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PETITIONER: SARASWATHI AMMAL AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJAGOPAL AMMAL.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/10/1953

BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND MUKHERJEA, B.K.

CITATION:  1953 AIR  491            1954 SCR  277  CITATOR INFO :  R          1970 SC 458  (12,14)  E&R        1978 SC1174  (13,14)

ACT:  Hindu  law-Religious endowments-Dedication for  worshing  at  tomb-Validity-Public policy.

HEADNOTE:    A  perpetual endowment of properties for the purpose  of samadhi  kainkaryam,  i.e., worship of and  at  the  samadhi (tomb) of a person, is not valid under Hindu law.    To the extent that any purpose is claimed to be a  valid one  for  perpetual dedication on the  ground  of  religious merit though lacking in public benefit, it must be shown  to have a Shastraic basis so far as Hindus are concerned.   The heads   of  religious  purposes  determined  by  belief   in acquisition  of  religious  merit cannot be  allowed  to  be widely enlarged consistently with public policy and needs of modern society.    Kunhamutty  v. T. Ahmad Musaliar and Others  (I.L.R.  58 Mad. 204, A. Draviasundaram Pillai v. N. Subrahmanya  Pillai (I.L.R.  1945  Mad.  854), Veluswami  Goundan  v.  Dandapani ([1946]  1  M.L.J.  354)  approved.   M.  K.  A.  Ramanathan Chettiar v. Vada Levvai Marakayar and Others (I.L.R. 34 Mad. 12)  and Board of Commissioners for Religious Endowments  v. Pidugu   Narasimham  and  Others  ([1939]  1   M.L.J.   134) distinguished.  Fatma Bibi v. Advocate-General of Bombay and Another  (I.L.R. 6 Bom. 42), Dwarakanath Bysack and  Another v.  Burroda  Persaud  By  sack (I.L.R.  4  Cal.  443),  Rupa Jagashet v. Kishnaji (I.L.R. 9 Bom. 169) and Parthasarthy v. Tiruvengada Pillai and Others (I.L.R. 30 Mad. 340)  referred to.

JUDGMENT:       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 200 of 1952.      Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 15th  day of  July,  1949, of the High Court of Judicature  at  Madras (Rajamannar C. J. and Ayyar J.) in Appeals Nos. 625 of  1945

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in  O.  S. No. 35 of 1944 of the Court  of  the  Subordinate Judge, Tinnevelly.     R   Ganapathy   Iyer  and  K.  Vaitheeswran     for   the appellants.       Ramchandra Iyer for the respondent.     1953.  October 20.  The Judgment of the  Court was deli- vered by JAGANADHA DAS J. 278      JAGANNADHADAS  J.-This appeal arises out of a suit  for partition.    The  plaintiff  and  the  1st  defendant   are daughters of one Kanakasabapathi Pillai.  The 2nd  defendant is the husband of the 1st defendant.  Kanakasabapathi was  a selfmade  man and built up a flourishing motor  bus  service and also acquired substantial properties, movable and immov- able.   He died on the 24th August, 1942, without  any  male issue and left him surviving a widow, Gomathi Ammal, and two daughters,  the plaintiff and the 1st defendant.  His  widow continued the motor service and managed the other properties with  the help of the 2nd defendant as her manager and  died on  the 7th March, 1940.  The 1st defendant and her  husband were  throughout  living with her mother.  On  her  mother’s death  they both got into possession of all  the  properties including  the  motor service.   The  plaintiff  accordingly brought   the   present   suit   originally   as   one   for administration but later amended it as one for partition and separate  possession  of her half share in  the  properties. Both the courts below have decreed partition with  ancillary reliefs.   There are some minor variations in the decree  of the  High Court from that of the Subordinate Judge,  details of which it is not necessary to notice.  The defendants  are the appellants before us.     Shortly  before  her death, the widow.   Gomathi  Ammal, executed two documents both on the same day, namely the  4th November,  1940, (1) a sale deed by which she  conveyed  the entire  bus service as a going concern to the 2nd  defendant for consideration of Rs. 80,000 (vide Exhibit D-6); and  (2) a  settlement  deed by which she  dedicated  some  immovable properties  worth about Rs. 27,000, for the  performance  of certain  services  purporting  to  be  of  a  religious  and charitable  character (vide Exhibit D-8).  The main  dispute between  the  parties was as to the validity  of  these  two deeds, apart from certain mind contest as to Whether some of the  suit properties were part of  Kanakasabapathi’s  estate and liable for partition.  As regards the sale deed (Exhibit D-6) ’both the  Court below have concurrently found that  it was  executed  for  grossly  inadequate  consideration   and brought about by undue                             279 influence and fraud of the 2nd defendant.  The sale deed was accordingly  set  aside.  With reference to the  dispute  as regards  the individual items of property,  the  Subordinate Judge found that item 25 of Schedule 11, item 6 of  Schedule 111-C  and  item 5 of Schedule IV did not form part  of  the estate  of  Kanakasabapathi  and that all  the  other  items belonged  to  the said estate.  This finding also  has  been confirmed by the High Court.  There is no further appeal  to this court as regards these matters.       The only questions before us are those arising out  of the  settlement  deed  (Exhibit  D-8)  and  relate  to   the properties comprised in Schedules I and 11 attached thereto. They  form  Schedule  11  of  the  plaint.   For  a   proper appreciation of the points that arise on this appeal, it  is desirable  to  set  out the settlement  deed  (Exhibit  D-8) executed by Gomathi Ammal which reads as follows:     "The  properties described in schedule I herein are  the

