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PETITIONER: SARDAR SOMA SINGH AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PEPSU AND UNION OF INDIA.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/1954

BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN BENCH: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN MAHAJAN, MEHAR CHAND (CJ) MUKHERJEA, B.K. BOSE, VIVIAN HASAN, GHULAM

CITATION:  1954 AIR  311            1954 SCR  955  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 191  (16)  R          1968 SC 331  (14)

ACT:  Constitution  of  India, art. 286 (3)-The Patiala  and  East  Punjab  States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006  (XXX  III of 2006)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: Held, that the Patiala and East ’Punjab States Union General Sales Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No.  XXXIII of 2006)  promulgated on  6th November, 1949, is not ultra vires art. 286  (3)  of the Constitution. Clause (3) of art. 286 contemplates a post-Constitution law, for  it  must be a law made by a "Legislature  of  a  State" which  must refer to the Legislature of a State  created  by the Constitution.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petition No. 325 of 1953. Petition  to  the  Supreme Court, under  article,32  of  the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights. S.   P.   Sinha  (Bakshi  Man  Singh,  with  him)  for   the petitioners. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India and J.   N. Kaushal (P.  G. Gokhale, with them) for respondent No. 1. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A.   Mehta and P. G Gokhale, with him) for respondent No. 2. 956 1954.  March 11.  ’the Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS J.-The short point raised on this petition filed in this court  under article 32 of the Constitution is  whether  the Patiala  and  East  Punjab States Union  General  Sales  Tax Ordinance, 2006 (No.  XXXIII of 2006) which was  promulgated on the 6th November, 1949, has become void since the date of the commencement of the Constitution.

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Article 286(3) of the Constitution of India runs as  follows :- "  286.  (3)  No  law made by the  Legislature  of  a  State imposing,  or  authorising the imposition of, a tax  on  the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared  by Parliament  by  law  to be essential for  the  life  of  the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved  for the  consideration  of the President and  has  received  his assent." The  Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of  Tax  on Sale  or Purchase) Act, 1952 (Central Act No. LII  of  1952) declared  certain commodities as essential for the  life  of the  community.  In the schedule appended to the Act item  8 relates to "all cloth, woven on handlooms, coarse and medium cotton cloth made in mills or woven on power looms." Section 3 of the same Act provides as follows:- "3.  Regulation  of tax on ’sale or  purchase  of  essential goods: No law made after the commencement of this Act by the Legislature   of  a  State  imposing,  or  authorising   the imposition  of, a tax on the sale or purchase of  any  goods declared  by this Act to be essential for the life’  of  the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved  for the  consideration  of the President and  has  received  his assent." The petitioners are dealers in coarse cloth and medium cloth and  their contention is that these commodities having  been declared  as essential, for the life of the  community  they are not liable to pay sales tax on them.  In the petition an allegation has been’ made that section 3 of Act LII of  1952 is  in  direct  contravention  of  article  286(3)  of   the Constitution.  There 957 does  not  appear to be any substance  in  this  contention. Section  3  is in line with article 286(3) and there  is  no inconsistency   between  that  section  and   the   relevant provision  of the Constitution.  The petitioners are  sought to be taxed under the Ordinance XXXIII of 2006, which, as an existing  law,  has  been continued  by  article  372.   The question   is   whether  that  Ordinance   contravenes   the provisions  of  article 286(3) or has  since  been  altered, repealed or amended by any competent legislative authority.. It is quite clear that section 3 of Act LII of 1952 does not affect the Ordinance’, for the Ordinance was not made  after the commencement of that Act.  The only question, therefore, is  whether  the  Ordinance runs counter to  clause  (8)  of article  286 of the Constitution.  A perusal of that  clause will  at  once  indicate that clause  contemplates  a  post- Constitution  law,  for  it  must be a  law  made  by  a  "I Legislature of a State " which must refer to the Legislature of  a State created by the Constitution.  Further, and  what is  more important, it contemplates a law which can  be  but has not been reserved for the consideration of the President and  has  not received his assent.  This  provision  clearly points  to  post-Constitution  law,  for  there  can  be  no question  of an existing law continued by article 372  being reserved   for  the  consideration  of  the  President   for receiving   his  assent.   As  we  are  concerned  in   this application with a pre-Constitution law, it is not necessary for  us  to  express  any opinion  as  to  the  validity  or otherwise  of  a  law made after  the  commencement  of  the Constitution but before the coming into operation of Act LII of 1952. The result, therefore, is that there is no substance in this petition and we dismiss it with costs. Petition dimissed.

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Agent for the petitioners: Sardar Singh. Agent for respondent No. 1: R. H. Dhebar. 124                             958