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PETITIONER: SARDAR SARUP SINGH & OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/04/1959

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1959 AIR  860            1959 SCR  Supl. (2) 499

ACT: Fundamental rights, violation of Sikh Gurdwaras-Election  of Gurdwara  Board-Statutory Provision therefor,  when  affects religion-Direct  election  by  entire  Sikh  Community,   if essential  "Matters of religion," Meaning of-Sikh  Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab 8 Of 1925), as amended by Punjab Act 1  of 1959,  ss. 43, 43A, 148B-Constitution of India, Art.  26(b), (d).

HEADNOTE: In  1925  the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925,  was  passed,  inter alia,   for  the  better  administration  of  certain   Sikh Gurdwaras,  and after the merger of the erstwhile  State  of Patiala and the East Punjab States Union, called Pepsu, with the  State  of  Punjab,  the Act was  amended  by  the  Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act, 1959, in order to extend the  Act to the area which was formerly within Pepsu.  Under s. 43 of the  Act,  before it was amended in 959, a  Board  had  been constituted, called the Sikh (1)  (1940) I.L.R. 22 Lah. 22. 500 Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee, to act as the  committee  of management  in respect of some of the principal  Sikh  Gurd- waras  and  in addition to exercise control,  direction  and general superintendence over all committees appointed  under the  provisions  of the Act ; the Board consisted  of  three categories  of  members,  namely (1)  elected  members,  (2) certain designated members, and (3) co-opted members,  which included persons residing in Pepsu and other parts of India. By  the Amending Act of 1959, S- 148B was added to the  main Act,  which provided: " (1) As from the commencement of  the Amending  Act,  in  addition to the  members  of  the  Board constituted under S. 43  (a)  every person in  the  extended territories who immediately   before the commencement of the Amending Act, is a member of  the  Interim  Gurdwara  Board, Patiala,  constituted  by Punjab Government shall be  deemed to  be a member of the Board, constituted under s. 43 ;  and (b)  thirty-five Sikhs including six Sikhs belonging to  the Scheduled  Castes residents in the extended territories  who

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shall  be elected by the persons specified in sub-s. (2)  in accordance  with the rules made in this behalf by the  State Government, shall become the members of the Board.......". The  petitioners  who profess and practice  the  Sikh  faith filed   a  petition  under  Art.  32  Of  the   Constitution challenging  the constitutional validity of s. 148B  on  the ground  that  the  section violated  the  fundamental  right granted  under  Art.  26(b) of  the  Constitution  to  every religious denomination or any section thereof including  the Sikh denomination " to manage its own affairs in matters  of religion".   They  contended,  inter  alia,  (1)  that   the amending  Act  of  1959  was  passed  with  a  view  that  a particular  group of Sikhs might not regain the majority  it had  lost on November 16, 1958, when the annual election  of the  Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee was held;  (2)  that the  members  of the Interim Board, Patiala,  who  under  s. 148B(1)(a) are deemed to be members of the Board constituted under  s.  43,  were appointed  under  a  Punjab  Government notification,  and being merely nominees of  Government  did not represent the Sikh Community; that under s. 148B thirty- five  Sikhs from the extended area were introduced into  the Board by means of an indirect method, that is, by a  limited Sikh  electorate,  the members of which electorate  were  in their turn elected by Sikhs as well as non-Sikhs ; that  the right  guaranteed under Art. 26(b) was given to all  members of the Sikh denomination to manage Sikh Gurdwaras, that  the right  must be exercised by all Sikhs who alone  must  elect their  representatives  and  that the  introduction  of  new members   into  the  Board  in  respect  of   the   extended territories in the manner envisaged by S. 148B, violated  by itself  the right of the Sikhs in a matter of  religion  and constituted an infringement of their fundamental right under Art. 26(b). Held : (1) that in considering the question as to whether a 501 provision of law is constitutionally valid, the court cannot be called upon to embark on an enquiry into public policy or investigate  into questions of political wisdom or  even  to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a  law which it is otherwise competent to make ; (2)  that a direct election by the entire Sikh Community  in the  management  of  Gurdwaras  is  not  part  of  the  Sikh religion; and, (3)  that  the  method of representation  for  the  extended areas  under s. 148B of the Act was an arrangement  dictated merely by considerations of convenience and expediency,  and did not involve any principle of religion. Accordingly,  s. I48B of the Act (-lid not affect "  matters of  religion  "  within the meaning of  Art.  26(b)  of  the Constitution   and  consequently  did  not  contravene   the fundamental right under that Article. The Commissioner, Hindu, Religious Endowments, Madyas v  Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha  Swamiar  of Sri  Shirur  Mutt,  [1954] S.C.R.  1005  and Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The  State  of Mysore; [1958] S.C.R. 895, referred to.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 13 of 1959. Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. Harnam Singh and Sadhu Singh, for the petitioners. S.   M.  Sikri,  Advocate-Gencral for the State  of  Punjab, Gopal Singh and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1.