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properties which belong to the estate of my husband the late T.  G. Kanakasabapathi Pillai Avargal aforesaid.  They  were purchased  by him in his name and after his death, they  be- long to me and are in my possession and enjoyment.  All  the properties  described  in schedule 2 herein are  my  private properties  which were purchased in my name from out  of  my own funds and which are in my possession and enjoyment.   My husband  aforesaid  who had been sick for about  two  months prior  to 24th August, 1942, died on 24th August  1942.   My husband, while he was so sick, expressed to me his wish that if  perchance  he should die, he should be entombed  in  the property  forming  the  first item property  of  schedule  I herein,  that the vacant lands forming item:, 2 to 6 of  the said schedule I should be annexed to the first item property of  the said schedule I as part and parcel thereof  utilised for the benefit of and free access to the said tomb that the incomes derived from the properties forming items 7 to 17 of the  said schedule I should be utilised for the  kainkariyam (services) expenses relating to the samadhi (tomb) that  the said first schedule properties should-be managed and enjoyed and  the kainkariyam relating to the said samadhi  performed by me 280 during  my lifetime and after me, by the persons who may  be appointed  by me according to my discretion, that  the  said properties   should   be  charged  solely  with   the   said kainkariyam  (services) in the manner stated above and  that no one else should have any right or interest therein,  that no  one should alienate the said properties in  any  manner, that all necessary interest should be taken in improving the said  properties  and  that I should make  a  settlement  in writing, mentioning the above particulars, and within a  few days thereafter, my husband passed away.  As desired by him, he has been entombed in the property forming the first  item of  schedule I herein.  A person was appointed  for  (doing) pooja in respect of the said samadhi and daily pooja as well as  special Gurupooja and annadhanam (charity  of  feeding), etc.  in  Avani  (August September) of  the  first  year  in Tiruvona  Nakshatram when he died, have been conducted.   In having so conducted them, a sum of Rs. 200 has been spent in connection  with  the expenses of daily pooja  and  for  the salary  of the person and a sum of Rs. 1,000  for  Gurupooja and  annadhanam,  etc.  in  the  aforesaid  one  year.   The properties forming items 7 to 16 of Schedule I fetch only an income of Rs. 400 per year.  Since it is not sufficient  for conducting the said kainkariyams (services) and as I  intend that  the said kainkariyams shall be regularly and  decently conducted  by  contributing  the  amount  required  for  the expenditure  over and above the said income, that  the  said acts  shall  be hereditarily and permanently  performed  for ever and that necessary arrangements must be made therefore. I have, with a view to discharge my duties which I have  to- wards  my  husband  and  also  realising  the  necessity  of utilising   also  the  income  derived  from   any   private properties  described in schedule 2 herein for the  expenses in  connection  with the kainkariyam of  the  said  samadhi, executed  this  settlement deed including  also  my  private properties  mentioned above.  I have therefore  charged  all the properties mentioned in schedules I and 2 herein  solely with my husband’s samadhi kainkariyam.  I have decided  that out  of the incomes derived from ’the aforesaid  properties, the -Revenue Union and other theer- 281 vas  payable in respect of the aforesaid properties and  the expenses in connection with repairs and improvement shall be

