord but he had refused to accept  

the same.  After  such refusal,  it  would be open to  the tenant  to  

deposit the same in the office of the Rent Controller but even if he  

does not do so, non deposit of the rent after such refusal cannot be  

said to be mandatory in nature which entails eviction of the tenant  

on the ground that he has committed second default and, therefore,  

he is liable to be evicted.   It  was further argued by the learned  

counsel for the respondent/tenant that in view of the word  “may”  

used  in  Section  27  of  the  Act  and  the  Act  being  a  beneficial  

legislation for the tenant, it can never be said that the intention of  

the Legislature to use the word “may” was to mean that “may” must  

be construed as “shall”.     

12

11. We  are  unable  to  accept  this  submission  of  the  learned  

counsel for the tenant/respondent for the following reasons :-

It is true that in Section 27 of the Act, it has been provided  

that the tenant may deposit rent when such rent was not accepted  

or refused or no receipt was granted by the landlord or there was  

bonafide doubt as to the person or the persons to whom the rent  

was  payable,  the  tenant  may  deposit  such  rent  with  the  Rent  

Controller in the prescribed manner.   

12. Chapter III deals with Control of Eviction of Tenants. Section  

14 gives a specific  right to the tenants to resist  evictions.  Sub-

section  (2)  of  Section  14  of  the  Act  provides  that  no  order  for  

recovery  of  possession  of  any  premises  shall  be  made  on  the  

grounds specified in Class A of the proviso to sub-section (1) if the  

tenant makes payment or deposit the rent as required by Section  

15.   

13. An overall reading of Chapter III of the Act would clearly show  

that an additional protection has been given by the Legislature to  

the tenant who has committed default in payment of rent for which  

he is liable to be evicted under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. Section  

13

14(1)(a) of the Act clearly provides that when the tenant has neither  

paid  nor  tendered  whole  of  the  arrears  of  the  rent  legally  

recoverable from him within two months from the date of which a  

notice of payment of the arrears of rent has been served on him by  

the landlord in the manner provided in Section 106 of the Transfer  

of Property Act, 1882. A plain reading of sub-section (2) of Section  

14  makes  it  clear  that  a  tenant  is  protected  from eviction  if  he  

makes payment  or  deposits  the rent  as required by Section 15.  

Section 15 deals with cases when a tenant can get the benefit of  

protection against eviction.  

14. Accordingly,  Section  14(1)(a)  is  a  ground for  eviction  of  a  

tenant for default in payment of rent.  In spite of that, protection has  

been given under Section 15 of the Act to the tenant to avail of the  

protection given by the Legislature by depositing rent in the manner  

indicated in Section 15 of the Act.   However, proviso to Section  

14(2) of the Act takes away the right of a tenant of the benefit of  

Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 if the tenant having obtained such  

benefit once in respect of any premises and makes a further default  

in payment of rent of those premises for three consecutive months.  

Therefore, it has been made clear that when the tenant makes a  

14

second  default,  no  protection  can  be  given  to  the  tenant  from  

eviction.   

15.  Chapter IV, however, deals with Deposit of Rent. Section 26  

of the Act provides that if the rent is paid it is the obligation of the  

landlord  to  grant  receipt  for  the  rent  paid  to  him.  In  default  of  

payment of rent within the time specified therein, the tenant is also  

liable to pay simple interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the  

date on which such payment of rent is due to the date on which it is  

paid. The proviso to Section 26(2) of the Act makes it clear that it  

shall be open to the tenant to remit the rent to his landlord by postal  

money  order.  Sub-section  (3)  of  Section  26  also  makes  the  

provision  that  if  the  landlord  or  his  authorized  agent  refuses  or  

neglects to deliver to the tenant a receipt referred to in sub-section  

(2), the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf  

by the tenant within two months from the date of payment and after  

hearing the landlord or  his authorized agent,  by order direct  the  

landlord or his authorized agent to pay to the tenant,  by way of  

damages, such sum not exceeding double the amount of rent paid  

by the tenant and the costs of the application and shall also grant a  

certificate to the tenant in respect of the rent paid. From a reading  

15

of sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the Act, it is clear that the tenant  

has been given further protection to get the rent receipt from the  

landlord and in the event the landlord refuses to grant such receipt,  

the procedure has been clearly made by the Legislature for  the  

purpose of getting the receipt under the Act and at the same time  

the landlord can be imposed to pay damages not exceeding double  

the amount paid by the tenant and the costs of the application and  

to obtain a certificate from the landlord in respect of the rent paid.  

