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PETITIONER: SANTOKH SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: IZHAR HUSSAIN AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/04/1973

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2190            1974 SCR  (1)  78  1973 SCC  (2) 406

ACT: Indian Penal Code, s. 211-Its scope.

HEADNOTE: Pursuant to an F.I.R. the respondent, I and few others  were tried  before Addl.  District Magistrate for offences  under Ss. 147, 323/149 and 325/149, I.P.C. The A.D.M. acquitted all the accused.  Respondent lzhar, one of  the  accused  was  implicated  and  wrongly  identified, although  he  was not one of the assailants present  at  the place of occurrence. Later,  respondent lzhar filed a petition before the  A.D.M. under Ss. 476/479 Cr. P.C. praying that the appellant, one K and  the  sub-Inspector  of Police, be  prosecuted  for  the offence  under  Ss.  211/193  I.P.C.  because  the  S.I.  in collusion with K had submitted a wrong charge sheet  whereas K  had  lodged a false report at the instance of one  H  and also  these  three  persons had  intentionally  given  false evidence  during  petitioner’s trial  and  fabricated  false evidence. The  Magistrate rejected the application of  the  respondent following  the  case of’ Shabir Hussain Bholu  v.  State  of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 816.  The Sessions Court  also dismissed  the appeal.  On a revision u/s.  435/439  Cr.P.C. the  High Court recorded its opinion that it was a fit  case in which the complaint under s. 211, I.P.C. should be  filed against   the   persons  responsible   for   lzhar’s   false prosecution and directed accordingly. According  to the respondents, when the appellant stated  in the  witness  box  that he had seen  Izhar  with  others  in ’marpit’ and thereafter in the identification parade in  the jail he had made a false charge against lzhar therefore,  he was liable to be prosecuted under s. 211 I.P.C. Allowing the appeal. HELD  : (i) The essential ingredient of an offence under  s. 211  I.P.C.  is to institute or cause to be  instituted  any criminal  proceeding against a person with intent  to  cause him  injury  or with similar intent to  falsely  charge  any person with having committed an offence, knowing that  there is  no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or  charge. Instituting   or   causing  to  institute   false   criminal proceedings  resume  false charge but false  charge  may  be

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prepared  even when no criminal proceedings result.  In  the present case, the appellant had not instituted any  criminal proceedings against anybody; neither did he ’falsely charge’ anybody.   Giving false evidence against an  accused  person during  the  course of a criminal trial,  may  appropriately amount  to  an  offence  under  Ss.  193,  I.P.C.;  but  the statement  in order to constitute the "charges"  under  sec. 211,  I.P.C.  should be made either in a complaint or  in  a report of a cognisable offence to a competent police officer with  the intention of setting the criminal law  in  motion. Therefore, under the circumstances, no offence under s. 211, I.P.C. can be ’considered to have been committed. [64D] (ii)In  view of the appellant’s statement that he  did  not see  lzhar  amongst the assailants, it was not  possible  to understand  how  it could be expedient in  the  interest  of justice  to  direct  the  appellant’s  prosecution.    Every incorrect  or false statement does not make it incumbent  on the  court to order prosecution.  The court has to  exercise judicial  discretion  in  the  light  of  all  the  relevant circumstances when it determines the question of expediency. The  court orders prosecution in the larger interest of  the administration  of  justice and not to gratify  feelings  of personal revenge. [65D-E] (iii)Identification  at test parades could by no stretch  of imagination,  be  considered  to amount to  a  false  charge against  the  respondent  lzhar as contemplated  by  s.  211 I.P.C.  Such identification is not substantive evidence  and it  can  only be used as corroborative of the  statement  in court. [65E] 79 (iv)It   is  doubtful  if  the  High  Court  had   at   all jurisdiction  to make an order of complaint because  it  was neither  the court which tried the original offences  nor  a court  to which the trial court was subordinate.   The  High Court,   instead  of  directing  the  prosecution   of   the appellant,  could have quashed the orders of the two  courts below  and  send  the  case back  to  the  trial  court  for reconsideration of the matter in accordance with law. [65H] Kuldip  Singh  v.  State of Punjab, [1956]  S.C.R.  125  and Haridas  v.  State  of West Bengal,  [1964]  7  S.C.R.  237, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No,. 35 of 1970. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May 22, 1969 of the Allahabad High Court, (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Cr.  A. No. 132 of 1967. R.   K. Jain and A. K. Gupta, for the appellant K.   L. Kohli, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUA,  J.  In  this appeal by special  leave,  the  appellant challenges  the  order  of a learned  single  Judge  of  the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court dated May 22, 1969 allowing  the  revision of lzhar Hussain and  after  setting aside the order of the Sessions Judge, Barabanki dated March 15, 1967 as also that of the Additional District  Magistrate (Judicial), Barabanki dated January 11, 1967, directing  the Deputy  Registrar  of the- High Court to  file  a  complaint under  S.  21 1, I.P.C. against the  appellant  for  falsely charging  Izhar Hussain with offences under ss. 323 and  325 read  with S. 149 and under S. 147, I.P.C. in the  court  of the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Barabanki.