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deducted that, from out of the balance income, the  expenses in connection with the daily pooja of the said samadhi,  the expenses  in respect of the salary of the person  conducting the  said  daily pooja and the expenses in  connection  with Gurupooja  and  annadhanam, etc., performing on the  day  of Thiruvona  Nakshathram in the month of Avani of  every  year shall  be regularly met and the said  kainkariyams  decently performed, that after deducting the expenses incurred in the manner stated above the surplus that may be left over  shall be  spent for matters connected with education and that  the properties  described in schedules I and 2 herein  shall  be enjoyed  and  all the acts performed in  the  manner  stated above  with the income derived therefrom during my  lifetime and  after my death by K. Ramaswami Doss Avargal, my  junior son-in-law,  who  has married my younger  daughter,  son  of Krishna  Konar Avargal, Yadhava, Vaishnavite, manager of  my motor  service, since I fully believe that only the said  K. Ramaswami  Doss  Avargal  is the fit and  proper  person  to perform all the above acts truly, regularly and  efficiently after  my  lifetime, and after him his male  descendants  in hereditary  succession as hukdars and I have  executed  this settlement.   Koilpatti, where the properties  described  in schedules  I  and  2  herein,  being  a  place  growing   in importance  from  day  to  day,  the  vacant  land  in   the properties described in schedules I and 2 herein may be sold if  and  when they can fetch suitably  and  profitably  high price  and for the amounts realised by such sale other  sub- stantial  properties capable of yielding income may be  pur- chased.   Except  under such circumstances, no one  has  the right  to make any other alienations whatever.   Should  any such alienations be made, it shall not be valid.  No one has the  right  to cancel this settlement  or  make  alterations therein".       As  appears  from the above, Kanakasabapathi  was  en- tombed  after  his  death  and the question  is  as  to  the validity  of the dedication made therefor. it will  be  seen that the settle- 282 ment  deed proceeds on the footing that the  dedication  was made in pursuance of the desire of the husband and that  the items  in  schedule 2 thereto which are items 18  to  24  of Schedule  II  attached to the plaint in this  suit  are  the widow’s  own  property  and  not  part  of  the  estate   of Kanakasabapathi.   The  courts below have found  both  these assertions not to be true.  But no question has been  raised before  the courts below or before us that  the  settlement, even  if  otherwise  valid, was beyond  the  powers  of  the limited owner, Gomathi Ammal.  The courts below in coming to the conclusion that the dedication was invalid (partially as held by the Subordinate Judge and wholly as held by the High Court)  relied on Kunhamutty v. Thondikkodan Ahmad  Musaliar and  two  others(1) and other cases following  it.   Learned counsel   for   the  defendants-appellants   contested   the correctness  of this line of decisions and also  urged  that the dedication in the present case was substantially one for religious and charitable purposes like, Gurupooja annadhanam and education and that, therefore, this does not come within the scope of these cases.  It will be convenient to consider this latter contention first.     From the recitals in the settlement deed set out  above, it will be seen that items I to 6 are vacant sites, and that the  samadhi is in item 1, while items 2 to 6 have been  set apart  along with item I for the benefit of and free  access to  the  samadhi.   All the other items 7 to  25  have  been dedicated  in order that the income thereof may be  utilised