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1959, April 1. The judgment-of the Court was delivered by S.   K.  DAS,  J.-This is a petition under Art.  32  of  the Constitution   in  which  the  petitioners   challenge   the constitutional  validity of s. 148-B of the  Sikh  Gurdwaras Act,  1925  (Punjab VIII of 1925),  hereinafter  called  the principal  Act,  the said section having been added  to  the principal  Act by the Sikh Gurdwaras (Amendment) Act,  1959, hereinafter   called   the  amending  Act  of   1959.    The petitioners  profess  and practice the Sikh faith  and  they allege  that  they  are interested in  the  maintenance  and management  of Sikh Gurdwaras, scheduled and notified  under the  principal Act.  Their main contention is that s.  148-B violates  the fundamental right granted under Art. 26(b)  of the  Constitution  to every religious  denomination  or  any section thereof including the Sikh denomination, " to 502 manage  its  own  affairs  in matters  of  religion  ".  The respondents  to  the  petition are, firstly,  the  State  of Punjab  and, secondly,, President and twelve members of  the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, who under cl. (a) of sub-s. (1)  of s. 148-B shall be deemed to be members of the  Board constituted under s. 43 of the principal Act.  That Board is now  known  by  the name of  the  Sikh  Gurdwara  Prabandhak Committee.  The application has been contested before us  by respondent  No. 1 only, namely, the State of Punjab, on  the ground  that  s.  148-B does not, in any  way,  violate  the fundamental  right  granted  to  the  petitioners  or  other members  of  the Sikh denomination under Art. 26(b)  of  the Constitution.     Therefore,   the   only    question    for consideration before us is if S. 148-B of the principal  Act does or does not contravene the fundamental right granted to the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution. We shall presently set out the provisions of s. 148- B   and also  of some other relevant sections of the principal  Act. But before we do that, it is necessary to state a few  facts with regard to the passing of the amending Act of 1959.   It has  been  stated before us that in or about the  year  1919 there  was  considerable  unrest amongst the  Sikhs  in  the Punjab  in respect of the management of their gurdwaras  and shrines,  and in 1922 an Act called the Sikh  Gurdwaras  and Shrines  Act was passed; this did not satisfy the Sikhs  and in  1925  the  principal Act was  passed,  as  its  preamble states,  "  for the better administration  of  certain  Sikh gurdwaras  and for enquiries into matters and settlement  of disputes  connected  therewith  ".  The  principal  Act  was amended  from time to time.  On November 1, 1956, there  was merger of the erstwhile State of Patiala and the East Punjab States  Union  (hereafter called Pepsu in  brief)  with  the State  of Punjab.  Sometime in February 1957 the  Government of  the State of Punjab appointed an advisory  committee  to report as to whether the principal Act should be extended to the area which was formerly within Pepsu.  In September 1957 the  committee recommended in favour of such extension.   On April 8, 1958, a bill called the Sikh 503 Gurdwaras  (Amendment)  Bill, 1958, was  introduced  in  the Punjab  Vidhan Sabha and the Bill was sent to  the  regional committees  constituted by an order of the President  called the  Punjab Regional Committees Order, 1957, made under  el. (1)   of  Art.  371  of  the  Constitution.   The   regional committees   dealt   with   the  Bill   and   made   certain recommendations.  For the purposes of the application before us, it is unnecessary to go into details of the  proceedings before  the regional committees.  Sometime in November  1958 there  was  a meeting of the Sikh Gurdwara  Prabandbak  Com-

