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PETITIONER: SAMBHU NATH SARKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1973

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) KHANNA, HANS RAJ MUKHERJEA, B.K. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. HEGDE, K.S. RAY, A.N. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN

CITATION:  1973 AIR 1425            1974 SCR  (1)   1  1973 SCC  (1) 856  CITATOR INFO :  R          1974 SC 432  (6)  D          1974 SC 613  (43)  RF         1974 SC1155  (2)  RF         1974 SC1796  (2)  R          1974 SC2151  (8,10,12,18)  R          1974 SC2279  (2)  R          1975 SC 550  (12)  RF         1976 SC1207  (53,131,523)  R          1978 SC 597  (9,40,54,55,131,195)  RF         1979 SC 478  (90)  R          1982 SC 710  (71)  MV         1982 SC1325  (80)  R          1985 SC1416  (103,104)  RF         1986 SC 555  (6)  RF         1992 SC1701  (27)

ACT: The  Maintenance of Internal Security Act, (26 of 1971),  s. 17A-If violates Art. 14 and Art. 22(7) of the Constitution. Constitution  of India, 1950, Art. 22(4)(a) and (b) of  Art. 22(7)-Scope of. Practice-Scope  of  Supreme  Court’s  Power  to  review  its earlier decisions.

HEADNOTE: The  Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, was  passed on  July  2, 1971.  On December 3, 1971, a  Proclamation  of Emergency  was  issued and on the next day. the  Defence  of India  Act. 1971, was enacted.  Section 6 of the Defence  of India  Act introduced various amendments and a new  section, s.  17A.  in  the  Maintenance  of  Internal  Security  Act. Section 17A effectuated 3 main changes: (a) It overrides, by its  non-obstante clause, the other provisions of  the  Act; (b) a person may be detained in a class or classes of cam or under  the circumstances set out in 9. 17A(1) (a)  and  (b)- namely on the ground of prejudicial acts in relation to  (i) defence of India, relations with foreign powers and security

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of India, and (ii) security of the State and maintenance  of public  order without obtaining the opinion of  an  Advisory Board  for a period longer than 3 months. but not  exceeding two  years from the date of detention; and (c)  the  maximum period of detention of such a person can be 3 years or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, whichever is  later. These  changes were brought about by  Parliament  exercising the  power contained in Art. 22(4)(b), (7) (a) and  (b),  in respect  of all the heads under Entries 9 and 3 of  Lists  I and III of the VII Schedule to the Constitution, except  the one  with respect to maintenance of essential  supplies  and services. The  petitioner was arrested on January 29, 1972,  under  a. 3(1)  and (2) of the Maintenance of Internal  Security  Act, and  on April 15, 1972,the State Government, after  perusing the  report  of the Advisory Board, confirmed the  order  of detention  under  s.  12(1) and directed  the  detention  to continue for 3 years from the date of detention. In a petition under Art. 32, HELD : The petitioner should be released from his  detention forthwith. (1)  (a)   There  is  no  question  of  discrimination   or. violation of Art. 14 as a result of any such discrimination. By  the use of the words ’may be detained in the first  part of s. 17A, an unguided discretion has not been conferred  on the  detaining  authority whether to take action  under  the more drastic provisions of s. 17A or under s. 3(1) read with as. 10 to 13. [10E] (i)  The opening words in a. 10 ’save as otherwise expressly provided  in this Act’, mean that s. 10 would apply only  to cases  not  expressly provided for In the Act,  that  is  it would not apply to cases falling under ss. 17 and 17A. [10B] (ii) The  words ’may be detained’ in s. 17A(1) go  with  the words  which  follow them, namely,  ’without  obtaining  the opinion of the Advisory Board’ and ’in any of the  following classes  of  cases or under any of  the  following  circums- tances . . ..". and hence. are words enabling the  authority to detain in certain cases and are not words giving a choice to the authority to apply s. 17A or not. [10C-D] (b)  Even  if the operation of ss. 17A and 10 side  by  side were to result in any difference in the working of the  Act. that  difference would not amount to any discrimination,  by reason  of the provision in s. 17A(2) to the effect that  in the case of a person to whom s. 17A(1) applies, s. 10  shall be read subject to the modifications set out therein.  [10D- E] L944Sup.CI/74 2 (2)  Article  22(4)(a)  lays  down  a  rule  to  which  Art. 22(4)(b)  read with Art. 22(7)(a) is an exception.  In  that view,  cl.  (7)(a)  must be construed as  a  restriction  on Parliament’s  power of making preventive detention  laws  in the sense that it can depart from the rule laid down in  cl. (4)(a)  and dispense with reference of cases to an  Advisory Board only by a law which prescribes both the  circumstances under  which and the class or classes of cases in  which,  a person  may  be detained for a period longer than  3  months without  obtaining  the  opinion of  an  Advisory  Board  in accordance  with  cl. (4) (a).  Since s. 17A has  failed  to comply  with  the requirement of cl. (7)(a). it  has  to  be declared bad as being inconsistent with that clause. [23F-H] (a)  Parliament  has no alternative power either to  pass  a law providing for it longer   period  of  detention  than  3 months with the intercession of an Advisory Board or      to enact a law under Art. 22 (4) (b) read with Art. 22 (7)  (a)

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providing  also  for  a longer detention.  but  without  the intercession  of  such a Board, for, if such a  theory  were accepted, it would mean that : (1) Art. 22 (4) (a) would  be totally nullified by Art. 22(4)(b) read with Art.  22(7)(a), and (ii) whereas State laws providing longer detention would require  the  intercession of an Advisory Board,  such  laws passed by Parliament would not.  Moreover, the construction, that cl. (4)(b) read with cl. (7)(h) lays down an  exception to  cl.  (4)(a),  harmonises the  clauses.   Therefore,  the theory  of  independent or alternative power  of  Parliament cannot be accepted. [18E-H; 19C] (b)  (1) An analysis of the 2 clauses, cls. (4) and (7)  of Art. 22 shows : (A) that ordinarily, detention provided by a preventive  detention law should not be for a period  longer than  3 months; (B) that if however such a law does  provide for  a longer period than 3 months, it must provide for  the intercession  of an Advisory Board; and (C) that  situations may arise when in certain classes of cases Parliament  alone should  be  empowered to enact a law which  provides  for  a longer  detention  even  without  the  intercession  of   an Advisory Board. [19A-B] (ii) The  law  under cl. 7 (a) would be a  drastic  law,  as compared  to the one to which cl. (4) (a) would  apply,  and the presumption would be that such a drastic law would apply to exceptional circumstances and activities expressly and in precise  terms  described.  Circumstances  would  ordinarily mean  situation or events erroneous to the activities  of  a concerned person or a group of persons, such as riots  etc., which might by their pre-existence accentuate the impact  of such  activities affecting the security of the country or  a part of it or the public order.  Class or classes of  cases, on  the  other  hand,  relate  to  a  group  or  groups   of individuals,  who,  by the nature of their  activities  fall under  one  particular group or groups by  their  common  or similar objective or objectives. [21B-C, E] (iii)     The  entries 9 in List I and 3 in List III of  the VII  Schedule  lay  down  the topics  in  respect  of  which legislation can be made.  They are intended to delineate the bounds  within which legislatures can pass  detention  laws. The  purpose  of  these entries and  of  Art.  22(7)(a)  are distinct.  The purpose of Art. 22 (7) (a) is to  distinguish the ordinary from the exceptional to which only the salutary safeguards provided by cl. (4)(a) would not apply. [21C-E] (iv) Therefore, mere repetition of the subjects or topics of legislation  from  the entries would  not  mean  prescribing either  the circumstances or the classes of cases  to  which only.  as  against  the rest of the  individuals  and  their activities, the safeguard of intercession of an  independent body  would not apply.  If enumeration of the heads  in  the entries   were  to  mean  compliance  with  prescribing   of circumstances  and classes of cases.  Parliament would.,  in such  a law, be dealing with all situations and all  classes of  cases  from  the lowest to  the  most  extraordinary  or abnormal  and  not  with some  only  requiring  a  treatment different from that envisaged by cl. (4) (a); and in such  a case,  61.  (4) (a) would again be rendered  nugatory,  for, Parliament  can,  by  enumerating  verbatim  the  heads   or subjects   set  out  in  the  entries,  do  away  with   the requirement of cl. (4) (a). [20B-F; 21 E-H] (v)  The  meaning of the word ’and’ in cl. (7) (a)  must  be held to have its ordinary conjunctive sense. the context  in the  clause  requiring  Parliament  to  prescribe  both  the circumstances  and  the  classes  of  cases  in  which  only consideration  by the Board can be dispensed  with.   Hence, cl, (7) (a) envisages that Parliament should apply its  mind

