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PETITIONER: SAMPAT PRAKASH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/1968

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1118            1970 SCR  (2) 365  1969 SCC  (1) 562  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC 963  (24)

ACT:     Constitution  of  India, 1950 (as applied to  Jammu  and Kashmir)  Arts. 35(c) and 370--Jammu and Kashmir  Preventive Detention   Act  J & K 13  of 1964)  s.   13A--Validity   of detention  under  without reference to Advisory Board--Scope of Art. 370--Power of President to extend period of immunity of State laws even if fundamental rights are infringed.

HEADNOTE:     After the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India.  in  Art.  35 of the Constitution of  India,  in  its application  to  the State, el. (c) was introduced  in  1954 providing  protection to any  law  relating   to  preventive detention in the State against invalidity on the ground   of infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed  by Part III of the Constitution.  The protection was limited to a period of five years.in 1956, ,the Constituent Assembly of the State completed its work by :’raining a Constitution for the  State and it came into  force  on  26th  January  1956. In 1959 the period of 5 years in Art. 35(c) was extended  to 10  and  in  1964, it was further extended to  15  years  by Orders  passed by the President of India under Art.  370(1). On  18th  March  1968, the petitioner was  detained  by  the District  Magistrate under the Jammu and Kashmir  Preventive Detention  Act, 1964.  The State Government acting under  s. 13A of the Act continued the detention without making    any reference to the Advisory Board.     In  a petition under Art. 32 challenging  his  detention the  petitioner  contended  that,  the  Orders  making   the modifications  in 1959 and 1964 could not be validly  passed by the President, because. (1)  the Article contained only temporary  provisions  which ceased  to  effective after the Constituent Assembly of  the State  had completed its work by framing a Constitution  for the State; (2) Under Art. 370(2) the power of the President,  depending

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on  the  concurrence  of  the  State  Government,  must   be exercised before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State; (3) Under Art. 370(1), at the time of applying any provision of  the  Constitution  to  the  State,  the  President   was competent  to make modification and exceptions, but after  a provision  of  the Constitution had been applied  the  power under the Article ceased; (4) Since Art. 368 relating to amendment of the Constitution with  proviso added to it is ’applied to the State Art.  370 was  no  longer applicable for .amending  or  modifying  the provisions of the   Constitution applied to the State; (5)  The  power of making modifications  under  the  Article should  be  limited to making minor alterations and  not  to abrogate an  Article applied to the State; and (6) The modifications made by the Presidential orders  under Art. 370 had the effect of abridging the fundamental  rights of  citizens  of 366 Kashmir under Art. 22 and other Articles of Part III,  after they  had been applied to the State and so were  void  under Art. 13 of the Constitution.     HELD: (1) The-political situation that existed when Art, 370 was incorporated in the Constitution had not  materially altered   either  in  1959  or  1964  and  the  purpose   of introducing it was to empower the President to exercise  his discretion  in applying the Indian Constitution  while  that situation remained unchanged.  Article 370(3) envisages that the   Article  will continue to be operative until  and  can cease  to  be operative only if. on  the  recommendation  of Constituent  Assembly of the State,  the President  makes  a direction  to that effect.  No such recommendation was  made nor  was any order made by the President.  On  the  contrary the Constituent Assembly of the State made a  recommendation that  the  Article  should  be  operative  with  a  modified Explanation.   Therefore  the Article did not  cease  to  be operative. [372 C--D; 373 A--B]     (2)Article  370(2) only refers to the concurrence  given by  the  Government  of the  State  before  the  Constituent Assembly  was convened. and makes no mention at all  of  the completion  of the work of the Constituent Assembly  or  its dissolution.     (3) The power under the Article is to be exercised  from time to time and includes within it the power to add, amend, vary or rescind.      Article   367  lays  down  that,  unless  the   context otherwise   requires,   the  General  Clauses   Act,   1897, shall  .apply  for the interpretation of  the  Constitution. Therefore  s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, under  which  a power  to issue a notification or order includes a power  to add.  amend, vary or rescind it, is applicable to the  power of the President under Art. 370:  If it were held that s. 21 of  the  General  Clauses Act is not to be  applied  to  the interpretation  of  the Constitution, it will  lead  to  the anomaly  that  when  once rules are  made  under  the   rule making  powers- under various Articles such as Arts.  77(3), 166(3) and 309, they would be inflexible.     Further  the  legislative history of the  Article  shows that it was envisaged that the President would have to  take into  account  the  situation existing  in  the  State  when applying  a  provision  of the Constitution  and  that  such situations   arise  from  time  to  time:  There   was   the possibility that, when applying a particular provision,  the situation  might demand an exception or modification of  the provision applied; but  subsequent changes in the  situation