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mittee  for  the purpose of the  annual  election.   Learned counsel  for  the petitioners has stated before us  that  at this  meeting  there was a majority by a very  small  margin (three votes only) in favour of a particular group of  Sikhs and  against  another group known as the "  Shiromoni  Akali Dal".   Within  one week, however, a notice  was  given  for calling a meeting to consider the provisions of the amending Bill;  this meeting could not, however, be held as an  order of   stay   was  obtained  from  the   Judicial   Commission constituted  under  the principal Act.  In December  1958  a special session of the Vidhan Sabha was summoned to consider the  amending Bill.  It has been stated that originally  the amending  Bill did not contain provisions like  those  later embodied in s. 148-B.  The Bill was accordingly sent back to the  regional  committees  and on  December  27,  1958,  the regional committees submitted a final report and recommended the  addition  of provisions which subsequently  became  the provisions of s. 148-B of the principal Act.  It may be here stated  that even in the regional committees there was  some opposition  to the provisions in question.  On December  31, 1958,  the  Bill  was passed by the  Vidhan  Sabha,  and  on January  3, 1959, it was passed by the Legislative  Council. On  January 8, 1959, it received the assent of the  Governor and  became Punjab Act No. 1 of 1959, which is the  Amending Act  of  1959.  It came into force at once  and  some  rules under  the Act were made a few days after.  On  February  2, 1959,  the  present petition was filed and on  February  14, 1959, the election of 35 Sikhs contemplated under el. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 148-B was completed. 504 It  is necessary at this stage to refer to some of  the  old provisions  of the principal Act as also the new  provisions added by the amending Act of 1959.  The Board which is known as  the  Sikh  Gurdwara Prabandhak  Committee  acts  as  the committee of management in respect of some of the  principal Sikh  gurdwaras;  in  addition,  it also  has  the  duty  of ensuring  that every committee of management deals with  the property and -income of the gurdwara or gurdwaras managed by it in accordance with the provisions of the Act and for  the fulfilment of this duty it exercises control, direction  and general superintendence over all committees appointed  under the provisions of the principal Act (see s. 125).  The Board is  constituted under s. 43 of the principal Act.   Previous to the passing of Punjab Act No. 44 of 1953, s. 43 said that the Board shall consist of (i) 84 elected members, (ii)  the bead  ministers of certain well-known Sikh gurdwaras,  (iii) 12 members nominated by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu and (iv)  17 members  resident in India of whom not more than four  shall be residents in Punjab, co-opted by the members of the Board as  described  in (i), (ii) and (iii) above.   In  1953  was passed Punjab Act No. 44 of 1953 and s. 43 of the  principal Act was amended.  The amended section was in these terms:- " S. 43. (1) The Board shall consist of- (i)  one hundred and thirty-two elected members; (ii) the  head ministers of the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar,  and the following four Takhts, namely,the Sri Akali Takht Sahib, Amritsar,  the  Sri Takht Kesgarh Sahib, Anandpur,  the  Sri Takht  Patna  Sahib, Patna, and the Sri Takht  Nazur  Sahib, Hyderabad Deccan ; and (iii)twenty-five members resident in India of whom at  least twelve  shall be residents of Pepsu, at least nine of  other parts of India than Punjab and Pepsu and not more than  four of Punjab, co-opted by the members of the Board as described in clauses (1) and (ii). (2).............."

