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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  1708 of 2007

PETITIONER: Sanapareddy Maheedhar and Another

RESPONDENT: State of  Andhra Pradesh and Another

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & G.S. Singhvi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.  6680 OF 2006)                                                 G.S. Singhvi, J.

       Leave granted.         This appeal is directed  against the order dated 6.12.2006  passed by the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High  Court whereby he dismissed the petition filed by the appellants  under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short  Cr.P.C)  for quashing the proceedings of CC No.240/2002 pending in the  Court of XXII Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in relation to  offences under Sections 498A & 406, Indian Penal Code read with  Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 (for short \021the  Dowry Act).      Bhavani Shireesha, the eldest daughter of respondent no. 2  Shrimati D. Shaila, is a doctor by profession.  She was married to  appellant no. 1 Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri who is working as  Software Engineer at New Jersey, USA on 22.04.1998 at Hyderabad.   Before marriage, the appellants and their parents demanded Rs. 5  lakh cash, 50 tola gold jewellery and Rs. 75,000/- towards Adapaduchu  Katnam as dowry.  They also demanded transfer of the ground floor  of the residential house belonging to respondent no. 2 and her  husband in favour of the parents of the appellants.  Respondent no. 2  and her husband agreed to pay Rs. 4 lakh cash, 60 tola gold jewellary  and Rs. 75,000/- towards Adapaduchu Katnam as dowry.  They also  agreed to bequeath the ground portion of their house in the name of  their daughter.  The appellants and their parents accepted the  proposal and performed betrothal on 16.04.1998. Thereafter, the   parents of the appellants demanded Zen car and threatened to cancel  the engagement unless the car is given.  This compelled the husband  of respondent no. 2 to raise loan of Rs. 4 lakh and purchased the car,  which is said to have been kept at the disposal of the parents of the  appellants.  After marriage, the appellants left for USA, but Shireesha  Bhavani stayed back at Hyderabad with their parents because she  was undergoing training as House Surgeon.  After completing the  training, Shireesha Bhavani went to USA along with the parents of  the appellants.  She stayed at New Jersey from 1.11.1998 to 2.12.1998.   During this period, Shireesha Bhavani was subjected to cruelty and  harassment by the appellants and their parents on the ground that  she did not bring enough dowry.  On 3.12.1998 she went to Maryland  (U.S.A.) and stayed with her relatives.  In April 1999, the parents of  the appellants returned to India.  On 5.4.1999, appellant No.1  instituted divorce petition in Superior Court at New Jersey and an ex  parte decree was passed in his favour on 15.12.1999.        In the meanwhile, Shireesha Bhavani wrote letter dated  13.04.1999 to her parents complaining of cruelty by the appellants  and their parents.  She disclosed that while she was staying with the  parents of the appellants at Hyderabad, the mother-in-law always

