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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.286 OF 2020  

(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.)NO.1041 OF 2020)  

SANJEEV KAPOOR      ... APPELLANT  

VERSUS  

CHANDANA KAPOOR & ORS.    ... RESPONDENTS  

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.  

This appeal has been filed against the judgment of  

the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh  

dated 05.11.2019 in CRM-M-4663 of 2019 filed by the  

appellant for setting aside the order dated 05.01.2019  

passed by the Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court,  

Faridabad. The High Court dismissed the petition filed  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the appellant.   

2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding this  

appeal are:  

The appellant was married to respondent No.1 on  

04.11.1998. On 17.08.199 a daughter was born and on

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18.07.2005 a son was born out of their wedlock. An  

application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was filed by  

respondent No.1 on 09.07.2013 against her husband  

claiming maintenance for respondent No.1 as well as  

respondent Nos.2 and 3, minor daughter and son. On  

14.10.2013 the appellant filed a petition for divorce  

against respondent No.1. On the reconciliation efforts  

made by the Family Court parties settled the matter  

amicably on the terms and conditions recorded  

separately in the Court. As per the settlement the  

appellant was to pay Rs.25,000/- per month towards the  

maintenance of the respondents with effect from July,  

2015 upto April, 2017. With effect from May, 2017, the  

amount of Rs.25,000/- per month was to be deposited  

directly in the account of Chandana Kapoor, respondent  

No.1 before 10th day of each month. The arrears were to  

be paid within six months. It was further contemplated  

that the appellant and respondent No.1 shall file  

petition for divorce by mutual consent by incorporating  

the terms and conditions. The maintenance petition was,  

thus, disposed of by the Family Court by order dated  

06.05.2017.  

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3. The appellant from May, 2017 paid the maintenance  

only for four months i.e. Rs.1,00,000/-. Respondent  

No.1 filed an application in January, 2018 under  

Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. for enforcement of the order  

dated 06.05.2017 being Execution Petition No.240 of  

2018. The Execution Petition filed by respondent No.1  

was rejected by the Additional Principal Judge, Family  

Court, Faridabad vide order dated 16.07.2018. The Court  

held that order dated 06.05.2017 being purely  

conditional and was subject to the fulfilment of the  

respective obligations by the parties which they have  

not performed, the application under Section 125(3)  

Cr.P.C. was not maintainable.   

4. After the application filed by respondent No.1 for  

execution of the order was rejected, respondent No.1  

filed an application for recall the order dated  

06.05.2017 on 31.07.2018. Respondent No.1 stated in the  

application that the appellant did not deposit the  

arrears of the amount as agreed and total amount paid  

by the appellant was only Rs.75,000/- towards  

maintenance. Respondent No.1 prayed that order  

06.05.2017 may be recalled and application under

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Section 125(3) Cr.P.C. be restored and decided on  

merits after hearing the parties. The application filed  

by respondent No.1 was objected by the appellant by  

filing objection. In the objection, it was stated that  

the appellant had made payment of some amount as per  

terms since the respondent backed out, the payment was  

stopped.   

5. The learned Additional Principal Judge, Family  

Court by order dated 05.01.2019 set aside the order  

dated 06.05.2017 restoring the petition under Section  

125 Cr.P.C. Challenging the order dated 05.01.2019  

passed by the Family Court, the appellant had filed  

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court  

which has been rejected by the High Court by order  

dated 05.11.2019. Aggrieved by the order dated  

05.11.2019 of the High Court the appellant has filed  

this appeal.  

6. Shri Subodh Markandeya, learned senior counsel for  

the appellant submits that the application under  

Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No.1 having  

been finally decided by order dated 06.05.2017 by the

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learned District Judge, Family Court, Family Court had  

no jurisdiction to set aside the order. The impugned  

order dated 05.01.2019 is without jurisdiction and is  

in the teeth of provision of Section 362 Cr.P.C.   

7. It is submitted that according to the Section 362  

Cr.P.C. the Court cannot alter or review the judgment  

except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. It  

is submitted that order dated 05.01.2019 of the  

Principal Judge, Family Court being contrary to Section  

362 Cr.P.C. is void. He submits that the High Court  

committed error in not setting aside the order dated  

05.01.2019.   

8. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of  

his submission has relied on several judgments of this  

Court which shall be noticed hereinafter.  

9. The respondent appeared through counsel on caveat.  

Learned counsel for the respondent supported the  

impugned judgment of the High Court.  