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It  appears  that pursuant to the first  information  report (Ext.   Ka-9) lodged by Kartar Singh s/o Shri Lachman  Singh at  police station Kotwali Sub-District Nawabganj,  District Barabanki on February 7, 1966, lzhar Hussain respondent  and some  others  were  tried in the  court  of  the  Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Barabanki for offences under ss. 147, 323/149 and 325/149, I.P.C. Several witnesses  were examined in support of the prosecution case.  Santokh  Singh appellant appeared as P.W.4. In his examination in chief, so far as relevant for our purpose, he had deposed on September 3, 1966 as follows :-               "I  had gone to the jail for  identifying  the               accused persons.  By putting his hand on Mohd,               Zahir,  Usman,  Shahnshah,  Puttan  and  Izhar               Husain the witness stated, I had seen them  in               the    marpit    and   thereafter    in    the               identification parade in the jail-"               In  cross-examination,  he had  stated,  inter               alia               "I  did  not  see  among  the  assailants  the               accused lzhar Hussain present in Court.  I did               not happen to see this boy in that night.  The               men of the Octroi post said to me that Anwar’s               son   Izhar   was  also  present   among   the               assailants.  I identified this boy in the jail               at  the instance of the people of  the  Octroi               post." 80 The   Additional  District Magistrate  trying  the   cases acquitted  all  the  accused  of  the  offences  charged  on November  30,  1966.   In the course of  his  judgment.  the learned Magistrate observed inter alia               "One  of  the accused lzhar Hussain is  a  boy               aged  about 13 years.  It has been  stated  by               Kartar Singh and- Santokh Singh that  actually               they  had  not  seen  him  ;it  the  place  of               occurrence.   Still Santokh  Singh  identified               him  before Shri A. P. Singh, Magistrate.   He               explains  that this he did because the  Octroi               personnel  told  him so.  Obviously  on  their               mere  telling it could not have been  possible               to identify this boy." Earlier  the  learned Magistrate had  observed  that  Kartar Singh  and Santokh Singh were obviously the victims  of  the assault.   It  is noteworthy that  the  Additional  District Magistrate while acquitting the accused persons did not hold that Santokh Singh had falsely charged lzhar Hussain or  any other  accused  persons,  nor  did  the  learned  Magistrate consider  it to be expedient in the interest of justice  to prosecute Santokh Singh for an offence under s. 21 1, I.P.C. In January, 1967, lzhar Hussain presented an application  in the court of the Additional District Magistrate  (Judicial), Barabanki  under ss. 476/479-A, Cr-P.C. (in the  application as printed in the paper book apparently these sections  have wrongly been described to be of I.P.C.) praying that  Kartar Singh,  Santokh  Singh  and R.  D.  Chowdhry,  S.I.,  police station  Kotwali,  be prosecuted for the offence  under  ss. 211/193,  I.P.C.  because Shri R. D. Chowdhry  in  collusion with  Shri Kartar Singh had submitted a wrong  charge  sheet whereas  Kartar  Singh  had lodged a  false  report  at  the insta nce  of  one Karnail Singh and also that  these  three persons  had intentionally given false evidence  during  the petitioner’s  trial  and had also  intentionally  fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used as evidence  in the case.