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and  prescribe specific situations and types of cases  which require a drastic law dispensing with the intervention of an Advisory Board. [22A-B] 3 (c)  The classification of prejudicial activities set out in Regulation   18B  of  the  British  Defence  of  the   Realm Regulations, 1939. in rr. 34(6) and 36(6) of the Defence  of India  Rules,  1939,  and  in  a.  3(2)  of  the  W.  Bengal (Prevention  of  Violent Activities) Act, 1970,  show,  that there  is  no practical difficulty in  prescribing  specific circumstances  under  which and the classes of  cases  which need dispensing with the intercession of an Advisory  Board. [23F] (3)  This Court would review its earlier decisions if it  is satisfied  of  its  error or of the baneful  effect  such  a decision would have on the general interest of the public or if  it is inconsistence it with the legal philosophy of  our Constitution and in constitutional matters, this Court would do  so  more  readily  than in other  branches,  of  law  as perpetuation of an error would be harmful to public interest Nevertheless,  this  Court  will have to bear  in  mind  the accepted  rule  that earlier decisions are not to  be  upset except   upon  a  clear  compulsion  especially   when   the legislature  has acted upon them as perhaps Parliament  did, while enacting the impugned s. 17A. [16A-D] Majority  view  on  the construction of  Art.  22(4)(b)  and (7)(a) in Gopalan v.     Madras   [1950]  S.C.R.  88,   over ruled. [230-H] The  Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C.R.  603 and  Legal  Remembrancer,  State,  of  West  Bengal  v.  The Corporation of Calcutta, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 176, followed. [The following two questions were left open : ((1) Since the major premise in the majority decision in Gopalan that  Art. 22 was a self-contained code and therefore the provisions of a  law  made  under  that  Article  would  not  have  to  be considered  in the light of the provisions of Art.  19,  was disapproved  in  Cooper T. Union of India, [1970]  3  S.C.R. 530,  as.  3  and 8 to 13 of  the  Maintenance  of  Internal Security Act, must be declared void as imposing unreasonable restrictions;  and  (2)  the  maximum  period  of  detention prescribed by the amended s. 13 and by s. 17A(2)(d) did  not satisfy Art. 22(7)(b), since the period fixed by  Parliament therein  is  3 years or until the expiry of the  Defence  of India Act whichever is later, which was an uncertain event.] [24A-E]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL, JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 266 of 1972. (Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India  for issue of writ it the nature of habeas corpus), Naranarayan  Gooptu,  Dilip Sinha, Pulak Ranjan  Mandal  And Rathin Das, for the petitioner. Niren De, Attorney-General of India, D. N. Mukherjee and  G. S. Chatterjee, for the respondent. Niren De, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen and S. P. Nayar, for Attorney General of India R.   K. Garg and S. C. Agarwala, for Intervener Nos. 1 & 4, R.   K. Garg and K. R. Nambiar, for Intervener No. 2 Prodyot Kumar Chakravarthy, for Intervener No. 3 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHELAT,  ACTING C.J., At all material times  the  petitioner was  an  employee of the Government of West  Bengal  in  the Collectorate  of  Hooghly  District.   He  was  arrested  on

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January  29, 1972 pursuant to the order of  detention  dated January 25, 1972 passed by the District Magistrate,  Hooghly under  s.  3(2)  read with S. 3(1)  of  the  Maintenance  of Internal  Security  Act,  26 of 1971.  The  said  order  was passed  "with  a view to preventing him from acting  in  any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order".   He was served with 4 grounds of detention on that very day.  The said grounds  of detention were in connection with certain incidents  alleged to  have taken place on April 25, 1971, September 14,  1971, October 12, 1971 and January 19, 1972, as set out therein. Before  the  said order was issued, the petitioner  and  six others,  also Government employees in Hooghly  Collectorate, were  prosecuted  for their alleged parts in the  first  two incidents on the basis of the first information report dated September  14, 1971 under s. 143/506 of the Penal Code.   On March 29, 1972, they were discharged by the Magistrate on  a final  report of the police dated March 10, 1972.   Purusant to  the said order of detention, the petitioner  was  detain and is still in Hooghly jail. The mother of the petitioner thereafter filed an application No.  318 of 1972 in the High Court of Calcutta under s.  491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  In that application  the petitioner’s  detention was challenged only on two  grounds, namely,  vagueness  of the grounds of  detention  and  their irrelevance.  On May 29, 1972, the High Court dismissed  the said  application.   The  present  petition  is  more   com- prehensive and for the first time challenges the validity of several provisions of the Act. The record before us shows that all the steps required under the  Act have been taken and complied with in the  time  and manner  prescribed by the Act.  No objection, therefore,  to the  petitioner’s  detention on that ground can  be  validly taken.   The petitioner’s case was referred to the  Advisory Board  constituted under the Act, which reported that  there was sufficient cause for his detention.  On April 15,  1972, the  State  Government,  on  receipt  of  the  said  report, confirmed the order of detention under s. 12(1) and directed that detention to continue for three years from the date  of detention.    The  said  order  of  confirmation  was   duly communicated to the detenu.  The petitioner thereafter  made his  representation  to the State Government on  August  10, 1972, that is to say, several months after reference of  his case  to the Board and the said order of confirmation.   The said   representation  was  not  considered  by  the   State Government  as by that time this writ petition  had  already been filed and was pending before this Court. The  order of detention has been challenged in the  petition on the following grounds:               (1)   that  the  grounds  of  detention   were               vague;               (2)   that  there  was no  nexus  between  the               grounds and maintenance of public order;               (3)   that   they  were  mechanically   framed               without  the detaining authority applying  his               mind;               (4)   that the order was mala fide and  passed               for  collateral purpose, namely, to  victimise               the  active members of the State  Coordination               Committee of which the petitioner was one;               (5)   that s. 6(6) (d) and (e) of the  Defence               of  India  Act,  42  of  1971  increasing               the detention period from 12 months to 3 years               by the amendment of s. 13 of the Act has

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             5               treated   equally   citizens  of   India   and               foreigners and has thereby violated Art. 14;               (6)   that  the  said  order  of  confirmation               providing  three  years  detention  was  ultra               vires Art. 22. The District Magistrate by his counter-affidavit denied  all the grounds of challenge to the validity of the said order. On  October  24,  1972, the petitioner  applied  for  urging additional grounds of challenge and on liberty being granted to  amend,  the petition was amended.  Stated  briefly,  the additional  grounds challenged the validity of ss. 3, 5,  8, 11,  12  and  13 of the Act on the grounds  of  their  being unreasonable restrictions and as violating Arts. 14, 19,  21 and  22 by reason of those provisions failing to provide  an impartial  authority to consider a detenu’s  representation. and the means to challenge the materials on which the  order is  made, the materials placed by the authority  before  the advisory  board  and the report of the board based  on  such materials before government confirmed the detention. The  hearing  of the case started  before  the  Constitution Bench  on  November 17, 1972 and was heard on that  day  and again  on November 21, 1972 and December 1, 1972.  It  seems that  a contention was then raised as to the validity of  s. 17A of the Act which provides for a period of detention  for 21  months  without  consulting  an  advisory  board,  which question, the Bench thought, required reconsideration of the decision  in  Gopalan v. Madras.(1) The  Constitution  Bench thought,  therefore, that the case should be referred  to  a larger  bench, and that is how this case has come up  before us for disposal. The  Act was passed on July 2, 1971.  Its long  title  shows that it was passed to provide for detention for the  purpose of  maintenance of internal security and  matters  connected therewith.  Sec. 3(1)(a) empowers the Central and the  State Governments  to  make  an  order  detaining  a  person,   if satisfied  with respect to such person that it is  necessary to  do so with a view to preventing him from acting  in  any manner  prejudicial  to  : (i) the  defence  of  India.  the relations  of  India with foreign powers,  the  security  of India, or (ii) the security of the State, or the maintenance of  public order, or (iii) the maintenance of  supplies  and services essential to the community.  Sub-s. (2)  authorises the  exercise of the power of detention under sub-s.  (1)(a) by  certain  officers named therein,  inter  alia,  district magistrates, with respect to matters set out in s. 3(1)  (a) (ii)  and  (iii).  Sec. 5 confers power on  the  appropriate government  to remove a person detained under s. 3 from  one place of detention to another Whether within or outside  the State.   Sec.  6 provides that such an order  shall  not  be invalid on the ground that the concerned person is  detained in  a jail outside the jurisdiction of that  Government,  or the  office  making  the order.  Sec.  8  Provides  for  the communication   of  grounds  for  detention.to  the   detenu ordinarily  within  five’  days, and  in  exceptional  cases within 15 days (1)  [1950] S.C.R. 88. 6 from  the  date  of  detention.  Sec.  9  provides  for  the constitution  of  advisory boards.  Sec. 10  provides  that, save  as otherwise provided for in the Act, the  appropriate Government  shall within 30 days from the date of  detention refer  every case to the advisory board.  Under S.  11,  the advisory  board  has to give its report  to  the  Government within  ten weeks from the date of detention.  Sub sec.  (4)

