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PETITIONER: SAPPANI MOHAMED MOHIDEEN & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R. V. SETHUSUBRAMANIA PILLAI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/12/1973

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. DWIVEDI, S.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V.

CITATION:  1974 AIR  740            1974 SCR  (2) 594  1974 SCC  (1) 615

ACT: Religious  Endowment- Whether absolute or partial-Tests  for determining

HEADNOTE: In  1882,  there  was a partition  of  ancestral  properties amongst 5 brothers by means of a partition deed Three of the 5  brothers  took the properties mentioned in  the  relevant schedules  for enjoyment severally, and  certain  properties were  kept  for enjoyment in common.  Two brothers K  and  V were  enjoying  their shares jointly, Clause 1 of  the  deed excluded from partition the properties specified in  certain clauses.   One  of  the clauses is  cl.  8  which  describes certain  charity purposes and provides that  the  properties mentioned in the 8th schedule and allotted for charity shall be administered by K. Clause 9 makes a special provision  in connection  with three religious charities in relation to  a temple.  The clause mentions that a sum of Rs 45/- had  been spent  annually for these three purposes, that  arrangement, had been made for contribution of sums amounting to Rs  13/- by  three brothers that the dry lands mentioned in  the  9th schedule  shall  be administered by K and from  out  of  the income  of  the said properties and from out  of  their  own funds  K  and  V shall perform the  aforesaid  charities  by spending  the balance of Rs 32/without fail.   The  property mentioned in cl. 9 was not excluded from partition.  At  the time  of the partition the income from the property  in  the 9th schedule was in fact not sufficient to meet the expenses of  the  three  charities directed  to  be  performed.   The property having been alienated, the respondents filed a suit for  a declaration that there was an absolute  endowment  of the property for the performance of the religious  charities and that the alienation was invalid. The trial Court decreed the suit.  The first appellate Court held  that  there was no absolute dedication  and  the  High Court,  in second appeal, restored the decree of  the  trial Court. Allowing the appeal to this Court HELD  :  Whether  an  endowment  is  absolute  or   partial, primarily depends on the terms of the grant.  If there is an express  endowment, there is no difficulty, but if there  is

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only an implied endowment, the intention has to be  gathered on  the  construction of the document.as a  whole.   If  the words  of  the  document  are  clear  and  unambiguous,  the question  of  interpretation would not arise.  If  there  be ambiguity. the intention of the founders has to be carefully gathered  from the scheme and language of the  grant.   Even surrounding  circumstances,  subsequent  dealing  with   the property,  the  conduct of the parties to the  document  and long  ’usage of the property and other relevant factors  may have to be considered in an appropriate case. 1607D-F] In the present case, it is clear from the terms of cl.9  and other  material  provisions of the deed that  there  was  no absolute endowment of the property to the temple or a trust. The  property, however, is impressed with the obligation  or charge  of performing the religious charities  mentioned  in cl.9 of the partition deed in the manner indicated  therein. The alienation is therefore, not invalid and the  obligation to perform the charity follows the property. [607F-G;  608A- C] (1)  While  cl. 8 recites that ’the properties mentioned  in the  8th  schedule  and  allotted  for  charities  shall  be administered by K’. cl. 9 recites that dry land mentioned in the  9th Schedule shall be administered by K.’ There  is  no reference in cl. 9 that the land was allotted for  charity’. [602D] (2)  If the property was absolutely dedicated to the  temple for the performance of the religious charities the intention of  the  founders would have been defeated the  income  from the, property being little or nothing.  A construction of  a document which would frustrate the intention of the founders should  be  avoided.  To gather such intention at  the  time when  the document came into existence the Present value  of or  present income from, the property is irrelevant.  [602H- 603B] 595 (3)  It  is  because of the obligation to keep alive  the  3 charities that the property was not allotted to the  temple, but  was  allotted  to K and V, so that they  may  get  some recompense out of its income some day. [602G-H] (4)  The  present case is far from a case where  the  entire income  of  the  property has been endowed  to  a  trust  to sustain  a conclusion that the entire corpus belongs to  the trust. [608 A] (5)  This  conclusion drawn from the intrinsic  evidence  of the document itself, is reinforced by the subsequent conduct of  the parties and the various transactions  effected  from time to time with respect to the property. [603 E-F; 607H] Sree  Sree  Ishwer  Sridhar Jew v.  Sushila  Bala  Dasi  and others,  [1954] S.C.R. 407414 Menakuru Das aratharami  Reddi v.  Duddukuru  Subba Rao,[1957] S.C.P. 1122,  1128  and  Ram Kissore  Lal  v.  Kamal  Narain,  [1963]  Supp.  (2)  S.C.R. 417/424/428, followed. Sri Sri Iswar Bhubaneswari Thakurani v. Barojo Nath Dey  and Others,  A.I.R.  1937 Privy Council 185, Gopal Lal  Sett  v. Purna  Chandra Busak and others, A.I.R. 1922  Privy  Council 2531254, Hulada Prasad Deghoria v. Kalidas Naik and  others, A.I.R. 1914 Cal. 813/814-815, North-Eastern Railway Co.,  v. Lord  Hastings,  [1900]  A.C.  260,  Drammond  v.   Attorney General,  (1849) 2 H.L.C. 837, The Attorney-General  v.  The Master Wardens, &c. of the wag Chandlers, (1873)Eng. & Irish Appeal,  6 L.R., 1/19, Dr. Villiam Jack, Principal  and  the Professors of the University and King’s College of  Aberdeen v.  Sir  Thomas Burnett, of Leys Bart. (1846)  XII  Clark  & Finnelly, 812, and Mayre on Hindu Law and Usage 11th ed.  P. 923,  Section  792 and Halsbury’s Laws of England,  3rd  ed.