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might  justify  the  rescinding of  those  modifications  or exceptions.  This could only be brought about by  conferring on  the  President the power of making Orders from  time  to time under Art. 370. [375 E--H]     (4)  The  proviso to Art. 368, serves the  purpose  that amendments to the Constitution should be made applicable  to the State only with the concurrence of the State  Government and  that  after such concurrence available  the  amendments should  take effect when an order is made under Art. 370  of the  Constitution.  Therefore, the powers of  the  President under Art. 370 have to be exercised and the applicability of Art.   368  to the ’State does not curtail  the  President’s power under Art. 370. [376 D--F]     (5) There is-no reason to limit the word  ’modification’ in Art. 370(1) only to such modification as do not make  any ’radical transformation’. [377 H]      Puranlal Lakhanpal v. The President of India, [1962]  1 S.C.R.  688, 692, followed. 367     (6)   Under  Art.  35(c)  as  originally  enacted,   the applicability of the provisions of Part III for the  purpose of  judging  the validity of a law  relating  to  preventive detention made by the State ’Legislature was postponed for a period  of five years.  The object of the subsequent  Orders of  1959  and 1964 was to extend the period  of  protection. The  result  of  the. extension is that  a  detenu   cannot, during  the  period of protection challenge the law  on  the ground  of  its being inconsistent with Art 22, and  not  to infringe or abridge fundamental rights. [378 E, H]

JUDGMENT:     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 11 of 1968.     Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.     M.  K.   Ramamurthi, Baroobhai Mehta, Vineet  Kumar  and Shyamala Pappu, for the petitioner.     C.  K.  Daphtary, Attorney-General,  B.R.L.lyengar   and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondents.     R.K. Garg, for intervener No. 1.     R.V.S. Mani, for intervener No. 2.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Bhargava,  J.  This  petition under Article  32  of  the Constitution  of  India  (hereinafter referred  to  as  "the Constitution") has been presented by Sampat Prakash who  was the  General Secretary of the All Jammu &  Kashmir  Low-Paid Government  Servants  Federation.   On  October  25,   1967, Government employees and teachers of the Jammu Province held a  mass meeting making a demand that dearness  allowance  at Central rates should be paid to them.  They further resolved that,  if  the Government did not accept  this  demand,  the employees  and  the  teachers would go on  ’Dharna’  on  5th November 1967.  The Revenue Minister of the Jammu &  Kashmir State   promised  dearness  allowance  at  half  the   rates applicable  to Central Government servants.  No  dharna  was started on 5th November 1967, but, on 17th November, 1967, a notice  was  given  on  behalf  of  the  employees  to   the Government  that  there  would be a hunger  strike  on  18th November, 1967. On that day, the employees went on a  hunger strike  for  one  day outside the  residence  of  the  Chief Minister.   Then, there was a mass meeting on 27th  November 1967, in which it was announced that, if their demands  were not met, the employees would go on a pen-down strike on  2nd

