IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5906 OF 2006

SAMPATI GOVIND BHIL [DECEASED] TR. HIS L.RS. ……. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SUDAM BAPU WARIK ……. RESPONDENT

ORDER

1. By filing this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order  

dated 10th October, 2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay  

whereby the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant  

herein.

2. The appellant herein are the tenants and the respondent is the landlord.  It  

is  an  admitted  position  that  the  parties  herein  are  governed  by  the  

provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.

3. The  respondent-landlord  was  a  minor  on  1st April,  1957.   He  attained  

majority on 26th May, 1960.  It is also an admitted position between the  

parties that the provisions of Section 32F are applicable to the facts and  

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circumstances of the present case.  The whole controversy in the present  

appeal is centered around the provision of Section 32F(1A) of the said Act.  

4. The Bombay High Court had an occasion to consider the said provisions in  

the case of  Tuka Ram Maruti Chavan v.  Maruti Narayan Chavan (Dead) by  

LRs.  &  Ors. wherein  the  Bombay  High  Court  interpreted  the  aforesaid  

provisions and held that the provisions of Section 32F(1A) mandate that a  

tenant has to give to the landlord a notice of his intention to purchase the  

land of which he is in possession as a tenant.  The said judgment rendered  

by the Bombay High Court was challenged in this Court which has been  

decided,  and  is  reported  in  2008  (9)  SCC  358  titled  Tuka  Ram  Maruti   

Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan (Dead) by LRs. & Ors.  In paragraphs 12  

&  13  of  the  said  judgment,  this  Court  has  held  that  the  provisions  of  

Section 32F are independent in nature and are separate from the provisions  

under Section 31 of the said Act.  It was further held that the right given to  

the landlord under Section 31 has nothing to do with the right given to the  

tenant under Section 32F for purchasing the land and that a tenant has a  

legal obligation or statutory duty under Section 32F to give to the landlord  

as well as to the Tribunal a notice of his intention to purchase the land  

which is in his possession as a tenant.  We also wish to refer to a judgment  

of this Court, which has relevance in the context of the case at hand, viz.,  

Anna Bhau Magdum (  since deceased by his legal representatives)  v.  

Babasaheb Anandrao Desai, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 243.  The Court in  

para 13 of its judgment held as follows: -

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“13.  The contention of Shri Wad that the provisions of sub- section  (1-A)  of  Section  32-F  are  not  mandatory  but  only  directory  in  nature  and  non-compliance  with  the  said   provisions does not render the purchase ineffective cannot be  accepted for the reason that sub-section (1-A) of Section 32-F  prescribes the condition for the exercise of the right conferred  on the tenant under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 32-F and the   failure  on  the  part  of  the  tenant  to  comply  with  the   requirements of sub-section (1-A) would result in non-exercise  of  the  right  of  purchase by the  tenant  and as a result  the   tenant  should be treated as having not availed of the right   that  has been conferred on him.  Apart  from the  use of  the   word  ‘shall’  in  sub-section  (1-A)  an  indication  about  the  mandatory nature of the said provision is also given by the  proviso  to  sub-section  (1-A)  inserted  in  1969  whereby  the  tenant  who had failed to  give an intimation  as required by  sub-section (1-A),  but was  in possession of the land on the  date of  commencement of  the  Amendment Act of  1969 and   was  desirous  of  exercising  the  right  conferred  under  sub- section (1)(a), was permitted to give such intimation within a  period of  two  years from the date of  commencement  of  the  Amendment  Act  of  1969.  Furthermore,  we  find  that  the  consequences for non-compliance with the provisions in sub- section (1-A) of Section 32-F are laid down in Section 32-P(1)   wherein it is provided that where a tenant fails to exercise the   right to purchase the land held by him within  the specified   period under Section 32-F the Tribunal may suo motu or on an  application made in this behalf after holding a formal inquiry   direct  that  the  land  shall  be  disposed  of  in  the  manner   provided in sub-section (2). Such a direction could provide for   summary  eviction  of  the  tenant.  We  are,  therefore,  of  the   opinion that requirement regarding intimation by the tenant to  the landlord prescribed under sub-section (1-A) of Section 32-F  is  mandatory  in  nature  and  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  tenant in the present case to give such an intimation to the  landlord  within  the  prescribed  period  has  resulted  in  the  tenant having failed to avail the right to purchase conferred on  him and it has been rightly held that the tenant having failed  to exercise the right to purchase conferred on him by the Act  was liable to summary eviction under Section 32-P(1) of the  Act.“

The aforesaid position is the settled position in law.

5. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, we wish to examine  

the facts of the present case. There is nothing on record to indicate that any  

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notice as required under the provisions of Section 32F(1A) was issued by the  

appellant-tenants. In absence of such a notice, it has to be held that the  

precondition for the applicability of the provisions of Section 32 would not  

be satisfied.  

6. It was pointed out by the counsel appearing for the appellants that since  

they had no knowledge of the fact that the respondent-landlord had attained  

majority, the appellants could not serve notice as required and instead they  

initiated proceedings under Section 32G of the said Act.  

7. In our considered opinion, initiation of said proceedings by the appellants  

under Section 32G was wholly unjustified and uncalled for.  The same was  

not maintainable.   In any event, in the absence of service of a notice as  

required under Section 32F(1A), the appellant could not have claimed the  

relief which has now been claimed before us.  Apart from that this Court in  

the  decision  of  Tukaram  Maruti  Chavan (supra)  has  also  held  that  the  

initiation  of  the  proceedings  under  Section  32G  would  not  absolve  the  

appellant from his responsibility of issuing a notice to the respondent under  

Section 32F(1A).  The High Court, therefore, was justified in dismissing the  

claim of the appellant.  

8. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High  

Court.  The  present  appeal  lacks  merit  and  is  therefore  dismissed.  The  

parties are left to bear their own costs.

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………………………………………. J [ DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA ]

…………………. J [ A.K. PATNAIK ]

NEW DELHI MARCH 18, 2010.

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