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Vo. 4, p. 306 , referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1555  of 1967. Appeal  by Special leave from the judgment and Decree  dated the  5th  January, 1967 of the Madras High Court  in  Second Appeal No. 82 of 1963. K.   S. Ramamurthi and B. R. Agrawala, for the appellants, M. K. Ramamurti and J. Ramamurti, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI,  J. In this. appeal we have to go back to a  period close  upon a passing century to divine what a  Hindu  Joint Family  that  had separated at that distant  date,  thought, contemplated,  did and above all intended not only then  but also for the future.  It was the year 1882 and precisely  on 13th May of at year an instrument of partition was  executed and  registered  amongst  five  brothers,  namely,  Sivarama krishna  Pillai,  Kailasam  Pillai,  Venkatachalam   Pillai, Chidambaram Pillai and Namasivayam Pillai sons of Subramania Pillai.   The family appears to be religiously disposed  and was keen to perpetuate the pious 596 ancestral  ideology, A genealogy given in the  statement  of case by the appellants gives the appropriate picture for the purpose of this appeal:                      Subramenia Pillai ---------------------------------------------------------- Shiverama  kailasam Venkatachalam  Chidambaram   Navasiva krishna    Pillai    Pillai        Pillai        yam Pillai                                           Pillai                    Sethusubramanya Pillai Kailasam pillai Venkatachalam  Gopalakrishan  Prianayagam (Junior)        Pillai (Jr.)     Pillai        Pillai (died in 1950) (died in 1953)    (D-6)          (D-7)           R.V. Sthusubramanya      R.P. Sethusubramanya           Pillai                    Pillai           (1st plaintiff)          (2nd plaintiff) ---------------------------------------------------------- To  start  with  the  deed of  partition,  it  appears,  the properties of the family were ancestral and were partitioned amongst  the five brothers reserving some to be  enjoyed  in common  and allotting certain properties to charities to  be administered  by  one of their  brothers,  Kailasam  Pillai. Reading the entire. document it appears that even after  the partition  Kailasam Pillai and Venkatachalam Pillai  desired to  enjoy their shares of the property jointly and were,  in great  cordiality while the other three brothers  lived  and enjoyed  their properties separately.  It also appears  that the   second   and   the  third   brothers,   Kailasam   and Venkatachalam  were  given to piety or, at  any  rate,  were perhaps  considered as responsible and solvent persons,  who could be entrusted to administer the charities indicated  in the deed.  There is also reference to family debts and other amicable  adjustments  amongst  the  brothers  and  also  to voluntary  relinquishment  of  a  share  by  Sivaramakrishna Pillai.   With this brief synopsis we may now  extract  some material  provisions of the partition deed (Ext.  Al)  which was written in Tamil and has been officially translated:               Clause 1: "Out of the entire properties  worth               Rs.  28,000/:  belonging  to  our  family  and               mentioned  in the schedules herein,  excluding               the properties situate in Rasavallipuram  held

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             in common as detailed in para 6 and  mentioned               in  the  sixth schedule  here,  excluding  the               charity properties as               597               detailed in para 8 and mentioned in the eighth               schedule excluding the other wet, dry  (lands)               gardens  and  all the  properties  situate  in               Kattampulimanapadayur excluding the  property,               kept  in common from October 1880 as  detailed               in  para  7  and  mentioned  in  the   seventh               schedule   herein,   situate   in   one   crop               cultivation  village  Gananthanparai,  in  the               other  properties, settled in favour of us  in               one  month  of  September 1881,  dry  and  wet               lands, palmyra trees, etc. in Kilakadu situate               in     Alangulam    Village    attached     to               Naranammalpuram   Jamabandi   area,    whereas               Sivaramakrishna  Pillai has  relinquished  his               share  in favour of the other four persons  as               detailed  in  para  4  out  of  the  aforesaid               properties,  excepting the properties held  in               common as detailed in para II and mentioned in               the  10th schedule the other  properties  were               divided  among  the other  four  persons  with               reference to good and bad by casting chits  in               the month of January 1882".               Clause  2 refers to family houses  which  need               not be quoted.               Clause   3  :"As  division  was  effected   as               detailed in paras 1 and 2, the first  Schedule               properties  fell  to the  share  of               Sivaramakrishna Pillai amongst us, the  second               and  third schedule properties to two  persons               Kailasam  Pillai and Venkatachalam Pillai  the               fourth  schedule  properties  to   Chidambaram               Pillai  and the fifth schedule  properties  to               Namasivayam Pillai.  Ever since the properties               were  allotted as aforesaid,  Kailasam  Pillai               and Venkatachalam Pillai were enjoying the two               shares  of their properties in common and  the               other  three  persons were  enjoying  all  the               other  shares of properties separately.   That               is   the  second  item  of   Kattampuli   land               mentioned in fourth schedule which fell to the               share of the Chidambaram Pillai and the second               item of Kattampuli land mentioned in the fifth               schedule   which   fell  to   the   share   of               Namasivayam  Pillai were enjoyed  by  Kailasam               Pillai under usufructuary mortgage rights".               Clause  6: "As the Kulukuthurai Inam  Palmyrah               trees  situate in Rasavallipuram mentioned  in               the  sixth schedule here and  one-third  share               belonging  to  us five persons  could  not  be               conveniently enjoyed by division, it was to be               enjoyed  in  common  and  the  income  derived               therefrom should be given to the early morning               pooja of the seventh day festival in the month               of  "Thai" of Sabhapati Naicker Deity  in  the               Siva  Temple  situate  in  Rasavallipuram  for               expenses  for Archana on the 4th  Thai  Friday               every year               Clause  7:  "The dry  lands,  palmyrah  trees,               gardens   and  other  buildings   situate   in               Gangathanaprai  mentioned in the 7th  schedule               herein  should  be  enjoyed  in  common.   The