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December,  1967.  The Government failed to comply with  this demand.  Then,  between  4th and 10th  December,  1967,  the employees  went  on a strike--first a  pendown  strike  and, later,  a  general  strike.  Between  this  period,  on  5th December,  1967,  there was another mass meeting  which  was addressed  by the petitioner.  On 11th December, 1967,  even the workers of the various industries in the State went on a general  strike in sympathy with the  Government  employees. On  that day, the petitioner was dismissed  from  government service  and  on 12th December, 1967, he  addressed  another mass meeting.  In view 368 of these activities of the petitioner and the continuance of such  a  situation, the District Magistrate  of   Jammu,  on 16th  March,  1968,   made  an order  of  detention  of  the petitioner under section 3 of the Jammu & Kashmir Preventive Detention  Act  No. 13 of 1964 (hereinafter referred  to  as "the  Act")  and, on 18th March, 1968,  the  petitioner  was actually  placed under detention.  The grounds of  detention were  served on the petitioner on the 26th March,  1968  and the  State  Government  granted approval  to  the  order  of detention  on  8th  April,  1968.   The  detention  of   the petitioner  was continued without making a reference to  the Advisory  Board,  as the State Government purported  to  act under s. 13A of the Act.  The present petition was flied  by the petitioner on 3rd May, 1968.     During  the preliminary .hearing of this  petition,  Mr. Ramamurthy,  representing  the petitioner, raised  a  ground that  s. 13A of the Act was ultra vires the Constitution  as contravening  the provisions of Art. 22 of the Constitution. That question  was referred by the Constitution Bench of the Court to a larger Bench and came before the Full Court.   On this occasion, the  Court held. that, in view of clause  (c) of   Art.   35  of  the  Constitution  introduced   in   the Constitution  in  its application to the State  of  Jammu  & Kashmir,  the point that had been raised stood  answered  by the addition of this clause and, unless the  clause   itself was challenged, the point raised on behalf of the detenu did not  arise. In this view, that reference was  dissolved  and the case has been heard by the Constitution Bench.      On  the return of the reference, the main  point  which has been argued on behalf of the petitioner is based on  the fact  that  Art.35(c)  of  the  Constitution,  as  initially introduced  by  the  Constitution (Application  to  Jammu  & Kashmir)  Order, 1954 (C.O. 48),had given protection to  any law  relating  to preventive detention in  Jammu  &  Kashmir against  invalidity on the  ground  of  infringement of  any of  the  fundamental rights guaranteed by Part  III  of  the Constitution for a limited period of five years only.   This clause, as introduced in 1954, read as follows :--                     "No  law  with  respect  to   preventive               detention,  made  by the  Legislature  of  the               State  of Jammu & Kashmir, whether  before  or               after  the  commencement of  the  Constitution               (Application to Jammu & Kashmir)  Order, 1954,               shall  be  void  on  the  ground  that  it  is               inconsistent  with  any of the  provisions  of               this  Part,  but :any such law shall,  to  the               extent  of such inconsistency, cease  to  have               effect  on the expiration of five  years  from               the  commencement of the said Order, except as               respects  things  done or omitted to  be  done               before the expiration thereof." 369 It  was urged that the five years mentioned in  this  clause

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expired  in  1959,  and, consequently, the  Act,  which  was passed  in  1964, did not get immunity from  being  declared void  on  the ground of inconsistency with Art.  22  of  the Constitution.   It,   however, appears that  for  the  words "five  years"  in  Art. 35(c), the words  "ten  years"  were substituted  by  the Constitution (Application  to  Jammu  & Kashmir)  Second Amendment Order, 1959 (C.O. 59), which  was passed   before  the  expiry  of  those  five   years   and, subsequently,  for  the words "ten years"   so   introduced, the    words  "fifteen  years"  were  substituted   by   the Constitution  (Application to Jammu and  Kashmir)  Amendment Order,  1964  (C.O.  69). This modification  was  also  made before  the expiry of the period of ten years from the  date on’which the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 was passed.  On these facts, the point raised on behalf  of the detenu was that these two   modifications  in 1959 and 1964, substituting  "ten  years"  for "five years", and "fifteen years" for "ten years", were themselves void on the  ground that orders making such modifications could  not be validly passed by the President under Art. 370(1) of  the Constitution in the years 1959 and 1964. Article 370 of the Constitution is as follows .--                    "370.  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in               this Constitution,-                     (a) the provisions of article 238  shall               not apply in relation to the State of Jammu  &               Kashmir;                     (b)  the  power of Parliament  to   make               laws for the said State shall be limited to-                     (i) those matters in the  Union List and               the  Concurrent List which,  in   consultation               with  the  Government  of   the   State,   are               declared  by  the President to  correspond  to               matters  specified  in   the   Instrument   of               Accession  governing the    accession  of  the               State  to  the Dominion of    India   as   the               matters  with  respect to which  the  Dominion               Legislature may make laws for that State; and                     (ii)  such  other matters  in  the  said               Lists    as,  with  the  concurrence  of   the               Government of the State, the  President may by               order specify.       Explanation.   For the purposes of this  article,  the Government of the State means the person for the time  being recognised  by  the  President as the Maharaja  of  Jammu  & Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council 370 of  Ministers  for  the time being in   office   under   the Maharaja’s Proclamation dated the fifth day of March, 1948;   (c)  the  provisions of article (1) and  of  this  article shall apply in relation to that State;   (d) of that clause be given before the  Constituent  shall apply  in relation to that State subject to such  exceptions and modifications as the President may be order specify:      Provided  that  no  such order  which  relates  to  the matters  specified  in the Instrument of  Accession  of  the State  referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b)  shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of  the State;       Provided further that no such  order which relates  to matters  other than those referred to in the last  preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of  that Government.       (2) If the concurrence of the Government of the  State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1