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of  s.  11  disentities the detenu to appear  by  any  legal practitioner  before the board and maker,,  the  proceedings before  and the opinion of the board confidential.  Sec.  12 provides  that  if  the board is of opinion  that  there  is sufficient  reason  for the detention,  the  Government  may confirm  the  order  and continue such  detention  for  such period  as status fit. in case the opinion is that there  is no  such sufficient cause, the Government has to revoke  the detention  order.  Sec. 13 provides that the maximum  period of detention shall be 12 months from the date of  detention. Sec.  17  provides that a foreigner, in respect  of  whom  a detention order is passed, may be detained without obtaining the  opinion of the advisory board for a longer period  than three  months,  but not exceeding two years in  any  of  the classes  of  cases  I  or under  any  of  the  circumstances thereinafter  set out in sub-cls. (a) to (d) of sub-s.  (1), namely, where a foreigner enters or attempts to enter  India or is found with arms, ammunition or explosives, or Where  a foreigner enters or attempts to enter a notified area or  is found  therein  in  breach  of s.  3  of  the  Criminal  law Amendment  Act,  1961, or where such a foreigner  enters  or attempts to enter in an area adjoining the borders of  India specified  under s. 139 of the Border Security Forces,  Act, 1968  without  a  travel  document,  or  where  the  Central Government  has  reason  to believe that  such  a  foreigner commits or is likely to commit an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923.  Sec. 17 thus lays down classes of  cases in or circumstances under which foreigners can be,  detained for  a period longer than three months without reference  to an advisory board. Art.  19(1) guarantees the rights of freedom of  speech  and expression, of assembly, to form associations and unions  to move  freely throughout India, to reside and settle  in  any part  of India and to practise any  profession,  occupation, trade or business, subject to reasonable restrictions  which may  be  imposed  by  law as provided by  cls.  (2)  to  (6) thereof.  Art. 21 guarantees protection of life and liberty, the  deprivation  of  which is not  permissible,  except  in accordance  with procedure established by law.  Art. 22,  by its  cls.  (1)  and (2) guarantees that  no  person  can  be detained  in custody without his being informed, as soon  as may  be,  of the grounds for his arrest  and  without  being furnished with an opportunity to consult and be defended  by a  legal practitioner of his choice, and his being  produced before  the  nearest  magistrate within 24  hours  from  his arrest.   No such person can be detained for more than  that period  without the authority of a magistrate.  Cl.  (3)  of Art.  22, however, makes cls. (1) and (2) inapplicable to  a person  arrested  and  detained under a  law  providing  for preventive  detention.  But  cl. (4) provides  that  no  law providingfor preventive detention shall authorise detention for a period longerthan three months unless (a) an advisory board has reported before the    expiration  of   three months that there is sufficient cause for ’suchdetention, or (b) such    person  is detained in accordance with a  law madeby Parliament under cl. 7(a) and (b). 7 Cl.  (7) provides that Parliament may by law  prescribe  (a) the  circumstances under which, and the class or classes  of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than  three  months under any law providing  for  preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an advisory board in accordance with the provisions of sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4); (b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing  for

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preventive detention.  Parliament under entry 9 of List I of the  Seventh  Schedule  can  pass such  a  law  for  reasons connected with defence, foreign relations or the security of India, and concurrently with State legislatures under  entry 3,  List III for reasons connected with the security of  the State, the maintenance of public order or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. On December 3, 1971, the President issued a proclamation  of emergency  under Art. 352 of the Constitution.  On  December 4, 1971, Parliament enacted the Defence of India Act, 42  of 1971.   The  Act was passed in view of the  grave  emergency which  then existed as proclaimed by the President,  and  to provide  for  special measures to ensure public  safety  and interest, the defence of India and civil defence, for  trial of  certain  offences and for matters  connected  therewith. Sec. 2(3) of the Act provided that it would remain in  force during  the  period  of operation  of  the  proclamation  of emergency and for six months thereafter.  By sec. 6, the Act introduced  amendments  in several Acts, one  amongst  them being  the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.   Cl. (d) of sub-s. (6) of s. 6 amended s. 13 of the Act by adding after  the words therein "from the date of  detention",  the words  and figures "or until the expiry of the  Defence  of- India Act, 1971, whichever is later".  By cl. (e) of  sub-s. (6) of s. 6, a new section, s. 17A was inserted in the  Act. The new section reads as follows :               "17A.  (1) Notwithstanding anything  contained               in  the  foregoing  provisions  of  this  Act,               during   the  period  of  operation   of   the               Proclamation  of Emergency issued on  the  3rd               day of December, 1971, any person (including a               foreigner)  in  respect of whom  an  order  of               detention has been made under this Act, may be               detained without obtaining the opinion of  the               Advisory Board for a period longer than  three               months,  but not exceeding two years from  the               date of his detention in any of the  following               classes of cases or under any of the following               circumstances, namely:-               (a)   where such person had been detained with               a  view to preventing him from acting  in  any               manner  prejudicial to the defence  of  India,               relations of India with foreign powers or  the               security of India; or               (b)   where  such  person had  been,  detained               with  a view to preventing him from acting  in               any manner prejudicial to the security of  the               State or the maintenance of public order.               (2)In  the case of any person to whom  sub-               section  (1) applies, sections 10 to 13  shall               have   effect   subject   to   the   following               modifications, namely,               8               (a)   in  section  10, for the  words  "shall,               within  thirty days", the words "may,  at  any               time prior to but in no case later than  three               months  before  the expiration of  two  years"               shall be substituted;               (b)   in section 11,-               (i)   in  sub-section (1) for the words  "from               the  date of detention", the words  "from  the               date  on which reference is made to it"  shall               be substituted;               (ii)in  sub-section (2), for the words  "the               detention of the person concerned", the  words

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             "the   continued  detention  of   the   person               concerned" shall be substituted;               (c)   in  section 12. for the words  "for  the               detention",  in  both the places  where  they               occur, the words "for the continued detention’               shall be substituted;               (d)   in  section  13, for the  words  "twelve               months",  the  words "three  years"  shall  be               substituted." The new section, s. 17A effectuates three main changes : (1) by its non-obsante clause overrides the other provisions  of the Act, (2) a person may be detained in a class or  classes of cases or under the circumstances set out in sub-cls.  (a) and  (b) of its sub-s. (1) without obtaining the opinion  of an advisory board for a period longer than three months, but not exceeding two years from the date of detention, that  is to say, no opinion of an advisory board need now be obtained for  21 months from the date of detention, the  first  three months  of  the  detention being  permissible  without  such opinion  even  before the insertion of s. 17A; and  (3)  the maximum  period of detention of such a person can  be  three years or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act,  1971 whichever  is later.  These changes have been brought  about by Parliament exercising power contained in cl. (4) (b) read with cl. 7(a) and (b) of Art. 22.  The power is exercised in respect  of classes of cases and circumstances  relating  to all  the heads under entries 9 and 3 of Lists I and  III  of the  Seventh  Schedule,  except one,  viz.,  maintenance  of essential  supplies  and  services,  in  respect  of   which Parliament has the power to pass preventive detention laws. Counsel  for the petitioner challenged the validity  of  the provisions of the Act and the detention order mainly on  the following grounds :               (1)   that  the amendments introduced  in  the               Act  by s. 6(6) (d) and (e) are  violative  of               Ut. 22(4), (5) and (7);               (2)   that s. 10, both prior to and after  its               amendment, contravenes Art. 22(4);               (3)   that  sec.  6 (6) (d) and  (e),  of  the               Defence of India Act contravenes Art. 14;               (4)   that  the maximum period  prescribed  by               the amendment to s. 13 by, s. 6 (6) (d) of the               Defence  of  India  Act and by ,  the  new  s.               1.7A(2)  (d)  is ultra  vires  the  powers  of               Parliament  since it amounts to  punitive  and               not, preventive detention;               9               (5)   that secs. 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12 of the Act               are  violative of Arts. 14, 19 and 21, on  the               ground that they are unreasonable restrictions               and are not saved by any of the sub-clauses of               Art. 19(1); and               (6)   that  the  amendments brought  about  in               them by s. 6(6) (d) and (e) of the Defence  of               India Act cannot breathe life in them as  they               were non est, by reason only of the subsequent               proclamation of emergency. These contentions fall under two parts, (1) relating to  the provisions  as  they stood before the  amendments,  and  (2) relating  to  the amendments introduced in the  Act  by  the Defence of India Act, s. 6 (6) (d) and (e).  As regards  the first part, the arguments were that               (i)the  Act  was invalid as  the  restrictions               placed  thereby  on  the  fundamental   rights               guaranteed  by Arts. 14, 19(1) (a) to (d)  and