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             income  from the said dry lands  and  palmyrah               groves should be divided into five shares  and               two  such shares should be enjoyed in  common.               by  Kailasam Pillai and  Vankatachalam  Pillai               and the other three shares by the other  three               persons independently".               598               Clause 8: "The properties mentioned in the 8th               schedule herein and allotted for charity shall               be  administered in person by  Kailsam  Pillai               and  from out of the income of the first  item               property shall be given to mid-day offering of               Thirumanjanam  expenses in the Siva Temple  in               Rasavallipuram.    From   the   second    item               properties the expenses for the evening  pooja               of  the  said temple shall be  met,  from  the               third item property the expenses for pooja  of               Lord  Siva  at Sepparai on "ani"  Uttiram  day               should  be  met and from the 4th item  of  the               property.   They shall feed four  brahmins  in               the Siva Temple Sepparai during Dwadashi days               The  next  clause No. 9 which is the  bone  of               contention  between  the parties  may  now  be               quoted:               Clause   9:  "In  the  Sepparai  Siva   Temple               established   by  our  parents,  for   meeting               expenses  of  lamp burning for  ever  and  one               measure of rice for daily offering to God  and               Archana  expenses, a sum of Rs. 451- is  spent               annually.  Out of this a sum of Rs. 5 per year               which shall be paid by Sivaramakrishna Pillai,               Namasivayam Pillai and a sum of Rs. 3 per year               by  Chidmbaram Pillai to Kailasam  Pillai  and               excluding the sum of Rs. 13/- as given in  the               three  items aforesaid for the balance of  Rs.               32 the dry land mentioned in the 9th  schedule               shall  be administered in person  by  Kailasam               Pillai and spent from out of the income of the               said  properties  and from out  of  their  own               funds Kailasam Pillai and Venkatachalam Pillai               shall  perform the aforesaid  charity  without               fail".               Clause 12: "Kailasam Pillai and  Venkatachalam               Pillai shall in respect of their properties in               common and the other three in respect of their               respective    properties    separately     and               absolutely enjoy with powers of alienation  by               way of gift, exchange, sale etc.  In the share               of properties allotted to Kailasam Pillai  and               Venkatachalam Pillai the other sharers have no               right and similarly in the share of properties               of the other sharers the aforesaid two persons               have no right.  Likewise in the property  held               by the other three persons, in the property of               which one of them the others have no manner of               right". Then  nine schedules are given showing the  properties  that have fallen to the shares of different brothers.  The  ninth schedule property, which is the suit property, is  described in Ext.  A-1 as follows: 599 The  9th  schedule situate within the  jurisdiction  of  the aforesaid  Sub-District Naranathanapuram Jamabandi  attached to  Alangulam  village and Cilakadu wet irrigated  by  well, tamarind  trees and dry and the particulars of these are  as