10. We have considered the submissions of the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.

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11. The only point to be determined in this appeal is  

as to whether the order passed by the Additional  

Principal Judge, Family Court dated 05.01.2019 setting  

aside the order dated 06.05.2017 disposing of the  

application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and restoring the  

application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. was contrary to  

Section 362 Cr.P.C. which provides that no Court can  

alter or review its judgment except for correcting a  

clerical or arithmetical mistake. Section 362 Cr.P.C.  

contained in Chapter XXVII “THE JUDGMENT” is to the  

following effect:  

“Section 362.Court not to alter judgement.-  

Save as otherwise provided by this Code or  

by any other law for the time being in force,  

no Court, when it has signed its judgment or  

final order disposing of a case, shall alter  

or review the same except to correct a  

clerical or arithmetical error.”  

12. We may first notice the judgments which have been  

relied by the learned counsel for the appellant in  

support of his submission. The first judgment which has  

been relied by the learned counsel for the appellant  

is in Sankatha Singh vs. State of U.P., 1962 AIR 1208.  

In the above case when a criminal appeal came for

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hearing before the trial court, the trial court  

dismissed the appeal, noticing that the appellants have  

been absent, and their counsel has not appeared to  

argue the appeal. The Court also observed that it had  

perused the judgment of the Magistrate and seen the  

record and there is no ground for interference. An  

application was filed before the Appellate Court for  

restoration of the appeal which was allowed by the  

learned Sessions Judge. However, when the appeal was  

again listed for hearing the learned Judge took the  

view that the Appellate Court had no power to review  

or restore an appeal which had been disposed of. The  

appeal was dismissed. The criminal revision was filed  

in the High Court which too was dismissed. This Court  

in the above case had occasion to consider Section 369  

of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 which is now Section  

362 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. This Court held  

that Section 369 of the Code prohibited the Courts from  

reviewing or altering its judgment. Following was laid  

down by this Court:  

“It has been urged for the appellants that  

Shri Tej Pal Singh could order the rehearing  

of the appeal in the exercise of the inherent

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powers which every court possesses in order  

to further the ends of justice and that Shri  

Tripathi was not justified in any case to sit  

in judgment over the order of Shri Tej Pal  

Singh, an order passed within jurisdiction,  

even though it be erroneous. Assuming that  

Shri Tej Pal Singh, as Sessions Judge, could  

exercise inherent powers, we are of opinion  

that he could not pass the order of the  

rehearing of the appeal in the exercise of  

such powers when Section 369, read with  

Section 424 of the Code, specifically  

prohibits the altering or reviewing of its  

order by a court. Inherent powers cannot be  

exercised to do what the Code specifically  

prohibits the court from doing. Shri Tripathi  

was competent to consider when the other  

party raised the objection whether the appeal  

was validly up for rehearing before him. He  

considered the question and decided it  

rightly.  

It is also urged for the appellants Shri  

Tej Pal Singh had the jurisdiction to pass  

orders on the application presented by the  

appellants on December 17, 1956, praying for  

the rehearing of the appeal and that  

therefore his order could not be said to have  

been absolutely without jurisdiction. We do  

not agree. He certainly had jurisdiction to  

dispose of the application presented to him,  

but when Section 369 of the Code definitely  

prohibited the court’s reviewing or altering  

its judgment, he had no jurisdiction to  

consider the point raised and to set aside  

the order dismissing the appeal and order its  

rehearing.”  

13. Next judgment cited is Smt. Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare  

Lal and another, AIR 1981 SC 736, where Section 362

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Cr.P.C. came for consideration. This Court laid down  

following:  

“The appellant points out that he invoked  

the inherent power of the High Court saved  

by Section 482 of the Code and that  

notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by  

Section 362 the High Court had power to grant  

relief. Now it is well settled that the  

inherent power of the court cannot be  

exercised for doing that which is  

specifically prohibited by the Code (Sankatha  

Singh v. State of U.P.). It is true that the  

prohibition in Section 362 against the court  

altering or reviewing its judgment is subject  

to what is “otherwise provided by this Court  

or by any other law for the time being in  

force”. Those words, however, refer to those  

provisions only where the court has been  

expressly authorised by the Code or other law  

to alter or review its judgment. The inherent  

power of the court is not contemplated by the  

saving provision contained in Section 362  

and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that  

power can be of no avail.”  