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complained of lack of dowry and abused and criticized her and asked  her to do menial job.  She further disclosed that appellant no. 1 and  his brother harassed and also pressurized her to bring additional  money for purchase of a house at Hyderabad in the name of the in- laws.  She gave detailed account of the alleged harassment and  torture meted out by the appellants and their parents.  Thereupon,  respondent no. 2 filed complaint dated 26.8.1999 in the Court of XXII  Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as \023the  concerned Magistrate\024) detailing therein the facts relating to demand  of dowry by the appellants and their parents and the incidents of  cruelty and harassment to which her daughter was subjected at  Hyderabad and New Jersey.  Respondent no. 2 also alleged that  immediately after marriage, the appellants and their parents  complained about lack of dowry by saying that appellant no. 1 could  have been married for a dowry of Rs. 35 lakhs.  Another allegation  made by respondent no. 2 was that her daughter was driven out of  the house with an indication that she will be allowed  to return only  after the demands of the accused appellants and their parents are  met.  The learned Magistrate referred the complaint for investigation  under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. This led to registration of Crime  No.54/1999 at Women Police Station, CID, Hyderabad.  On 18.9.2000  the Inspector of Police, Women Protection Cell, C.I.D., Hyderabad  submitted final report   with the prayer that the case may be treated  as closed due to lack of evidence.  He mentioned that much progress  could not be made due to non-availability of de facto victim and  other key witnesses in India and there was no immediate prospect of  their coming to India.  He also mentioned that the accused party  returned the personal belongings including gold jewellery to the       de facto victim in U.S.A. and that a decree of divorce had been passed  by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,  Middlesex County.  The Investigating Officer also made a reference  to the direction given by Additional Director General of Police, CID  to close the case due to lack of evidence.      By an order dated 1.11.2000, the concerned Magistrate rejected  the final report and directed the police to make further investigation.   In the opinion of the learned Magistrate, the investigation had not  been done properly and  the final report submitted under the dictates  of the Additional Director General of Police was not acceptable.   While doing so, the learned Magistrate made a reference to the letter  addressed by Director General of Police, CID, Andhra Pradesh to the  Regional Passport Office, Hyderabad wherein it was mentioned that  Shrimati Bhavani Shireesha had been subjected to cruelty and a  request was made to cancel or impound the  passport of the  appellants.        In compliance of the direction given by the learned Magistrate  the police conducted  further investigation and recorded statements  of 18 persons.  Notice was also issued to Shrimati Shireesha Bhavani  to appear before CID Police, Hyderabad.  At that stage, respondent  no. 2 filed Criminal Petition No. 3912 of 2000 under Section 482  Cr.P.C. for quashing the notice issued by the Inspector of Police, CID,  Hyderabad for appearance of her daughter in connection with the  Crime No. 54 of 1999.  The same was disposed of by the learned  Single Judge on 22.9.2000 with liberty to the petitioner to approach  the investigating agency and inform it about the efforts being made  by her daughter to come to India or to approach the concerned court  for non-acceptance of final report, if any, submitted by the police.   Respondent no. 2 also filed Writ Petition No. 1173 of 2001 for issue of  a mandamus to the Regional Passport Officer, Secuderabad to  impound the passport of appellant no. 1 herein.  That petition was  disposed of by the learned Single Judge on 26.9.2000 with a direction  to the Regional Passport Officer to take appropriate decision on the  complaint made by respondent no. 2.       It is borne out from the record that on an application made by  respondent no. 2 the concerned Magistrate issued warrant for search  of the premises of the parents of the appellants for recovery of the