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             (g), 21 and 22 were not saved by sub-cls. (2),               (3), (4) and (6) of Art. 19(1);               (ii)  s. 3 of the Act in so far as it empowers               the  detention  of  a  person  on   subjective               satisfaction,   and  not  on   any   objective               assessment  of the truth of  allegations  made               against    him,   imposes   an    unreasonable               restriction  on his several rights  guaranteed               by Art. 19(1);               (iii)s.  8,  which obliges the  authority  to               furnish to the detenu the grounds of detention               and  confers  on  him  the  right  to  make  a               representation  does not provide for its  con-               sideration  by  an independent  and  impartial               body, is bad;               (iv)  s. 12 is bad as government can, contrary               to  principles  of  natural  justice,  confirm               detention  for  a  period  longer  than  three               months on the strength of an advisory  board’s               report  without giving any opportunity to  the               detenu  to know the contents of such a  report               and to controvert it;               (v)   the   provisions   of   the   Act    are               discriminatory  in so far as they  drastically               curtail  the liberty of a detenu  without  his               having   safeguards  available  to  a   person               proceeded against under ss. 107 to 110 of  the               Code of Criminal Procedure. As  stated above, s. 17A authorises detention on the  ground of  prejudicial  acts in relation to (a) defence  of  India, relations  with foreign powers and security of  India,  and, (b)  security of the State and maintenance of  public  order only.   Counsel argued that by the use of the words "may  be detained"  in  the  first part of the  section  an  unguided discretion  has  been conferred on the  detaining  authority whether to take action under the more drastic provisions  of this  section or under s. 3(1) read with ss. 10 to 13,  even though  the activities in respect of which action  is  taken are  in  both the cases of the kind set out in (a)  and  (b) above.  in support of this argument, counsel relied  on  the decisions  of this Court in Northern India Caterers  Private Ltd. 10 v.Punjab, (1) State of M.P., v. Thakur Bharat Singh,  (2) S.  G.  falsinghani  v. Union  of  India,(3)  Satwant  Singh Sawhney  v.  D.  Ramarathnam,  Assistant  Passport  Officer, Government of India, New Delhi. (4) The contention, however, is not borne out by the  provisions of  W.  10 and 17A(1) and (2).  In the first  place,  s.  10 opens with the words save as otherwise expressly provide  in this  Act".  These words mean that the section  would  apply only to cases not expressly provided for in the Act, that is to  say that would not apply to under ss. 17 and  17A  which deal  cases "otherwise expressly provided" in the  Act.   In the  second place, the words "may be detained" in s.  17A(1) go  with  the  words which  follow  them,  namely,  "without obtaining the opinion of the advisory board" and in "any  of the following classes of cases or under any of the following circumstances The words "may be detained", no doubt,  enable the  authority  to  detain a person  without  obtaining  the opinion of an advisory board for a period ’longer than three months, but not exceeding two years in the cam% therein  set out.   The words "may be detained" thus are  words  enabling ,the  authority to detain without a board’s opinion for  the period there provided for, but are not words giving a choice

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to  the  authority to apply s. 17A(a) or not.  Even  if  the operation of s. 17A and s. 10 side by side were to result in any  difference in the working of the Act,  that  difference would not seem to amount to any discrimination by reason  of the provision in s. 17A(2) to the effect that in the case of a  person  to  whom sub-s.(1) applies s. 10  shall  be  read subject  to  the modification, namely, that  for  the  words "within thirty days", the words "at any time prior to but in no case later than three months before the expiration of two years"  shall  be substituted.  In this view,  there  is  no question  of  discrimination or violation of Art.  14  as  a result  of  any  such discrimination.   This  conclusion  is clearly borne out by the combined effect of the non-obstante clause  in the commencement of s. 17A(1) and the  qualifying words "save as otherwise provided in this Act" in s. 10. But  the more important challenge to the validity of s.  17A was  as  regards  its  incompatibility  with  and  the  non- compliance of the requirements of Art. 22(7).  The  argument was  two fold: (1) that on a proper reading of  Art.  22(4), (5) and (7), cl. (7) was an exception to the rule laid  down in cl. (4), and (2) that consequent upon such a construction of cl. (7), that is, as an exception to cl. (4), that clause did not generally empower Parliament to enact a law, on the subjects  set  out  in entries 9 and 3 of Lists  I  and  III respectively,  without  the safeguard provided by  cl.  (4), namely,  of obtaining an opinion of an impartial body,  like the advisory board’ On the contrary, that clause  authorises Parliament to enact a detention law in exceptional class  or classes   of   cases  and   in   exceptional   circumstances specifically  prescribed by such a law.  The contention  was that  s. 17A did not comply with such a requirement  of  cl. (7)  inasmuch as enumeration of the subjects or heads in  s. 17A,  except that with respect to maintenance  of  essential supplies  and services, would not mean prescribing class  or classes of cases and circumstances as provided by cl. (7). (1) [1967] 3 S. C. R. 399. (2) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 454. (3) [1967] 2 S. C. R. 703. (4) [1967] 3 S. C. R. 525. 11 Three  questions  would  emerge from  this  contention:  (1) whether cl. (7) is an exception to the rule laid down in cl. (4); (2) whether Parliaments power to enact a detention  law is limited by the requirements laid down in cl. (7); and (3) whether  setting out verbatim the heads or subjects or  some of  them  upon which Parliament can enact such a  law  would mean compliance of the requirements of cl. (7). These very questions were considered in one form or  another in  Gopalan  v. Madras(1) in connection with s.  12  of  the Preventive  Detention  Act,  1950.   The  validity  of  that section  was  impugned  on  the ground  of  its  not  having complied  with  the  requirements  laid  down  in  cl.  (7), firstly, because the section merely enumerated the heads  or subjects,  except  one,  namely,  maintenance  of  essential supplies  and  serves upon which under entries 9  and  3  of Lists  I  and  III respectively  Parliament  could  enact  a detention law and not the class or classes of cases and  the circumstances  in  which  detention,  without  the   board’s opinion  could be ordered , and secondly, because it  failed to comply with both the requirements, the word ’and’ in that connection  being used conjunctively and not  disjunctively. Sec.  3(1) of that Act authorised the Central or  the  State Government to detain a person, (i) if it was satisfied  that his  detention was necessary to preventing him  from  acting prejudicially to (a) to the defence of India, her  relations with  foreign  powers,  the security of India;  or  (b)  the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or