Now  we  come  to  the  most  important  provision  regarding  the  

procedure under the Act to pay or  deposit  or  tender rent  to the  

landlord,  if  he  refuses  to  grant  any  receipt  in  respect  of  the  

payment already made to him. As quoted herein earlier, Section 27  

deals with deposit of rent by the tenant. It clearly says that where  

the landlord does not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within  

the time referred to in Section 26 or refuses or neglects to deliver a  

receipt referred to therein or where there is a bona fide doubt as  

the person or persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may  

deposit  such  rent  with  the  Controller  in  the  prescribed  manner.  

When the words “ bona fide doubt” has been added to Section 27,  

the tenant may remit such rent to the Controller by postal money  

order. From a conjoint reading of this provision referred to herein  

16

above and particularly Section 27 of the Act, in our view, it cannot  

be  doubted  that  the  procedure  having  been  made  by  the  

Legislature how the rent can be deposited if it was refused to have  

been  received  or  to  grant  receipt  for  the  same.  If  that  be  the  

position, if such protection has been given to the tenant, the said  

procedure has to be strictly followed in the matter of taking steps in  

the event of refusal of the landlord to receive the rent or to grant  

receipt to the tenant. It is well settled that whether the word “may”  

shall  be used as “shall”, would depend upon the intention of the  

Legislature.  It is not to be taken that once the word “may” is used  

by the Legislature in Section 27 of the Act, would not mean that the  

intention of the Legislature was only to show that the provisions  

under Section 27 of the Act was directory but not mandatory.   

16. In other words, taking into consideration the object of the Act  

and the intention of the Legislature and in view of the discussions  

made  herein  earlier,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  word  “may”  

occurring  in  Section  27  of  the  Act  must  be  construed  as  a  

mandatory  provision  and  not  a  directory  provision  as  the  word  

“may” , in our view, was used by the Legislature to mean that the  

procedure given in those provisions must be strictly followed as the  

17

special protection has been given to the tenant from eviction.  Such  

a cannon of construction is certainly warranted because otherwise  

intention  of  the  Legislature  would  be  defeated  and  the  class  of  

landlords, for whom also, the beneficial provisions have been made  

for recovery of possession from the tenants on certain grounds, will  

stand deprived of them.   

17. In  Mohan  Singh  and  Ors.  Vs.  International  Airport  

Authority of India and Ors. 1997 (9) SCC 132, this Court while  

dealing with the intention of the Legislature to use the word “may”  

or “shall” observed in paragraph 17 as follows :-

“The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the   language depends upon the language couched in the statute under   consideration  and its  object,  purpose and effect.  The distinction  reflected  in  the  use  of  the  word  "shall"  or  "may"  depends  on  conferment  of  power.  In  the  present  context,  "may"  does  not  always  mean  may.  May  is  a  must  for  enabling  compliance  of   provision  but  there  are  cases in  which,  for  various  reasons,  as  soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the  power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute   creates  a  duty,  the  special  remedy  is  prescribed  for  non- performance of the duty. In "Raise on Statute Law" (7th Edn.) it is   stated  that  the  Court  will,  as  a  general  rule  presume  that  the   appropriate remedy by common law or mandamus for action was  intended  to  apply.  General  rule  of  law  is  that  where  a  general   obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for  violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language  of the statute and consideration of policy at times may, however,   create exception showing that Legislature did not intend a remedy  (generality) to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language.  

18

The language is the medium of expressing the intention and the  object  that  particular  provision  or  the  Act  seeks  the  achieve.   Therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  ascertain  the  intention.  The  word  "shall" is not always decisive. Regard must be had to the context,   subject matter and object of the statutory provision in question in  determining  whether  the  same  is  mandatory  or  directory.  No  universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether  a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory  or directory. It is the duty of Court to try to get at the real intention   of  the Legislature by carefully  analysing the whole scope of  the  statute  or  section  or  a  phrase  under  Consideration.  As  stated  earlier,  the  question  as  to  whether  the  statute  is  mandatory  or   directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not always   upon the language in which the intent is couched. The meaning  and intention of the Legislature would govern design and purpose  the Act seeks to achieve. In "Sutherland Statutory Construction"  (3rd Edn) Volume I at page 81 in paragraph 316, it is stated that   although the problem of mandatory and directory legislation is a  hazard  to  all  governmental  activity,  it  is  peculiarly  hazardous  to  administrative  agencies  because  the  validity  of  their  action  depends upon exercise of authority in accordance with their charter  of  existence  the  statute.  If  the  directions  of  the  statute  are  mandatory,  then  strict  compliance  with  the  statutory  terms  is   essential to the validity of administrative action. But if the language  of the statute is directory only, the variation from its direction does   not invalidate the administrative action. Conversely, if the statutory  direction  is  discretionary  only,  it  may  not  provide  an  adequate  standard for legislative action and the delegation. In "Crawford on  the Construction of Statutes" at page 516, it is stated that:

