29 July 1999
Supreme Court
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SANKARAN PILLAI (DEAD) BY LRS. Vs V.P.VENGUDUSWAMI .

Bench: V.N.KHORE,SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI
Case number: C.A. No.-004062-004063 / 1998
Diary number: 4697 / 1998
Advocates: V. BALACHANDRAN Vs


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PETITIONER: SANKARAN PILLAI(DEAD) BY LRS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: V.P.VENUGUDUSWAMI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       29/07/1999

BENCH: V.N.Khore, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri

JUDGMENT:

V.N.KHARE, J.

     The  appellants  herein  are  the  tenants(hereinafter referred  to  as  the  tenant).  It appears  that  on  6th October,  1982  the  tenant entered into an  agreement  with erstwhile owner of the building, namely, the Church of South India  Trust  Association  for purchase of the  premises  in dispute.  It is stated that the appellants paid a sum of Rs. 3  lakhs  towards the part payment of  consideration  amount under   the  said  agreement.   It  further   appears   that subsequently  certain disputes arose with regard to the mode of payment of the balance amount and as a result of which on 12th  April,  1984 the Church repudiated the agreement.   On 29th  August,  1986  the tenant filed a  suit  for  specific performance  of the agreement referred to above.  While  the aforesaid  suit was pending, the Church on 12.11.86 executed a  sale deed in respect of premises in dispute in favour  of first   respondent,  namely,   V.P.   Venuguduswami.   After purchasing  the aforesaid premises the purchaser who  became the  landlord  of the premises filed a suit on  27.8.87  for ejectment  of  the  tenant-appellant   on  various  grounds, including  the  default in payment of arrears of rent for  a period  beginning  from  12.11.86  to 31.7.87.   It  is  not disputed  that  the premises in dispute is governed  by  The Tamil  Nadu  Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control)  Act,  1960 (hereinafter  referred  to as the Act).  Since one of  the grounds  for  ejectment was default in payment of rent,  the Rent   Controller  on  23.7.1990   passed  an  order   under Sub-section  (1)  of  Section 11 of the  Act  directing  the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent by 3.8.90.  The tenant did  not comply the order dated 23.7.1990.  Since the  order dated  23.7.90 remained non-complied, the Rent Controller by an  order  dated 7.8.90 passed an order for eviction of  the tenant.   The tenant preferred two separate appeals, one  of which  was directed against the order dated 23.7.90 and  the other  related  to the order dated 7.8.90.  On 22.8.90,  the tenant  deposited  the arrears of rent before the  appellate authority  as  the said deposit was condition precedent  for the  appeal being heard on merits.  The appellate  authority by  an order dated 27.10.92 allowed both the appeals holding that  the  tenant was not liable to deposit the  arrears  of rent.   The  subsequent  purchaser, namely,  the  respondent aggrieved  by  the aforesaid order preferred Civil  Revision

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Petitions  before  the  High Court of Judicature  at  Madras which   were  numbered  as   Civil  Revision  Petition  Nos. 3195-3196/93.  The High Court allowed the Revision Petitions and that is how the tenant is in appeal before us.

     Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the  facts  that  the tenant after having  entered  into  an agreement  with  the  erstwhile owner of the  building  paid considerable amount of money towards part performance of the agreement  and his further filing of suit in the Civil Court for  specific  performance  of   the  agreement  constituted sufficient  cause under Sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act  for non-depositing the arrears of rent within time,  as well as monthly rent which became due in respect of building and,  therefore, this Court may, after condoning the  delay, permit  the appellant to deposit the entire arrears of  rent and  remand the matter to the Rent Controller to enable  the appellant  to contest the application filed by the  landlord for  his eviction from the premises on the ground of default in  payment of rent.  In order to appreciate the argument of learned  counsel, it is necessary to look into the  relevant provisions  of Section 11 of the Act.  Sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of the Act runs as under :

     11(1)  No  tenant  against whom  an  application  for eviction  has been made by a landlord under section 10 shall be entitled to contest the application before the Controller under that section, or to prefer any appeal under section 23 against  any order made by the Controller on the application unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the  Controller or the appellate authority, as the case  may be,  all arrears of rent due in respect of the building upto the  date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay or  to deposit  any  rent  which  may subsequently  become  due  in respect  of  the  building  until  the  termination  of  the proceedings   before  the  Controller   or   the   appellate authority, as the case may be.