14. Next judgment relied is Mostt. Simrikhia vs. Smt.  

Dolley Mukherjee @ Smt. Chhabimukherjee & another, AIR  

1990 SC 1605, in which this Court held:  

“Section 362 of the Code expressly provides  

that no court when it has signed its judgment  

or final order disposing of a case, shall  

alter or review the same except to correct a  

clerical or arithmetical error save as  

otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482  

enables the High Court to make such order as

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may be necessary to give effect to any order  

under the Code or to prevent abuse of the  

process of any court or otherwise to secure  

the ends of justice. The inherent powers,  

however, as much are controlled by principle  

and precedent as are its express powers by  

statute. If a matter is covered by an express  

letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by  

to the statutory provisions and instead  

evolve a new provision in the garb of  

inherent jurisdiction.”  

15. To the same effect, is the judgment of this Court  

reported in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa  

& others, 2001 (1) SCC 169, which has been relied by  

the appellant.  

16. Next case relied is State vs. K.V. Rajendran and  

others, 2008(8) SCC 673. This Court had occasion to  

consider Section 362 and Section 482 Cr.P.C. In the  

above case relying on the judgment of this Court in  

Mostt. Simrikhia vs. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee (supra) this  

Court laid down in paragraph 18:  

“18. Keeping the principles, as laid down  

by the aforesaid decisions of this Court in  

mind, let us now look to Section 362 of the  

Code, which expressly provides that no court  

which has signed its judgment and final order  

disposing of a case, shall alter or review  

the same except to correct clerical or  

arithmetical error save as otherwise provided  

by the court. At this stage, the exercise of

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power under Section 482 of the Code may be  

looked into.”  

17. Learned counsel for the appellant has also referred  

to judgment of this Court in Mahua Biswas(Smt.) vs.  

Swagata Biswas and another, (1998) 2 SCC 359. In the  

above case, in the proceedings under Section 125  

Cr.P.C. parties compromised and started living together  

but later fell apart. An objection was raised by the  

husband that order of maintenance could not be revived  

with which High Court agreed. This Court revived the  

maintenance application by allowing the appeal. In  

paragraph 3 following was held:  

“3. The matter can be viewed from either  

angle. It can be viewed that there was a  

genuine effort by the wife to rehabilitate  

herself in her matrimonial home but in vain.  

The previous orders of maintenance in a  

manner of speaking could at best be taken to  

have been suspended but not wiped out  

altogether. The other view can be that the  

maintenance order stood exhausted and thus  

she be left to fight a new litigation on a  

fresh cause of action. Out of the two  

courses, we would prefer to adopt the first  

one, for if we were to resort to the second  

option, it would lead to injustice. In a  

given case the wife may then be reluctant to  

settle with her husband lest she lose the  

order of maintenance secured on his neglect  

or refusal. Her husband on the other side,  

would jump to impromptu devices to demolish

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the maintenance order in duping the wife to  

a temporary reconciliation. Thus, in order  

to do complete justice between the parties,  

we would in the facts and circumstances  

activate the wife’s claim to maintenance and  

put her in the same position as before.  

Evidently, she has obtained a maintenance  

order at a figure which was taken into  

account by the Court of the C.J.M. Taking  

that into account, we order the husband to  

pay to his wife and the daughter a sum of Rs  

1000 each, effective from 1-10-1997. The sum  

of Rs 12,000 which was earlier ordered by  

this Court to be paid to the wife and her  

daughter as arrears of maintenance shall be  

taken to have been duly paid uptil 30-9-1997,  

irrespective of the rate of maintenance. This  

streamlines the dispute between the parties.  

It is made clear that it is open to the  

parties to claim such other relief as may be  

due to him/her by raising a matrimonial  

dispute before the matrimonial court.”  

18. The Legislative Scheme as delineated by Section  

369 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, as well as  

Legislative Scheme as delineated by Section 362 of Code  

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is one and the same. The  

embargo put on the criminal court to alter or review  

its judgment is with a purpose and object. The  

judgments of this Court as noted above, summarised the  

law to the effect that criminal justice delivery system  

does not cloth criminal court with power to alter or  

review the judgment or final order disposing the case

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except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error.  

After the judgment delivered by a criminal Court or  

passing final order disposing the case the Court  

becomes functus officio and any mistake or glaring  

omission is left to be corrected only by appropriate  

forum in accordance with law.   

19. In the present case, we are concerned with the  

order passed by the Court under Section 125 Cr.P.C.  