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(c)  the maintenance of supplies and services  essential  to the  community,  or (ii) with reference to  a  foreigner  to regulate  his  continued  presence  in  India,  or  to  make arrangements for his expulsion from India.  See. 9  required the  appropriate Government to place the case of the  person detained under s. 3(1) before the advisory board within  six weeks from the date of detention only in cases (1) where the order was made on apprehension that the detenu was likely to act  prejudicially to the maintenance of essential  supplies and services, and (2) where it was made against a  foreigner under the two heads stated above.  S. 12 of the Act provided that  a  person  could be  detained  without  obtaining  the board’s opinion for a period longer than three month-,.  but not exceeding one year from the date of the detention in the following  classes  of  cases, or in any  of  the  following circumstances, namely, where such a person has been detained with  a view to preventing him from acting prejudicially  to (a) the defence of India, relations with foreign powers, the security of India, and (b) the security of the State or  the maintenance  of public order.  S. 12(2),  however,  provided for  a review by the appropriate Government in  consultation with  a  person  who is or has been or is  qualified  to  be appointed  a judge of a High Court.  Such a provision for  a review and the intercession of an independent and  impartial person  reduced to a certain extent the rigour of s.  12(1). No  such review, which would be of a quasi judicial  nature, [(see Lakhanpal v. Union of India(2)] is provided for in the impugned section 17A. The   majority  Court.  consisting  of  Kania.   C.J.,   and Patanjali Sastri, Mukherjea and Das, JJ., (as they all  then were)  rejected both the contentions, holding, firstly  that the word ’and’ meant in the context ’or, which meant that it was enough if Parliament, under Art. (1) [1950] S. C. R. 88. (2) [1967] 1 S. C. R. 433. 12 22(7)  (a),  prescribed either the circumstances or  the  of cases  in  which  a person might be detained  for  a  period longer  than three months without reference to  an  advisory board,  and  secondly,  that matters referred to  in  s.  12 constituted  sufficient  description  of  circumstances   or classes  of cases so as to comply with the  requirements  of Art. 22(7)(a), and that therefore, the section was not  open to any constitutional. challenge. The minority Court consisting of Fazl Ali and Mahajan,  JJ., (as   the  latter  then  was)  accepted  the’   petitioner’s contention in both its aspects and held that the word  ’and’ meant  the  conjunctive and not the  disjunctive,  and  that therefore,  the impugned provision had to specify  both  the classes  of cases and the circumstances in  which  detention for  a  longer period could be directed without  a  board’s opinion.  They  also  held that the  expressions  "class  or classes  of  cases" and "the circumstances" would  not  mean merely  the heads or the subjects on which a  detention  law was permissible under cl. (7)(a). Kania,  C.J., held that the word ’and’ in cl. (7) (a)  meant that  the power of preventive detention beyond three  months may  be exercised, either for the circumstances in which  or the  class  or  classes  of cases  in  which  a  person  was suspected to be doing the objectional things mentioned in s. 12.  According to him, "the use of the word ’which’ twice in the first- art of the sub-clause read with a comma put after each  shows that the legislature wanted these to be read  as disjunctive and not conjunctive".(126-127) Patanjali Sastri, J.,  (as  he  then was) also construed  the  word  ’and’  as

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meaning   that   Parliament   may   prescribe   either   the circumstances or the classes of cases or both and held  that s. 12 provided both, for, to say that persons likely to  act prejudicially to the defence of India may be detained beyond three months was at once to prescribe a class of persons who and the circumstances under which persons could be  detained for the longer period. (216) Mukherjea, J., (as he then was) thought that c1. (7)(a) laid down an enabling provision  and Parliament, if it so chose, could pass a law in terms of the same.   "where an optional power is conferred  on  certain.. authority to perform two separate acts, ordinarily it  would not be obligatory to perform both; it may do either if it so likes".  (282)  Das,  J., (as he then was)  also  felt  that Parliament "was not obliged under el. (7) to prescribe  both circumstances and classes, and in any case has in fact,  and substance  prescribed  both, particularly as in  some  cases circumstances   and   classes  of  cases   may   conceivably coalesce." (330-331) The approach, on the other hand, of the minority  judges  was that cl. (4) of Art. 22  laid  down  a general rule and cl. (7) war, an exception thereto.  Read in that  light,  cl. (7) meant-that Parliament  could  dispense with  an  advisory board. but that if it did,  it,  ’had  to prescribe  the  circumstance and the classes of  cases,  and therefore,  the word ’and’ in that sub-clause could  not  be read as ’oil. (175-176; and 235) As regards the expression "the circumstances under which and the  class or classes of cases in which" a Person  could  be detained for a longer period than three months, Kania, C.J., observed  that  circumstances  ordinarily  meant  events  or situations  extraneous  to I the actions of  the  individual concerned, while a class of cases meant determinable  groups based on the actions of the individuals with a common aim or 13 idea.  He, however, held that the assumption that entry 9 in List  I  and  entry 3 in List II  were  incapable  of  being considered   as  circumstances  or  classes  of  cases   was untenable, and therefore, there was no reason why the  words of those entries could not be used in s. 12 so as to  comply with  the  requirement of cl.  (7)(a).  (127-128)  Patanjali Sastri,  J., thought that cls. (4) and (7) were  independent clauses  and could not be correlated so as  to  characterise cl.  (7) as a proviso or exception to cl. (4), and  that  to read  them  as  a rule and an exception  was  against  their language and structure.  He also thought that cl: (7)  dealt with  preventive detention, a purely  protectional  measure, which must necessarily proceed in all cases on suspicion  or anticipation    as.   distinct   from   proof,    [Rex    v. Halliday(1)]and that in such laws it would be impossible  to maintain  the  various circumstances  to  enumerate  various classes  of cases exhaustively for which a person should  be detained for more than three months except in broad outline. (214) According to him sufficient guidance could be given by indicating the general nature of the prejudicial  activities which  a person is likely       to indulge in.  He  observed that  he failed to see why enumeration of five       out  of the   six   subjects  on  which  a   detent              was permissible  under  the  two entries could not  be  said  to comply  with  the requirements of cl. (7)(a).   "I  fail  to see",  he said, " why this could not be regarded as a  broad classification   of   cases  or  a   broad   discretion   of circumstances where Parliament considers longer detention be justifiable". (215) While  Kania,  C.J.,  and Patanjali Sastri,  J.,  were  thus satisfied  Got  the  requirement  of  cl.  (7)(a)  would  be complied with by the mom enumeration of the subjects in  the

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entries  or  some of them, Das J. and Mukherjea  J,  do  not appear  to  express their satisfaction in so   forthright  a language.  This is-clear from the following passages:               "It  is  true  that  circumstances  ordinarily               relate  to  extraneous  things,  like   riots,               commotion, political  or communal or some sort               of abnormal situation and it is said that  the               framers  of the Constitution had in mind  some               such  situation when the advisory board  might               be done away, with. it is also,urged that they                             had  in mind that the more dangerous t ypes  of                             detenus  should be denied the privileg e of  the               advisory  board.   I am free to  confess  that               prescription  of specific circumstances  or  a               more   rigid  and  definite                 of               classes  would  have  been  better  and   more               desirable.  But that is crying for the  ideal.               The  Constitution  has ’not in terms  put  any               such limitation-(per Das, J., at 331-332)               "I am extremely doubtful", said Mukherjea, T.,               "whether  the classification of cases made  by               Parliament  in  section 12 of the  Act  really               fulfils the object which the Constitution  had               in view.  The basis of classification has been               the  apprehended acts of the persons  detained               described with reference to the lists as  said               above.   Five Out of the six heads  have  been               taken out and labelled as classes of cases  to               which the protection of clause (4) (a) of  the               article would not be available.  It is against               common sense that all forms of (1)[1917] A.C. 260, at 275. 14               activities connected with these five items are               equally  dangerous and merit the same  drastic               treatment.  The descriptions are very  general               and  there may be acts of various  degrees  of               intensity and danger under each one of  these.               heads." (281) Although he thought that s.12 was not framed-with due regard to  the object which the Constitution had in view.  he  held that  he was unable to say that the section was  invalid  as being ultra vires the Constitution. Fazl- Ali J., on the other hand, held (1) that cl. (4) laid down  a general rule and cl.. (7) engrafted an exception  to it,  and  that it was never intended that  Parliament  could treat  the  normal  as  the abnormal,  or  the  rule  as  an exception; (2) that the circumstances to be prescribed  must be  special  and extraordinary and the class or  classes  of cases  %Mt  be of the same nature.  The  Constitution  never contemplated  that Parliament should mechanically  reproduce all  or  most of the categories in the  legislative  entries almost verbatim and not to apply its mind to decide in  what circumstances  and  in what class or classes  of  cases  the advisory-board  should be dispensed with; (3) that  even  if cls.- (4) and (7) were treated as alternatives and not as  a rule and an exception, a law under cl.- (7) (a) would be  an exceptionally  drastic law and such a law must  be  intended for an exceptional situation and not for all the  situations which would fall under the heads in the entries, under which a  detention  law is permissible.  It  followed,  therefore, that class or classes of cases and the circumstances must be of  a special nature to require legislation which  dispenses

