http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  8737 of 2003

PETITIONER: Sangeeta Singh                                                   

RESPONDENT: Union of India and Ors.                                  

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/08/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & H.K. SEMA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [With C.A. Nos. 8739/2003, 8740/2003, 8741/2003 and  8742/2003]

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

       Civil Appeal nos. 8739/2003 and 8740/2003 relate to  civil writ petition no.24966/2001 disposed of by a Division  Bench of Allahabad High Court, while, Civil Appeal nos.  8742/2003, 8741/2003, 8737/2003 relate to civil writ  petition no. 18104/2002, which was disposed of following the  view expressed in the other writ petition. The dispute  relates to eligibility of appellants to be selected for  dealership in petroleum products.  

       Factual controversy lies in a narrow compass and is as  follows:

       In both writ petitions challenge was to the selection  of the appellants in Civil Appeal nos.8737/2003 and  8739/2003 for retail dealership of Indian Oil Corporation  Limited (in short ’IOC’) at different places. The appellants  and writ-petitioners in the writ petitions before the High  Court were applicants for dealership and distributionship of  various petroleum products. Challenge to the selection was  on the ground that the selected persons were not eligible  for selection on several grounds. One of the grounds  highlighted was that their relatives already hold letters of  intent for dealership or distributionship of  MS/HSD/Kerosene/LDO/LPG of another or same public sector oil  company. So far as appellant in Civil Appeal no. 8739/2003  is concerned, it was pointed out that the selected person’s  father-in-law was already holding dealership.  In the case  of appellant in civil appeal no.8737/2003 similar plea was  raised. Successful persons took the stand that the person  who was already holding dealership did not come within the  enumerated prohibited category and, therefore, there was no  illegality in the selection.  The High Court, however, held  that no doubt the terms and conditions of grant of  dealership mention that if daughter-in-law holds dealership  then the father-in-law is disqualified. A literal or narrow  meaning should not be given and if the father-in-law holds a  dealership, daughter-in-law is also disqualified. A literal  interpretation need not be given to the requirement, but the  intention has to be seen. It was observed that the intention  of the prohibition criteria for awarding of dealership was  that if a close relative is already holding a dealership,  relatives of such persons should not be granted a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

dealership. If father-in-law is a close relation to the  daughter-in-law reverse is also true and, therefore, the  daughter-in-law is ineligible if the father-in-law had  already a dealership.  IOC and the selected persons have  challenged the correctness of the judgments rendered by the  High Court. Writ petitioner in Civil Misc. petition  No.24966/2003 has questioned correctness of High Court’s  order in Civil Appeal no.8742/ 2003 on the ground that it  had raised several other points to contend that the selected  person was ineligible but the High Court did not refer to  them.  Originally, selected persons and IOC are appellants  in other Civil Appeals.   

       Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the  view of the High Court is clearly untenable.  In clear and  unambiguous terms the advertisement indicated persons who  are covered.  It was not permissible for the High Court to  add persons to the list of the relatives.  The writ- petitioners before the High Court, the respondents herein  supported the judgment of the High Court. Their stand is  that intentions have to be seen, monopoly has to be  discouraged and while dealing with State or public sector  undertakings largesse a narrow meaning should not be given.   It is a clear case of casus omissus, an unintentional  omission, which is to be ignored as the intention is clear.   IOC’s stand is similar to that of originally selected  candidates.  It does not subscribe to the stand that it is a  case of casus omissus. It is to be noted at this juncture  that the eligibility criteria so far as relatives are  concerned are different from 1997 onwards. Pre 1997 the  relatives enumerated are as follows:                                                 I       Spouse         II      Father/Mother         III     Brother/Sister         IV      Son/Daughter         V       Daughter-in-law/Son-in-law         VI      Parent-in-law   

       After 1997, the list reads as follows:

       I       Spouse         II      Father/Mother (not applicable to daughter) III     Brother/Brother’s wife (Not applicable for women  applicants)          IV      Son/Daughter in law.                   It is well settled principle in law that the Court  cannot read anything into a statutory provision or a  stipulated condition which is plain and unambiguous. A  statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language  employed in a statute is the determinative factor of  legislative intent. Similar is the position for conditions  stipulated in advertisements.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental  references to referents. The object of interpreting a  statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature  enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of  India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr.  (AIR 1998 SC 74).  The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered  from the language used, which means that attention should be  paid to what has been said as also to what has not been  said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for  its support, addition or substitution of words or which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be  avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore  PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures’ defective  phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by  construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See  The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel  and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253).  It is contrary to all rules  of construction to read words into an Act unless it is  absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones  (Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of  interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the  provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful  meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act  of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found  within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord  Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910)  AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v.  Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).

The question is not what may be supposed and has been  intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be  construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand  said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of  the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley  Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated  in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem  Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).  

In D.R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport  Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was  observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a priori  determination of the meaning of a provision based on their  own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme  into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat  fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function  under the disguise of interpretation.  

While interpreting a provision the Court only  interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision  of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of  law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal  it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax,  M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 511).  The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial  interpretative process.  

Two principles of construction \026 one relating to casus  omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a  whole \026 appear to be well settled. Under the first principle  a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in  the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found  in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same  time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for  that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be  construed together and every clause of a section should be  construed with reference to the context and other clauses  thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular  provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.  This would be more so if literal construction of a  particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous  results which could not have been intended by the  Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable  result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou  (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if  there is some other construction available". Where to apply

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the  legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we  must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that  obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per  Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1963 AC 557) where at p. 577 he  also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our  standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".  

It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend  not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those  which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the  words further than they reach, by saying it is casus  omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius  accidunt." "But," on the other hand, "it is no reason,  when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience  seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well  as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but  seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton (1858) XI Moore, P.C. 347. A  casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation,  save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a  casus omissus does really occur, either through the  inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod  semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is  that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be  disposed of according to the law as it existed before such  statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni  communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed  Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case  be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make  laws."  The principles were examined in detail in Maulavi  Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (JT  2004(6) SC 227).  

The golden rule for construing all written instruments  has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense  of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to  some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the  rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and  ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid  that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey  v. Pearson (1857 (6) H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of this  "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution.  "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are  plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to  construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead,  in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest  injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their  import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions  of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of  the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we  see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to  their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).

       In the aforesaid background the High Court’s judgment  cannot be maintained and is set aside. However, writ  petitioner in writ petition no.24966/2000 has taken the plea  that other grounds were highlighted in the writ petition to  show as to how the selected person was ineligible.  The High  Court has not dealt with any other issue and has disposed of  only on the ground that the father-in-law was holding  dealership, thereby rendering daughter-in-law ineligible.   

       We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court for  consideration of other issues raised.  We make it clear that  we have not expressed any opinion on any other issue then

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

those indicated above. So, far as writ petition 18104/2002  is concerned, it is not the case that any other point was  raised.  Therefore, only writ petition no.24966 of 2003  remitted to the High Court to consider if the other pleas  raised are tenable. Parties shall be permitted to place  material in support of their respective stand, and not on  the issue of relationship.

       The appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid  extent with no order as to costs.