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PETITIONER: SANTURAM KHUDAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KIMATRAI PRINTERS & PROCESSORS (P) Ltd. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/12/1977

BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT BENCH: SINGH, JASWANT UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1978 AIR  202            1978 SCR  (2) 387  1978 SCC  (1) 162  CITATOR INFO :  R          1985 SC 311  (22)

ACT: Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI  of 1947),  s.  80 r/w s 27A, scope of-Right of  the  individual employee  to  appear or act in a proceeding under  the  1946 Act, where a representative union has entered appearance  as the representative of the employees.

HEADNOTE: Respondent No. 1 is an undertaking in the Textile Processing Industry  which  was  recognised as such  under  the  Bombay Industrial  Relations  Act.  Respondent No.  2  namely,  the General    Workers’   Union,   Bhadra,   Ahmedabad   is    a representative  union  of all the employees of  the  various undertakings registered by the Registrar as undertakings  in the  Textile  Processing  Industry  in  the  local  area  of Ahmedabad city and city Taluka irrespective of the fact that the  employees of any of the aforesaid undertakings  may  or may  not  be  members of the  representative  union  and  is registered  and recognised as such under the  provisions  of the  Act.  An industrial reference No. 176/1976 was made  to the  Industrial Court at Ahmedabad on 27-7-76 as  respondent No.  1 did not agree to a desire of respondent No. 2  for  a change  in respect of classification, pay  scales,  dearness allowance,  casual  leaves, festival  holidays  and  certain other  industrial matters.  In May, 1976 a new  rival  union was  formed under the name and style of "New Labour  General Trade Union, Ahmedabad" which was registered under the Trade Unions  Act on June 3, 1976.  This new Union by  its  letter dated  June 8, 1976, raised certain demands regarding  issue of permanent entry passes, casual leave, festival  holidays, provident  fund,  Employees State Insurance  Scheme,  bonus, dearness  allowance which were not heeded to  by  respondent No. 1 on the ground that the Union could not be treated as a representative  union under the Act.  Since every effort  of theirs failed to elicit any response from respondent No.  1, the  New  Union gave a strike notice on September  2,  1976. Pursuant  thereto 131 employees of respondent No. 1 went  on strike  on September 24, 1976, whereupon an application  No. 1455/76. was made on the following day, by respondent No.  1 to  the Third Labour Court at Ahmedabad u/s. 79(1)  and  (4)

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r/w  ss. 78(1)(A)(C) and 97(1) of the Act for a  declaration that  the action of the workers mentioned in  Annexures  ’A’ and  ’B’ to the application amounted to an  illegal  strike. In  the  said proceedings respondent No. 2 appeared  as  the representative   and  approved  union  for  the   processing industry in the local area where the mills of respondent No. 1 are situate and filed written statement admitting that the strike  resorted to by the workmen was illegal.  On  October 4,   1976,  the  appellant  and  five  other  employees   of respondent  No.  1 made an application to  the  said  Labour Court  for  impleading  them as  parties  to  the  aforesaid proceedings  No.  1455/76 and allowing them  to  appear  and defend  the  same.  On the same day, the  appellant  and  15 other  employees  of respondent No. 1 requested  the  Labour Court  to  declare  the  strike  as  legal.   The  aforesaid application  for being impleaded as parties was rejected  by the Labour Court, as per its order dated 6-10-76.  On 12-10- 76,  the  Labour Court allowed the application No.  1455  of 1976 of respondent No. 1 u/s. 79(1) and (4) read with ss. 78 (1  ) (A) (C) and 97 (1 ) of the Act and declared  that  the employees  mentioned  in  Annexures  ’A’  and  ’B’  to   the application  resorted to an illegal strike w.e.f.  24-9-1976 the  continuation  whereof was also illegal as it  had  been resorted to during the pendency of the reference No. 176  of 1976,  wherein  as  a result  of  negotiations,  an  interim settlement  was arrived at on November 17, 1977.  A  special Civil Application No. 1845/76 filed by the appellants  under Art. 227 of the Constitution for quashing the two orders  of the Labour Court dated 6-10-76 and 12-10-76 was dismissed in limine by the Gujarat High Court. Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court, 12-1114SCI/77 388 HELD  : (1) The legislative intent underlying the scheme  of the  Bombay Industrial Relations Act being to inculcate  and encourage the practice of collective bargaining so that  the labour  is neither exploited nor victimised  and  industrial peace and harmony is ensured, the provisions of the Act  are designed  to  emphasize  that if labour in  an  industry  is organised  through  its own union which  is  registered  and recognised  under the Act, then it is that union  which  can appear   and  do  all  acts  and  agitate  matters  in   its representative capacity for the labour and if it does choose to  appear or act, then no individual employee is  competent to appear and present his point of view. [392 B-C] (2)Section  80 of the Act makes it clear that  the  Labour Court  can  permit the parties affected by  the  dispute  to appear in the manner provided by ss. 80A to 80C of the  Act, but  the  discretion  conferred  on  the  Labour  Court  has specifically been made subject to the provisions of  Chapter V   which  deals  with  "representation  of  employees   and employers and appearance on their behalf". [392 E-F] (3)Section  27A of the Act consists of two  parts.   While the  second part contains the general rule  prohibiting  the grant  of permission to an individual employee to appear  or act  in  any  proceeding under the Act  except  through  the representative  of the employees, the first part carves  out three  exceptions  to  the  said  general  rule  which   are mentioned in s. 32, 33 and 33A of the Act.  Whereas the last exception, that is, the one carved out by s. 33-A of the Act relates   to  proceedings  where  the  dispute  is   between employees and employees, the other two exceptions  mentioned in ss. 32 and 33 of the Act relate to proceedings in respect of  certain other disputes.  Sections 32 and 33 of the  Act, no  doubt, engraft exceptions on the aforesaid general  rule

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embodied in s. 27A of the Act, the provisos appended thereto specifically preclude individual employees from appearing or acting   in   any  proceeding  under  the  Act   where   the representative  union  enters  appearance  or  acts  as  the representative of employees. [392 G-H, 393 A-F] Girja  Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujrat Spinning and  Weaving Co.  Ltd [1962] 2 Supp.  SCR 890 [1962] 2 L.L.J. 369  (S.C.) and   Textile  Labour  Association,  Bhadra   Ahmedabad   v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association, Ahmedabad (1970)3 SCC 890 at p. 891, followed. (4)Mala fides or bona fides of a representative union  has no relevance while considering the provisions of s. 27-A and ss.  32  and 33 of the Act which taken  together  impose  an absolute ban on the appearance of any individual employee in any proceeding under the Act where the representation  union chooses to appear or act as representative of the employees. In case the employees find that the representative union  is acting  in a manner which is prejudicial to their  interest, their remedy lies in invoking the aid of the Registrar under Chapter  III  of  the  Act and  asking  him  to  cancel  the registration of the union. [395 A-C] Girja  Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat’ S inning &  Weaving Co.  Ltd. [1962] 2 Supp.  SCR 890=(1962) 2 L.L.J.  369(S.C), applied. N.   M.  Naik v. Golaba Land Mills (1960) L.I.J. 448,  over- ruled. (5)A combined reading of ss. 80, 27A, 30, 32 and 33 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy  of  preventing the exploitation of the  workers  and augmenting  their  bargaining  power,  the  Legislature  has clothed  the  representative  union with  plenary  power  to appear or act on behalf of employees in any proceeding under the Act and has deprived the individual employee or  workman of  the right to appear or act, in any proceeding under  the Act where the representative union enters appearance or acts ,is representative of employees. [383 B-C] Girja  Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning  &  Weaving Co. Ltd. [1962] 2 Supp.  SCR 890=(1962) 2 L.L.J. 369 (S.C.), applied. (6)In  the instant case (a) neither the appellant nor  his other co-employees had any locus standi to appear or act  as individual   employees  in  the  proceedings  initiated   by respondent  No.  1  in which respondent No.  2  which  is  a representative  union in the industry in the local area  had the  right  to appear and act as the representative  of  the employees  in  the industry and did appear or act  as  such; [395 G-H] 389 (b)The  new union to which the appellant and some  of  his co-employees  belonged would have no right to appear or  act on  behalf  of  the appellant or  his  co-employees  in  the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 as it had not been registered  and  recognised as the representative  union  of employees under the Act. [396 A] [In  view of the abstention of the parties  from  addressing the court regarding the legality or otherwise of the strike, the  court refrained from making any observation  in  regard thereto.]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 21  11  of 1977. Appeal  by Special Leave, from the Judgment and Order  dated