The question  as  to  whether  a  statute  is  mandatory  or  directory   depends  upon  the  intent  of  the  Legislature  and  not  upon  the   language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention  of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained,   not  only  from  the  phraseology  of  the  provision,  but  also  by  considering  its  nature,  its  design,  and  the  consequences  which  would follow from construing it the one way or the other....”

18. It is not in dispute that in this case, according to the landlord,  

this was a case of second default whereas the case of the tenant  

19

was that since he has already tendered the rent to the landlord,  

who  refused  to  receive  the  same,  he  had  complied  with  the  

provisions of the Act.   The tenant/respondent  had already taken  

protection under the beneficial legislations of the Rent Control Act  

once  and,  therefore,  he  ought  to  have  strictly  followed  the  

procedure given in Section 27 of the Act.   

19. In  Atmaram’s  case  (supra), this  Court  observed  at  

paragraph 19 as under :-

“It will thus appear that this Court has consistently taken the views  that  in  Rent  Control  Legislations if  the  tenant  wishes  to  take  advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Act, he must strictly   comply with the requirements of the Act. If any condition precedent  is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must strictly  comply  with  that  condition.  If  he  fails  to  do  so  he  cannot  take  advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision” (Emphasis  supplied).   

20. Again  in  paragraph  20  of  the  same  decision,  this  Court  

observed as follows :-

“Section 26 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 provides that every  tenant shall pay rent within the time fixed by contract, and in the   absence of such contract, by the fifteenth day of the month next   following  the  month  for  which  it  is  payable.  Every  tenant  who  makes a payment of rent to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain  forthwith from the landlord or his authorized agent a written receipt   for the amount paid to him, signed by the landlord or his authorized  agent. It is also open to the tenant to remit the rent to his landlord  

20

by postal money order. The relevant part of Section 27 of the Act   reads as under:-

"27. Deposit of rent by the tenant - (1) Where the landlord does  not accept any rent tendered by the tenant within the time referred  to in Section 26 or refuses or neglects to deliver a receipt referred   to therein or where there is a bona fide doubt as to the person or   persons to whom the rent is payable, the tenant may deposit such  rent with the Controller in the prescribed manner :

Provided that in cases where there is a bona fide doubt as to the   person or persons to whom the rent is payable,  the tenant may  remit such rent to the Controller by postal money order.”

21. This Court in the aforesaid decision, after examining   Section  

27 of the Act observed at paragraph 21 as follows :-

“The Act, therefore, prescribes what must be done by a tenant if   the  landlord  does  not  accept  rent  tendered  by  him  within  the  specified period. He is required to deposit the rent in the Court of   the Rent Controller giving the necessary particulars as required by  Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  27,  There  is,  therefore,  a  specific   provision which provides the procedure to be followed in such a   contingency. In view of the specific provisions of the Act it would  not be open to a tenant to resort to any other procedure. If the rent  is not deposited in the Court of the Rent Controller as required by  Section 27 of the Act. and is deposited somewhere else, it shall not   be treated as a valid payment/tender of the arrears of rent within   the meaning of the Act and consequently the tenant must be held  to be in default.”

22. In  E. Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (2003) 1 SCC, 123, this  

Court while considering the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings  

(Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, which is similar to the Delhi  

Rent Control Act, observed at paragraph 4, 5 & 8 as follows :-

21

“4.  It  would  be  seen  from  the  above  provisions  that  while  the  landlord  is  required  to  issue  a  notice  of  default,  on  refusal  by  landlord  to  accept  rent,  the  tenant  is  required  to  call  upon  the   landlord by way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which  rent could be deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If   the landlord specify the name of the Bank to deposit the rent, there   is an obligation on the part of the tenant to make the deposit of   arrears of rent in the account of landlord. However, if the landlord   does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being called upon   by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the   amount  of  arrears  through  a  money  order  to  the  landlord  after   deducting  the  commission  payable  on  the  money  order.  If  the  landlord still refuses to accept the rent, the tenant is entitled to file   an application  before  the  Rent  Controller  seeking  permission  to   deposit the arrears of rent under Sub-section (5) of Section 8  of   the Act.