Whether the embargo contained in under Section 362  

Cr.P.C. prohibiting the court to alter or review its  

judgment or final order disposing the case applies to  

order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. is the question  

to be answered in the present case.   

20. Section 362 Cr.P.C. begins with the word “save as  

otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for  

the time being in force”. The above expression clearly  

means that rigour as contained in Section 363 Cr.P.C.  

is relaxed in following two conditions: -  

i) Save as otherwise provided by the code of  

Criminal Procedure.  

ii) any other law for the time being in force.  

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21. We need to first examine as to whether the orders  

passed in present case are covered by the exception  

i.e. “save as otherwise provided by the Code”. Section  

362 Cr.P.C., thus, although put embargo on the criminal  

Court to alter or review its judgment or final order  

disposing the case but engrafted the exceptions as  

indicated therein. The legislature was aware that there  

are and may be the situations where altering or  

reviewing of criminal court judgment is contemplated  

in the Code itself or any other law for the time being  

in force. We since in the present case are concerned  

only with Section 125 Cr.P.C., we need to examine as  

to whether Section 145 Cr.P.C. in any manner relaxed  

the rigour of Section 362 Cr.P.C..  

22. Before we proceed to look into the Legislative  

Scheme of Section 125 Cr.P.C., we need to notice few  

rules of interpretation of statutes when court is  

concerned with interpretation of a social justice  

legislation. Section 125 Cr.P.C. is a social justice  

legislation which order for maintenance for wives,  

children and parents. Maintenance of wives, children  

and parents is a continuous obligation enforced. This

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Court had occasion to consider the interpretation of  

Section 125 Cr.P.C. in Badshah versus Urmila Badshah  

Godse and another, (2014) 1 SCC 188. In paragraphs 13.3  

to 18, following has been laid down: -  

“13.3. Thirdly, in such cases,  

purposive interpretation needs to be  

given to the provisions of Section 125  

Cr.P.C. While dealing with the  

application of a destitute wife or  

hapless children or parents under this  

provision, the Court is dealing with  

the marginalised sections of the  

society. The purpose is to achieve  

“social justice” which is the  

constitutional vision, enshrined in  

the Preamble of the Constitution of  

India. The Preamble to the  

Constitution of India clearly signals  

that we have chosen the democratic  

path under the rule of law to achieve  

the goal of securing for all its  

citizens, justice, liberty, equality  

and fraternity. It specifically  

highlights achieving their social  

justice. Therefore, it becomes the  

bounden duty of the courts to advance  

the cause of the social justice. While  

giving interpretation to a particular  

provision, the court is supposed to  

bridge the gap between the law and  

society.  

14. Of late, in this very direction,  

it is emphasised that the courts have  

to adopt different approaches in  

“social justice adjudication”, which  

is also known as “social context  

adjudication” as mere “adversarial

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approach” may not be very appropriate.  

There are number of social justice  

legislations giving special  

protection and benefits to vulnerable  

groups in the society. Prof. Madhava  

Menon describes it eloquently:  

“It is, therefore, respectfully  

submitted that ‘social context  

judging’ is essentially the  

application of equality jurisprudence  

as evolved by Parliament and the  

Supreme Court in myriad situations  

presented before courts where unequal  

parties are pitted in adversarial  

proceedings and where courts are  

called upon to dispense equal justice.  

Apart from the social-economic  

inequalities accentuating the  

disabilities of the poor in an unequal  

fight, the adversarial process itself  

operates to the disadvantage of the  

weaker party. In such a situation, the  

Judge has to be not only sensitive to  

the inequalities of parties involved  

but also positively inclined to the  

weaker party if the imbalance were not  

to result in miscarriage of justice.  

This result is achieved by what we  

call social context judging or social  

justice adjudication.”  

15. The provision of maintenance  

would definitely fall in this category  

which aims at empowering the destitute  

and achieving social justice or  

equality and dignity of the  

individual. While dealing with cases  

under this provision, drift in the  

approach from “adversarial”  

litigation to social context  

adjudication is the need of the hour.  

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16. The law regulates relationships  

between people. It prescribes patterns  

of behaviour. It reflects the values  

of society. The role of the court is  

to understand the purpose of law in  

society and to help the law achieve  

its purpose. But the law of a society  

is a living organism. It is based on  

a given factual and social reality  

that is constantly changing. Sometimes  

change in law precedes societal change  

and is even intended to stimulate it.  