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) or in the second proviso to  sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before  the  Constitutent Assembly for the  purpose of  framing  the Constitution of the State is  convened,  it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.        (3)  Notwithstanding  anything   in   the   foregoing provisions  of  this article, the President may,  by  public notification,  declare  that  this article  shall  cease  to be   .operative  or  shall  be  operative  only  with   such exceptions  and modifications and from such date as  he  may specify:       Provided  that the recommendation of  the  Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in  clause  (2)  shall  be necessary    before   the   President     issues   such    a notification."        The  first argument was that this  article  contained temporary  provisions  which ceased to be  effective   after the   Constituent  Assembly  convened  for  the  purpose  of framing  the  Constitution  the Jammu &  Kashmir  State  had completed  its  task by flaming the  Constitution  for  that State.  Reliance was placed on the historical background  in which this Art. 370 was included in the Constitution to urge that  the  powers  under this article were  intended  to  be conferred   only   for  the  limited   period    until   the Constitution  of  the State was framed,  and  the  President could 371 not  resort  to  them after  the  Constituent  Assembly  had completed its work  framing the Constitution of the   State. The  back  ground or the legislative history,which reference was  made was brought to our notice by learned   counsel  by drawing    our   was   brought   to   our   notice   by    e attention to the speech of the Minister,Sri  N.  Gopalaswami Ayyangar when he moved in the Constituent  Assembly  clause 306A of the Bill, which now corresponds ’with Article 370 of the  Constitution.  It was stated by him that conditions  in Kashmir  were special and required special  treatment.   The special  circumstances, to which reference was made  by  him were :--      (1)  that  there  had been a war going  on  within  the limits of Jammu & Kashmir State;      (2)  that  there was a cease-fire  agreed  to  at   the beginning of the year and that cease-fire was still on;      (3) that the conditions in the State were still unusual and abnormal and had not settled down;      (4) that part of the State was still in the hands of   rebels and enemies;      (5)  that  our  country   was   entangled   with    the United Nations in regard to Jammu & Kashmir and it   was not possible   to  say  when  we  would  be  free   from    this entanglement;      (6)   that  the  Government  of  India  had   committed themselves  to the people of  Kashmir in   certain  respects which  commitments   included   an   undertaking    that  an opportunity be given to the people of the   State to  decide for  themselves whether they would remain with the  Republic or wish to go out of it; and       (7)  that  the will of the  people  expressed  through the Instrument of a Constituent Assembly would determine the Constitution  of the State as well as the sphere   of  Union Jurisdiction over the State. Learned counsel urged that, in this background, Art. 370  of the  Constitution could only have been intended  to   remain effective until the Constitution of the State was framed and the  will  of    the  people of Jammu  &  Kashmir  had  been