5.  Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellants argued  that since the appellants-tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in   Court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act.   This  would  mean  there  is  no  default  on  the  part  of  tenant  in  payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been   passed against  the appellants  on that  ground.  According to  the  learned counsel, the Court should not take a technical view of the   matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of   the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that   the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to deposit   the  arrears  of  rent.  Since  there  is  a  substantial  compliance  of   Section 8  in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in   Court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by   the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  by  the  learned  counsel.  The  rent   legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the  same  time,  it  is  well-settled  that  the  benefits  conferred  on  the  tenants through the relevant statues can be enjoyed only on the  basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable  consideration have no place in such matters. The statute contains   express provisions. It  prescribes various steps which a tenant is   required  to  take.  In  Section  8  of  the  Act,  the  procedure  to  be   followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a  

22

pre-condition  for  the  next  step.  The  tenant  has  to  observe  the   procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the   procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to  the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come  only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are  fortified  in  this  view by  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Kuldeep  Singh v. Ganpat Lal and Anr. 1996 (1) SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar  v. J. Venkatarama Naidu 1996 (6) SCC 228..  

8.   Admittedly  the  tenant  did  not  follow  the  procedure   prescribed  under  Section  8.   The  only  submission  that  was  advanced on behalf of the appellants was that since the deposit of   rent  had been made, a lenient  view ought  to be taken.  We are  unable  to  agree  with  this.  The  appellants  failed  to  satisfy  the  conditions contained in Section8. Mere refusal of the landlord to   receive rent cannot justify the action of the tenant in straightaway  invoking Section 8(5)  of the Act without following the procedure   contained in the earlier sub-sections i.e. Sub-sections (2), (3) and  (4) of Section8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the   eviction order passed against appellants with respect of  the suit   premises on the ground of default  in payment of arrears of rent   need no interference.”

23. Applying the principles laid down in Atmaram’s case (Supra),  

as noted herein earlier, and the decision in E. Palanisamy (Supra)  

and in view of our discussions made herein earlier and  considering  

the object of the Act and the intention of the Legislature, we are in  

respectful agreement with the observations made by this Court in  

the aforesaid two decisions.  In our view, similar facts had arisen in  

the present case.   

24. It is not in dispute that the tenant/respondent had availed the  

benefit  of  Section  14(2)  of  the  Act  by  its  order  dated  3rd of  

23

December, 2001 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.  

Since  we  have  already  come  to  the  conclusion  that  since  the  

tenant/respondent  has  failed  to  deposit  rent  in  compliance  with  

Section  27  of  the  Act  because  in  the  present  case,  admittedly,  

landlord/appellants  had  not  accepted  any  rent  tendered  by  the  

tenant/respondent within the time referred to in Section 26, it was  

the  duty  of  the  tenant  to  deposit  such  rent  before  the  Rent  

Controller as prescribed in Section 27 of the Act.  Admittedly, this  

step was not taken by the respondent which is mandatory in nature  

and,  therefore,  we  must  hold  that  the  tenant/respondent  had  

committed a second default in payment of rent and is, therefore,  

liable to be evicted from the suit premises.   

25. In view of our discussions made hereinabove and considering  

the scope and object of the Act and the provisions of the same, we  

are of the view that the word “may” in the context of the Act, shall  

be construed as “shall” and therefore, the tenant shall deposit the  

rent after refusal by the landlord and, accordingly, having not done  

so, he is liable to be evicted.   

26. That being the position, we are unable to sustain the order of  

the High Court and are of the view that the High Court  was not  

24

correct in holding that the tenant/respondent had not failed to pay  

or tender arrears of rent for the period mentioned herein earlier.  

27. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High  

Court  is  set  aside  and  since  the  tenant/respondent  having  

committed  second  default  for  which  he  is  not  entitled  to  be  

protected under the Act, the order of eviction passed by the Rent  

Controller must be restored.   

28.      Accordingly, the appeal is allowed.  The impugned order of  

the High Court is set aside and that of the Additional Rent Control  

Tribunal is restored.  There will be no order as to costs.             29.

   Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we  

grant six months time to the respondent to deliver peaceful actual  

physical possession of the suit premises subject to filing of a usual  

undertaking in this Court within a month from this date.  

                 ………………..…..J.                                         [Tarun Chatterjee]

  New Delhi;   ….………………….J.

  July 08, 2009.                      [H.L.Dattu]   

25