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16-11-76  of  the,  Gujarat  High  Court  in  Special  Civil Application No. 1 845 of 1976. B.   Datta and K. Kumar for the Appellant. Y.   S.  Chithey, V. N. Ganpule, Mukul Mudgal, M. R.  Gehani and Mrs.  V. D. Khanna for Respondent No. 1. V.  M. Tarkunde, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur for  Respondent No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JASWANT  SINGH,  J. This appeal by special  leave  which  is directed  against the order dated November 16, 1976  of  the High  Court  of Gujarat at  Ahmedabad  summarily  dismissing Special  Civil  Application No. 1845% of 1976 filed  by  the appellant and another under Article 227 of the  Constitution raises  an  interesting  question  regarding  the  right  of individual employees to appear or act in a proceeding  under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Bombay Act No. XI of  1947)  (herein,after referred to as ’the Act’)  where  a representative   union  has  entered  ,appearance   as   the representative of the employees. The  facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal,  in brief, are Respondent  No.  1 herein viz.  The, Kimatrai  Printers  and Processors  Pvt.  Ltd.  Ahmedabad is an undertaking  in  the Textile  Processing  Industry which was recognised  as  such vide  Notification No. KH-SHMC/ 2724/RU dated September  13, 1974  issued by the Assistant Registrar,  Bombay  Industrial Relations  Act  in exercise of the powers conferred  on  him under  section 11(1) of the Act.  Respondent No. 2 viz.  the General Workers Union, Bhadra, Ahmedabad is a representative union  of  all  the employees of  the  various  undertakings registered by the Registrar ,as undertakings in the  Textile Processing Industry in the local area of Ahmedabad City  and city  Taluka irrespective of the fact that the employees  of any of the aforesaid undertakings may or may not be  members of the representative union and is registered and recognised as such ,under the provisions of the Act.  In 1975, the said union  raised  demands regarding wages  dearness  allowance, washing  allowance, supply of shoes, uniforms,  and  casual, holidays.   As the demands were not agreed to,  the  dispute was  taken in conciliation which culminated in  an  amicable settlement between the parties on the basis whereof an award was made by the Industrial Court on September 29, 1975.   On December 22, 1975, respondent No. 2 gave a notice under sub- section (2)    of  section 42 of the Act intimating  thereby its desire for a change 390 in   respect   of  classification,  pay   scales,   dearness allowance, casual leave, festival holidays and certain other industrial  matters.  The notice was followed by  two  other notices    dated    March   22,   1976   and    March    27, 1976under     the    same    provision    of    the     Act. The dispute not having been settled by the parties amicably, the   same   was  taken  in   conciliation   which   failed. Consequently  on July 27, 1976, a reference being  Reference No.  176  of  1976,  was made to  the  Industrial  Court  at Ahmedabad under section 73-A of the Act, wherein as a result of negotiations, an interim settlement appears to have  been arrived at on November 17, 1977.  Meanwhile, the workers  of respondent No. 1 struck work with effect from September  24, 1976 whereupon an application being application No. 1455  of 1976 was made an the following day by the respondent to  the Third  Labour Court at Ahmedabad under section 79(1)  &  (4) read  with section 78(1) A (C) and section 97(1) of the  Act for a declaration that the aforesaid action of. the  workers

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mentioned  in  Annexures  ’X  and  ’B’  to  the  application amounted  to an illegal strike.  A public  notice  regarding the  filing  of  this  application  was  given  in  ’Gujarat Samachar’ on September 27, 1976 and a copy thereof was  also affixed  on  the notice board of respondent No.  1.  In  the proceedings  taken upon the said application  of  respondent No. 1, respondent No,. 2 appeared as the representative  and approved union for the processing industry in the local area where the mills of respondent No. 1- are situate, and  filed written statement admitting that the, strike resorted, to by the,  workmen  was illegal.  Without meaning to  burden  the record  unnecessarily  but  with  a  view  to  complete  the narrative,  it may be stated that in May, 1976, a new  union of  workers employed in the concern of respondent No. 1  was formed under the name and style of ’New Labour General Trade Union’ Ahmedabad which was registered under the Trade Unions Act  on June 3, 1976.  Vide its letter dated June  8,  1976, the  new union raised demands regarding issue  of  permanent entry  passes,  casual leave, festival  holidays,  provident fund,  Employees State Insurance, Bonus, Dearness  Allowance etc.  which  were not heeded to by respondent No. 1  on  the ground   that   the  union  could  not  be  treated   as   a representative  union under the Act.  The reminders sent  by the  new union on June 21, 1976, June 29, 1976 and  July  2, 1976 were also ignored by respondent No. 1. On July 6, 1976, the  new  union  suggested a few names  of  its  members  to respondents  No,.  