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follows:-                Extent Dry Wet   Survey   Letter   Acres De.            No. Wet       866   A-2   0-47   The number of tama- Dry       890   C-2   1-00   rind trees stand-           343      c    0-30 ing near the tank           360      D    0-83 bund of the afore-           376     A-2   1-22 said village, 72 Dry       377       A   0-68           428           9-37           845     B-6   1-21           901     C-2   0-35           902     A-2   0-40                903       c-  0-20                           -----------      In all wet and Dry       16-05 This ninth schedule property is the suit property. It  appears that Kailasam Pillai in the meantime died as  is apparent  from  the  partition  deed  (Ext.   A-3)  executed between Venkatachalam Pillai and Thirumalai Vadvammal  widow of  Kailasam Pillai on 21-1-87.  Clause 19 of this deed  may be quoted:               "Sivaramakrishna  Pillai, Chidamabram  Pillai,               Venkatachalam   Pillai,  son   of   Namasivaya               Pillai, these persons were contributing a  sum               of  Rs. 13/- every year to the  said  Kailasam               Pillai  for  perpetual  burning  of  lamp   at               Chepparaiswami Nataraja Sannathi.   Henceforth               the  said Venkatachalam Pillai  shall  receive               the said amount and perform the charity". In  this partition deed, the properties of  Kailasam  Pillai and  Venkatachalam  Pillai were  divided  and  Venkatachalam Pillai  took the responsibility of performing the  charities entrusted  to  Kailasam Pillai under clause 9 of  the  first partition  deed  of 1882.  It appears from Ext.   B-1  dated 8-9-1937,  which  is a sale deed in favour of  S.  Srinivasa Iyengar, that on 8th November, 1921, the suit properties had been "usufructually mortgaged for Rs. 11,000/- in favour  of one  Maragathammal  by  Gomathi Ammal  for  the  purpose  of discharging  the  family debts for a period of  five  years. The  period was extended by a further usufructuary  mortgage of  the  properties for a sum of Rs. 7350/- on  26th  April, 1923.   It  also  appears  that the  rights  under  the  two usufructuary  mortgage deeds were assigned to  S.  Srinivasa Iyengar by a deed of’ assignment in November, 1962, executed by  the  said  Maragathammal  for  a  consideration  of  Rs. 18,350/-.  Since S. Srinivasa Iyengar made repeated  demands for  clearing  up  the  debts  due  under  the  usufructuary mortgages  the  said properties along with some  other  land were  sold  to him by Kailasam Pillai  (Jr.),  Venkatachalam Pillai (Jr.), Gopalakrishna Pillai (defendant 6, briefly  D- 6) and Perianyagam Pillai 600 (defendant  7.  briefly  D-7) for  a  consideration  of  Rs. 18,350/-.   So this sale in favour of Srinivasa Iyengar  was in  "discharge  of  the said  othi  (usufructuary  mortgage) debts"  and  the  properties  which  had  already  been   in possession  of Srinivasa Iyengar continued to remain in  his possession  now  as owner of the properties with  "power  of alienation   by   way  of  gift,  exchanges,   sales,   etc. absolutely". A  third  partition deed (Ext.  A-10) had been  executed  on 19th   October,   1936,  amongst  Kaliasam   Pillai   (Jr.), Venkatachalam  Pillai (Jr.), Gopalakrishna Pillai (D-6,  and

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Prianayagam  Pillai  (D-7)  in  order  to  later  facilitate absolute  sale of the properties in favour of  S.  Srinivasa Iyengar  in 1937.  It was stated in this deed  (Ext.   A-10) that  "from the property endowed to the temple  of  Sepparai Algiakootha we shall keep the eternal lamps burning, collect the  sums which our grandfather endowed for our  family  and use  special efforts to perform the charities".   In  clause 14(1) of this deed it was stated as follows:-               "In  as such as sharer No. 1, Kailasam  Pillai               (reference to Kailasam Junior) has voluntarily               relinquished in favour of the other 3  sharers               the right to perform and administer the family               charities  and the properties endowed for  the               same; sharer No. 1 shall not have at any  time               any    right    to    said    charities     or               endowments. . . . " Thus  on  8th  September, 1937, a sale  deed  for  the  suit property and other lands (Ext.  B-1) was executed in  favour of  S. Srinivasa Iyengar Avergal by Kailasam  Pillai  (Jr.), Venkatachalam  Pillai (Jr.),Gopalakrishna Pillai  (D-6)  and Perianayagam  Pillai  (D-7)  for  a  consideration  of   Rs. 18350/-.   Srinivasa Iyengar also got his name  recorded  in the patta.  On 10th June, 1943, S. Srinivasa Iyengar sold by Ext.  B-2 the suit property, etc. to Sappani Ahmad Mohideen, father of the two appellants herein, for a consideration  of Rs.  22600/-.  Sappani Ahmed Mohideen got his name  recorded in  the patta in due course.  The second appellant,  who  is the brother of the first appellant, sold some portion of the suit property to Defendants 3 to 5 on 7th April, 1960. This  appears  to  be  the history  and  background  of  the litigation. The  plaintiffs (the first two respondents) herein  are  the great  grandsons of Venkatachalam Pillai son  of  Subramania Pillai.   They  instituted  a suit in the  court  of  munsif Tirunelveli   on   5th  September,  1960,   impleading   the purchasers  of  the suit property as Defendants 1 to  5  and Gopalakrishna   Pillai,   uncle  of   the   plaintiffs   and Perianayagam  Pillai,  father of the 2nd plaintiff,  as  the defendants  6  and 7 respectively, praying  for  declaration that  the suit properties belong to the trust and  that  all alienations in respect of them are not binding on the  trust and for possession of the suit properties from defendants  1 to  5 to "the lawful trustees".  One written  statement  was submitted  on behalf ,of the defendants 1 to 5 and the  suit proceeded ex-parte against defendants 6 and 7, who were  not even examined as witnesses in the trial. Two points were in dispute during the trial, namely, whether the suit was barred by limitation (issue No. 2) and  whether the   deed  dated  13th  May,  1882,  creates  an   absolute dedication of the suit property 601 or  only a charge on the income of the said property  (issue No.  3).  The 1st plaintiff Who was a young man of 28  years on the date of his giving evidence, examined himself and two other  witnesses.   The defendants examined only  the  first defendant.   The trial court answered both the above  issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit.  On appeal the Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, affirmed the finding  of the  Munsif on the question of limitation but reversed  that relating  to issue No. 2. He held that the entire income  of the  suit property was not sufficient even to meet a  minute fraction  of the expenses and, therefore, the   question  of absolute  dedication of the property did not arise.  It  may be  noted  here  that  the  trial  court  as  well  as   the Subordinate Judge held that the income from the property was