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expressed  and, there  after, this article must be  held  to have  become ineffective,  so   that the modifications  made by  the  President in exercise of the    powers  under  this article, subsequent to the enforcement of the   Constitution of  the State, would be without any authority of  law.   The Constitution  of the State came into force on 26th  January, 1956 and, therefore, the two Orders of 1959 and 1964  passed by  the President in purported exercise of the  power  under Art. 370 were void. It was also urged that the provisions of clause  (2)  of   Art. 370 support  this  view,  because  it directs  that, if the 372 concurrence  of the Government of the State is  given  under para  (ii)  of sub-clause (b) of clause ( 1 ) or  under  the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause before  the. Constituent  Assembly  for  ,the  purpose  of  flaming   the Constitution of the State is convened, that concurrence  has to  be placed before such Assembly for such decision  as  it may  take thereon. From this, it was sought to  be  inferred that   the  power  of  the  President,  depending   on   the concurrence  of  the  Government  of  the  State,  must   be exercised before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of  the State, sot hat the concurrence could be  placed  for its decision, and that. power must be held to cease to exist after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly when  that course became impossible.     We  are not impressed by either of these  two  arguments advanced  by  Mr.  Ramamurthy.  So  far  as  the  historical background  is concerned, the Attorney-General appearing  on behalf  of  the Government also relied on it to  urge   that the  provisions of Art. 370 should be held to be  continuing in  force,  because  the situation that  existed  when  this article  was  incorporated  in  the  Constitution  had   not materially  altered,  and the purpose  of  introducing  this article  was  to  empower  the  President  to  exercise  his discretion  in applying the Indian Constitution  while  that situation  remained unchanged.  There is considerable  force in  this   submission.   The  legislative  history  of  this article cannot, in these circumstances, be of any assistance for  holding that this article became ineffective after  the Constituent   Assembly   of  the  State   had   framed   the Constitution for the State.     The  second submission based on clause (2) of  Art.  370 does not find support even from the language of that  clause which only refers to the concurrence given by the Government of  the State before the Constituent Assembly was  convened, and  makes no mention at all of the completion of  the  work of .the Constituent Assembly or its dissolution.     There  are, however, much stronger reasons  for  holding that the provisions. of this article continued in force  and remained  effective even after the Constituent  Assembly  of the  State  had passed the Constitution of the  State.   The most   important  provision  in  this  connection  is   that contained  in  clause  (3) of  the article which  lays  down that  this article shall cease to be operative or .shall  be operative  only with such exceptions and  modifications  and from,  such  date  as the President may  specify  by  public notification,  provided  that  the  recommendation  of   the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause  (2) shall  be  necessary  before the  President  issues  such  a notification.   This  clause  clearly  envisages  that   the article  will continue to be operative and can cease  to  be operative only if, on the recommendation of the  Constituent Assembly of the State, the  President 373

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makes  a  direction  to  that  effect.  In  fact,  no   such recommendation  was made by the Constituent Assembly of  the State,  nor  was any Order made by the  President  declaring that  the  article  shall cease to  be  operative.   On  the contrary,  it appears that the Constituent Assembly  of  the State  made   a recommendation  that the article  should  be operative  with one modification to be incorporated  in  the Explanation   to   clause  (1  )  of  the   article.    This modification in the article was notified by the President by Ministry.  of  Law Order No. C.O. 44  dated  15th  November, 1952, and laid down that, from the 17th November, 1952,  the article  was  to be operative with substitution of  the  new Explanation  for the old Explanation as it existed  at  that time.   This  makes  it  very  clear  that  the  Constituent Assembly  of  the  State did not desire  that  this  article should  cease to be operative and, in fact,   expressed  its agreement  to  the continued operation of  this  article  by making  a  recommendation that it should be  operative  with this modification only.     Further reference may also be made to the proviso  added to  Art. 368 of the Constitution in its application  to  the State  of Jammu & Kashmir, under which an amendment  to  the Constitution made in accordance with Art. 368 is to have  no effect  in relation to the State of Jammu &  Kashmir  unless applied  by  Order  of the President under clause  (1  )  of Article  370.  The proviso, thus, clearly requires that  the powers  of  the President under Art. 370 must  be  exercised from  time to time in order to bring into effect in Jammu  & Kashmir amendments made by Parliament in the Constitution in accordance  with Art. 368.  In view of these provisions,  it must  be  held that Art. 370 of the Constitution  has  never ceased to be operative and there can be no challenge on this ground to the validity of the Orders passed by the President in exercise of the. powers conferred by this Article.     The next submission made for challenging the validity of the Orders of modification made in the years 1959 and   1964 was that, under sub-clause (d) of clause (1 ) of Art. 370 of the  Constitution,  the  power  that  is  conferred  on  the President is for the ’purpose of applying the provisions  of the Constitution to Jammu & Kashmir and not for the  purpose of making amendments in the Constitution as applied to  that State.  The interpretation sought to be placed was that,  at the  time of applying any provision of the  Constitution  to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the President is competent  to make  modifications  and exceptions therein;  but  once  any provision  of the Constitution has been applied,  the  power under  Art.  370  would not cover any  modification  in  the Constitution  as applied.  Reliance was thus placed  on  the nature of the power conferred on the President to urge  that the  President could not from time to time amend any of  the provisions  .of the Constitution as applied to the State  of Jammu & Kashmir. It was 374 further  urged  that the President’s power  under  Art.  370 should  not  be interpreted by applying section  21  of  the General  Clauses Act, because a Constitutional power  cannot be equated with a power conferred by an Act, rule,  bye-law, etc.     The  argument, in our opinion, proceeds on  an  entirely incorrect  basis.  Under Art. 370(1 )(d.), the power of  the President is expressed by laying down that provisions of the Constitution,  other  than  article (1  )  and  article  370 which,   under  Art. 370(1) (c), became applicable when  the Constitution came into force, shall apply in relation to the State  of  Jammu & Kashmir subject to  such  exceptions  and

