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PETITIONER: SANT RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJINDER LAL AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/09/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1601            1979 SCR  (1) 900

ACT:      East Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction  Act,  1949,  Sec. 13(2) (ii) (b), as applied to Himachal Pradesh, construction of-Words & Phrases-"Used the building... for a purpose other than that for which it was leased".

HEADNOTE:      The appellant,  a harijan  by birth  and a  cobbler  by vocation was the lessee of a portion of a shop in Ram Bazaar Simla, since  1963, on  an annual  rent of Rs. 300/-. On the landlord’s petition  for eviction  of the appellant a tenant under section  13 (2) (ii) (b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applied to Himachal Pradesh on the ground that the premises were being used for a purpose other than  the  one  for  which  they  were  let  out,  the  Rent Controller held  in favour  of the  landlord. The  appellate authority having  reversed it, the landlord went in revision before  the  High  Court.  The  High  Court  set  aside  the appellate decision and restored the Rent Controller’s Order, inferentially inter  preting the  lease deed  that the lease being of  a shop  the purpose  must have been commercial. In appeal  by  special  leave,  the  appellant  reiterated  his contentions viz.  that (a)  there was no specific commercial purpose inscribed  in the  demise and  therefore it  was not possible to  postulate a  diversion of  purpose and (b) even assuming that  the letting was for a commercial purpose, the fact that  the appellant  had cooked  his food  or stayed at night in  the rear  portion of the small shop did not offend against S. 13(2) (ii) (b) of the Act.      Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD :  1. While  interpreting deeds  and statutes  two rules must  be remembered.  The first one is "in drafting it is not  enough to  gain a degree of precision which a person reading in good faith can understand, but it is necessary to attain if  possible to  a degree of precision which a person reading in  bad faith cannot misunderstand". The second more important  one   for  the  Third  World  countries  is  that statutory construction,  so long as law is at the service of life, cannot  be divorced  from the  social setting. Welfare legislation  must   be  interpreted   in   a   Third   World perspective. [903E-G]

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    The law  itself is  intended to  protect  tenants  from unreasonable eviction  and is, therefore, worded a little in favour of that class of beneficiaries. When interpreting the text of  such provisions-and  this holds good in reading the meaning of  documents regulating  the relations  between the weaker and the stronger contracting parties-the Court should remember that           "where doubts  arise the Gandhian talisman becomes      a  tool   of  interpretation;   "whenever  you  are  in      doubt.....apply the  following test. Recall the face of      the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen,      and ask  yourself, if the step you contemplate is going      to be of any use to him." [903G-H, 904A-B]      Moti Ram  and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1979] 1 SCR 335, applied. 901      2. The  provision of  Section 13(2)(ii)(b)  of the East Punjab  Urban  Rent  Restriction  Act,  1949  has  not  been attracted. Even  the legislature by a later amendment of the definition of "non-residential building" in its realism, has veered round  expressly to  approve de  jure what  is the de facto situation  prevailing in  the urban  areas of Himachal Pradesh. [905B, F-G]      3. The  life style  of the people shapes the profile of the law  and not  vice versa.  Law, not being an abstraction but a  pragmatic exercise,  the legal  inference to be drawn from  a   lease  deed   is  conditioned  by  the  prevailing circumstances. The  intention of  parties from  which courts spell out  the purpose  of the  lease is to be garnered from the social  milieu. Thus  viewed it  is difficult  to  hold, especially when  the lease  has not  spelt it out precisely, that the purpose was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portion. [903D-E]      In the instant case, it is impossible to hold that if a tenant who  takes out petty premises for carrying on a small trade also  stays in the rear portion, cooks and eats, he so disastrously perverts  the purpose of the lease. A different ‘purpose’  in  the  context  is  not  minor  variations  but majuscule in  mode of enjoyment. This is not a case of a man switching over  to a  canteen business  or closing  down the cobbler shop  and converting  the place  into a  residential accommodation. On  the other  hand, the  common case is that the cobbler  continued to  be cobbler and stayed in the shop at night  on days  when he was running his shop but left for his home  on shop  holidays. A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence. [904G-H, 905A-B]      [The Court  directed the restitution into possession by the trial  court under  section 144  C.P.C. within one month ignoring the fact that some other tenant was inducted by the landlord.]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1526 of 1978.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 9-8-1977  of the  Himachal Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision No. 68 of 1976.      R. K. Bhatt and Mrs. Krishna Bhatt for the Appellant.      Hardev Singh for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER, J. A small event may mark a great portent as this tiny proceeding for eviction, from a mini-shop, of a little man, will presently disclose.