In most cases, however, a change in  

law is the result of a change in social  

reality. Indeed, when social reality  

changes, the law must change too. Just  

as change in social reality is the law  

of life, responsiveness to change in  

social reality is the life of the law.  

It can be said that the history of law  

is the history of adapting the law to  

society’s changing needs. In both  

constitutional and statutory  

interpretation, the court is supposed  

to exercise discretion in determining  

the proper relationship between the  

subjective and objective purposes of  

the law.  

17. Cardozo acknowledges in his  

classic  

“… no system of jus scriptum has  

been able to escape the need of it.”  

and he elaborates:  

“It is true that codes and statutes  

do not render the Judge superfluous,  

nor his work perfunctory and  

mechanical. There are gaps to be  

filled. … There are hardships and  

wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided.  

Interpretation is often spoken of as  

if it were nothing but the search and  

the discovery of a meaning which,

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however obscure and latent, had  

nonetheless a real and ascertainable  

pre-existence in the legislator’s  

mind. The process is, indeed, that at  

times, but it is often something more.  

The ascertainment of intention may be  

the least of a Judge’s troubles in  

ascribing meaning to a statute. …  

Says Gray in his lectures:  

“The fact is that the difficulties  

of so-called interpretation arise when  

the legislature has had no meaning at  

all; when the question which is raised  

on the statute never occurred to it;  

when what the Judges have to do is,  

not to determine that the legislature  

did mean on a point which was present  

to its mind, but to guess what it would  

have intended on a point not present  

to its mind, if the point had been  

present.””  

18. The court as the interpreter of  

law is supposed to supply omissions,  

correct uncertainties, and harmonise  

results with justice through a method  

of free decision — libre recherché  

scientifique i.e. “free scientific  

research”. We are of the opinion that  

there is a non-rebuttable presumption  

that the legislature while making a  

provision like Section 125 Cr.P.C., to  

fulfil its constitutional duty in good  

faith, had always intended to give  

relief to the woman becoming “wife”  

under such circumstances. This  

approach is particularly needed while  

deciding the issues relating to gender  

justice. We already have examples of  

exemplary efforts in this regard.  

Journey from Shah Bano to Shabana Bano

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guaranteeing maintenance rights to  

Muslim women is a classical example.  

23. The closer look of Section 125 Cr.P.C. itself  

indicates that the Court after passing judgment or  

final order in the proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C.  

does not become functus officio. The Section itself  

contains express provisions where order passed under  

Section 125 Cr.P.C. can be cancelled or altered which  

is noticeable from Section 125(1), Section 125(5) and  

Section 127 of Cr.P.C., which are to the following  

effect:  -  

“125(1). Order for maintenance of  

wives, children and parents. - (1) if  

any person having sufficient means  

neglects or refuses to maintain-  

(a) his wife, unable to maintain  herself, or  

(b) his legitimate or  illegitimate minor child,  

whether married or not,  

unable to maintain itself, or   

(c) his legitimate or  illegitimate child (not being  

a married daughter) who has  

attained majority, where such  

child is, by reason of any  

physical or mental  

abnormality or injury unable  

to maintain itself, or  

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(d) his father or mother, unable  to maintain himself or  

herself,  

a Magistrate of the first class may,  

upon proof of such neglect or refusal,  

order such person to make a monthly  

allowance for the maintenance of his  

wife or such child, father or mother,  

at such monthly rate, as such  

Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the  

same to such person as the Magistrate  

may from time to time direct:  

Provided that the Magistrate may  

order the father of a minor female  

child referred to in clause (b) to  

make such allowance, until she attains  

her majority, if the Magistrate is  

satisfied that the husband of such  

minor female child, if married, is not  

possessed of sufficient means:  

[Provided that the Magistrate  

may, during the pendency of the  

proceeding regarding monthly  

allowance for the maintenance under  

this sub-section, order such person to  

make a monthly allowance for the  

interim maintenance of his wife or  

such child, father or mother, and the  

expenses of such proceeding which the  

Magistrate considers reasonable, and  

to pay the same to such person as the  

Magistrate may from time to time  

direct:  

Provided also that an application  

for monthly allowance for the interim  

maintenance and expenses of proceeding

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under the second proviso shall, as far  

as possible, be disposed of within  

sixty days from the date of the  

service of notice of the application  

to such person.]  