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dowry articles and passport of her daughter.  In the course of search  conducted by Sri P.Ventaka Rami Reddy, Inspector of Police (Women  Protection Cell) CID, Hyderabad on 19.7.2000 the parents of the  appellants disclosed that the passport has been sent to Shrimati B.  Shireesha by Ordinary Post some time in January/February, 1999,  but they could not produce any evidence to substantiate the same.        After disposal of Criminal Petition No. 3912 of 2000, Bhavani  Shireesha obtained duplicate passport and visa and came to India on  26.7.2002.  She appeared before the Investigating Officer on 27.7.2002  and gave statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  Thereafter, the police  filed a charge-sheet under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with  Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act.  On 4.10.2002 the concerned  Magistrate took cognizance of the case and issued summons to the  appellants and their parents.      It is also borne out from the record that without disclosing the  fact that the concerned Magistrate had already rejected the final  report, the appellants and their parents filed writ petition nos. 6237 of  2001 and 2284 of 2001 with the prayer for quashing the proceedings  of Crime No. 54 of 1999 on the file of Women Protection Cell, CID,  Hyderabad.  The learned Single Judge who heard the writ petitions  made a reference to order dated 26.9.2000 passed by another learned  Single Judge in Criminal Petition No. 3912 of 2000 and disposed of  both the petitions on 4.12.2001 by directing XXII Metropolitan  Magistrate, Hyderabad to pass appropriate order on the final report  within a period of two months of receipt of the copy of the order.        The parents of the appellants challenged the proceedings of CC  No. 240 of 2002 in Criminal Petition No. 1302 of 2003 filed under  Section 482 Cr.P.C.  They pleaded that in view of the bar contained in  Section 468 Cr.P.C. the concerned Magistrate did not have the  jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under Sections 498A  and 406 IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.  By an  order dated 24.10.2006 the learned Single Judge accepted their plea  and quashed the proceedings of CC No. 240 of 2002.  While doing so,  the learned Single Judge also expressed doubt regarding Bhavani  Shireesha having come to India for the purpose of making statement  before the police.      Encouraged by the success of litigious venture undertaken by  their parents, the appellants filed Criminal Petition No. 4152 of 2006  for quashing the proceedings in CC No. 240 of 2002.  They pleaded  that after the expiry of three years counted from the date of filing the  complaint, the learned magistrate could not have taken cognizance of  the offences allegedly committed by them under Sections 498A and  406 read with Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Act.  Another plea taken  by them was that in the face of the decree of divorce passed by the  Superior Court at New Jersey, USA and the fact that Shrimati  Shireesha Bhavani had contracted marriage with one Mr. Venkat  Puskar in the year 2000, there was no warrants for initiation of  criminal proceedings against them, and that the offences allegedly  committed by them outside India cannot be enquired into or tried  without obtaining prior sanction of the Central Government in terms  of Section 188 Cr.P.C.          The learned Single Judge briefly referred to the parameters for  exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the  ingredients of Sections 498A & 406 IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the  Dowry Act and held that the proceedings in CC No.240/2002 cannot  be quashed because the learned magistrate had taken cognizance  within three years.  The learned Single Judge distinguished the  judgments of this Court in M/s. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v.  Mohd. Sharaful Haque [2005 (1) SCC 122] and Ramesh Chandra  Sinha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. [2003 (7) SCC 254] by  observing that in those cases the magistrate had taken cognizance  long after three years.  He then observed that each act of cruelty  could be a new starting point of limitation and, therefore, the  cognizance taken by the Magistrate cannot be treated as barred by  time.  As regards the ex-parte decree of divorce passed by the Court

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at New Jersey, the learned Single Judge observed that the foreign  judgment is not conclusive and that various facts are required to be  proved and established before the Criminal Court.  The learned  Single Judge rejected the appellant\022s plea regarding lack of sanction  of the Central Government by observing that such sanction can be  obtained even during the trial.       Ms. Beena Madhavan, learned counsel for the appellants  reiterated the contentions raised on behalf of her clients before the  High Court and argued that the learned Single Judge committed an  error by refusing to quash the proceedings of CC No.240 of 2002  ignoring the fact that the learned Magistrate had taken cognizance  after almost four years of the last act of alleged cruelty committed  against Shireesha Bhavani.  She submitted that after dissolution of  the marriage, Shrimati Shireesha Bhavani had taken back the Gold  and Silver jewellery and then contracted marriage with Mr. Venkat  Puskar and this fact ought to have been considered by the learned  Single Judge while examining the appellants\022 pleas that the  proceedings of criminal case instituted against them amounts to an  abuse of the process of law.  She then argued that in exercise of the  power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is duty bound to  quash the proceedings which are barred by time and protect the  appellants against unwarranted persecution.        Shri I.Venkata Narayana, learned Senior Advocate appearing  for respondent No.2, supported the order under challenge and  argued that the learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly  declined to quash the proceedings of criminal case because the  offences committed by the appellants are continuing in nature.  Shri  Venkata Narayana  further argued that even though as on the date of  taking cognizance of offences by the learned magistrate, a period of  more than three years had elapsed, the proceedings of CC  No.240/2002 cannot be declared as barred by limitation because the  appellants were not in India and the period of their absence is liable  to be excluded in terms of Section 470(4).  Shri Venkata Narayana  relied on Section 472 and argued that offences of cruelty and criminal  breach of trust are continuing offences and prosecution launched  against the appellants cannot be treated as barred by time.   He then  submitted that the learned Magistrate could also exercise power  under Section 473 for extending the period of limitation because the  appellants and their parents did not co-operate in the investigation  and also prevented Smt. Shireesha Bhavani from coming to India to  give her statement.  Lastly, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the  judgment of this Court in Ajay Agarwal v.Union of India [1993 (3)  SCC 609] and argued that the proceedings of the criminal case cannot  be quashed only on the ground of lack of sanction under Section 188,  Cr.P.C.        We have considered the respective submissions and carefully  scrutinised the record.  For deciding whether the learned Magistrate  could take cognizance of offence under Sections 498 A and 406 IPC  read with Sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act after expiry of three  years, it will be useful to notice the scheme of Chapter XXXVI of the  Code of Criminal Procedure.  Section 468 which finds place in that  Chapter creates a bar against taking cognizance of an offence after  lapse of the period of limitation.  Sub-section (1) thereof lays down  that except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court,  shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub- section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.  Sub-section (2)  specifies different periods of limitation for different types of offences  punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not  exceeding three years , the period of limitation is three years.  Section  469 specifies the point of time with reference to which the period of  limitation is to be counted. Section 470 provides for exclusion of time  in certain cases.  Sub-section (4) thereof lays down that in computing  the period of limitation, the time during which the offender has been  absent from India or from any territory outside India which is under  the administration of the Central Government or has avoided arrest