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for the following services. (1) Expenses in connection  with the  daily pooja of the said samadhi and the salary  of  the person  conducting  the  daily  pooja;  (2)  Gurupooja   and annadhanam  to  be  performed annually  at  the  samadhi  on Thiruvona  Nakshathram day in Avani when he died,  that  is, the day of the annual sradh of late Kanakasabapathi; and (3) any balance left over after meeting the above expenses to be spent for matters connected with education.  Learned counsel for the appellants points out ’that the recitals in the deed show that only a sum of Rs. 200 (1) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 204.                             283 had been spent by the widow in connection with the expenses, of daily pooja and that as much as Rs. 1,000 had been  spent for Gurupooja and annadhanam on the day of annual sradh  and that  it was to enable the Gurupooja and annual sradh to  be performed  regularly  on more or less the  same  scale  that items 7 to 25 of Schedule 11 to the plaint with their income has  been  dedicated.   It is  urged,  therefore,  that  the performance of the pooja and the feeding at the annual sradh on  a substantial scale and the utilisation of the  balance, if any, for educational purposes, were the main  destination of  the income and hence the main object of  the  settlement and that accordingly the dedication is valid.  We are unable to  accede to this contention.  There is no evidence in  the case  as  to  what  "Gurupooja"  contemplated  in  the  deed consists  of  and whether it is not merely  worship  of  the deceased  entombed in the samadhi.  Though the  word  "Guru" ordinarily refers to a preceptor, it is not inapplicable  to an  ancestor considered as Guru.  However that may be  there is  enough in the settlement deed to show what the  dominant motive  of  the  dedication is.  A careful  perusal  of  the document  shows that Gurupooja and annadhanam on  the  sradh day  were contemplated as being parts of the worship at  the tomb.   There  can be no doubt about it at least so  far  as items 1 to 10 are concerned which fetch only a small income. The  inspiration and motive for the dedication  therefor  is the  alleged desire of the husband that the  properties  and their  income  are  to  be  utilised  for  the   kainkariyam (services)  expenses  relating  to the  said  samadhi.   The dedication of additional items 11 to 25 is only in pursuance of  the same impulse.  It is recited that during  the  first year  after  her husband’s death she herself got  the  daily pooja  as well as Gurupooja and annadhanam on the sradh  day conducted  and spent for the same.  Her spending as-much  as Rs. 1,000 for Gurupooja and annadhanarn on the day of  sradh was clearly as part of the smadhi kainkariyam which she  had undertaken.   It  is  for the  continuance  of  the  samadhi kakariyam,  an  the same scale that she  endowed  additional properties over and above what was said to have 284 been  endowed  at the desire of her husband.  It  is  clear, therefore,  that  all these various items  of  expenses  are contemplated as expenses for the samadhi kainkariyam and not for  any  other kind of religious or charitable  purpose  as such.   That  the dedication was meant not  for  the  annual sradh  or  education  as such but only as  part  of  samadhi kainkariyam is clinched by the term in the deed, Exhibit  D- 8, which runs as follows: -      "I have, therefore charged all the properties mentioned in  schedules  1 and 2 herein (Schedule 11  of  the  plaint) solely with my husband’s samadhi kainkariyam".     Hence  notwithstanding  that the major  portion  of  the income may have to be spent for Gurupooja and annadhanam  in connection with the annual sradh, it is clear that the domi-

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nant purpose of this dedication was the samadhi kainkariyam, that  is to say, that worship of and at the samadhi  (tomb). The validity or otherwise, therefore, of the dedication must be  determined  on that footing and not as though it  was  a dedication for the performance of the annual sradh on a sub- stantial scale or for annadhanam as such.  Nor does it  make any difference in this case that the surplus is contemplated to  be utilised for educational purposes.  That  surplus  is contigent  and  indefinite  as  well  as  dependent  on  the uncontrolled discretion of the 2nd defendant as to the scale on which he chooses to perform the samadhi kainkariyam.    The validity, therefore, of such a dedication as was made under  Exhibit D-8 for the worship primarily connected  with the  tomb of a deceased person falls to be  considered.   As already stated the Madras High Court has pronounced  against it  in a number of cases, viz., Kunhamutty  v.  Thondikkodan Ahmad Musaliar and two other(1); A. Draivaisundram Pillai v. N.  Subramania  Pillai(2)  and  Veluswami  Goundan  v.  Dan- dapani(3).  It has been brought to our notice that the  said High  Court  in a case which came up for  its  consideration subsequent to the judgment in the present case felt that the (1)  I.L.R.58 Mad.204 at 2ll. (2)  I. L.R. 1954 Mad. 854. (3)   [1946] I.M.L.J. 354.                             285 above  line of cases require re-consideration  and  referred the question for the consideration of a Full Bench.  But  we are   informed  that  the  Full  Bench  reference  did   not materialise on account of the subject-matter therein  having been compromised.        It  was  held in the Madras decisions  above  noticed that the building of a samadhi or a tomb over the remains of a  person  and the making of provision for  the  purpose  of Gurupooja  and other ceremonies in connection with the  same cannot  be  recognised as charitable  or  religious  purpose according to Hindu law.  This is not on the ground that such a  dedication is for a superstitious use and hence  invalid. Indeed the law of superstitious uses as such has no applica- tion to India.  The ground of the Madras decisions is that a trust of the kind can claim exemption from the rule  against perpetuity  only  if it is for a  religious  and  charitable purpose  recognised as such by Hindu law and that Hindu  law does  not recognise dedication for a tomb as a religious  or charitable  purpose.  It is, however, strenuously argued  by the  learned counsel for the appellants that  the  perpetual dedication of property in the present case, as in the Madras cases  above  referred to, must be taken to have  been  made under the belief that it is productive of spiritual  benefit to the deceased and as being some what analogous to  worship of ancestors at a sradh.  It is urged, therefore, that  they are  for religious purposes and hence valid.  The  following passage in Mayne’s Hindu Law, 11th Edition, at page 192,  is relied on to show that.       "What are purely religious purposes and what religious purposes will be charitable must be entirely decided accord- ing to Hindu law and Hindu notions."     It is urged that whether or not such worship was origin- ally part of Hindu religion, this practice has now grown  up and with it the belief in the spiritual efficacy thereof and that courts cannot refuse to accord recognition to the  same or  embark  on  an  enquiry as to  the  truth  of  any  such religious  belief,  provided it is not contrary  to  law  or morality.   It is further urged that unlike in English  law, the  element of actual or assumed public benefit is not  the determining factor as to