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It would thus appear that after the passing of Punjab 505 Act  No.  44  of  1953 the Board  consisted  of  only  three categories  of  members, namely, (1)  elected  members,  (2) certain  designated  members and (3)  25  co-opted  members. Now, we come to s. 148-B which was added by the amending Act of  1959.  That section in so far as it is material for  our purpose is in these terms :- "  S.  148-B. (1) As from the commencement of  the  Amending Act,  in  addition to the members of the  Board  constituted under section 43 and till the next election of the new Board under section 43-A- (a)every person in the extended territories who, immediately before the commencement of the Amending Act, is a member  of the  Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, constituted by  Punjab Government, Home Department, Notification No.  18-Gurdwaras, dated the 10th January, 1958, shall be deemed to be a member of the Board, constituted under section 43; and (b)thirty-five  Sikhs including six Sikhs belonging  to  the Scheduled  Castes residents in the extended territories,  to be  divided among different districts thereof in  proportion to  the Sikh population of each district in  the  prescribed manner, who shall, within forty days of the commencement  of the  Amending  Act, be elected by the persons  specified  in subsection  (2)  in accordance with the rules made  in  this behalf by the State Government, shall become the members  of the Board from the date specified in subsection (3). (2)  The  thirty-five persons referred to in clause  (b)  of sub-section (1) shall be elected by- (i)  the  persons  who are deemed to be the members  of  the Board under clause (a) of-sub-section (1) ; (ii) the  twelve  members of the Board  being  residents  of Pepsu as are referred to in clause (iii) of sub-section  (1) of section 43; (iii)     the sitting Sikh members of Parliament and the two Houses  of State Legislature returned from any  constituency or part thereof from the extended territories; (iv) the  Sikh  members  of  Municipal  Committees  in   the extended territories; 64 506 (v)the  Presidents or Chairmen of such Singh Sabhas and  the Managers   or   Secretaries   of   such   Sikh   educational institutions   or  Sikh  religious  organisations   as   are registered  on  or  before the 1st December,  1958,  in  the extended territories; and (vi) the  Sikh Sarpanches and Sikh Nayay Pardhans  of  Nagar Panchayats and Panchayati Adalats, respectively: Provided  that the electors under clauses (iii),  (iv),  (v) and  (vi) are not disqualified under the proviso to  section 49 of the Act. (3) ........................ (4) ........................ (5) ........................" It  is worthy of note here that s. 148-B occurs  in  chapter XII-A  and  the heading of the chapter is  "  Temporary  and Transitional  Provisions  " which indicates  clearly  enough that the provisions in sections 148-B to 148-F ate temporary and transitional provisions.  It has been stated at the  Bar that  in about a year, a fresh election of the Board is  due under s. 43-A, and the temporary and transitional provisions in chapter XII-A are to be in force only for the intervening period.   Section 43-A which was also added by the  amending Act of 1959 says - "S.  43-A.  (1) Whenever a new Board within the  meaning  of

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section 51 is constituted, it shall consist of- (i)  one hundred and forty elected members; (ii) the  Head Ministers of the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar,  and the  following four Takhats, namely :- the Sri Takhat Sahib, Amritsar, the  Sri  Takhat Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur, the Sri Takhat Patna Sahib, Patna, and the  Sri  Takhat  Hazur Sahib,  Nanded;  and (iii)  fifteen  members resident in India, of whom not  more than  five  shall  be residents of Punjab,  coopted  by  the members of the Board as described in clauses (i) and (ii). (2)  The  State Government shall, as soon as may be, call  a meeting of the members of the Board described in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) for the 507 purpose  of co-opting the members described in clause  (iii) of  that  sub-section, and after the members have  been  co- opted,  the  State Government shall notify the fact  of  the Board  having  been  duly constituted and the  date  of  the publication  of the notification shall be deemed to  be  the date of the constitution of the Board." Thus,  the new or permanent Board which will be  constituted under  s.  43-A will consist of (1) one  hundred  and  forty elected  members,  (2)  five  designated  members,  and  (3) fifteen co-opted members, and there will be no room for  any nominated  members therein.  The petitioners have raised  no objections to the constitution of the Board under s. 43-  A; all their objections are confined to the constitution of the Board  under  s.  148-B,  even  though  it  is  a  transient provision for the transitional period only. What  then are these objections, in so far as they  bear  on the alleged violation of the petitioners’ fundamental  right under Art. 26 (b) of the Constitution ? Learned  counsel for the petitioners has first commented  on what  he  has characterised as undue haste  in  passing  the amending Act of 1959.  