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modifications  as the President may by order specify.   What the  President  is  required  to  do   is   to  specify  the provisions  of  the Constitution which are to apply  to  the State   of   Jammu   &  Kashmir  and,   when   making   such specification,  he is also empowered to  specify  exceptions and  modifications  to  those provisions.  As  soon  as  the President  makes such specification, the  provisions  become applicable  to the State with the specified  exceptions  and modifications.  The specification by the President has to be in  consultation with the Government of the State  if  those provisions  relate  to  matters in the Union  List  and  the Concurrent  List  specified in the Instrument  of  Accession governing  the  accession of the State to  the  Dominion  of India  as  matters  with  respect  to  which  the   Dominion Legislature  may make laws for that State. The specification in respect of all other provisions of the Constitution under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Art. 370 has to be with  the concurrence of the State Government.  Any specification made after  such consultation or concurrence has the effect  that the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  specified  with  the exceptions and modifications become applicable to the  State of Jammu & Kashmir. It cannot be held that the nature of the power contained in this provision is such that section 21 the  General  Clauses  Act  must  be  held  to  be   totally inapplicable.     In this connection, it may be noted that Art. 367 of the Constitution  lays down that, unless the  context  otherwise requires,  the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject  to any  adaptations and modifications that may be made  therein under  article  372, apply for the  interpretation  of  this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an  Act of the Legislature of Dominion of India. This provision made by  the Constitution itself in Art. 367, thus,  specifically applied  the  provisions of the General Clauses Act  to  the interpretation  of  all  the articles  of  the  Constitution which  include Art. 370.  Section 21 of the General  Clauses Act is as follows :-               "Where,  by any Central Act or  Regulation,  a               power  to issue notifications, orders,  rules,               or  by-laws  is  conferred,  then  that  power               includes  a  power, exercisable  in  the  like               manner and subject to the like  sanction and 375               conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or               rescind  any notifications, orders,  rules  or               bye-laws so issued." This provision is clearly a rule of interpretation which has been  made  applicable  to the  Constitution  in  the   same manner  as it applies to any Central Act or Regulation.   On the face of it, the submission that s. 21 cannot be  applied to  the  interpretation  of the Constitution  will  lead  to anomalies which can only be avoided by holding that the rule laid  down  in this section is fully applicable to  all  the provisions  of the Constitution.  As an example, under  Art. 77(3),  the President, and, under Art. 166(3), the  Governor of  a  State  are  empowered to  make  rules  for  the  more convenient  transaction of the business of  the   Government of India or the Government of the State, as the case may be, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business. If,  for the interpretation of these provisions, section  21 of the General Clauses Act is not applied, the result  would be that  the  rules once made by the President or a Governor would  become inflexible and the allocation of the  business among  the Ministers would for ever remain as laid  down  in the   first  rules.  Clearly,  the power of  amending  these