1  for the purposes  of  negotiation  and requested it to fix a date for that purpose before July  10, 1976.  As the attempt at negotiation also failed to evoke  a favourable  response  from respondent No. 1, the  new  union made  a  representation to Labour Commissioner on  July  10, 1976.   A further representation made by the workmen to  the Management of respondent No. 1 on August 15, 1976 which  was followed  by representations to the Governor of  Gujarat  on August  18, 1976 and August 25. 1976 also failed  to  elicit any  response  from respondent No. 1.  Thereupon,  the,  new union  gave  a strike notice on September 2,  1976  pursuant thereto 131 employees of respondent No. 1 went on strike  on September On  October 4, 1976, the appellant and five other  employees of respondent No. 1 made an application to the Labour  Court praying  that  they  may  be impleaded  as  parties  to  the aforesaid proceedings   391 initiated  by  respondent No. 1 and allowed  to  appear  and defend  the  same.  By means of another application  of  the even date, the appellant and fifteen other employees of  the respondent requested the, Labour Court to declare the strike as  legal.   The  former application was  rejected  by  the, Labour  Court vide order dated October 6, 1976.  On  October 12, 1976, the Labour Court allowed the aforesaid application of  respondent  No. 1 under section 79(1) &  (4)  read  with section  78(1)  A  (C)  and section 97(1)  of  the  Act  and declared  that the employees mentioned in Annexures ’A’  and ’B’  to the application resorted to an illegal  strike  with effect from September 24, 1976 and the continuation  thereof was  also  illegal  as it had been resorted  to  during  the pendency  of  the  aforesaid  Reference  No.  176  of  1976. Aggrieved by these orders, the appellant and Kamalgiri,  two of  the aforesaid six employees, filed, as  already  stated, Special Civil Application No. 1845 of 1976 in the High Court of  Gujarat  at  Ahmedabad under Article  227  of  the  Con- stitution praying that the aforesaid orders dated October 6, 1976  and  October 12, 1976 passed by the  Labour  Court  be quashed.  They also asked for a declaration that the  strike

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resorted to by the employees of respondent No. 1 pursuant to the, aforesaid notice of strike given by their new union was just,  proper and legal and that the employees who  resorted to the strike continued to be in service of respondent No. 1 without  any  break  or interruption.   The  said  employees further  prayed that respondent No. 1 be directed  to  award full  wages  to the employees who went on  strike.  for  the period  commencing  from  September  24,  1976  (when   they initially went on strike) to the date, of resumption of work by  them.  Vide its order dated November 16, 1976, the  High Court summarily dismissed the petition and declined to, give leave to appeal to this Court.  The appellant thereupon made an  application to. this Court for Special Leave  which  was granted.  This is how the matter is before us. Appearing  on  behalf  of the appellant, Mr.  B.  Dutta  has contended  that the order of the High Court  dated  November 16,  1976  dismissing in limine the aforesaid  petition  No. 1845 of 1976 submitted by the appellant and his co-employee, Kamalgiri,  under  Article 227 of the  Constitution  thereby upholding  the  aforesaid  orders of the  Labour  Court  and dismissing the application of the appellant and his five co- employees  for being impleaded as parties to  the  aforesaid application  of respondent No. 1 under section 79(1)  &  (4) read  with section 78(1) A (C) and section 97(1) of the  Act is   erroneous   and   cannot  be  sustained   on   a   true interpretation  of  section 80 of the Act  which  confers  a right  on  every individual employee to  appear  before  the Labour Court and contest on application under section 79  of the  Act which may threaten to adversely affect  his  rights and   interests.   Mr.  Dutta  has  also  urged   that   the application could not have been rejected in view of the  two exceptions  engrafted on section 27 of the Act.’  Mr.  Dutta has  finally urged that in any event, the application  ought to have been allowed and the individual employees  permitted to   appear  and  contest  the  aforesaid   application   of respondent  No. 1 as the stand taken by  the  representative union  in’ regard thereto was mala fide and,  against  their interests. 392 that   it  was  respondent  No.  2  alone,  which  was   the representative  union,  and not the appellant or  any  other individual employee who had a right to appear and act in the aforesaid  proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1  before the Labour Court. For a proper appreciation of the rival contentions  advanced by  counsel  for the parties, it is necessary  to  refer  to section 80 and other relevant provisions of the Act.  