He has submitted that the Pepsu  area came  within the State of Punjab in November, 1956, and  for about  two years, the Punjab Government evinced  no  serious anxiety  to extend the principal Act to that area; but  from November  16,  1958, when the annual election  of  the  Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee was held, up to January, 1959, when   the  amending  Act  of  1959  was   passed,   hurried proceedings were taken to enact the amending law in question and so constitute the Board that a particular group of Sikhs might  not regain the majority it had lost on  November  16, 1958.   In  our  opinion these submissions (we  do  not  say whether  they  are right or wrong) have no  hearing  on  the question  at  issue  before us.  The  petitioners  have  not specifically  alleged  in  their  petition  that  the  State Government  has acted in any mala fide manner; and  whatever justification  some people may feel in their  criticisms  of the   political  wisdom  of  a  particular  legislative   or executive action, this Court cannot be called 508 upon  to  embark  on  an  enquiry  into  -public  policy  or investigate  into questions of political wisdom or even  -to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a  law which it is otherwise competent to make.  We do not say that in pronouncing on the rights of the parties before it,  this Court  must  always  stand aloof on the  chill  and  distant heights of abstract logic and pay no heed to the great tides and  currents which move society and men.  If and  when  the occasion demands, for example, when there is violation of  a fundamental  right guaranteed by the Constitution,  it  will never  hesitate to act.  But it is well to remember  that  a

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fundamental  right,  such as freedom of religion, is  of  an enduring  character  and  must stand  beyond  the  sweep  of changing  and  deflecting forces of  current  opinion.   Our limited function in this case, therefore, is to examine  the constitutionality of s. 148-B, and to that task we must  now confine our attention. The main argument of learned counsel for the petitioners  is that  Art. 26(b) gives to every religious  denomination,  or any  section thereof, the right " to manage its own  affairs in  matters of religion " and the right is subject  only  to public order, morality and health.  In this case,  according to  him,  the  right is given to all  members  of  the  Sikh denomination  and not to any particular members thereof,  to manage  Sikh  gurdwaras  ;  therefore,  the  right  must  be exercised  by  all Sikhs, and they alone  must  elect  their representatives to manage Sikh gurdwaras; and to the  extent that s. 148-B departs from the aforesaid principle, it  con- stitutes  an  infringement of the right  guaranteed  to  the petitioners under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution. We  are unable to accept this argument as correct.   Article 26  of  the Constitution, so far as it is relevant  for  our purpose, says- "  Art. 26.  Subject to public order, morality  and  health, every  religious denomination or any section  thereof  shall have the right (a)........................... (b)  to manage its own affairs in matters of religion 509 (d)  to administer such property in accordance with law. The  distinction  between cls. (b) and (d)  strikes  one  at once.   So  far as administration of its  property  is  con- cerned,  the  right  of a religious denomination  is  to  be exercised  in " accordance with law ", but there is no  such qualification  in  el.  (b).   In  The  COmmissioner,  Hindu Religious  Endowments,  Madras v.  Sri  Lakshmindra  Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1), this distinction was pointed out  by  this  Court  and  it  was  there  observed:  "  The administration  of its property by a religious  denomination has  thus been placed OD a different footing from the  right to manage its own affairs in matter of religion.  The latter is  a fundamental right which no legislature can take  away, whereas  the  former  can be regulated  by  laws  which  the legislature  can validly impose ". Secondly, the  expression used  in cl. (b) is ’in matters of religion’. In what  sense has the word ’religion ’ been used ?  This was considered in two  decisions  of  this  Court:  The  Commissioner,   Hindu Religious  Endowments,  Madras v.  Sri  Lakshmindra  Thirtha Swamiar  of Sri Shiru Mutt (1) and Sri Venkataramana  Devaru v. The State of Mysore (2), and it was hold that freedom  of religion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs  only, but extends to essential religious  practices as well  subject to the restrictions which the  Constitution has  laid  down.   In  The  Commissioner,  Hindu   Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur  Mutt (1) it was observed at p. 1026 that under  Art. 26(b),  a  religious  denomination  or  Organisation  enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of  the religion they hold (we emphasise here the word ’essential’). The  same  emphasis was laid in the later  decision  of  Sri Venkataramana  Devaru v. The State of Mysore (2),  where  it was  said  that matters of religion in  Art.  26(b)  include practices which are regarded by the community as part of its religion.  Two questions, therefore, (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1005,1023, 1026.