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not  sufficient  to meet all the expenses of  the  charities directed  to  be performed.  The value of the suit  land  in 1882  was  found by the Subordinate Judge to  be  only  40/- after  elaborate discussion of the value of the  neighboring properties which were subject matters of different sales  at the relevant time.  When the matter was taken to the  Madras High  Court in second appeal, the High Court held  that  the family  had  divested itself of the ownership  of  the  suit property and that the deed of partition created an  absolute endowment of the suit property for the purpose of performing the  charities mentioned therein.  It further held that  the suit  property was not allotted to Kailasam  Pillai’s  share and  he was only made a trustee of the properties.   In  the view the High Court took, the second appeal was allowed  and the  trial court’s decree was restored.  Hence  this  appeal with special leave. The  only  question that has been canvassed in  this  appeal before us by the learned counsel for the appellants is  that the deed of partition (Ext.  A-1) did not create an absolute endowment  of the suit properties for performing  the  three kattalis  (endowment  for  religious  charities)   mentioned therein,  This takes us to the construction of the  document as a whole with particular reference to the clauses which we have  set  out earlier therefrom.  The  deed  of  partition discloses  a  scheme of partial division  of  the  ancestral properties amongst the brothers.  Three of the five brothers have  taken properties mentioned in the  relevant  schedules for enjoyment severally and certain properties were kept for enjoyment in common.  Two brothers, Kailasam Pillai and Ven- katachalam   Pillai  were  enjoying  their  shares  of   the properties  jointly.   Provision was made for  discharge  of family debts and different mutual adjustments have also been recorded.   Clause  I  of the deed, which we  have  set  out earlier,  is  very significant. it excludes  from  partition properties  specified  in  certain  clauses  including   the charity  properties as detailed in para 8 and  mentioned  in the eighth schedule.  Property mentioned in clause 9 is  not excluded  from partition.  When we look to clause 8 in  this context, we find that the properties mentioned in the eighth schedule   are   "allotted  for  charity"  and   "shall   be administered        in       person       by Kailasam Pillai"(emphasissupplied).Inthisclause   four   objects   of charity  have been mentioned, the expenses of which have  to be  met  from  four items of  property  allotted  for  them. Besides clause 8 refers to mid-day offering of Thirumanjanam expenses  in the Siva Temple in Rasavallipuram, and also  to the evening pooja of the said temple.  There is reference in this clause also to the expenses for 602 pooja of Lord Siva at Sepparai on "Ani" Uttiram day and also for feeding four brahmins in the Siva Temple Sepparai during Dwadashi  days.   What is, therefore, excluded  for  charity purposes in clause I is clearly described in clause 8 of the partition deed.  Having provided for all these ,charities in clause  8, clause 9 makes a special provision in  connection with the same Sepparai Siva Temple "for meeting all expenses of  lamp burning for ever and one measure of rice for  daily offering to God and Archana expenses. . . ". Clause 9  takes note  that  a sum of Rs. 45/- has been  spent  annually  for these  kattalais’.   Arrangement has been made  therein  for contribution  by two brothers of Rs. 51 each per year and  a sum of Rs. 3/- per year by another brother, totalling a  sum of  Rs.  13/-  which has to be given  by  them  to  Kailasam Pillai.  it  may  be  noted  that  these  two  brothers  are unconnected with the suit property after partition.   Clause

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9  thereafter recites that "for the balance of Rs. 32/-  the dry  land  mentioned  in the ninth  schedule  shall  be  ad- ministered  in person by Kailasam Pillai and spent from  out of  the income of the said properties and from out of  their own  funds  Kailasam Pillai and Venkatachalam  Pillai  shall perform  the aforesaid  charity  without  fail". (emphasis supplied).  The draftsman, who prepared this deed, had  good reasons  to  mention  in  clause  8  that  "the   properties mentioned in the eighth schedule and allotted for  charities shall be administered in person by Kailasam" while in clause 9  he chose to record that "dry land. mentioned in  the  9th schedule  shall  be  administered  in  person  by   Kailasam Pillai".   There is no reference in clause 9 that this  land shall be "allotted for charity" whereas those words  clearly appear in clause 8 of the deed.  In the entire scheme of the deed  there  must  be a  legitimate  justification  for  not allotting  the  lands mentioned in the  ninth  schedule  for charity.  Besides, it is clear on the findings of the courts below  that  the  value  of the property  in  1882  was  in- considerable and the income out of it was not sufficient  to meet  tile  expenses  for  the  charities.   A  device  had, therefore,  to  be made to keep alive the sacred  memory  of their  parents who were keen to continue these charites  out of the ancestral property.  Having divided the properties in the manner done in the partition deed, each of the  brothers contributed   according  to  his  capacity  and  by   mutual adjustment  a very substantial share of the expenses was  to be  borne by Kailasam Pillai and Venkatachalam  Pillai,  who were  entrusted  to perform the charities without  fail,  if necessary,  which  was even inevitable at the time,  out  of their  own  funds.   Since it is a common  ground  that  the charities  have been performed for years, the burden of  the liability must have fallen on kailasam Pillai and thereafter on  Venkatachalam Pillai, It is because of this  feature  in keeping alive the three charities mentioned in clause 9 that the  lands in the ninth schedule were allotted  to  Kailasam Pillai  and Venkataclaalam Pillai so that they may get  some recompense  out  of  the income of the property  if  it  may somehow or some day be forthcoming.  The entire income  from the  property  was  little or nil  and  was  not  absolutely dedicated  to the Temple for the charities.  We have got  to look  at the matter from what the founders intended  in  the year 1882 and no construction. can be given to the  document which would frustrate the intention of the founders to  keep alive  the charities by appropriate performance.   If  these dry  and then barren properties of the ninth schedule  were absolutely dedicated to 603 the  Temple  for  performance of  the  three  kattalais  the intention  of  the founders would have  been  defeated.   It would  have been nobody’s business, income being  little  or nil.  We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that there is no ambiguity  about  any of the provisions of this  deed  which clearly go to show that there was no intendment to create an absolute endowment of the suit property to the Temple or the trust. The  present  value of the property and the  present  income therefrom will, in our view, not be relevant nor a safe  aid to  gather  the intention of the parties in  1882.   We  are unable  to agree with the High Court that "the  wording"  of the  deed  makes it ’clear beyond doubt’ that  there  is  an absolute  endowment of the property.  We are also unable  to hold,  as  the  High Court has done, that  "the  family  has divested  itself  of. the ownership and  Kailasam  has  been created  trustee  therefore".  Ext.  A-3 on which  the  High