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by absconding or concealing himself, shall be excluded.  Section 472,  which deals with continuing offence declares that in case of a  continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at  every moment of the time during which the offence continues.   Section 473, which begins with non-obstante clause, empowers the  Court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period  of limitation, if it is satisfied that the delay has been properly  explained and it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice.        In State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh [1981 (3) SCC 34], this  Court noted that the object of Section 468 Cr.P.C. is to create a bar  against belated prosecutions and to prevent abuse of the process of  the court and observed that this is in consonance with the concept of  fairness of trial enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution.        In Venka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy [1993 (3)  SCC 4] this Court considered the applicability of Section 468 to the  cases involving matrimonial offences, referred to the judgment in  Sarwan Singh\022s case (supra) and observed:    \024 It is true that the object of introducing Section 468 was  to put a bar of limitation on prosecutions and to prevent  the parties from filing cases after a long time, as it was  thought proper that after a long lapse of time, launching  of prosecution may be vexatious, because by that time  even the evidence may disappear. This aspect has been  mentioned in the statement and object, for introducing a  period of limitation, as well as by this Court in the case  of Sarwan Singh (supra).  But, that consideration cannot  be extended to matrimonial offences, where the  allegations are of cruelty, torture and assault by the  husband or other members of the family to the  complainant. It is a matter of common experience that  victim is subjected to such cruelty repeatedly and it is  more or less like a continuing offence. It is only as a last  resort that a wife openly comes before a court to unfold  and relate the day-to-day torture and cruelty faced by  her, inside the house, which many of such victims do  not like to be made public. As such, courts while  considering the question of limitation for an offence  under Section 498-A i.e. subjecting a woman to cruelty  by her husband or the relative of her husband, should  judge that question, in the light of Section 473 of the  Code, which requires the Court, not only to examine as  to  whether  the  delay  has been properly explained, but  

as to whether \023it is necessary to do so in the interests of  justice\024.                                                       [ Emphasis added ]      The court then compared Section 473 Cr.P.C. with Section 5 of  the Limitation Act and observed : \024 For exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation  Act, the onus is on the appellant or the applicant to satisfy  the court that there was sufficient cause for condonation  of the delay, whereas Section 473 enjoins a duty on the  court to examine not only whether such delay has been  explained but as to whether it is the requirement of the  justice to condone or ignore such delay. As such,  whenever the bar of Section 468 is applicable, the court  has to apply its mind on the question, whether it is  necessary to condone such delay in the interests of justice.  While examining the question as to whether it is  necessary to condone the delay in the interest of justice,  the Court has to take note of the nature of offence, the  class to which the victim belongs, including the  background of the victim. If the power under Section 473  of the Code is to be exercised in the interests of justice,  then while considering the grievance by a lady, of torture,