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The  Additional  District  Magistrate  observed  that  after considering the evidence in the main case he had disbelieved the  witnesses  for  the  prosecution  and  had  held  lzhar Hussain’s  prosecution  to  be false but in  spite  of  this conclusion  he had not directed any proceedings to be  taken under  s.  479-A,  Cr.P.C.,  nor  had  be  ordered  criminal prosecution  of  the three  aforementioned  witnesses.   The proceedings  under  s. 476, Cr.P.C.  were  accordingly  held incompetent.   ’Ibis  view  was taken on the  basis  of  the decision of this Court in Kuppa Goundan and another v. M. S. P.  Rajesh(1)  and two other decisions of  the  Madras  High Court.   In his order, however, the learned Magistrate  also made  a  reference  to  Shabir Hussain  Bholu  v.  State  of Maharashtra (2). lzhar Hussain’s application was  considered by the Magistrate to be misconceived in view of the decision in Shabir Hussain’s case (supra) and rejected. lzhar Hussain took the matter on appeal to the court of the Sessions Judge but with no better fate.  The Sessions  Judge also (1) A.J.R. 1966 S. C. 1863. (2) A.T.R. 1963 S. C. 816. 81 referred  to the aforesaid two decisions of this  Court  and observed as follows               "Applying  the said principle of law  as  laid               down  by their Lordships, it is  obvious  that               the  entire  material was before  the  Court               below and in spite of the fact that it arrived               at the finding that the witness had  perjured,               it  did  not decide to proceed  under  Section               479-A,  Code of Criminal Procedure.  In  these               circumstances,  it was not open to  the  Court               below  to  have proceeded  for  perjury  under               Section 479-A, Code of Criminal Procedure,  as               prayed  by  the learned counsel  appearing  on               behalf  of  the appellant,  because  upon  the               facts  of the present case, out of which  this               appeal  has arisen, the bar of clause  (6)  of               Section  479-A clearly came into play.   Thus,               the Court below was correct in dismissing  the               application   made   by   the   appellant   as               misconceived.,, The appeal of Izhar Hussain was accordingly dismissed. lzhar.   Hussain  thereupon took the matter to  the  Lucknow Bench  of  the Allahabad High Court on  revision  under  ss. 435/439, Cr.P.C. The learned single Judge observed that even accepting  the  view of the courts below that  no  complaint under  S.  193,  I.P.C.  could  be,  filed  because  of  the technical  defect,  the  applicant’s  prayer  for  filing  a complaint under S. 21 1, I.F.C. should have been considered. It  was then observed that lzhar Hussain. a boy of 13  years had  been  falsely  prosecuted  in the  case  and  that  his participation  in  the crime was highly improbable,  if  not impossible.   He further observed that Kartar Singh had  not named  Izhar Hussain as one of the assailants in the  F.I.R. lodged  by him, nor did Kartar Singh identify Izhar  Hussain as  a  culprit in the test identification parade or  in  the trial court.  Santokh Singh appellant, however, did identify lzhar Hussain as one of the participants in the crime in the test  identification  parade and also picked him up  in  the trial  court  stating  that he had also taken  part  in  the crime.   In the cross-examination, as the High Court  itself noticed,  Santokh Singh expressly admitted that he  had  not seen lzhar Hussain amongst the assailants and indeed he  had not  seen lzhar Hussain that night.  On this  material,  the