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(2) [1958] S.C.R. 895. 510 arise in connection with the argument of learned counsel for the  petitioners: (1) does s. 148-B added to  the  principal Act  by  the  amending Act of 1959 have  reference  only  to administration of property of Sikh gurdwaras and, therefore, must be judged by cl. (d) of Art. 26 or (2) does it affect ’ matters  of religion’ within the meaning of cl. (b)  of  the said Article ? The  argument  on  behalf of the  petitioners  is  that  the principal  Act to which s. 148_B has been added relates  not merely to administration of properties of Sikh gurdwaras but also to matters of religion and in so far as s. 148-B brings in  new  members into the Board, it affects Sikhs  in  their religious affairs.  The argument on behalf of the respondent State is that matters of religion in the sense of  essential beliefs  and practices of the Sikh faith are left  untouched by  s.  148-B,  and  even other  relevant  sections  of  the principal Act do not interfere with Sikh religion.  In  this connection,  our attention has been drawn to the  provisions in Ch.  X which deal with the powers and duties of the Board and to those in Ch.  XI which deal with powers and duties of Committees.  Section 125, to which we have already referred, states  that the duty of the Board is to ensure  that  every Committee deals with the property and income of the gurdwara or gurdwaras it manages in accordance with the provisions of the Act and in fulfilment of that duty, the Board has vested in  it control, direction and general  superintendence  over all  committees appointed under the provisions of  the  Act. Section 129 states- " S. 129.  The Board in any meeting may consider and discuss any  matter with which it has power under this Act  to  deal and  any matter directly connected with the  Sikh  religion, but shall not consider or discuss, or pass any resolution or order upon, any other matter.  " If s. 129 is read subject to s. 125 as the learned Advocate- General  for the State contends it should be read, then  the powers  and  duties of the Board, in substance  and  effect, relate to administration of gurdwara properties and  matters ancillary thereto.  They have 511 hardly any reference to ’ matters of religion ’. Section 133 states  generally the powers of Committees, and one  of  the powers   is  I  enforcing  the  proper  observance  of   all ceremonies and religious observances in connexion with  such gurdwara or gurdwaras and of taking all such measures as may be necessary to ensure the proper management of the gurdwara or  gurdwaras  and  the  efficient  administration  of   the property,  income and endowments thereof.’  Learned  counsel for the petitioners has emphasised that part of the  section which  relates to I proper observance of all ceremonies  and religious  observances’ and has contended that as the  Board is  the  committee  in  respect of  some  of  the  principal gurdwaras, it has a duty to ensure proper observance of  all essential  religious  ceremonies of the  Sikh  faith,  which according to him is a I matter of religion’.  Under s.  134, the  -Committee has power inter alia to dismiss  an  office- holder  or minister, if he fails in the performance of  ’any rituals  and ceremonies in accordance with the teachings  Of Sri  Guru Granth Sahib ’ or has ceased to be a Sikh ; it  is contended  that  this  power also relates to  a  ’matter  of religion’ within the meaning of Art. 26(b). Without  a  fuller  and more  detailed  examination  of  the provisions  of  the principal Act we hesitate  to  pronounce finally  on  the  larger  question  if  any  of  the   other

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provisions of the principal Act affect matters of religion ; nor do we think it necessary to decide that larger  question in  the present case.  We are of the view that  the  present petition  can  be decided on a shorter ground,  even  if  we proceed on the assumption that some of the provisions of the principal  Act relate to matters of religion and the  Board, either acting in exercise of its power of control, direction and superintendence over other committees or in its capacity as  the  committee for certain gurdwaras,  can  pass  orders about matters of religion.  We may point out, however,  that the  preamble  of  the principal Act indicates  that  it  is mainly  a  law to provide for the better  administration  of certain Sikh gurdwaras and it is admitted that in so far  as the  powers  of the Board relate to mere  administration  of gurdwara properties in either 512 of  its  two  capacities, such  administration  must  be  in accordance with law, and the appropriate legislature can lay down what the law should be.  The question which is decisive of  the  present  petition is-does  s.  148-B  interfere  in matters of religion ? Sections 133 and 134 of the  principal Act are not impugned before us; what is impugned is s.  148- B.  