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with the safeguard of an advisory board. (11-3-176) Mahajan, I.,  (as he then was) held.that if clause (7) were  regarded as  an independent clause or an alternative to  cl.(4),  cl. (4)  would  , be rendered nugatory and such  a  construction would amount to the Constitution saying in one breath that a detention  law  cannot provide for detention  for  a  period longer  than three months without reference to  an  advisory board  and in the same breath saying that Parliament, if  it so  chose,  can do so in respect of or any of  the  subjects mentioned in the lists.  If that was so, it would have  been wholly  unnecessary  to  provide such  a  safeguard  in  the Constitution  on a matter which seriously affected  personal liberty.   On the construction of cl. (7), he held that  the Constitution  recognised  varying  scales  of  duration   of detention with the idea that this would vary with the nature of  the  apprehended act, detention for a  period  of  three months in ordinary cases, detention for a longer period with intervention of a board in more serious cases, and detention for   a   longer  period  than  three  month   without   the intercession  of a board for still more dangerous  class  or Classes  and  for acts: committed  in  grave  situation,-,." (238-239) About  a  mouth  before  the  Supreme  Court  delivered  its judgment  in  Gopalam(1)’the  High  Court  of  Calcutta   in Sitendra Narain Ray Choudhury v. The Chief Secretary to  the Government. of West Bengal (2) (F.  B.; Ref.  1 of 1950) had decided  by a majority that setting out five out of the  six heads  in  the  entries  in  s. 1 2  of  the  1950  Act  was sufficient compliance of the requirements under cl. (4) (b) read with cl. (7) (a of-Art’. 22. (1)  [1950] S. C. R. 88. (2) I. L. R. [1954] 1 Cal, 1. 15 Counsel for the petitioner canvassed for the reasoning given by  Fazl  Ali and Mahajan, JJ., while the  learned  Attorney General contended that the reasoning in the judgments of the majority  judges was in consonance with clauses (4) and  (7) of Art. 22.  He commended the following propositions for our acceptance:               (1)   The  Constitution authorises  preventive               detention and makes, specific provisions for               it in Art. 22(4) to (7);               (2)   The heads in respect of which preventive               detention  can  be ordered are  carefully  and               deliberately made in entries 9 and 3 of  Lists               I and III;               (3)   The.  Constitution provides two separate               and  independent situations  where  preventive               detention   can  be  directed,   namely   the,               substantive part of cl. (4)(a) and cl.  (4)(b)               read with cl. (7)(a) and (b);               (4)   Except  for  the enabling power  in  cl.               (7)(a) both Parliament and State  legislatures               are  competent to make  preventive  de’tention               laws under entry 3 of List III;               (5)   So  far  as  cl.  (7)  of  Art.  22   is               concerned,  it  is  an  enabling  clause   and               provides  for  two situations in which  a  law               under  that clause can be made  by  Parliament               alone.   In other words, these two  situations               are  independent  of each other  and  are  not               conditions-precedent, The  learned  Attorney General argued that what  cl.  (7)(3) provides is that Parliament may. prescribe the circumstances or  prescribe class or classes of cases for which  a  person

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can  be  detained  for  ’more  than  three  months   without reference  to an advisory board.  In other words the  clause is   an  enabling  clause  authorising  Parliament  (1)   to prescribe  the  circumstances under which a person  may  be. detained  for a period longer than three months de hors  the advisory board; and (2) to prescribe the class or classes of cases  etc.  In this sense Parliament can do either  of  the two,  and therefore, though cl. (7)(a) uses the word  ’and’, that word is used in the disjunctive and not in  conjunctive sense.  ’Circumstances’, according to him, mean the heads or subjects  set  out in the two legislative entries,  and  the expression  "class  or  classes  of  "  mean  incidents   or activities  but  is not related to individuals or  group  or groups of individuals. The  learned Attorney-General finally urged the fact.  which all  of  us  are too well conscious  of,  that  the  majesty decision  in Gopalan(1) has stood for such a long time  that it  should  not  be disturbed unless there  are  strong  and manifest  reasons to do so.  Counsel for the petitioner,  on the other hand, argued that the majority decision was  cont- rary  to  the scheme and the terms, of Art.  22.  Since  the matter involves the right of personal liberty, the fact that ’the decision has held the field should not. by itself be  a deterrent against its reconsideration.  The principles  upon which  such reconsideration would be resorted to  have  been explained by this Court in a number of decisions, of,  which we  need remind ourselves of two  only. The Bengal  Immunity Co.  Ltd. v. Bihar(2) and the Legal Remembrancer,  State  of West Bengal (1) [1950] S. C. R. 88.      (2) [1955]    2 S.C.R. 603. 16 v. The Corporation of Calcutta.(1) These decisions have laid down  that this Court would review its earlier decisions  if it is satisfied of its error or of the baneful effect such a decision would have on the general interest of the public or if  it  "is inconsistent with the legal  philosophy  of  our Constitution," and that in constitutional matters this Court would  do so more readily than in other branches of  law  as perpetuation  of  an  error  would  be  harmful  to   public interests.   Indeed,  the inhibit of the doctrine  of  Stare decisis  is in this case, partly reduced ,by the  fact  that despite the majority decision in Gopalan (supra) up  holding the  validity of the impugned s. 12 of the Act of 1950,  and presumably in deference to the minority views, that  section was  removed  from  the  Act  the  very  next  year  by  the Preventive  Detention (Amendment) Act, 1951.   Further,  the major  premise in the majority decision ,that Art. 22 was  a self-contained  code and that therefore the provision  of  a law  permitted  by  that  Article  would  not  have  to   be considered  In  the light of the provisions of Art.  19  was disapproved  in  R.  C. Cooper v.  The  Union  of  India.(2) Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind the accepted rule that earlier  decisions are not to be upset except upon  a  clear compulsion especially when the legislature has acted  upon-, as  perhaps  Parliament did while enacting the  impugned  s. 17A. Art.  19(1)  in the first instance, guarantees  the  several freedom, well accepted in all democratic systems, subject of course  to  the  power of the  State  to  impose  reasonable restrictions  in public interest and public good.   Art.  21 then guarantees the equally well accepted safeguard  against arbitrary  deprivation of life and personal liberty save  in accordance  with  procedure  established  by  law,   thereby ensuring government by law and not by men.  Cls. (1) and (2) of  Art  22  again lay down the well-accepted  rule  that  a

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person  detained in custody shall be expeditiously  informed of the grounds of his arrest and guarantee II& right to  the assistance  of  a legal practitioner of his choice  and  the necessity  of his having to be produced before a  magistrate thus  securing  a judicial as against a  legislative  or  an executive sanction for hit arrest. The  non-applicability of cls. (1) and (2) provided  by  cl. (3)  of Art. 22 in the case of an enemy-alien and  a  person detained under a preventive detention law was provided  for, as  is  notorious, as a sequel to the tragic  incidents  and danger  to  both the internal and external security  of  the country  following the partition.  Cl. (3) consequently  was inserted  as an exception to the rule laid down in cls.  (1) and  (2) of Art. 22.  There can be no doubt whatsoever  that the Constitution makers accepted preventive detention ’,as a necessary  evil, to be tolerated in a constitutional  scheme which  otherwise, guaranteed personal liberty in  its  well- accepted  form.   Having thus recognized  the  necessity  of preventive  detention  laws, the  constitution-makers  first delineated in clear and precise terms certain. heads or such in   respect  of  which  only  Parliament  by   itself   and concurrently with State legislatures was empowered to  enact detention  laws  under entries 9 and 3 of Lists  I  and  III respectively.   Secondly, they provided in cl. (4)  that  no such law shall authorise detention of a person for a period longer than three,months as (a) an advisory- with (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 176.    (2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530. 17 of  judicial training has reported that there is  sufficient cause  for  detention;  or  (b)  a  person  is  detained  in accordance   with  a  Parliamentary  statute  passed   under cl..(4)(b)  read with cl. (7)(a) and (b).  These  provisions clearly  indicate that ordinarily preventive  detention  can only  be  for  a period of three months  only.   If  a  law, however,  provides for detention for longer period,  it  can only   do  so  with  the  intercession  of   an   impartial, independent  body, viz., an advisory board.  Sub-cl. (b)  of cl.  (4),  however, provides that a detention for  a  longer period than three months can be had, if a person is detained under  a  law made by Parliament under cl. (7)(a)  and  (b). Cl.  (4) thus lays down two situations in which the rule  of three  months  detention  can  be  relaxed;  (1)  where  the intercession of an advisory board is provided, and (2) where Parliament has enacted a. law under cl. (7)(a) and (b).  The proviso to sub-cl. (a) of cl. (4) lays down that even  where there is intercession of. the board, detention cannot be  in any event for more than the maximum period prescribed in the law in question under cl. (7).  Reading cl. (4) thus in  its entirety,  the plain meaning of the language used  there  is clear.   It first lays down the ordinary rule  of  detention being only for three months and then provides two exceptions to it, viz., (a) detention for longer period of intercession of  an  advisory  board  is  provided  for,  and  (b)  where Parliament  acts under cl. (7) (a) and (b), subject in  both the  cases to the maximum period provided in the  law  under consideration.  It will be seen that sub-cl. (a) of cl.  (4) is  not restricted to Parliamentary Statutes, while  sub-cl. (b) is and applies to an Act passed by Parliament alone.               We  next  go to cl. (7).  That clause  by  its               sub-cl.  (a) provides "Parliament may  by  law               prescribe-               (a)   the  circumstances under which, and  the               class  or classes of cases in which, a  person               may be detained for a period longer than three               months  without. the opinion ’of ’an  Advisory