Explanation. – For the purposes of  

this Chapter, -  

(a) “minor” means a person who,  under the provisions of the  

Indian Majority Act, 1875(9  

of 1875) is deemed not to have  

attained his majority;  

(b) “wife” includes a woman who  has been divorced by, or has  

obtained a divorce from, her  

husband and has not  

remarried.  

125(5). On proof that any wife in  

whose favour an order has been made  

under this section is living in  

adultery, or that without sufficient  

reason she refuses to live with her  

husband, or that they are living  

separately by mutual consent, the  

Magistrate shall cancel the order.  

127. Alteration in allowance. – [(1)  

On proof of a change in the  

circumstances of any person,  

receiving, under section 125 a monthly  

allowance for the maintenance or  

interim maintenance, or ordered under  

the same section to pay a monthly  

allowance for the maintenance, or  

interim maintenance, to his wife,  

child, father or mother, as the case  

may be, the Magistrate may make such  

alteration, as he thinks fit, in the

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allowance for the maintenance or the  

interim maintenance, as the case may  

be.]  

(2) Where it appears to the  

Magistrate that, in consequence of any  

decision of a competent Civil Court,  

any order made under section 125  

should be cancelled or varied, he  

shall cancel the order or, as the case  

may be, vary the same accordingly.   

(3) Where any order has been made  

under Section 125 in favour of a woman  

who has been divorced by, or has  

obtained a divorce from, her husband,  

the Magistrate shall, if he is  

satisfied that –   

(a) the woman has, after the date  

of such divorce, remarried,  

cancel such order as from the date  

of her remarriage.   

(b) the woman has been divorced by  

her husband and that she has  

received, whether before or after  

the date of the said order, the  

whole of the sum which, under any  

customary or personal law  

applicable to the parties, was  

payable on such divorce, cancel  

such order –  

i) in the case where such sum was  

paid before such order, from  

the date on which such order  

was made,  

ii) in any other case, from the  

date of expiry of the period,  

if any, for which maintenance

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has been actually paid by the  

husband to the woman;  

(c) the woman has obtained a  divorce from her husband and that  

she had voluntarily surrendered  

her rights to [maintenance or  

interim maintenance, as the case  

may be] after her divorce, cancel  

the order from the date thereof.   

(4) At the time of making any  

decree for the recovery of any  

maintenance or dowry by any  

person, to whom [monthly  

allowance for the maintenance and  

interim maintenance or any of them  

has been ordered] to be paid under  

section 125, the Civil Court shall  

take into account that sum which  

has been paid to, or recovered by,  

such person [as monthly allowance  

for the maintenance and interim  

maintenance or any of them, as the  

case may be, in pursuance of] the  

said.”  

24. In Section 125 Cr.P.C. uses the expression used is   

“as the Magistrate from time to time direct”. The use  

of expression ‘from time to time’ has purpose and  

meaning. It clearly contemplates that with regard to  

order passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C., the  

Magistrate may have to exercise jurisdiction from time  

to time. Use of expression ‘from time to time’ in is

24    

exercise of jurisdiction of Magistrate in a particular  

case. Advanced Law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd  

edition defines ‘time to time’ as follows: -  

“Time to time. As occasion arises”  

25. The above Legislative Scheme indicates that  

Magistrate does not become functus officio after  

passing an order under Section 125 Cr.P.C., as and when  

occasion arises the Magistrate exercises the  

jurisdiction from time to time.  By Section 125(5)  

Cr.P.C., Magistrate is expressly empowered to cancel  

an order passed under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. on  

fulfilment of certain conditions.   

26. Section 127 Cr.P.C. also discloses the legislative  

intendment where the Magistrate is empowered to alter  

an order passed under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Sub-Section  

(2) of Section 127 Cr.P.C. also empower the Magistrate  

to cancel or vary an order under Section 125. The  

Legislative Scheme as delineated by Sections 125 and  

127 Cr.P.C. as noted above clearly enumerated the  

circumstances and incidents provided in the Code of  

Criminal Procedure where Court passing a judgment or

25    

final order disposing the case can alter or review the  

same. The embargo as contained in Section 362 is, thus,  

clearly relaxed in proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C.  

as indicated above.   

27. The submissions which have been pressed by the  

learned counsel for the appellant were founded only on  

embargo of Section 362 and when embargo of Section 362  

is expressly relaxed in proceeding under Section 125  

Cr.P.C., we are not persuaded to accept the submission  

of counsel for the appellant that the Family Court was  

not entitled to set aside and cancel its order dated  

06.05.2017 in facts and circumstances of the present  

case.   