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High  Court felt that it had been established  beyond  doubt that  lzhar  Hussain had been implicated falsely.   On  this premise,  the High Court recorded its opinion that it was  a fit case in which the complaint under S. 211, I.P.C.  should be filed against the persons responsible for Izhar Hussain’s false prosecution.  After so observing, the High Court  felt that  since Kartar Singh had frankly stated that he had  not seen  lzhar Hussain at the spot on the night in question  at all  there  was no cogent ground for prosecuting  him.   The cases of Santokh Singh appellant and of R. D. Chowdhry  were considered  to  be different.  Izhar  Hussain’s  father  who carried  on  transport business through trucks  and  lorries had,  according to the MO Court, trade rivalry with  Santokh Singh  and his master.  There was thus a "foul  attempt"  to wreak  vengeance against Izhar Hussain’s father  by  falsely implicating  the  minor  boy and for  this  reason,  it  was directed  that the complaint under s. 21 1, I.P.C. be  filed against the appellant for falsely charging Izhar Hussain for the offences already mentioned. 7-L 944 Sup CI/73 82 In  this  Court,- Shri Gupta has very  forcefully  contended that on the material on the record this direction is  wholly unjustified,  if  not  positively illegal,  being  based  on misreading  of  evidence  and on  ,erroneous  view  of  law. According  to  the  submission, the  appellant  had  neither lodged  the  F.I.R. nor otherwise  instituted  any  criminal proceeding  or  falsely  charged Izhar  Hussain  within  the contemplation of s. 21 1, I.P.C.Besides,     there     is absolutely no material on the record on which theHigh Court could  have  formed an opinion that it is expedient  in  the interest  of justice that a complaint under s. 21 1,  I.P.C. should be filedagainst the appellant. Shri-  Kohli  on  behalf of the  respondents  has  tried  to support the order of the HIgh Court and has submitted  that, as  observed  by Madholkar, J. in Haridas v. State  of  West Bengal(1) the words "or :falsely charges" in s. 211,  I.P.C. are not restricted by the words "institutes or causes to  be instituted   any  criminal  proceeding".   The   Legislature according to the submission has provided in this section for two  kinds of acts : (i) the institution of  proceeding  and (ii)  making a false charge.  This section ’in the words  of Mudholkar,  J.,  added  Shri Kohli, is not  limited  to  the institution  of a complaint upon a false charge as  such  an interpretation   would   completely   shut   out    criminal proceedings in which no charge of an offence has been  made. It  is  on this. observation that the  learned  counsel  has tried  to  build and ,develop the contention that  when  the appellant  stated  in the witness box as P.W.4 that  he  had seen  Mohd.   Zahir,  Usman, Shahanshah,  Puttan  and  lzhar Hussain in the marpit and thereafter in the  identification’ parade in the jail, he had made a false charge against lzhar Hussain  and was, therefore, liable to be prosecuted for  an offence  under  s.  211,  I.P.C. The  counsel  has  in  this connection  expressly  stated  that  he  does  not  want  to prosecute the appellant for any offence mentioned in s. 479- A,  Cr.P.C. The bar resulting from non-complaince with  that section would, therefore, be ineffective so far as  prosecu- tion  for  other offences is concerned.  In support  of  his case   he  has  relied  on  ss.  195  (1  )  (b)  and   476, I.P.C.Section 195 so far as relevant reads Prosecution for contempt          (1) No Court shall of lawful authority of             take cognizance public servants. (a) x x              x             x              x

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Prosecution for certain offences against public justice.               (b)   of  any offence punishable under any  of               the  following  sections  of  the  same  Code,               namely, sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200,               205,  2P6,  207- 208, 209, 210, 211  and  228,               when  such  offence is alleged  to  have  been               committed   in,   or  in  relation   to,   any               proceedings  in  any  Court,  except  on   the               complaint in writing of (1) [1964] 7.  C.R. 237. 83               such  Court  or of some other Court  to  which               such Court is subordinate; or               (c) x            x           x            x Sub-section  (3)  of  this section lays down  that  for  the purposes  of this section, a Court shall be deemed  to  be subordinate  to  the court to which appeals  ordinarily  lie from-  the  appealable decrees or sentences of  such  former court.   According  to the proviso, where-  appeals  lie  to more,  than  one  court, the  Appellate  Court  of  inferior jurisdiction shall be the court to which such Court shall be deemed  to  be subordinate Section 476  which  provides  for procedure  in cases mentioned in g. 195 so far  as  relevant for our purpose lays down                              "476.   (1)  When  any   Civil,               Revenue or Criminal                                           Court is,  whether               on application               Procedure   in  cases  made  to  it  in   this               behalf or other               mentioned in    wise,  of opinion     that  it               is expedient in               section 195.    the interests of justice  that               an inquiry should be made into, any               offence referred     to   in   section    195,               subsection  (1),  clause (b)  or  clause  (c),               which appears to have been committed in or  in               relation  to a proceeding in that Court,  such               Court may, after such preliminary inquiry,  if               any, as it thinks necessary, record a  finding               to that effect and make a complaint thereof in               writing signed by the presiding officer of the               Court,  and  shall  forward  the  same  to   a               Magistrate,  of the first class having  juris-               diction, and may take sufficient security  for               the  appearance  of the  accused  before  such               Magistrate  or if the alleged offence is  non-               bailable may, if it thinks necessary so to do,               send   the   accused  in   custody   to   such               Magistrate,  and may bind over any  person  to               appear   and   give   evidence   before   such               Magistrate               Provided  that,  where the  Court  making  the               complaint  is a High Court, the complaint  may               be signed by such officer of the Court as  the               Court may appoint..               For  the  purposes  of  this  sub-section,   a               Presidency Magistrate shall be deemed to be  a               Magistrate of the first class." Now,   in  the  present  case,  the   Additional    District Magistrate on November 30, 1966 acquitted all the accused of the offences charged. He did not hold that the appellant had falsely charged.  Izhar Hussain with any offence, nor did he