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             Board  in  accordance with the  provisions  of               sub-cl. (b) of cl. (4)." Two  alternative  constructions  of  cl.   (7)  (a) were suggested before US.  The learned Attorney-General submitted that  cls.  (4) and (7) should be read together, and  if  so read,  they mean, two independent powers; (1) to make a  law providing  for  longer detention with the provision  for  an advisory board, and (2) to make a low providing for a longer detention  without  an  advisory  board.   He  argued  that, therefore,  the powers were independent or  alternative  and ’there was no question of’ cl. (7)(a) being an exception  to cl.  (4  a  Secondly, he argued that the words "may  by  law prescribe"  in  cl. (7)(a) meant that that  sub-cl.  was  an enabling provision which authorised Parliament (i) to  pres- cribe the circumstances. under which, and (ii) the class  or classes  of  cases in which a person can be detained  for  a longer period without the intervention of an advisory board. Since  the  constitution enables Parliament to  perform  two things, it has the power to do either of them and  therefore the  word ’and’ there used has to be read in the context  as having  been  used  in the disjunctive  sense.   Maxwell  on Interpretation  of  Statutes (11th ed.) 229) ’On  the  other hand,  the contention on behalf of the petitioner  was  that cl.  (4) (a) laid down a safeguard that there has to be  the intervention of a board in all cases where the law  Provides for  detention for a period longer than three months  except 44 SupCI/73 18 in  the  case when Parliament choose to exercise  its  power under cl. (7) (a). In  determining which of these constructions is correct,  it is necessary to consider first the ’nature and scope of  cl. (4)(a).   Under  that  clause, no  law,  whether  passed  by Parliament under entry 9 of List I and or by Parliament  and the  State  Legislature  under  entry  3  of  List  III  can authorise  longer  detention  than three  months  unless  it provides  for  the intercession of an advisory  board.   Cl. (4)(a) thus lays down a limitation on the legislative  power conferred  on both the Central and State legislatures  while exercising their power under the said entries.  The position then is that although Parliament and the State  Legislatures have  the  power  to make detention laws under  any  of  the topics or subjects enumerated in the two entries, cl. (4)(a) first  provides that a law passed by either of  them  cannot provide detention for a period longer than three months.  It next  lays down that if such a law provides detention for  a period  longer  than three months, it can do so only  if  it includes  the safeguard of the intercession of  an  advisory board, which the Constitution was anxious enough to see that it contained persons who were or would be qualified to  hold the position of a High-Court judge. Whereas  sub-cl.  (a)  of cl.  (4)  applies  to  legislation enacted by both Parliament and the State Legislatures,  sub- cl.  (b)  applies to laws made by Parliament.   Sub-cl.  (b) provides  that  the  limitation  placed  ,on  the  power  of Parliament  under sub-cl. (a) is not to apply to a law  made by  Parliament  under cl. (7)(a) and (b). If the  theory  of alternative  power  of  Parliament either to  enable  a  law providing for a longer period but with the intercession of a Board  or  to  enact a law under cl. (4)(b)  read  with  cl. (7)(b) providing also for a longer detention but without the intercession of a board, were accepted cl. (4) (a) would  be totally  nullified by cl. (4)(b) read with cl, (7) (a).   In other words, such a construction would mean that though  the constitution  makers  laid down a safeguard  against  a  law

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providing  for  a longer duration, they, in  the  very  same breath,  nullified  that safeguard by  generally  empowering Parliament under cls. (4) (b) read with cl. (7) (a) to enact laws  with  longer period of detention  without  the  inter- cession   of   an   advisory   board.    Surely,   such   an interpretation  which nullifies one part of the same  clause while  interpreting  its  another pad  has  to  be  avoided. Further, if cl.(4) (b) read with cl. (7) (a) was intended to override  cl.  (4) (a) and the safeguard required in  a  law providing   for   detention   for  a   longer   period   the constitution-makers  would have confined cl. (4)(a) only  to laws  made  by  the State Legislatures and  would  not  have applied  it to Parliament as well.  The  constitution-makers in that case would have simply used in  used in cl. (4)  (b) and  cl.  (7)  (a)  language  such  as  "Nothing   contained in cl. (4) (a) shall apply to ’a law of preventive detention made  by  Parliament".   The acceptance  of  the  theory  of alternative power           of Parliament means that whereas State  laws  providing longer  detention               would require  the intercession of an advisory board, laws  passed by             Parliament,  though,  providing  for   longer detention, would not It is impossible to conceive that  such a  result  could  have been intended  by  the  constitution- makers,   who  were  careful  enough  to  provide  for   the intervention of an impar- 19 tial  and  an  independent  body in  laws  whether  made  by Parliament or State Legislatures providing for detention for longer period than three months.  On an analysis of the  two clauses  (4)  and (7), the, conclusion is  inescapable  that what they provide is (a) that ordinarily, detention provided by  a  preventive detention law should not be for  a  period longer than three months; (b) that if, however, such, a  law does provide for a longer period than three months, it  must provide  for  the intercession of an advisory body  and  (c) that  situations may arise when in certain classes of  cases Parliament  alone should be empowered to en,act a law  which provides  for  a longer detention even  without  the  inter- ,cession  of an advisory board.  On a careful  consideration of  the  language  of  cls.  (4)  and  (7),  the  theory  of independent  or alternative power of Parliament breaks  down and cannot be accepted, firstly, because the language of the two  clauses  does  not bear out such  a  construction,  and secondly,  because the construction under which cl. (4)  (b) read  with cl. (7)(a) lays down an exception to  cl.  (4)(a) harmonises  both  the  clauses  and  brings  out  the   true intention in enacting the two clauses. The  next question is what kind of a law which  can  provide for a longer duration of detention and at the same time  can dispense  with the advisory board is permissible  under  cl. (7) (a).  Such a law has to be one passed by Parliament  and has  to  be one which prescribes  "the  circumstances  under which, and the class or classes of cases in which", a person may   be  detained  for  a  longer  period  than   the   one contemplated by cl. (4), i.e.., three months and without the requirement  of  an  advisory board.   The  expression  "the circumstances under which and the class or classes of cases" evoked  a  controversy  in  Gopalan(1)  which  resulted   in difference of opinion between the majority and the  minority judges.  That controversy practically in the same terms  was repeated before us, one side contending that enumeration  of the  heads or subjects in the two entries on which a law  of detention  can  be made would sufficiently comply  with  the requirement  of cl. (7) (a), and the other  side  contending against  such  a  meaning  being  given  to  the   aforesaid