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    The appellant,  a harijan  by birth  and a  cobbler  by vocation, was  a petty  tenant of the eastern half of a shop in Ram  Bazar, Simla.  The original landlord passed away and his sons,  the respondents,  stepped into his shoes as legal representatives. He  filed a  petition for  eviction of  the appellant-tenant under  S.13(2) (ii)  (b) of the East Punjab Urban Rent  Restriction Act,  1949, as  applied to  Himachal Pradesh on  the ground that the premises were being used for purpose other  than the one for which they were let out. The Rent Controller having held in 902 favour of  the land-lord,  an  eviction  order  ensued.  The appellate authority  reversed this finding and dismissed the petition for eviction. The High Court, in revision, reversed the appellate  decision and  restored the  Rent Controller’s order. The cobbler-appellant, in the last lap of litigation, has landed  in this  Court. The  poverty of the appellant is reflected in  the chequered career of the case in this Court where it was dismissed more than once for default in payment but ultimately,  thanks to the persistence of the appellant, he  got  this  Court’s  order  to  pay  the  balance  amount extended. He complied with that direction and thus could not be priced  out of  the justice  market, if  we may  use that expression.      The short  point for  adjudication is as to whether the respondent land-lord  made  out  the  statutory  ground  for eviction,  of   having  diverted  the  building  for  a  use radically different  from the  one for  which  it  was  let, without his consent. There is no case of written consent put forward by  the tenant.  But he  contested  the  land-lord’s claim by  asserting that  there was  no specific  commercial purpose inscribed  in the  demise and, therefore, it was not possible to  postulate a  diversion of purpose. Secondly, he urged that,  even  assuming  that  the  letting  was  for  a commercial purpose,  the fact that he had cooked his food or stayed at  night in  the rear  portion of the small shop did not offend against S. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.      S.13 (2) (ii) (b) reads:           "used the  building ..... for a purpose other than      that for which it was leased"      The factual matrix may be shortly projected; for as Mr. Justice Cardozo luminously stated.           "More  and  more  we  lawyers  are  awaking  to  a      perception of the truth that what divides and distracts      us in  the solution  of a  legal problem is not so much      uncertainty about  the law  as  uncertainty  about  the      facts-the facts  which generate  the law. Let the facts      be known  as they are, and the law will sprout from the      seed and turn its branches toward the light."(1) A cobbler-the  appellant-was the  lessee of  a portion  of a shop in  Ram Bazar,  Simla, since 1963, on an annual rent of Rs. 300/-  (i.e. Rs.  25/- per  month). Ex.  P. 1, the lease deed, disclosed  no purpose;  but inferentially  it has been held by  the High  Court that  the lease being of a shop the purpose must have been commercial. Possible; not 903 necessarily  sure.  The  actual  life-situations  and  urban conditions of  India, especially  where poor  tradesmen like cobblers, candle-stick  makers, cycle  repairers and tanduri bakers, take  out small  spaces on  rent, do  not warrant an irresistible inference  that if  the lease  is of a shop the purpose of  the lease  must  be  commercial.  It  is  common knowledge that  in the  small towns-why,  even  in  the  big cities-little men plying little crafts and possessing little resources taken  on lease little work places to trade and to

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live, the two being interlaced for the lower, larger bracket of Indian  humanity. You struggle to make a small income and work late  into the right from early in the morn and, during intervals, rest  your bones  in the same place, drawing down the shutters of the shop for a while. The primary purpose is to ply  a petty  trade, the secondary but necessary incident is to  sleep in  the same  place since you can hardly afford anything but  a pavement  for the  creature needs of cooking food, washing yourself, sleeping for a time and the like.      The life  style of the people shapes the profile of the law and  not vice-versa. Law, not being an abstraction but a pragmatic exercise,  the legal  inference to be drawn from a lease deed  is conditional  by the prevailing circumstances. The intention of parties from which we spell out the purpose of the  lease is to be garnered from the social milieu. Thus viewed, it  is difficult  to hold, especially when the lease has not  spelt  it  out  precisely,  that  the  purpose  was exclusively commercial and incompatible with any residential use, even of a portion.      Two rules  must be  remembered while interpreting deeds and statutes. The first one is:           "In drafting  it is not enough to gain a degree of      precision which  a person  reading in  good  faith  can      understand, but  it is  necessary to attain if possible      to a  degree of precision which a person reading in bad      faith cannot misunderstand."(1) The second  one  is  more  important  for  the  Third  World countries. Statutory  construction, so long as law is at the service of life, cannot be divorced from the social setting. That is  why, welfare legislation like the one with which we are now  concerned, must  be interpreted  in a  Third  World perspective. We  are not  on the  Fifth Avenue or Westend of London. We  are in  a hilly  region of  an Indian  town with indigents struggling  to  live  and  huddling  for  want  of accommodation. The law itself is intended to protect tenants from unreasonable  eviction  and  is,  therefore,  worded  a little in  favour  of  that  class  of  beneficiaries.  When interpreting the text of such provisions-and this holds good in reading 904 the meaning  of documents  regulating the  relations between the weaker  and the  stronger  contracting  parties-we  must remember what is an earlier decision of this Court, has been observed :(1)           "Where doubts  arise the Gandhian talisman becomes      a  tool   of  interpretation;   "Whenever  you  are  in      doubt.... apply  the following test. Recall the face of      the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen,      and ask  yourself, if the step you contemplate is going      to be of any use to him." If we  remember these two rules, the conclusion is easy that there is  no exclusiveness  of purpose that can be spelt out of the  lease deed. That knocks at the bottom of the case of the land-lord.      The circumstances  are clearer  as we  proceed further. For well  over a  decade the tenant have been in occupation, cobbling and  sleeping, in  the same  place on working days, but going  home on days when the shop is closed. Indeed, the pathetic genesis  of the  residential user  cannot  be  lost sight of. The cobbler’s wife became mentally deranged and he could not  leave her  at home lest she should prove a danger to herself  and to others around. Being a harijan cobbler he could not  hire servants  and so,  in despair,  he took  his insane wife to the place where he was toiling on leather. He worked in the shop, cooked food for his wife, slept there at