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cruelty and inhuman treatment, by the husband and the  relatives of the husband, the interest of justice requires a  deeper examination of such grievances, instead of  applying the rule of limitation and saying that with lapse  of time the cause of action itself has come to an end. The  general rule of limitation is based on the Latin maxim : v  igilantibus, et non, dormientibus, jura subveniunt (the  vigilant, and not the sleepy, are assisted by the laws).  That maxim cannot be applied in connection with  offences relating to cruelty against women.\024                                                         [ Emphasis added]                 In Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas [1999 (4) SCC 690 : 1999 SCC  (Cri) 629] this Court again considered the applicability of Section 473,  Cr.P.C. in cases  relating to matrimonial offences and observed:  \024The first limb confers power on every competent  court to take cognizance of an offence after the period  of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the  circumstances of the case that the delay has been  properly explained and the second limb empowers  such a court to take cognizance of an offence if it is  satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the  case that it is necessary so to do in the interests of  justice. It is true that the expression \021in the interest of  justice\022 in Section 473 cannot be interpreted to mean  in the interest of prosecution. What the court has to  see is \021interest of justice\022. The interest of justice  demands that the court should protect the oppressed  and punish the oppressor/offender. In complaints  under Section 498-A the wife will invariably be  oppressed, having been subjected to cruelty by the  husband and the in-laws. It is, therefore, appropriate  for the courts, in case of delayed complaints, to  construe liberally Section 473 Cr.P.C. in favour of a  wife who is subjected to cruelty if on the facts and in  the circumstances of the case it is necessary so to do  in the interests of justice. When the conduct of the  accused is such that applying the rule of limitation  will give an unfair advantage to him or result in  miscarriage of justice, the court may take cognizance  of an offence after the expiry of the period of  limitation in the interests of justice. This is only  illustrative, not exhaustive.\024      In State of H.P. v. Tara Dutt [2000 (1) SCC 230] a three Judges  Bench of this Court considered whether there can be a presumption  of condonation of delay under Section 473 Cr.P.C. and observed : \023Section 473 confers power on the court taking  cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation,  if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of  the case that the delay has been properly explained  and that it is necessary so to do in the interest of  justice. Obviously, therefore in respect of the offences  for which a period of limitation has been provided in  Section 468, the power has been conferred on the court  taking cognizance to extend the said period of  limitation where a proper and satisfactory explanation  of the delay is available and where the court taking  cognizance finds that it would be in the interest of  justice. This discretion conferred on the court has to be  exercised judicially and on well-recognised principles.  This being a discretion conferred on the court taking  cognizance, wherever the court exercises this  discretion, the same must be by a speaking order,  indicating the satisfaction of the court that the delay  was satisfactorily explained and condonation of the  same was in the interest of justice. In the absence of a