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consider  it  expedient  in  the  interest  of  justice   to prosecute him for an offence under s. 211, I.P.C. As already noticed when in January, 1967, Izhar Hussain applied to that court  under ss. 476/479-A, Cr.P.C. for the  prosecution  of the appellant and two others, the court felt that in view of the decision in Kuppa Goundan’s case (supra) the proceedings under S. 476, Cr-P.C. were incompetent.  Section 479-A   has not  been  relied  upon by Shri Kohli  and  in  our  opinion rightly because on the admitted 84 facts in this case that section has not been complied  with. In  Kuppa  Goundan’s case (supra) it was observed  that  the scheme of S. 479-A, Cr.P.C. is to enact a special  procedure for  more expeditious and effective manner of  dealing  with certain  cases of perjury and fabrication of false  evidence of  witness in the course of judicial proceedings.  But  the necessary  condition for applying this section is  that  the court  must  form an opinion that a  particular  witness  or witnesses is or are giving false evidence and at the time of delivering  its  judgment record a finding to  that  effect. This  was not done in this case.  Now, by virtue of s.  479- A(6) no proceeding can be taken against Santokh Singh  under ss.  476  to 479 for giving false  evidence.   Shri  Kohli’s argument,  as already noticed, is that the appellant is  not being prosecuted for giving false evidence as indeed that is not  permissible  now, but only for falsely  charging  lzhar Hussain in his evidence in court.  The short question posed, therefore,  is,  if by giving false evidence  as  a  witness against  Izhar  Hussain the appellant can be  said  to  have charged  him  within the contemplation of s-211,  I.P.C.  If this  question is answered in the affirmative, then it  will have  to  be  determined whether there is in  fact  a  false accusation  and  finally  whether it is  expedient  in  the, interest  of justice on the facts and circumstances  of  the present  case to direct a complaint to be filed under s.  21 1,  I.P.C.  This  section as  its  marginal  note  indicates renders  punishable false charge of offence with  intent  to injure.   The  essential ingredient of an offence  under  s. 211,  I.P.C. is to institute or cause, to be instituted  any criminal  proceeding against a’ person with intent to  cause him  injury  or with similar intent to  falsely  charge  any person with having committed an offence, knowing that  there is  no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or  charge. Instituting   or   causing  to  institute   false   criminal proceedings  assume  false charge but false  charge  may  be preferred  even when no criminal proceedings result.  It  is frankly conceded by Shri Kohli that the appellant cannot  be said to have instituted any criminal proceeding against  any person.   So,  that part of s. 211,  I.P.C.  is  eliminated. Now, the expression "falsely charges’.’ in this section, in our  opinion,  cannot  mean  giving  false  evidence  as   a prosecution  witness  against an accused person  during  the course of a criminal trial.  "To falsely charge" must  refer to the original or initial accusation putting or seeking  to put  in motion the machinery of criminal  investigation  and not  when  seeking  to  prove the  false  charge  by  making deposition  in support of the charge framed in  that  trial. The words "falsely charges" have to be, read along with the expression "institution of criminal proceeding".  Both these expressions,  being susceptible of analogous meaning  should be  understood  to have been. used in their  cognate  sense. They  get  as  it were their colour and  content  from  each other.  They seem to have been used in a technical sense  as commonly  understood in our criminal law.  The false  charge must, therefore, be made initially to a person in  authority