     (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within the time and in the manner prescribed.

     (4)  If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as  aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the  case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows  sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an  order  directing  the  tenant to  put  the  landlord  in possession of the building.

     A Perusal of the aforesaid provisions shows that where an  application for eviction has been filed against a tenant on  the  ground of default in payment of rent the tenant  is required  (i)  to  deposit all the arrears of  rent  due  in respect of the building with the Controller or the appellate authority,  as the case may be;  (ii) the tenant is  further required  to pay or deposit the rent which may  subsequently fall due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings;  (iii) the said deposit of rent is required to  be  paid  or deposited within time provided and  in  the manner  prescribed;  and (iv) if the deposit of rent is  not made, the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may  be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause  to

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the  contrary,  stop  all proceedings and pass an  order  of eviction against the tenant.  It is true that the Controller or  the  appellate  authority, as the case may  be,  if  the tenant  shows  sufficient  cause may permit  the  tenant  to contest  the  application  filed  by the  landlord  for  his eviction.  The question that is required to be seen is, what does  the expression sufficient cause means in sub-section (4)  of Section 11 of the Act?  It is no doubt true that the expression  sufficient cause has to be liberally construed to  do  substantial injustice between the parties.  But  the expression sufficient cause necessarily implies an element of sincerity, bona fide, honesty and reasonableness.  It has to  be  shown by the tenant who has not deposited  the  rent within time, as directed by the Controller, that non-deposit of  the rent was beyond his control and there was no element of  negligence or inaction or lack of bona fides on his part in  not  depositing  the rent within time.  Viewed  in  this light,  what we find in the present case is, that the tenant was  required  to  deposit the rent by  3.8.1990.   But  the arrears  of  rent  were  not deposited  by  that  date.   On 7.8.1990,  when  the  order  of   eviction  was  passed,  no application  was  moved  by  the   tenant  before  the  Rent Controller for revoking the order striking out defence as he could  not deposit the arrears of rent on account of reasons beyond  his control.  On the contrary, the tenant denied the relationship   of  landlord  and   tenant  before  the  Rent Controller.   The tenants subsequent deposit of the arrears of  rent before the appellate authority being requirement of law  for hearing the appeal on merits, cannot be treated  as bona  fide deposit.  Further, the tenant did not deposit the month  to month rent as required under section 11(1) of  the Act and reiterated his stand that he is a landlord and not a tenant  of  the premises in dispute.  Even before  the  High Court it was not the case of the tenant that under some bona fide  mistake he could not deposit the arrears and month  to month  rent  and,  therefore,  delay may  be  condoned.   It appears that, after the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of  the suit filed by the tenant for specific performance of the  Agreement, the tenant has now come forward with a  plea that  since he under mistaken belief did not deposit arrears and  month  to  month rent and, therefore,  default  may  be condoned.   As noticed earlier, this plea of  non-depositing of  arrears of rent on account of sufficient cause was not a case  set  up by the tenant before the Rent Controller,  the appellate  authority  and  the  High  Court.   The  tenants consistent  stand was that he was not required under law  to deposit  any  arrears of rent and month to month rent as  he himself  was the landlord of the premises.  This plea of the tenant  now advanced is an afterthought and is not bona fide and,  therefore, we do not find it to constitute sufficient cause  as  to condone the non-deposit of arrears  and  also month  to  month rent which was required to be deposited  by the  tenant.   We, therefore, do not find any merit  in  the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants.

     In  view  of  the  above, the  appeals  fail  and  are dismissed.  However, in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.