Before doing  so,  it  is  necessary to  bear,  in  mind  that  the legislative intent underlying the scheme of the Act being to inculcate   and   encourage  the  practice   of   collective bargaining  so  that  the labour is  neither  exploited  nor victimized and industrial peace and harmony is ensured,  the provisions  of  the Act are designed to  emphasize  that  if labour  in  an industry is organised through its  own  union which is registered and recognised under the Act, then it is that  union  which can appear and do all  acts  and  agitate matters in its representative capacity for the labour and if it does choose to appear or act then no individual  employee is competent to appear and present his point of view.   With these  prefatory observations, we proceed to advert  to  the relevant provisions of the Act. Section  80  of  the  Act provides  :  "con  receipt  of  an application under section 79, the Labour Court shall issue a notice  to  all  parties. affected by the  dispute,  in  the manner  provided by rules under section 85. Subject  to  the

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provisions  of  Chapter V, the Labour Court may  permit  the parties so affected to appear in the manner provided by  the provisions of sections 80A to 80-C.  The Labour Court  shall then hold an inquiry". A  plain reading of the above section which was  substituted for  the  original section 80 by the Bombay Act 49  of  1955 makes it clear that the Labour Court can permit the  parties affected by the dispute to appear in the manner provided  by sections  80-A  to  80-C  of  the  Act  but  the  discretion conferred  on  the Labour Court has specifically  been  made subject  to  the provisions of Chapter-V  which  deals  with "representation of employees and employers and appearance on their behalf" and contains amongst other provisions  section 27-A which is in the following terms :-               "27-A.  Save as provided in sections. 32,  33,               and  33-A,  no employee shall  be  allowed  to               appear or act in any proceeding under this Act               except    through   the   representative    of               employees". This  section,  it would be noted, consists  of  two  Parts. While the second part contains the general rule  prohibiting the grant of permission to an individual employee to  appear or  act in any proceeding under the Act except  through  the representative,  of  employees, the first  part  carves  out three exceptions to the said general rule which are mention- ed in sections 32, 33 and 33-A of the Act.  Whereas the last exception i.e. the one carved out by section 33-A of the Act relates   to  proceedings  where  the  dispute  is   between employees and employees, the other two exceptions  mentioned in  sections 32 and 33 of the Act relate to  proceedings  in respect of certain other disputes. 393 The term ’representative of employees’ as used in the  above quoted section 27-A of the Act is defined in section 3  (32) of  the  Act  as  meaning  "a  representative  of  employees entitled to appear or act as such under section 30." This takes us to section 30 of the Act.  This section  which sets out in preferential order the persons who are  entitled to  appear  or act as representatives of  employees  in  any industry in local area assigns the foremost position to  the representative union. Now  a combined reading of sections 80, 27-A, 30, 32 and  33 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy of preventing the exploitation of the  workers and  augmenting their bargaining power, the Legislature  has clothed  the  representative  union with  plenary  power  to appear or act on behalf of the employees in any  proceedings under  the Act,and has deprived the individual employees  or workmen  of  the right to appear or act  in  any  proceeding under   the  Act  where  the  representative  union   enters appearance  or acts as representative of employees.  We  are fortifid  in this view by a decision of this Court in  Girja Shankar  Kashi  Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning  &  Weaving  Co. Ltd.(1) where Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) speaking for  the Court observed as follows               "It will be seen that s. 27-A provides that no               employee shall be allowed to appear or act  in               any  proceeding under the Act, except  through               the  representative  of  employees,  the  only               exception to this being the provisions of  ss.               32 and 33.  Therefore, this section completely               bans  the appearance of an employee or of  any               one  on his behalf in any proceeding after  it               has   once   commenced  except   through   the               representative   of   employees.    The   only