That section has not in any way affected whatever powers the  Board  or Committee has under ss. 133 and  134  of  the principal  Act.   The gravamen of the  objections  urged  on behalf  of the petitioners is that s. 148-B introduces  even though  as  a temporary measure, some more  designated  Sikh Members into the Board by cl. (a) of sub.s. (1) thereof  and further  introduces the election of thirty-five Sikhs  (from the  Pepsu  area)  into the Board by means  of  an  indirect method,  that is, by a limited Sikh electorate, the  members of  which electorate are in their turn elected by  Sikhs  as well  as non Sikhs.  In order to establish their  case,  the petitioners  must prove not merely that some  provisions  Of the principal Act refer to matters of religion, but that the introduction of new members into the Board in respect of the extended  territories  of  the Pepsu  area,  in  the  manner envisaged  by s. 148-B, violates by itself the right of  the Sikhs  in  a matter of religion.  Learned  counsel  for  the petitioners  is  thus  forced to take up the  stand  that  a direct  election of the members of the Board by  the  entire Sikh community is itself a matter of the Sikh religion  and, therefore, part of the content of the right Guaranteed under Art. 26(b).  We do not think that such a stand is correct or justified  by  Art.  26 of the  Constitution:  nor  has  any authoritative  text  been placed before us to  show  that  a direct  election  by  the  entire  Sikh  community  in   the management  of gurdwaras is part of the Sikh religion.   The principal Act, as it stood before the amending, Act of 1959, does  not  support any such contention.  However  great  our respect  may  be  for the  democratic  principle  of  direct elections  we  do  not  think  that  having  regard  to  the provisions  of’ the principal Act and the  circumstances  in which  s. 148-B came to be added thereto, the  principle  of direct 513 election on universal denominational suffrage can be  raised to the pedestal of religion within the meaning of Art. 26(b) of  the  Constitution.  If it were so raised, then  the  co- option of some members which has not been challenged by  the petitioners  would  also be violative of  their  fundamental right;  so also any restrictions which the principal Act  or the  rules  made  thereunder may impose  in  the  matter  of election or the exercise of the vote, such as,  restrictions with regard to the age of the voter, etc.  Obviously,  these

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are  not matters of religion and we say without meaning  any offence  to  anybody  that  to treat  these  as  matters  of religion  is tantamount to confusing religion  with  current politics. It is to be remembered that the principal Act constituted  a Board  representative  of the Sikhs both inside  Punjab  and outside  it;  that is why in the constitution of  the  Board there was provision for election, nomination, designation of the head ministers of certain principal Sikh gurdwaras,  and also co-option.  The purpose obviously was to make the Board as representative as possible, and because an Act passed  by the Punjab legislature could not contain provisions for  the election of members from constituencies outside the  Punjab, there  arose the necessity for nomination,  designation  and co-option.   The  designation of the head ministers  of  the five  principal Sikh shrines may be also attributed  to  the reason that they were important functionaries who should  be on  the Board.  In 1953, nomination was done away  with  and the number of co-opted members was increased to  twentyfive, of whom at least twelve were to be residents of Pepsu.  This was even before the principal Act was extended to the  Pepsu area.  When the amending Act of 1959 extended the  principal Act  to the Pepsu area, the problem at once arose as to  how to  give  some representation to the Sikhs in  the  extended areas,  for the intervening period before the next  election of  the  Board, and also as a permanent  measure:  s.  148-B gives  representation to those areas as an  interim  measure and s. 43-A as a permanent measure.  Considering s. 148-B in the light of these circumstances, we 65 514 are unable to hold that it violates the fundamental right of the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.  The  method of representation for the extended areas during the  interim period appears to us to be an arrangement dictated merely by considerations  of convenience and expediency, and does  not involve  any principle of religion.  The question before  us is  not whether a more satisfactory arrangement  could  have been  made even for the interim period ; perhaps,  it  could have been.  