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Court  relied  to  reach its conclusion  does  not,  in  our opinion,   make  any  departure  from  the  nature  of   the transaction nor from the original intention of the  parties, particularly  in  view of clause 19 thereof  already  quoted above.   Similarly Ext.  A-10 executed in 1936 on which  the High Court relied does not unerringly point to any different intention  even  of the succeeding  generation.   The  first extract  quoted  earlier from Ext.  A-10 does  not,  in  our opinion,  relate  to the ninth schedule  property  when  the charity has been specifically endowed in the eighth schedule to  Ext.  A-1.  Again ,the second extract from Ex  t.  A-10, namely,  clause.  14(1), earlier set out, does not,  in  our view,  run  counter  to  the  original  intention  of  their ancestors.   The  initial intention to be gathered  from  an ancient  document when the provisions are  reasonably  clear cannot  be readily altered to suit changing conditions  over the  ears.  Even so, if somehow it is possible to hold  that the subsequent dealing with the property is consistent  with the  intention of the original  parties to the document,  as interpreted  by us on the terms of the original  deed,  that course  has  to  be preferred by  the  court.   Besides,  in interpreting ancient documents courts have to be cautious to guard   against  warping  of  the  issue  by  reference   to subsequent conduct of parties or their representatives which may vary for imponderable reasons, bona-fide or otherwise. Clause 3 of the partition deed mentions only such properties as have- been allotted to the brothers in full ownership. it could not mention the property specified in clause 9 because it is burdended with a charge in favour or kattalais. We may now refer to some decisions cited at the bar. In  Sree  Ishwar  SridharJew v. Sushila Bala  Dasi  (1)  and others, it was observed :               "It  is quite true, that a dedication  may  be               either absolute or partial.  The property  may               be given out and out to the idol, or it may be               subjected  to a charge in favour of the  idol.               ’The,  question whether the idol itself  shall               be considered the true beneficiary, subject to               a  charge in favour of the heirs or  specified               relatives of the testator for their upkeep, or               that, on the other               (1)   [1954] S. R. 407-414.               604               hand, these heirs shall be considered the true               beneficiaries  of the property, subject  to  a               charge for the upkeep, worship and expenses of               the  idol,  is a question which  can  only  be               settled   by  a  conspectus  of   the   entire               provisions  of the will’ Pande Har Narayan  v.               Surja Kunwari(1)".               Observations to the same effect have also been               made  by the Privy Council in Sri  Sri  Iswari               Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey  and               others.(2)               in  Menakuru Daseratharami Reddi v.  Duddukuru               Subba  Rao,(3) this Court observed as  follows               :-               "Now it is clear that dedication of a property               to  religious  or charitable purposes  may  be               either complete or partial.  If the dedication               is  complete,  a  trust in  favour  of  public               religious   charity   is  created.    If   the               dedication  is partial, a trust in  favour  of               the  charity  is not created but a  charge  in               favour  of  the charity is attached  to,  and-