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positive order to that effect it may not be permissible  for a superior court to come to the conclusion that the  court must be deemed to have taken cognizance by  condoning the delay whenever the cognizance was  barred and yet the court took cognizance and  proceeded with the trial of the offence. But the  provisions are of no application to the case in hand  since for the offences charged, no period of limitation  has been provided in view of the imposable  punishment thereunder. In this view of the matter we  have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the  High Court committed serious error in holding that  the conviction of the two respondents under Section  417 would be barred as on the date of taking  cognizance the Court could not have taken cognizance  of the said offence. Needless to mention, it is well  settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that if an  accused is charged with a major offence but is not  found guilty thereunder, he can be convicted of a  minor offence if the facts established indicate that such  minor offence has been committed.\024       This Court then considered the earlier judgment in Arun Vyas  v. Anita Vyas (supra) and held : \023The aforesaid observations made by this Court  indicate that the order of the Magistrate at the time of  taking cognizance in case of an offence under Section  498-A, should indicate as to why the Magistrate does  not think it sufficient in the interest of justice to  condone the delay inasmuch as an accused committing  an offence under Section 498-A should not be lightly  let off. We have already indicated in the earlier part of  this judgment as to the true import and construction of  Section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The  said provision being an enabling provision, whenever  a Magistrate invokes the said provision and condones  the delay, the order of the Magistrate must indicate  that he was satisfied on the facts and circumstances of  the case that the delay has been properly explained  and that it is necessary in the interest of justice to  condone the delay. But without such an order being  there or in the absence of such positive order, it cannot  (sic) be said that the Magistrate has failed to exercise  jurisdiction vested in law. It is no doubt true that in  view of the fact that an offence under Section 498-A is  an offence against the society and, therefore, in the  matter of taking cognizance of the said offence, the  Magistrate must liberally construe the question of  limitation but all the same the Magistrate has to be  satisfied, in case of period of limitation for taking  cognizance under Section 468(2)(c) having expired that  the circumstances of the case require delay to be  condoned and further the same must be manifest in  the order of the Magistrate itself. This in our view is  the correct interpretation of Section 473 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure.\024                      In Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu [ 2005 (3) SCC 507] this Court  considered the issue of limitation in taking cognizance of an offence  under  Section 498A and observed :  \023On the point of limitation, we are of the view that the  prosecution cannot be nullified at the very threshold  on the ground that the prescribed period of limitation  had expired. According to the learned counsel for the  appellants, the alleged acts of cruelty giving rise to the  offence under Section 498-A ceased on the exit of the  informant from the matrimonial home on 2-10-1997

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and no further acts of cruelty continued thereafter. The  outer limit of time for taking cognizance would  therefore be 3-10-200 0, it is contended. However, at  this juncture, we may clarify that there is an allegation  in the FIR that on 13-10-1998/14-10-1998, when the  informant\022s close relations met her in-laws at a hotel in  Chennai, they made it clear that she will not be  allowed to live with her husband in Mumbai unless  she brought the demanded money and jewellery. Even  going by this statement, the taking of cognizance on  13-2-2002 pursuant to the charge-sheet filed on           28-12-2001 would be beyond the period of limitation.  The commencement of limitation could be   taken    as  2-10-1997 or at the most 14-10-1998. As pointed out by  this Court in Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas (supra) the last  act of cruelty would be the starting point of limitation.  The three-year period as per Section 468(2)(c) would  expire by 14-10-2001 even if the latter date is taken into  account. But that is not the end of the matter. We have  to still consider whether the benefit of extended period  of limitation could be given to the informant. True, the  learned Magistrate should have paused to consider the  question of limitation before taking cognizance and he  should have addressed himself to the question  whether there were grounds to extend the period of  limitation. On account of failure to do so, we would  have, in the normal course, quashed the order of the  Magistrate taking cognizance and directed him to  consider the question of applicability of Section 473.  However, having regard to the facts and circumstances  of the case, we are not inclined to exercise our  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to  remit the matter to the trial court for taking a decision  on this aspect. The fact remains that the complaint was  lodged on 23-6-1999, that is to say, much before the  expiry of the period of limitation and the FIR was  registered by the All-Women Police Station,  Tiruchirapalli on that day. A copy of the FIR was sent  to the Magistrate\022s Court on the next day i.e. on          24-6-1999. However, the process of investigation and  filing of charge-sheet took its own time. The process of  taking cognizance was consequentially delayed. There  is also the further fact that the appellants filed Writ  Petition (Crl.) No. 1719 of 2000 in the Bombay High  Court for quashing the FIR or in the alternative to  direct its transfer to Mumbai. We are told that the  High Court granted an ex parte interim stay. On         20-8-2001, the writ petition was permitted to be  withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition. The  charge-sheet was filed four months thereafter. It is in  this background that the delay has to be viewed.\024    