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286 what is a religious purpose under the Hindu law.  Now, it is correct  to say that what is a religious purpose  under  the Hindu  law  must be determined according to  Hindu  notions. This  has been recognised by courts from very  early  times. [Vide   Fatma  Bibi  v.  Advocatc-General  of   Bombay   and another(1)].   It  cannot also be disputed  that  under  the Hindu law religious or charitable purposes are not  confined to purposes which are productive of actual or assumed public benefit.   The  acquisition of religious merit  is  also  an important  criterion.  This is illustrated by the series  of cases  which recognise the validity of  perpetual  endowment for  the maintenance and worship of family idols or for  the continued performance of annual sradhs of an individual  and his ancestors. See Dwrakanath Bysack and another v.  Burroda Persaud Bysack(2) and Rupa Jagashet v. Krishnali(3).  So far as  the textual Hindu law is concerned what acts conduce  to religious  merit  and  justify  a  perpetual  dedication  of property  therefor  is fairly definite.  As  stated  by  the learned  author  Prananath Saraswathi on the  Hindu  Law  of Endowments at page 18-    "From  very  ancient  times the sacred  writings  of  the Hindus  divided work productive of religious merit into  two divisions named ishta and purtta, a classification which has come  down  to our own times.  So much so  that  the  entire object of Hindu endowments will be found included within the enumeration of ishta and purtta."     The  learned author enumerates what are ishta  works  at pages 20 and 21 and what are purtta works at page 27.   This has  been  adopted, by later learned authors on the  law  of Hindu   Religious   Endowments  and  accepted   by   Justice Subrahmania Ayyar in his judgment in Parthasarthy Pillai and another  v. Thiruvengada Pillai and others(4).  These  lists are  no  doubt not exhaustive but they  indicate  that  what conduces to religious merit in Hindu law is primarily a mat- ter of Shastraic injunction.  To the extent, therefore, that any  purpose  is  claimed to be a valid  one  for  perpetual dedication (1)I. L R. 6 Bom. 42 (2)I.L.R. 4 cal 443. (3)I.L.R. 9 Bow. 169. (4) I.L.R.30 Mad. 340 at 342. 287 on  the ground of religious merit though lacking  in  public benefit,it must be shown to have a Shastraic basis so far as Hindusare  concerned.  No doubt since then  other  religious practices and beliefs may have grown up and obtained  recog- nition from certain classes, as constituting purposes Condu- cive to religious merit.  If such beliefs are to be accepted by courts as being sufficient for valid perpetual dedication of  property  therefore  without the element  of  actual  or presumed public benefit it must at least be shown that  they have obtained wide recognition and constitute the  religious practice of a substantial and large class of persons.   That is  a question which does not arise for direct  decision  in this  case.  But it cannot be maintained that the belief  in this  behalf  of one or more individuals  is  sufficient  to enable  them to make a valid settlement permanently  tyingup property.   The  heads of religious purposes  determined  by belief  in acquisition of religious merit cannot be  allowed to  be widely enlarged consistently with public  policy  and needs of modern society.     The  learned Judges of the Madras High Court  appear  to have  made  the  Full Bench reference above  noticed  on  an argument  before  them that erection of tombs  for  deceased

