IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6017 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 23788/2004)

Shri Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil & Ors.     …Appellants

Versus

Shri Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale & Ors.    …Respondents

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6018 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C ) No.22662/09 CC 2563)

JUDGEMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

Delay condoned in SLP (c) No.22662/09 CC  2563.   

2 Leave granted in both matters. 3. The short question that arises for consideration in  

this appeal by special leave is whether power of revision in  

Section 257 of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be  

exercised at any time although no time has been prescribed  

for exercise of such power.

4. Takawade  Gat  No.  1157  (Old  Survey  No.  201/1)  

admeasuring 6H65R originally belonged to one N.R. Deshpande.  

The land was an inam land which was resumed on August 1,  

1955. On the date of resumption, there were four tenants

holding  1/4th  share  each.  Tukaram  Sakharam  Shevale,  

predecessor in title of Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, one of such  

tenants, thus,  held land admeasuring 1H 66R. The original  

landlord, N.R. Deshpande, was required to pay occupancy price  

before July 31, 1965 which he did only to the extent of 3/4th  

in respect of lands possessed by three tenants other than  

Tukaram  Sakharam  Shevale.  The  3/4th portion  was,  thus,  

regranted and later on sold to the tenants occupying such  

portion. As regards 1/4th portion occupied by Tukaram Sakharam  

Shevale, it appears that no occupancy price was paid and this  

portion was resumed to the State. Tukaram is, however, said  

to have continued to remain in possession of 1/4th  portion of  

the land till 1974-75.  

5. The Tahsildar, Shirol, on March 30, 1976, passed an  

order hereby 3/4th of portion of Land earlier in occupation of  

Tukaram was granted in favour of Shivgonda Satgonda Patil on  

the basis of his occupation as cultivator and 1/4th remained  

in favour of Tukaram Sakharam Shevale.  

6. Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, until his death in 1990,  

did not challenge the Tahsildar’s Order dated March 30, 1976  

in any proceeding. It was only after the death of Tukaram  

that his legal heirs, namely, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein,  

made  an  application  before  the  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  

Ichalkaranji  in  1993  seeking  revision  of  the  order  of  

Tahsildar,  Shirol  passed  on  March  30,  1976.  The  Sub-

Divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji invoked his revisional power  

under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and

after hearing the parties and getting the report from the  

Tahsildar,  Shirol  vide  his  order  dated  August  16,  1994  

allowed  the  revision  application  and  set  aside  the  order  

dated March 30, 1976 giving 3/16th  share in R.S. No. 210/1 to  

Shivgonda  Satgonda  Patil.  The  Sub-Divisional  Officer,  

Ichalkaranji declared that 1/4th  share in R.S. No. 210/1  

admeasuring 1H 66R shall be deemed to have been granted to  

Tukaram  Shevale  and  pik-pahani  entries  made  in  favour  of  

Shivgonda Satgonda Patil shall be treated as unauthorized and  

illegal.

7. Upset by the order dated August 16, 1994, the present  

appellants preferred appeal before the Additional Collector,  

Kolhapur who agreed with the view of Sub-Divisional Officer,  

Ichalkaranji and rejected the appeal on September 16, 1995.

8. The  present  appellants  carried  the  matter  before  

Commissioner,  Pune Division, Pune but without any success.

9. The  present  appellants  then  filed  writ  petition  

before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  (Appellate  

side). The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on June  

20, 1996.

10. The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeal before  

the Division Bench of the High Court which also came to be  

rejected on September 1, 2004.

11. Section  257  of  the  Maharashtra  Land  Revenue  Code  

empowers  State  Government  and  certain  Revenue  and  Survey  

Officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of  

Subordinate Officers. Thus, a power of revision is conferred

on  the  State  Government  and  certain  Revenue  and  Survey  

Officers under Section 257.  

12. Section 257 reads thus :  

“Section 257 - Power of State Government and of  certain Revenue and Survey Officers to call for  and examine records and proceedings of subordinate  officers  

(1)  The  State,  Government  and  any  Revenue  or  Survey  Officer,  not  inferior  in  rank  to  an  Assistant or Deputy Collector, or a Superintendent  of Land Records, in their respective departments,  may call for and examine the record of any inquiry  or the proceedings of any subordinate Revenue or  Survey  Officer,  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  itself or  himself, as  the case  may be,  as the  legality  or  propriety  of  any  decision  or  order  passed,  and  as  to  the  regularity  of  the  proceedings of such officer.

(2)  A Tahsildar, a Naib-Tahsildar, and a District  Inspector of Land Records may in the same manner  call  for  and  examine  the  proceedings  of  any  officer subordinate to them in any matter in which  neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been  held.

(3)  If in any case, it shall appear to the State  Government, or to any officer referred to in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) that any decision  or order or proceedings so called for should be  modified, annulled or reversed, it or he may pass  such order thereon as it or he deems fit:

Provided  that,  the  State  Government  or  such  officer  shall  not  vary  or  reverse  any  order  affecting any question or right between private  persons without having to the parties interested  notice to appear and to be heard in support of  such order:

Provided  further  that,  an  Assistant  or  Deputy  Collector shall not himself pass such order in any  matter in which a formal inquiry has been held,  but shall submit the record with his opinion to  the Collector, who shall pass such order thereon  as he may deem fit.”