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night and thus managed to survive although she died a little later. "A bed by night and a chest of drawers by day" is not unusual even  in England,  as those  who have read Goldsmith know. The  dual uses of accommodation are common enough and, in  this   case,  the  land-lord  himself  appears  to  have understood  it   that  way.  The  evidence  shows  that  the sympathetic father  of the  respondents had  not objected to the petitioner  living in the premises and had even provided a sink  in the  shop to  facilitate such user. Not that oral permission to  divert the  user to  a different  purpose  is sufficient in  the face  of  the  statutory  requirement  of written consent  but that  circumstance of  the  land-lord’s acquiescence over a long stretch of time reinforces the case of the  tenant that  the purpose  was two-fold.  The  common experience of  life lends credence to this case and none but those who live in ivory towers can refuse to look at the raw realities of life while administering justice. We are in the field of Poverty Jurisprudence.      It is impossible to hold that if a tenant who takes out petty premises  for carrying  on a small trade also stays in the  rear  portion,  cooks  and  eats,  he  so  disastrously perverts the  purpose of the lease. A different ’purpose’ in the context is not minor variations but majuscule in mode of enjoyment. This is not a case of a man switching over to a 905 canteen business  or  closing  down  the  cobbler  shop  and converting the  place into  a residential  accommodation. On the  other  hand,  the  common  case  is  that  the  cobbler continued to  be cobbler  and stayed in the shop at night on days when  he was  running his shop but left for his home on shop holidays. A sense of proportion in social assessment is of the judicial essence.      The  irresistible   inference,  despite  the  ingenious argument  to   the  contrary,   is  that  the  provision  of S.13(2)(ii) has  not been attracted. We are comforted in the thought that  our conclusion  is  a  realistic  one,  as  is apparent from  a subsequent  amendment to  the definition of nonresidential building which reads thus:           "(d) "non-residential building"  means a  building                being used,-                (i)   mainly for  the purpose  of business or                     trade; or                (ii) partly for  the purpose  of business  or                     trade and  partly  for  the  purpose  of                     residence, subject to the condition that                     the person  who carries  on business  or                     trade in the building resides there;           Provided  that  if  a  building  is  let  out  for                residential   and   non-residential   purpose                separately  to  more  than  one  person,  the                portion thereof  let out  for the  purpose of                residence shall  not be  treated  as  a  non-                residential building.           Explanation.-Where a  building is  used mainly for                the purpose of business or trade, it shall be                deemed to  be a non-residential building even                though a  small portion  thereof is  used for                the purpose of residence."      Shri Bhatt  raised an  argument that this provision was applicable  to  pending  proceedings.  We  do  not  have  to investigate into  that question  in the view we have already taken and  note the  amendment only  to  indicate  that  the legislature, in  its realism,  has veered round expressly to approve de jure what is the de facto situation prevailing in the urban areas of Himachal Pradesh.

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    In this  view, the  appeal is  allowed with  costs. The tenant shall not be ejected. If he has been, as in this case it is  stated he  has been,  the tenant  shall be restituted into possession  by the  trial court  under S.  144,  C.P.C. within one month ignoring the fact that some other tenant is inducted by the landlord. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 906