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             exceptions  to  this complete ban  are  to  be               found in sections 32 and 33.               The first contention advanced by Mr. Dutta is,               therefore, overruled. The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta is also devoid  of substance.   Sections 32 and 33 of the Act no doubt  engraft exceptions on the aforesaid general rule embodied in section 27-A of the Act but they are not helpful to the appellant as the   provisos   appended  thereto   specifically   preclude individual  employees  from  appearing  or  acting  in   any proceeding  under-the  Act where  the  representative  union enters   appearance  or  acts  as  the   representative   of employees.   It will be advantageous in this  connection  to refer to the following passage occurring in the decision  of this   Court   in   Girja   Shankar   Kashi   Ram   V.   The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (supra), where Wanchoo,               "The  result therefore of taking ss. 27-A,  32               and 33 together is that s. 27A first places  a               complete ban on the appearance of an  employee               in  proceedings  under  the Act  once  it  has               commenced except through the representative of               employees.   But there are two  exceptions  to               this ban contained in ss. 32 and 33.   Section               32  is concerned with all  proceedings  before               the authorities and gives power to the               (1)   11962] 2 Supp.  S.C.R. 890 : 1196               (2) 2 L.L.J. 369 (S.C).                394               authorities   under  the  Act  to  permit   an               employee  himself  to  appear  even  though  a               representative of employees may have  appeared               but  this permission cannot be  granted  where               the  representative  union has appeared  as  a               representative of employees.  Section 33 which               is  the other exception allows an employee  to               appear through any person in certain  proceed-               ings  only  even though  a  representative  of               employees might have appeared; but here  again               it  is subject to this that no one  else,  not               even  the  employee who might  have  made  the               application, will have the right to appear  if               a  Representative Union has put in  appearance               as  the  representative of employees.   It  is               quite  clear therefore that the scheme of  the               Act  is  that  where  a  Representative  Union               appears  in any proceeding under the  Act,  no               one else can be allowed to appear not even the               employee  at  whose instance  the  proceedings               might  have begun under s. 42(4).   But  where               the  appearance  is by any  representative  of               employees  other than a  Representative  Union               authorities   under  s.  32  can  permit   the               employee to appear himself in all  proceedings               before  them  and  further  the  employee   is               entitled  to appear by any person  in  certain               proceedings specified in s. 33.  But  whenever               the   Representative   Union   has   made   an               appearance,  even the employee  cannot  appear               many  proceeding under the Act and the  repre-               sentation   must  be  confined  only  to   the               Representative   Union.   The   complete   ban               therefore  laid  by s. 27A  on  representation               otherwise  than  through a  representative  of               employees    remains   complete   where    the               representative  of  employees  is  the  Repre-

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             scntative Union that has appeared; but if  the               representative of employees that has appeared,               is  other than the Representative  Union  then               ss.  32  and 33 provide  for  exceptions  with               which  we  have  already  dealt.   There   can               therefore  be  no escape from  the  conclusion               that  the Act plainly intends that  where  the               Representative Union appears in any proceeding               under  the  Act even  though  that  proceeding               might  have commenced by an employee under  s.               42(4)  of  the Act, the  Representative  Union               alone  can  represent  the  employee  and  the               employee   cannot  appear  or  act   in   such               proceeding." The  following  observation made by  Hidayatullah,  C.J.  in Textile  Laboour Association, Bhadra Ahmedabad v.  Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association, Ahmedabad(1) is also, pertinent :-               "Reading these two sections (ss. 32 and 33  of               the  Act),  we find that it is  quite  clearly               stated  in  the provisos to the  two  sections               that no individual is allowed to appear in any               proceeding  in which the representative  Union               has  appeared  as the  representative  of  the               employees. The   second  contention  raised  by  Mr.  