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rules from time to time to suit changing situations must  be held  to  exist and that power can only be  found  in  these articles by applying section 21 of the General Clauses  Act. There  are  other similar rule-making powers,  such  as  the power  of  making  service  rules  under  Art.  309  of  the Constitution.   That  power must also  be  exercisable  from time   to time and must include within it the power  to  add to,  amend,  vary  or  rescind  any  of  those  rules.   The submission  that s. 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot  be held to be applicable for interpretation of the Constitution must,  therefore, be rejected.  It appears to us that  there is nothing in Art. 370 which would exclude the applicability of this section when interpreting the power granted by  that article.     The legislative history of this article will also  fully support this view.  It was because of the special  situation existing   in Jammu & Kashmir that the Constituent  Assembly framing   the  Constitution decided  that  the  Constitution should  not become applicable to Jammu & Kashmir under  Art. 394,  under which it came into effect in the rest of  India, and preferred to confer on the President the power to  apply the various provisions of  the Constitution with  exceptions and  modifications.   It was envisaged  that  the  President would  have to take into account the situation  existing  in the State when applying a provision of the Constitution  and such  situations could arise from time to time.   There  was clearly  the  possibility that, when applying  a  particular provision,  the  situation  might  demand  an  exception  or modification  of  the  provision  applied;  but   subsequent changes  in  the situation might justify the  rescinding  of those modifications or exceptions. 376 This  could  only  be brought about  by  conferring  on  the President the power of making orders from time to time under Art.  370  and this power must, therefore, be held  to  have been conferred on him by applying the provisions of s. 21 of the  General  Clauses  Act for  the  interpretation  of  the Constitution.     The   next  point  urged  was  that  Art.  368  of   the Constitution  having been applied to Jammu & Kashmir with  a proviso  added to it, there now exists a provision  relating to  amendment  of  the Constitution as applied  to  Jammu  & Kashmir  under tiffs article and, consequently,  while  such special  provision  for  this  purpose  exists,  we   should interpret  Art.  370  as  being  no  longer  applicable  for amending  or modifying the provisions of  the   Constitution applied  to  that State. This argument, in our  opinion,  is based  on a wrong premise.  Art. 368 has been   applied   to Jammu   & Kashmir primarily with the object that  amendments made  by  the  Parliament in the Constitution  of  India  as applicable  in  the whole  of the country should  also  take effect  in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.  The proviso,  when applying  this  article,  serves  the  purpose  that   those amendments  made should be made applicable to the  State  of Jammu  &  Kashmir  only with the concurrence  of  the  State Government  and, after such concurrence is available,  these amendments should take effect when  an order is made   under Art.  370  of  the  Constitution.  Thus,  Art.  368  is  not primarily   intended  for  amending  the   Constitution   as applicable  in  Jammu & Kashmir, but is for the  purpose  of carrying  the  amendments made in the Constitution  for  the rest of India into the Constitution as applied in the  State of  Jammu & Kashmir.  Even, in this process, the  powers  of the  President  under  Art. 370 have to  be  exercised  and, consequently,  it cannot be held that the  applicability  of

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this  article  would necessarily curtail the  power  of  the President under Art. 370.     It was also urged that the power of making modifications and  exceptions  in  the orders made  under  Art.  370(1)(d) should  at least be limited to making minor alterations  and should  not  cover  the ’power to  practically  abrogate  an article  of  the Constitution applied in that  State.   That submission  is clearly without force. The challenge  to  the validity  of Art. 35(c) introduced in  the  Constitution  as applied  to Jammu & Kashmir on this ground was  repelled  by this  Court  in  P.L.  Lakhanpal v. The  State  of  Jammu  & Kashmir(1).  Subsequently, the scope of the powers of making exceptions  ’and  modifications  was  examined  in   greater details by this Court in Puranlal Lakhanpal v. The President of India  and Others(2).  Dealing with the scope of the word "modification" as used in Art. 370(1), the Court held :--     "But,  in  the  present case, we have to  find  out  the meaning of the word "modification" used in Art.  370 (1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1101.   (2) [1962] S.C.R. 688, 692. 377               (1) in the context of the Constitution.  As we               have said already, the object behind  enacting               Art.  370(1)  was  to  recognise  the  special               position of the State  of Jammu & Kashmir  and               to provide for that special position by giving               power to the President to apply the provisions               of  the Constitution to that State  with  such               exceptions and modifications as the  President               might  by  order  specify.   We  have  already               pointed out that the power to make  exceptions               implies  that  President can  provide  that  a               particular provision of the Constitution would               not  apply to that State.  If, therefore,  the               power  is given to the President to efface  in               effect  any  provision  of  the   Constitution               altogether in its application to the State  of               Jammu & Kashmir, it seems that when he is also               given  the  power to make  modifications  that               power  should  be  considered  in  its  widest               possible  amplitude.  If  he  could  efface  a               particular   provision  of  the   Constitution               altogether in its  application to  the   State               of Jammu & Kashmir, we see no reason to  think               that  the Constitution did not intend that  he               should  have  the power to amend a  particular               provision  in its application to the State  of               Jammu and Kashmir.  It seems to  us that  when               the Constitution used the word  "modification"               in  Art. 370( 1 ), the intention was that  the               President  would have the power to  amend  the               provisions  of  the  Constitution  if  he   so               thought fit in their application to the  State               of Jammu and Kashmir." Proceeding further, and ’after discussing the meaning of the word "modify", the Court held :--                   "Thus, in law, the word "modify" may  just               mean "vary", i.e., amend, and when Art. 370(1)               says   that  the  President  may   apply   the               provisions of the Constitution to the State of               Jammu & Kashmir with such modifications as  he               may  by  order specify, it means that  he  may               vary  (i.e.,  amend)  the  provisions  of  the               Constitution  in its application to the  State               of  Jammu  & Kashmir. We are,  therefore,  ’of               opinion   that   in   the   context   of   the