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or  to  someone  who is in a position to  get  the  offender punished  by  appropriate proceedings.  In other  words,  it must be’ embodied either in a complaint or in a report of  a cognizable  offence to the police officer or to  an  officer having   authority   over  the  person  against   whom   the allegations are made.  The statement in order to  constitute the "charges" should be made with the intention and object 85 of  setting  criminal  law in  motion.   Statement  on  oath falsely  supporting the prosecution case against an  accused person  more appropriately amounts to an offence  under  ss. 193 and 195, I.P.C. and not under s. 21 1, I.P.C. We do  not think that the offences contemplated by ss.  193/195,I.P.C. on  the  one  hand  and S. 211, I.P.C.  on  the  other  were intended by the legislature, in this context, to overlap  so as  to make it optional whether to proceed under one or  the other.  The High Court was, therefore, in error in  thinking that  in  the present case the appellant’s  statement  as  a witness  in the trial court, could be construed as a  charge against  lzhar  Hussain.  Once it is held  that  no  offence under  s.  211, I.P.C. can be considered to have  been  com- mitted,  then no other question arises for, as  conceded  by Shri  Kohli, Section 479-A would bar prosecution for  giving false evidence. The High Court also seems to have committed serious error in ignoring  that in the appellant’s statement he  had  clearly stated  that  he  had not seen amongst  the  assailants  the accused Izhar Hussain present in the court.  In face of this statement,  there  was no question of the  appellant  having made any accusation against lzhar Hussain in his deposition. In  any  event,  considering the  entire  statement  of  the appellant  it  is not understood how it  can  be  considered expedient   in  the  interest  of  justice  to  direct   the appellant’s prosecution.  Every incorrect or false statement does   not  make  it  incumbent  on  the  court   to   order prosecution.  The court has to exercise judicial  discretion in  the  light  of all the relevant  circumstances  when  it determines  the  question of expediency.  The  court  orders prosecution in the larger interest of the administration  of justice  and not to gratify feelings of personal revenge  or vindictiveness or to serve the ends of a private party.  Too frequent  prosecutions for such offences tend to defeat  its very  object.   It is only in glaring  cases  of  deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely, that the  court should  direct  prosecution.  The High Court seems  to  have misunderstood  the appellant’s evidence and has also  failed to apply its mind to the question of expediency.   Reference by the High Court to identification parade is also  somewhat inappropriate.   Identification at test parades could by  no stretch  be considered to amount to a false  charge  against Izhar  Hussain  as  contemplated  by  s.  211,  I.P.C.  Such identification  is not substantive evidence and it can  only be  used  as corroborative of the statement in  court.   The identification parade thus could not improve the prosecution case. Besides,  we entertain considerable doubt if the High  Court had at all jurisdiction to make an order of complaint as  it has done.  It was either the court which tried the  original offences   or  a  court  to  which  the  trial   court   was subordinate,  that could make such an order.  The  court  of the  Additional  District Magistrate would not  seem  to  be subordinate to the High Court as provided by section 195(3), Cr-P.C.’  Kuldip  Singh v. State of Punjab(1).   Two  courts below having in their judicial discretion declined to direct the prosecution of the appellant, on revision the High Court

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was, in our view, not all justified in itself directing  the filing of the complaint.  At best, if it considered (1)  [1956] S.C.R. 125. 86 the  orders of the two courts below tainted with  a  serious legal  infirmity  or  manifest  error  resulting  in   grave miscarriage of justice, it could have, after quashing  those orders,   sent  the  case  back  to  the  trial  court   for reconsideration of the matter in accordance with law’ As  a  result  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  we  have  no hesitation  in  allowing this appeal and setting  aside  the order of. the High Court. S.C.                        Appeal alloWed. 87