Dutta  is   also, therefore, repelled. The  last contention of Mr. Dutta that in view of  the  fact that   while  appearing  as  the  representative  union   in respondent No. 1’s aforesaid (1) [1970] 3 S.C.C. 890-91. 395 application  No.  1455  of 1976, respondent No.  2  was  not acting  for  and on behalf of the employees but  was  acting mala fide and against their interests, the appellant and his five other co-employees should have been allowed to be added as  parties to the application and permitted to  appear  and act therein has also no force.  It has to be remembered that malafides  or  bonafides of a representative  union  has  no relevance  while considering the provisions of section  27-A and  sections  32  and 33 of the Act  which  taken  together impose  an absolute ban on the appearance of any  individual employee   in  any  proceeding  under  the  Act  where   the representative union chooses to appear act as representative of  the  employees.  In case, the employees  find  that  the representative  union  is  acting  in  a  manner  which   is prejudicial  to  their  interests,  their  remedy  lies   in invoking  the aid of the Registrar under Chapter III of  the Act and asking him to cancel the registration of the  union. The  following observations made in Girja Shankar Kashi  Ram v.  The  Gujarat  Spinning & Weaving Co.  Ltd.  (supra)  are apposite in this connection :-               "But it is clear that bona fides or mala fides               of  the representative of employees  can  have               nothing to do with the ban placed by s. 27A on               the  appearance  of any one  else  except  the               representative of employees, as defined in  s.               30  and that if anyone else can appear in  any               proceeding  we must find a provision  in  that               behalf in either s. 32 or s. 33, which are the               only exceptions to s. 27A.  It may be  noticed               that there is no exception in s. 27A in favour               of  the  employee,  who  might  have  made  an               application  under s. 42(4), to appear on  his               own  behalf and the ban which is placed by  s.               27A  will apply equally to such  an  employee.

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             In  order however to so en the rigour  of  the               provisions of s. 27A, for it may well be  that               the representative of employees may not choose               to  appear in many proceedings started  by  an               employee  under  S.  42(4),  exceptions-   are               provided  in  ss. 32 and 33.   The  scheme  of               these three provisions clearly is that if  the               Representative Union appears, no one else  can               appear  and carry on a proceeding, even if  it               be begun on an application under s. 42(4)  but               where the Representative Union does not choose               to  appear there are provisions in ss. 32  and               33   which   permit  others   to   appear   in               proceedings under the Act." In  view  of  the above  quoted  categoric  and  unequivocal observations,  the contrary observations made in N. M.  Naik v.  Colaba Land Mills(1) on which strong reliance  has  been placed by Mr. Dutta must be treated as overruled. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the  view expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court and holding that  neither the appellant nor his other  co-employees  had any locus standi to appear or act as individual employees in the  aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1  in which respondent No. 2 which is the representative union  in the industry in the local area bad the right to (1) [1960] 1 L.L.J. 440.  396 appear and act as the representative of the employees in the industry and did appear or act as such.  We may observe here in  passing that even new union to which the  appellant  and some  of  his co-employee& belonged would have no  right  to appear or act on behalf of the appellant or his co-employees in the aforesaid proceeding initiated by respondent No. 1 as it   had  not  been  registered  and  recognised   as   the. representative union of employees under the Act. In  conclusion,  we wish to make it clear  that  as  learned counsel  for the parties have abstained from  addressing  us regarding the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid  strike in view of the fact that it was not open to the appellant to agitate  that question because the Labour Court had  refused to  add  him  as a party to  respondent  No.  1’s  aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, we have refrained from  making any observation in regard thereto. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed  but in  them circumstances of the case without any order  as  to costs. S.R.                            Appeal dismissed- 397