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                           Constitution we must give the widest e ffect  to               the meaning of the word "modification" used in               Art.  370(1) and in that sense it includes  an               amendment.   There is no reason to  limit  the               word  "modifications" as used in  Art.  370(1)               only to such modifications as do not make  any               "radical transformation". This  decision  being binding on us, it is not  possible  to accept the submission urged by counsel. Sup. C169--7 378     Lastly,  it was argued that the  modifications  made  in Art.  35(c)  by  the Constitution (Application  to  Jammu  & Kashmir) Orders of 1959 and 1964 had the effect of abridging the fundamental right of the citizens of Kashmir under  Art. 22  and other article contained in Part III after  they  had already been applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and an order of the President under Art. 370 being in the nature of law,  it  would be void under Art. 13 of  the  Constitution. Article  35(c) as originally introduced in the  Constitution as  applied  to Jammu & Kashmir laid down that no  law  with respect  to preventive detention made by the Legislature  of that  State  could  be  declared  void  on  the  ground   of inconsistency  with any of the provisions of Part II1,  with the  qualification  that  such a law to the  extent  of  the inconsistency was to cease to have effect after a period  of five years. This means that, under clause (c) of Article 35, immunity  was   granted to the preventive laws made  by  the State  Legislature   completely,  though  the  life  of  the inconsistent  provisions  was  limited to a period  of  five years.   The extension of that life from five to  ten  years and ten to fifteen years cannot, in these circumstances,  be held  to be an abridgement of any fundamental right, as  the fundamental  rights  were already made inapplicable  to  the preventive  detention  law.   On  the  other  hand,  if  the substance   of  this  provision  is  examined,  the   proper interpretation  would be to hold that, as a result  of  Art. 35(c),  the applicability of the provisions of Part III  for the  purpose  of judging the validity of a law  relating  to preventive  detention  made by the State   Legislature   was postponed  for a period of five years, during which the  law could  not  be  declared  void.   As  already  stated,  Art. 370(1)(d),  in  terms, provides for the application  of  the provisions of the Constitution other than Articles 1 and 370 in  relation  to Jammu & Kashmir with  such  exceptions  and modifications as the President may by order specify.  It was not  disputed that the President’s Order of 1954,  by  which immunity for a period of five years was given to the State’s preventive detention law from challenge on the ground of its being  inconsistent with Part III of the  Constitution.  was validly  made  under ,and in conformity with clause  (d)  of Art. 370(1).  We have already held that the power to  modify in clause (d) also includes the power to subsequently  vary, alter,  add  to or rescind such an order by  reason  of  the applicability  of  the rule of interpretation laid  down  in section 21 of the General Clauses Act.  If the Order of 1954 is not invalid on the ground  of infringement or abridgement of  fundamental  rights under Part III, it is  difficult  to appreciate  how  extension  of period of  immunity  made  by subsequent  amendments   can  be  said  to   be  invalid  as constituting  an infringement or ’abridgement of any of  the provisions of Part IT.  The object of the subsequent  Orders of  1959 and 1964 was to extend the period of protection  to the preventive detention law and not to infringe or  abridge

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the funda- 379 mental rights, though the result of the extension is that  a detenu  cannot, during the period of  protection,  challenge the  law on the ground of its being inconsistent  with  Art. 22.   Such  extension  is  justified  prima  facie  by   the exceptional  state of  affairs  which continue to  exist  as before.     The  provision made in Art. 35(c) has the  effect   that the  validity of the Act cannot be challenged on the  ground that any of the provisions of the Act are inconsistent  with Art. 22 of the Constitution.     As a result the grounds taken to challenge the  validity of  the Act fail and are rejected. The petition will now  be set down for hearing arguments, if any, on the facts of  the case. R.K.P.S.        Petition set down for hearing on merits. 380