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persons  and endowment of properties for the upkeep  thereof and  for  the  performance of worship  thereat  were  common amongst Hindus of certain communities and that it is believ- ed  by them to redound to their spiritual benefit, and  that the validity of such endowments have been recognised by  the courts.   But the case that they referred to is  Muthu  Kana Ana   Ramanatham  Chettiar  v.  Vada  Levai  Marakayar   and Other(1),  which relates to Muslims and it may well be  that the  position  is, as stated therein, amongst  Muslims.   We have  been  referred  to a statement at page 223  of  P.  R. Ganapathi   Iyer’s  Hindu  and  Mohamedan  Endowments,   2nd Edition, wherein it is stated-     "Gifts  for  the maintenance of tombs  or  samadhies  of private persons have been regarded as valid under the  Hindu law." (1)  I.L.B. 34 Mad. 12. 288    We  have  been  unable to find  on  what  authority  this statement  was based.  There is only a solitary  passage  in the  case  reported as the Most Reverend  Joseph  Colgan  v. Administisator-General  of Madras(1) wherein it  appears  as follows: -     "Dedication  of property in perpetuity for the  perform- ance of religious ceremonies, maintenance of tombs and other purposes  not allowed by English law to be charitable,  have always been held lawful amongst Hindus and Muhammadans."    In  so far as this statement relates to tombs of  Hindus, we  are  unable to find any support from our  knowledge  and experience.   There  have been no doubt instances  of  Hindu saints  having been defined and worshipped but very few,  it at all, have been entombed and we are not aware of any prac- tice  of  dedication  of property  for  such  tombs  amongst Hindus.  Such cases, if they arise, may conceivably stand on a different footing from the case of an ordinary private in- dividual  who is entombed and worshipped threat.   The  case reported  as The Board of Commissioners for Hindu  Religious Endowments,  Madras v. Pidugu Narasimliam and others(2)  has also  been  referred  to.  It is  a  somewhat  curious  case furnishing an instance where images of as many as 66  heroes who  were  said  to have been killed in a  war  between  two neighbouring kingdoms in the 13th century were installed  in a regular temple and systematically worshipped by the public for  several centuries and inam grants therefor made  during the  Moghul  period.  With reference to the  facts  of  that case,  the  learned Judges were inclined to  hold  that  the worship was religious.  This, however, is a case of a  grant from a sovereign authority and in any case is not an  endow- ment  for worship of a tomb.  In the three Madras  cases  in which it was held that the perpetual dedication of  propertv by  a  Hindu for performance of worship at a  tomb  was  not vaild,  there was no suggestion that there was any  widely._ accepted  practice of raising tombs and worshipping  thereat and making endowments therefor in the belief as to the reli- gious merit acquired thereby.  In the present case also, no (1)I.L.B. 16 Mad 4. 424 at 446. (2) [1939] 1 M.L.J. 134. 289 question has been raised that in the community to which  the parties  belong there was any such well recognised  practice or belief.  The defendants in the written statement make  no assertion about it.  But on the other hand, the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of his plaint asserts that the-     "Institution of samadhi and ceremonies connected with it are not usual in the community to which the parties belong".      Indeed  it may be assumed that such a practice  is  not likely  to  grow up amongst Hindus where cremation  and  not

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burrial of the dead is the normal practice, except  probably as  regards sannyasis and in certain dissident  communities. We  see  no reason to think that the  Madras  decisions  are erroneous  in holding that perpetual dedication of  property for worship at a tomb is not valid amongst Hindus.’      We  accordingly affirm the judgment of the  High  Court and  dismiss  the appeal but in  the  circumstances  without costs.                                    Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant: S. Subramanian. Agent for the respondent: M. S. K. Aiyangar.