       The ratio of the above noted judgments is that while  considering the applicability of Section 468 to the complaints made  by the victims of matrimonial offences, the court can invoke Section  473 and can take cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of  limitation keeping in view the nature of allegations, the time taken by  the police in investigation and the fact that the offence of cruelty is a  continuing offence and affects the society at large.  To put it  differently, in cases involving matrimonial offences the court should  not adopt a narrow and pedantic approach and should, in the interest  of justice, liberally exercise power under Section 473 for extending  the period of limitation.         At this stage, we may also notice the parameters laid down by  this Court for exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482

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Cr.P.C to give effect to any order made under the Cr.P.C or to  prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the  ends of justice.  In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866]  this Court considered the question whether in exercise of its power  under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section  482 Cr.P.C. is pari materia to Section 561A of the 1898 Code), the  High Court could quash criminal case registered against the  appellant who along with his mother-in-law was accused of  committing offences under Section 420, 109, 114 and 120B of the  Indian Penal Code.  The appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition in  the Punjab High Court for quashing the investigation of the First  Information Report (FIR) registered against him and then filed appeal  before this Court.  While confirming the High Court\022s order this  Court laid down the following proposition:   \023The inherent power of High Court under Section 561A,  Criminal P.C. cannot be exercised in regard to matters  specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. The  inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to  quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the  abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the  ends of justice.  Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted  against an accused person must be tried under the  provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be  reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an  interlocutory stage.  It is not possible, desirable or expedient  to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the  exercise of this inherent jurisdiction.\024

       This Court then carved out some exceptions to the above stated  rule.  These are: (i)     Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar  against the institution or continuance of the criminal  proceedings in respect of the offences alleged.  Absence of  the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases  under this category;

(ii)    Where the allegations in the First Information Report or  the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value  and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the  offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating  evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the  complaint or the First Information Report to decide  whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not;

(iii)   Where the allegations made against the accused person  do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no  legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the  evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the  charge.  In dealing with this class of cases it is important  to bear in mind the distinction between a case where  there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence  which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the  accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence  which on its appreciation may or may not support the  accusation in question.  In exercising its jurisdiction  under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark  upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is  reliable or not.  That is the function of the trial magistrate,  and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to  invoke the High Court\022s inherent jurisdiction and  contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence  the accusation made against the accused would not be  sustained.\024      In State of Haryana v Bhajanlal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335] this   Court considered the scope of the High Court\022s power under Section

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482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the FIR  registered against the respondent, referred to several judicial  precedents including those of R.P.Kapoor v. State of Punjab (supra),  State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha [1980 (1) SCC 554] and State of  West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha [1982 (1) SCC 561] and held  that the High Court should not embark upon an enquiry into the  merits and demerits of the allegations and quash the proceedings  without allowing the investigating agency to complete its task.   At  the same time, the Court identified the following cases in which the  FIR or complaint can be quashed.   \023(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report  or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and  accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any  offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and  other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a  cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers  under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a  Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or  complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do  not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case  against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a  cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,  no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an  order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of  the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so  absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no  prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is  sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the  provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a  criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and  continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific  provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing  efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with  mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously  instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on  the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and  personal grudge.\024       The ratio of Bhajan Lal\022s case has been consistently followed in  the subsequent judgments.  In M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works  Ltd. V. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (supra), this Court referred to a large  number of precedents on the subject and observed:        \023The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of  the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power  requires great caution in its exercise.  Court must be careful to  see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound  principles.  The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle  a legitimate prosecution.  The High Court being the highest  court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima  facie decision in  a case where the entire facts are incomplete  and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected  and produced before the court and the issues involved,  whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen  in their true perspective without sufficient material.  Of course,  no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in  which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary  jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.   It would  not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the  complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to