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             follows,   the  property  which  retains   its               original   private  and   secular   character.               Whether  or not dedication is   complete would               naturally   be  a  question  of  fact  to   be               determined  in each case in the light  of  the               material terms used in the document.  In  such               cases  it is always a matter  of  ascertaining               the  true  intention  of  the  parties  it  is               obvious  that such intention must be  gathered               on  a fair and reasonable construction of  the               document considered as whole."               in  Ramkishore  Lal v. Kamal  Narain,(4)  this               Court observed :               "The golden rule of construction, it has  been               said,  is  to ascertain the intention  of  the               parties  to the instrument  after  considering               all  the  words, in  their  ordinary,  natural               sense.  To ascertain this intention the  court               has  to consider the relevant portion  of  the               document  as  a whole and also  to  take  into               account  the  circumstances  under  which  the               particular words were used".               it was further observed(4) :                 "What  was said in this  case  in connection                             with  the construction of a wilt  appl ies  with               equal force to the construction of every other               document by which some property is disposed of               In  Gopal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak  and               other(5),   the  Privy  Council  observed   as               follows -               "The  first. question that arises  is  whether               the  gift is a gift to the Idols,  or  whether               there  was  a  gift to  any  other  person  or               persons  charged with the maintenance  of  the               Idols.   The will is most obscure,  but  their               Lordships  think  that there is  certainly  no               direct  gift  of  the whole  property  to  the               Idols,  nor in the circumstances ought one  to               be  implied.  It is consequently necessary  to               see  in  what capacity and by virtue  of  what               right  the  worship  of the  Idols  is  to  be               carried out.  The person on. whom               (1)   1921  LR 48 I.A. 143, 145-146.               (2) A.I.R. 1937 P.C. 185.               (3) (1957) S.C.R. 1122,1128.               (4) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 417,424,428.               (5)   A.I.R. 1922 P. C. 253-54.                605               the duty was cast was undoubtedly Udoy  Chand,               and the conclusion which their Lordships  have               reached,  is that if, as they think, there  is               no  gift to the Idols it is only  possible  to               give  effect to the provision of the  will  by               treating  it as conferring the  property  upon               Udoy  Chand.   The will is addressed  to  him;               upon   him  throughout  all  the  burdens   of               performing different duties are cast, and this               necessarily  involves  the  ownership  of  the               property". It  may  be appropriate to refer to a passage  in  Mayne  on Hindu Law and Usage, eleventh edition (Reprint) at page  923 (Section 792) which reads as under               "A  dedication  of property for  religious  or               charitable purposes may be either absolute  or

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             partial (1).  In the former case, the property               is  given  out  and out to an  idol  or  to  a               religious  or charitable institution  and  the               donor   divests  himself  of  all   beneficial               interest  in  the property  comprised  in  the               endowment   (2).   Where  the  dedication   is               partial,  a charge is created on the  property               or  there  is a trust to receive and  apply  a               portion  of  the income for the  religious  or               charitable  purposes (3). In such a case,  the               property   descends  and  is   alienable   and                             partible   in  the  ordinary  way,  th e   only               difference  being  that  it  passes  with  the               charge upon it"(4). In this context we may also note a decision of the  Calcutta High  Court  in Hulada Prasad Deghoria v. Kalidas  Naik  and others,(5)  where the court had to deal with  interpretation of an ancient document:               "The matter may be put briefly in the word  of               Sugdan, L. C., in Attorney-General v. drummond               (6)  : ’One of the most settled rules  of  law               for  the  construction of  ambiguities  in  an               ancient  instrument is that you may resort  to               contemporaneous usage to ascertain the meaning               of the deed ; tell me what you have done under               such  a  deed, and I will tell you  what  that               deed  means’.   To  this  must  be  added  the               qualification formulated by Lord Cranworth, L.               C., in Sadlier v. Biggs (7), in the  following               terms  :  ’If  there is  a  deed  which  says,               according to its true construction, one thing,               you  cannot say that the deed means  something               else, merely because the parties have gone  on               for long time so understanding it". We have referred to this case although in the case before us the  terms  of the deed are not at all  ambiguus  while  the Calcutta High Court had to consider an instrument the  terms of which were "at best inconclusive" The principle that  the court  may call in aid acts under the deed as a clue to  the intention,  as was pointed out by Lord Halsbury, L.  C.,  in North-  Western  Railway Co.v.Lord  Hastings,(8)  "does  not apply unless there is an ambiguity, for even usage does  not justify deviation (1)  (1937) 64 I.A. 203/211. (2)  (1904) 31 I.A. 203. (3)  (1859) 8 M.I.A. 66. (4)  (1878) 4 Cal. 56. (5)  AIR 1914 Cal. 813/814-815. (6)  (1842) 1 Dr. & W. 358. (7)  (1853) 4 H.L.C. 436. (8) (1900) A. C. 260. M 602 Sup.  C I/75 606 from  terms which are plain : Attorney-General v.  Bochester Corporation"(1).   It was observed by the House of Lords  in Drammond v. Attorney General(2) :               " Consequently, while in a case of  ambiguity,               the  court will uphold that construction of  a               deed  which justifies a long usage as  to  the               application  of  trust funds, the  court  will               not,  where there is no ambiguity,  accept  an               erroneous  interpretation  though   consistent               with  usage,  so  as to  sanction  a  manifest               breach of trust".