13. A close look at the aforesaid provision would show  

that there is no time limit fixed for exercise of power of  

revision  by  the  revisional  authority.  The  question  is,  

could it be exercised at any time. While dealing with the  

question like the present one, a 3-Judge Bench of this  

Court in the case of  State of Gujarat v.  Patil Raghav  

Natha1,  with reference to Sections 65 and 211 of Bombay  

Land Revenue Act, 1879, held thus :

“11. The question arises whether the Commissioner  can revise an order made under Section 65 at any  time.  It  is  true  that  there  is  no  period  of  limitation  prescribed  under  Section  211,  but  it  seems to us plain that this power must be exercised  in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable  time must be determined by the facts of the case  and the nature of the order which is being revised. 12.   It  seems  to  us  that  Section  65  itself  indicates the length of the reasonable time within  which the Commissioner must act under Section 211.  Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does  not inform the applicant of his decision on the  application  within  a  period  of  three  months  the  permission applied for shall be deemed to have been  granted. This section shows that a period of three  months  is  considered  ample  for  the  Collector  to  make up his mind and beyond that the legislature  thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  granted.  Reading  Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that  the  Commissioner  must  exercise  his  revisional  powers within a few months of the order of the  Collector. This is reasonable time because after  the grant of the permission for building purposes  the occupant is likely to spend money on starting  building operations at least within a few months  from the date of the permission. In this case the  Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector  on October 12, 1961 i.e more than a year after the  order and it seems to us that this order was passed  too late.”

14. While  dealing  with  the  suo-motu  revisional  power  

1  (1969) 2 SCC 187

under Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenency and Agricultural  

Lands Act, 1976, this Court in Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v.  

Fatmabai Ibrahim2  held that generally where no time-limit is  

prescribed for exercise of power under statute, it should be  

exercised within a reasonable time. This is what this Court  

said:

“Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any  time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view  of the settled position by several judgments of  this Court that wherever a power is vested in a  statutory authority without prescribing any time- limit,  such  power  should  be  exercised  within  a  reasonable time. In the present case the transfer  took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo  motu  enquiry  was  started  by  the  Mamlatdar  in  September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be  invalid  the  appellant  is  likely  to  suffer  irreparable  injury,  because  he  has  made  investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this  connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance  was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B. Majmudar  (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in  State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah (Spe.  WA  No.  2770  of  1979) disposed  of  on  1-3-1990,  where in connection with Section 84-C itself it  was  said  that  the  power  under  the  aforesaid  section should be exercised within a reasonable  time.  This  Court  in  connection  with  other  statutory  provisions,  in  the  case  of  State  of  Gujarat v.  Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187)  and in the case of  Ram Chand v.  Union of India  (1994) 1 SCC 44) has impressed that where no time- limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under  a  statute  it  does  not  mean  that  it  can  be  exercised  at  any  time;  such  power  has  to  be  exercised  within  a  reasonable  time.  We  are  satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of  the present case, the suo motu power under Section  84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar  within a reasonable time.”

15. Recently, in the case of  State of Punjab and Others  

v.  Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd.3  

while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of  

2  (1997) 6 SCC 71  3  (2007) 11 SCC 363

the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held:

“17.  A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act  would reveal that although no period of limitation  has been prescribed therefore, the same would not  mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at  any time. 18. It is trite that if no period of limitation  has  been  prescribed,  statutory  authority  must  exercise  its  jurisdiction  within  a  reasonable  period.  What,  however,  shall  be  the  reasonable  period  would  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  statute,  rights  and  liabilities  thereunder  and  other relevant factors. 19.  Revisional  jurisdiction,  in  our  opinion,  should ordinarily be exercised within a period of  three years having regard to the purport in terms  of the said Act. In any event, the same should not  exceed the period of five years. The view of the  High  Court,  thus,  cannot  be  said  to  be  unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view  the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found  out  from  the  statutory  scheme.  As  indicated  hereinbefore,  maximum  period  of  limitation  provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of  the Act is five years.”

16. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statue does  

not  prescribe  the  time  limit  for  exercise  of  revisional  

power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at  

any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable  

time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled  

thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the  

legislature does not provide for any length of time within  

which  the  power  of  revision  is  to  be  exercised  by  the  

authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise  

of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.  

Ordinarily,  the  reasonable  period  within  which  power  of  

revision may be exercised would be three years under Section  

257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course,

to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely  

exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not  

a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-

Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land  

Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and  

circumstances  of  the  case  assuming  that  the  order  of  

Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not  

correct.  Pertinently,  Tukaram  Sakharam  Shevale,  during  his  

lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the  

order of Tehsildar, Shirol although it was passed on March  

30, 1976 and he was alive upto 1990. It is not even in the  

case of Respondent Nos.1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of  

the order dated March 30, 1976. There is no finding by the  

Sub-Divisional Officer either that order dated March 30, 1976  

was obtained fraudulently.

17. In what we have discussed above, the appeals deserve  

to be allowed against respondent Nos. 1 to 5 and are allowed  

and  impugned  orders  are  quashed  and  set  aside  as  against  

them.   Parties will bear their own costs.

......................J.       (Tarun Chatterjee)

......................J.       (R. M. Lodha)

New Delhi September 2,  2009.