Learned counsel for the petitioners has  pointed out  that many Sikhs of influence and standing in the  Pepsu area will have no vote for the interim period.  That may  be unfortunate,  but  is  not  a  relevant  consideration   for determining  the question before us, namely,  whether  there has been interference with freedom of religion. We now proceed to consider the specific grievances which the petitioners  have  made in respect of the persons  who  come into  the  Board under s. 148-B.  As to the members  of  the Interim  Board, Patiala, who under cl. (a) of sub-s. (1)  of s.  148-B are deemed to be members of the Board  constituted under  s. 43, it is argued that they were appointed under  a Punjab  Government notification dated January 10, 1958,  and though  they  are  Sikhs, they do  not  represent  the  Sikh community and are mere nominees of Government;  furthermore, they  are not subject to the disqualifications mentioned  in ss. 45 and 46 of the Act in respect of elected and  co-opted members respectively.  We have pointed out earlier that  the principal   Act  contained  a  provision  before  1953   for nomination  of  12 members by the Rajpramukh of  Pepsu;  and after  1953, the co-opted members included twelve  residents of  Pepsu.   By  an order of the Maharaja  of  Patiala,  the Interim  Gurdwara  Board, Patiala, was constituted  to  look after certain gurdwaras of the Pepsu area, and after  merger the  appointment  was made by the Governor  of  the  Punjab. Under s. 148-A which was also added to the principal Act  by

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the  amending  Act  of 1959,  the  Interim  Gurdwara  Board, Patiala,  has ceased to function, and under  s.  148-B(1)(a) the  members  of  the Interim Board,  Patiala,  have  become members 515 of the Board constituted under s. 43.  We are unable to hold that the designation of such members, as an interim measure, to  represent those gurdwaras in the Pepsu area  which  they were  actually  managing  is violative  of  any  fundamental right;  nor  do  we think that the  non-application  of  the disqualifications  stated  in ss. 45 and 46 of  the  Act  to these  members  advances  the case of  the  petitioners  any further.   The principal Act did not contain any  provisions as  to disqualification of designated members; it  contained provisions for disqualification of elected, nominated or co- opted  members and after nomination had ceased in  1953,  of elected  or  co-opted members only.  It  is  permissible  to presume  that the legislature knows that the members  it  is designating   do  not  suffer  from  any   disqualifications furthermore,  the  petitioners have not  even  suggested  in their  petition  that  the members  of  the  Interim  Board, Patiala, suffer from any Of the disqualifications stated  in s. 45 or s. 46. With regard to the thirty-five Sikhs to be elected under cl. (b)  of  sub-s.  (1)  of s.  148-B,  there  is  a  threefold contention.   It has been submitted that (1) the  electorate detailed in sub-s. (2) of s. 148-B is not representative  of all  the Sikhs ; (2) some of the members of  the  electorate like Sikh members of Parliament and Municipal Committees are in  their turn elected by joint constituencies of Sikhs  and non-Sikhs;  and  (3) some of the members of  the  electorate like  Sikh  Sarpanches  and Sikh Naya Pradhans  are  in  the service,  and under the influence of Government.  We do  not agree  that  these considerations are determinative  of  the problem before us.  We have already said that the method  of representation  to  the Board for the extended areas  as  an interim   measure  is  not  a  matter  of   religion.    The circumstance  that  some members of the  electorate  are  in their turn elected by constituencies consisting of Sikhs and non-Sikhs  is far too remote and indirect to  constitute  an infringement  of  freedom of religion.  The members  of  the electorate itself are    all  Sikhs and they have  to  elect thirty-five Sikhs.  Unless one proceeds mechanically on mere abstract  considerations, there is no real basis for the 516 contention  that  non-Sikhs  can in any  way  influence  the Board.   We  do  not agree that  Sikh  Sarpanches  and  Naya Pradhans  are  in the service of Government  or  that  their inclusion as members of the electorate violates the right of the Sikhs under Art. 26 (b) of the Constitution.  It may not be  quite  irrelevant  to point out  here  that  the  twelve members of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, plus thirty- five elected Sikhs from the Pepsu area will be a minority as against 132 elected members and twenty-five co-opted members of the Board. For  the reasons given above, we hold that  the  petitioners have  failed  to  make  out a case  of  violation  of  their fundamental  right.  Accordingly, the petition fails and  is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.