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determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on  such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to  be quashed.  It would be erroneous to assess the material before  it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with.   In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent  powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case  where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is  frivolous, vexatious or oppressive.   If the allegations set out in  the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance  has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court  to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under  Section 482 of the Code.  It is not, however, necessary that there  should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find  out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal.  The  complaint has to be read as a whole.  It if appears that on  consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement  made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the  offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to  show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in  that even there would be no justification for interference by the  High Court.  When an information is lodged at the police  station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the  informant would be of secondary importance.  It is the material  collected during the investigation and evidence led in court  which decides the fate of the accused person.  The allegations of  mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and  cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the  proceedings.\024

       In the aforementioned judgment, this Court set aside the order  of the Patna High Court and quashed the summons issued by the  First Class Judicial Magistrate in Complaint Case No.1613) of 2002  on the ground that the same was barred by limitation prescribed  under Section468 (2)) Cr.P.C.        In Ramesh Chand Sinha\022s case (supra) this Court quashed the  decision of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna to take cognizance of  the offence allegedly committed by the appellants by observing that  the same was barred by time and there were no valid grounds to  extend the period of limitation by invoking Section 473 Cr.P.C.        A careful reading of the above noted judgments makes it clear  that the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to  interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and  should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it  is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not  disclose commission of any offence or that the allegations contained  in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the  prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is  necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the court.  In  dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that  judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal process initiated  against a person accused of committing offence is highly detrimental  to the larger public and societal interest.   The people and the society  have  a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either  against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial  and, if found guilty, adequately punished.  Therefore, while deciding  a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the  competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in  the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High  Court should be extremely careful and circumspect.  If the allegations  contained in the FIR or complaint    discloses    commission     of some  crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and  allow the  investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter  and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial.   The  High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the  allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus

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against the author of the FIR or the complainant.  The High Court  must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of  possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on  account of investigation of the FIR or complaint.  Such a course will  result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of  committing crimes to repeat the same.   However, if the High Court  is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any  offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings  of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise  inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.      In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether the  High Court committed an error by refusing to quash the proceedings  of CC No.240 of 2002.               Although, the learned Single Judge of High Court dealt with  various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same by  recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have  been drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the co-ordinate  bench in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of  CC No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on  the ground that the learned Magistrate could not have taken  cognizance after three years.  Respondent No.2 is not shown to have  challenged the order passed in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003.  Therefore, that order will be  deemed to have become final.  We are  sure that if attention of the learned Single Judge, who decided  Criminal Petition No.4152/2006 had been drawn to the order passed  by another learned Single Judge in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003,  he may  have, by taking note of the fact that the learned Magistrate  did not pass an order for condonation of delay or extension of the  period of limitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., quashed the  proceedings of CC No.240/2002.   

       We are further of the view that in the peculiar facts of this case,  continuation of proceedings of CC No.240/2002 will amount to abuse  of the process of the Court.  It is not in dispute that after marriage,  Shireesha Bhavani lived with appellant No.1 for less than one and a  half months (eight days at Hyderabad and about thirty days at New  Jersey).  It is also not in dispute that their marriage was dissolved by  the Superior Court at New Jersey vide decree dated 15.12.1999.   Shireesha Bhavani is not shown to have challenged the decree of  divorce.  As a mater of fact,  she married Sri Venkat Puskar in 2000  and has two children from the second marriage.   She also received  all the articles of dowry (including jewellery) by filing affidavit dated  28.12.1999 in the Superior Court at New Jersey.  As on today a period  of almost nine years has elapsed of the marriage of appellant No.1  and Shireesha Bhavani and seven years from her second marriage.   Therefore, at this belated stage, there does not appear to be any  justification for continuation of the proceedings in CC No.240/2002.     Rather, it would amount to sheer harassment to the appellant and  Shireesha Bhavani who are settled in USA, if they are required to  come to India for giving evidence in relation to an offence allegedly  committed in 1998-99.  It is also extremely doubtful whether the  Government of India will, after lapse of such a long time, give  sanction in terms of Section 188 Cr.P.C.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the  order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court is set aside and  the proceedings of CC No.240/2002, pending in the Court of XXII  Metropolitan  Magistrate, Hyderabad, are quashed.