28. As noted above, the proceeding under Section 125(1)  

Cr.P.C. was disposed of on a settlement entered between  

the parties. The order passed by Family Court on  

06.05.2017 is as follows: -  

“Reconciliation efforts made in  

this Chamber of the under signed.  

Parties have settled the matter  

amicably on the terms and conditions  

recorded separately in the court  

today. As per which, the  

respondent/Sanjay Kapoor shall pay  

Rs.25,000/- per month towards the

26    

maintenance of petitioner no.1 and 3  

with effect from July 2015, out of  

which the arrears of amount of  

maintenance up to May to April 2017  

shall be paid by him in the bank  

account of petitioner no.1 Chandana  

within six months form today and  

account of maintenance of Rs.25,000/-  

per month with effect from May 2017  

shall be paid by him in the bank  

account of Chandana month to month on  

or before 10th day of each Calendar  

month. The parties shall be bound by  

their statement. In view of the  

statement recorded in the court today,  

the instant petition stands disposed  

of accordingly, and respondent/Sanjay  

Kapoor shall pay a sum of Rs.25000/-  

per month to petitioner no.2 and 3  

time to time, which shall be deposited  

directly in the bank account of  

Chandana. He shall clear the arrears  

of amount of maintenance @ Rs.25,000/-  

per month payable with effect from  

July 2015 to April 2017 within six  

months. In case of non-fulfilment of  

commitment made by Sanjeev Kapoor, the  

petitioners shall be at liberty to  

proceed as per law. File, after  

needful, be consigned to records.  

Sd/-  

Sartaj Baswana  

District Judge, Family Court- II  

Faridabad  

UID No.HR.0487”  

29. It has come on the record that after passing of  

the above order on settlement, the appellant according  

to his own case has paid only an amount of One Lakh

27    

Rupees, i.e. maintenance of four months after May 2017.  

The arrears from July, 2015 to April 2017 has not been  

paid by the appellant within six months which was time  

allowed by the Court. When the appellant did not honour  

its commitment under settlement, can the wife be left  

in lurch by not able to press for grant of maintenance  

on non-compliance by the appellant of the terms of  

settlement. The answer is obviously ‘No’. Section 125  

Cr.P.C. has to be interpreted in a manner as to advance  

justice and to protect a woman for whose benefit the  

provisions have been engrafted.   

30. We have noticed the judgment of this Court in Mahua  

Biswas (Smt)(supra) where this Court had activated the  

wife’s claim of maintenance to put her at same position  

before parties compromised in proceeding under Section  

125 Cr.P.C. Although learned counsel for the appellant  

submits that the judgment of this Court in Mahua Biswa  

(Smt) is not applicable, we do not agree with the  

submission. In the above case, order was passed by the  

Magistrate giving maintenance of token amount against  

which she moved to the High Court for revision where  

it was noticed that matrimonial case between the

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parties had stood compromised and one of the terms was  

that wife would go and live with her husband. The wife  

went to live with husband but later the spouse fell  

apart. Husband contended that the orders of maintenance  

could not be revived as there had arisen a fresh cause  

of action. The High Court had set aside the order of  

maintenance leaving the wife to approach again the  

Criminal Court for appropriate relief. This Court  

allowing the appeal had activated the wife’s claim of  

maintenance and put her in the same position as before.  

The above judgment clearly indicates that this Court  

adopted the Course which avoided injustice to the wife.   

31. We, thus, are of the considered opinion that the  

order passed in present case by Family Court reviving  

the maintenance application of the wife under Section  

125 Cr.P.C. by setting aside order dated 06.05.2017  

passed on settlement is not hit by the embargo  

contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C. The submission of  

learned senior counsel for the appellant that Section  

362 Cr.P.C. prohibit the Magistrate to pass the order  

dated 05.01.2019 cannot be accepted.  

29    

32. The High Court did not commit an error in rejecting  

the application filed by appellant under Section 482  

Cr.P.C. The inherent powers of the High Court given  

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised to secure  

the ends of justice. The Family Court in passing order  

dated 05.01.2019 has done substantial justice in  

reviving the maintenance application of the wife which  

need no interference by the High Court in exercise of  

its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.   

33. We, thus, do not find any merit in this appeal.  

The appeal is dismissed.  

......................J.  

                                 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )  

......................J.  

                                 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )  

New Delhi,  

February 19, 2020.