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Our attention was drawn to a decision of the House of  Lords in The Attorney-General v. The Master, Wardens, & C. of  the Wag Chandlers’ Co.3 wherein it was held :               "There is one well-known class of  authorities               of  this  sort.   A  testator  devises  to   a               corporate  body  or to an  individual,  landed               property,  and  he affixes to  that  devise  a               condition   that   the  corporation   or   the               individual  shall at their or his  own  peril,               and if necessary out of their own funds,  make               certain  payments,  or a certain  payment,  to               some object of his bounty.  In a case of  that               kind the devise is said to take the land  upon               condition.   If  the devise is  accepted,  the               condition  must  be fulfilled, and  the  money               must be paid, whether the land devised is,  or               is  not,  adequate to make the  payment.   The               very statement of a case of that kind  implies               that  the land is the land of the devise,  and               that every accretion to the value of the  land               belongs to the devise ; and that the person or               the  charity  which  has the  benefit  of  the               condition,   which   receives   the    payment               mentioned  in  the condition, has a  right  to               nothing more than that payment". This case meets the requirements of the present case  before us.   To  the same effect there is a passage  in  Halsbury’s Laws of England edition, volume 4, at page 306 :               "Speaking generally, the increase will  belong               to  the  donee, first, if the gift be  to  the               donee subject to certain payments to others  ;               secondly,  if  the gift be upon  condition  of               making   certain   payments   subject   to   a               forfeiture   upon   non-performance   of   the               condition ; or, thirdly, if the donee might be               a loser by the insufficiency of the fund". (4)               .lm0               The  case  referred  to  in  Halsbury  is  Dr.               Villiam Jack, Principal, and the Professors of               the University and King’s College of  Aberdeen               v.  Sir Thomas Burnett, of Leys, Bart.  (1846)               XII  Clark  & Finnelly,  812,(5)wherefrom  the               following passage is apposite :               "in  searching for the intention of  a  donor,               which   is   the  standard   to   govern   the               construction  of  a deed of gift,  the  facts,               first,  that  the  gift  is  subject  to   the               condition   of  making  certain  payments   to               others,--secondly, that forfeiture will be in-               curred by non-performance of that  condition,-               and, thirdly, that               (1)  5 De G.M. & G. 797.    (2) (1849)  2  HLC               837.               (3)   (1873) Eng. & Irish Appeal, 6 LA., 1119.               (4)   (1846) 12 Cl. & Fin. 812, H.L. 828.  per               Lord Cottenham.               (5)   8 English Reports, H.L., Cl. & Fin 8-12,               p. 1632.               607               the  donee  may be subjected to  loss  by  the               performance of that condition, are  sufficient               to  raise the presumption that in case of  the               increase  of the fund, the donor  intended  to               give   to  the  donee  the  benefit  of   that               increase".

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It  was held by the House of Lords in that case  "that  this was  a grant upon condition, and not a mere trust, and  that the Principal and Processors were entitled, after satisfying the  conditions  of  the deed of  gift,  to  appropriate  to themselves any surplus arising from the lands thus given". Argument was addressed at the bar with regard to the surplus income  from the suit property since with progress  of  time the value of the property has increased and necessarily  its income.   We are, however, of the view that for the  reasons already  discussed  in this particular case we will  not  be required to examine the rule of surplus income in  charities for the purpose of discovering the intention of the  parties at the time of initial partition. The  principles that emerge from the above decisions so  far as. appropriate to the case at hand may briefly be stated. Whether  the  endowment is absolute ’or  partial,  primarily depends  on the terms of the grant.  If there is an  express endowment,  there  is no difficulty.  If there  is  only  an implied  endowment, the intention has to be gathered on  the construction  of the document as a whole.  If the  words  of the  document  are clear and unambiguous,  the  question  of interpretation would not arise.  If there be ambiguity,  the intention of the founders has to be carefully gathered  from the  scheme  and language of the  grant.   Even  surrounding circumstances,  subsequent  dealing with the  property,  the conduct of the parties to the document and long usage of the property   and  other  relevant  factors  may  have  to   be considered in an appropriate case.  ’As pointed out earlier, we  have  a document in the instant case where there  is  an express endowment of certain specified properties as recited in-clause  8 of the deed.  Significantly, there is  complete omission to create an absolute endowment of the property  in the  ninth  schedule  although the same is  referred  to  in clause  9  of  the deed and has been dealt with  in  a  very special manner therein.  There is absolutely no doubt on the terms of clause 9 read with the other material provisions of the  deed  that there is no absolute endowment of  the  suit property  in  favour of the temple or for the  charities  as claimed by the planitiffs/respondents.  We may, however, add that  the  conclusion  we have reached  from  the  intrinsic evidence  of  the  document  itself  is  reinforced  by  the subsequent   conduct   of  the  parties  and   the   various transactions  effected from time to time with regard to  the suit properties.  To boot, it is far from a case where the 608 entire income of the property has been endowed to the  trust to  sustain a conclusion that the entire corpus  belongs  to the trust. Having  regard to the principles set out above, it is  clear that in the present case there was no absolute endowment  of the suit property to the temple or the trust.  The property, however,  is  impressed  with the obligation  or  charge  of performing the three kattalais mentioned in clause 9 of  the partition  deed  in  the  manner  indicated  therein.    The alienation  of the property is, therefore, not  invalid  and the  obligation  to perform the  above  mentioned  charities follow with the property. In the result the appeal is allowed and the judgment of  the High Court is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge is restored  subject  to the direction that the  suit  property will  be  impressed  with  the  obligation  to  perform  the charities  mentioned  in clause 9 of the partition  deed  of 1882 and the plaintiffs’ suit stands dismissed.  The parties will bear their own costs in this Court. V.P.S.                           Appeal Allowed.

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