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expression.    In  deciding  that  controversy,  one   broad consideration   at  once  arises  and  that  is   that   the circumstances  and  the classes of cases  mentioned  in  cl. (7)(a)  are not limited to any one or more of  the  subjects set  out in the two entries in respect of which a  detention law  can  be made’.  If the contention that  enumeration  of these subjects would satisfy the requirement of cl., (7) (a) I  were to be right, a Parliamentary law can  enumerate  all the  six subjects in the two entries and  provide  detention for a longer period for reasons connected with all of them.. Both,  the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and  the  impugned Act  excepted  the  subject  of  maintenance  of   essential supplies and services, but in the absence of any restrictive language  in that respect in.cl. (7)(a), they need not  have done  so.   That  means  that  Parliament  can  pass  a  law dispensing with the advisory board by merely stating therein all  the  heads or subjects it. the ’two entries.   If  that ,were  done,  the safeguard provided in cl. (4) (a)  can  be rendered  totally infructuous.  If that was  the  intention, cl.  (7)  (a) need not. have, been framed  in  an  elaborate language. as has been done and it would (1) [1950]SCR 88 20 have been sufficient to provide that nothing in cl. (4)  (a) shall apply to a law passed by Parliament which sets out the subjects  in the entries or any one or more, of  them.   Why did.  the  constitution-makers  consider  it  necessary   to provide  in  cl.  (7)(a) that the  law  must  prescribe  the circumstances  and the classes of cases ? The  insertion  of such  an expression coupled with Parliament being  the  only body  which can enact such a law seems to suggest  that  cf. (7)  (a) is an exception to cl. (4)(a) and it being such  an exception,  Parliament  alone  is empowered to  pass  a  law dealing  with  exceptional  circumstances  and   exceptional classes of cases. if enumeration of the heads in the entries were  to  mean compliance of prescribing  circumstances  and classes of, cases, Parliament would in such a law be dealing with all situations and all classes of cases from the lowest to the most extraordinary or abnormal and not with some only requiring a treatment different. from that envisaged by  cl. (4)  (a).   In  such a case, cl. (4)  (a)  would,  again  be rendered  nugatory,  for  Parliament  can,  by   enumerating verbatim  the heads or subjects set out in the  entries,  do away  with the requirement of cl. (4) (a).  Could that  have been  the  intention in, enacting cl.(7)  (a)?   It  clearly could  not have been so intended for the simple reason  that deprivation  of personal liberty even for a  period’  longer than  three months, ordinarily considered to be  sufficient, required,  according to cl. (4) (a), at least the  safeguard of  an impartial body against executive action of a  drastic kind. The  difficulty in equating enumeration in verbatim  of  the heads  of legislation permissible under the two  entries  in Lists I and III with both the circumstances and the  classes of  cases is that though the activities of  persons  thought necessary for detention may vary in degrees of their  impact depending  upon the situations existing at the time, all  of them, irrespective of their degree of intensity and  impact, would  be clubbed together so as to treat them equally in  a law  under  cl. (7) (4).  In such a  cage  even  activities, which  would ’not justify the dispensation of the  safeguard of  an  advisory  board as against  those  which  need  such dispensation, would be treated equally, with the result that in  respect of all activities and all situations  Parliament would  be  enabled  to dispense with the  safeguard  of  the

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intervention  of an advisory board.  What use would then  be of having cl. (4) (a) if its requirement can be avoided by a law which simply sets out the subjects or some of them  from the   two  entries?   As Mahajan,  J.,  pointed   out   in Gopalan,(1) the language of cls. (4) and (7) show that  they deal   with  three  distinct  situations;  (1)   where   the activities and the persons likely to perpetrate them, though connected  with the subjects in the entries, are of  such  a nature  and consequence that three months’  detention  would meet the situation; (2) where the activities and the persons likely to perpetrate them are of such nature and consequence that  they  need a longer period of detention but  with  the intercession  of  an’  advisory board,  and  (3)  where  the activities  and the persons likely to resort to them are  of such  a  nature and consequence that  the  situations  ’they created  are  such as require not only a  longer  period  of detention,  but also the dispensation of intercession by  an advisory  body.  in  times  of  severe  emergency  when  the security of the,country or a part of it is threatened (1)  [1950] SCR 88 21 for  instance, not only detention for a longer period  might become necessary but the intervention of an advisory body to which  information  of  a  vital nature  would  have  to  be disclosed  might be regarded both as inconsistent  with  the safety   of  the  country  or  the  community  as  well   as cumbersome.   Such situations may arise not merely in  cases involving the security of the nation or part or parts of. it but  may arise in connection with the rest of  the  subjects ’in  the  entries.   Sabotage  of  essential  supplies   and services  would  in given circumstances be as  dangerous  as activities  involving danger to the security of  the,  State and/ or public order. Circumstance;  would  ordinarily mean situations  or  events extraneous  to  the activities of a concerned  person  or  a group  of  persons,  such  as  riots,  disorders,  tensions, religious,  racial,  regional or linguistic  or  other  such commotions  which might by their  pre-existence  accentuate the impact of such activities affecting the. security of the country  or  a  part of it or the public  order.   Class  or classes  of  cases, on the other hand, relate  to  group  or groups of individuals, who by the nature of their activities fall under one particular group or groups by their common or similar objective or objectives.  The subjects or heads  set out  in the legislative entries were intended  to  delineate the bounds within which the legislatures can pass  detention laws.  The purposes of these entries and of cl. (7)  (a)_are distinct;  that  of the ,entries to lay down the  topics  in respect of Which legislation can be made and that of cl. (7) (a)  to  distinguish the ordinary from  the  exceptional  to which  only the salutary safeguard provided by cl.  (4)  (a) would not apply.  Mere repetition of the subjects or  topics of  legislation from the entries would not mean  prescribing either  the circumstances or the classes of cases  to  which only,  as  against  the rest of the  individuals  and  their activities, the safeguard of intercession of an  independent body would not apply.  The law under cl. (7) (a) would,.  as compared  to the one to which cl.(4) (a) would apply,  be  a drastic law and the presumption would be that such a drastic law   would   apply   to   exceptional   circumstances   and exceptional’  activities  expressly  and  in  precise  terms prescribed. If cl. (7) (a) were construed to permit mere enumeration  of the  subjects  in respect of which there is power  to  enact preventive detention laws, all those subjects can be set out

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verbatim,  in  which  event cl. (4) (a)  would  be  rendered otiose. All act prejudicial to the maintenance of  essential supplies  and  services  e.g. possession  of  controlled  or rational food articles in excess of statutory limits,  would be  equated  for treatment with an act  prejudicial  to  the security of India or of a State.  On the, other hand, an act sabotaging,   for   instance,   lines   of   supplies    and communication  in times of an emergency, prejudicial to  the maintenance  of  essential supplies and services  would   be equated  with  an act prejudicial to  maintenance  a  public order  in  one  locality  or  affecting  a  section  of  the community.  Cl. (7)(a), thus, envisages ’Parliament to apply its  mind  and prescribe specific situations  and  types  of cases  which  require  a drastic  law  dispensing  with  the intervention  of an advisory board on the ground  that  such intervention  would in such ’exceptional circumstances  and. in  cases  of dangerous individuals would be  cumbersome  or unsafe.   Reading  cls. (4)(a) and (7)(a)  together,  it  is quite clear that intercession of an independent body like 22 the  advisory board was regarded by the  constitution-makers as ;An essential safeguard against a jurisdiction  primarily based   on  suspicion  and  apprehension,  which  could   be dispensed  with  in  extraordinary  circumstances  and  with regard to dangerous persons and their apprehended activities specifically  prescribed in the law made under cl. (7)  (a). In  this view, the meaning of the word ’and’ in that  clause must.  be held to have its ordinary conjunctive  sense,  the context  in that clause also requiring not the opposite  but its  commonly  understood  sense,  requiring  Parliament  to prescribe both the circumstances and the classes of cases in which  only  consideration by the board  can  be.  dispensed with. In  Gopalan(1)  Patanjali  Sastri,  J.,  (as  he  then  was) expressed  the  view  that in such a  matter  as  preventive detention which by its nature depended on the likelihood  of certain  apprehended  acts,  it  would  be  impossible   for Parliament to exhaustively set out the circumstances or  the classes of cases which a law under cl. (7)(a) would be made. The  difficulty felt by Patanjali Sastri, J., was sought  to be  answered  by  Fazl  Ali, J. (p.  178)  by  referring  to Regulation  18B  of  the  ’British  Defence  of  the   Realm Regulations,  1939 as and by way of a concrete  illustration where activities and circumstances of a more dangerous  type could be classified from the rest.  Regulation 18B laid down the following classes of cases where the Secretary of  State could direct preventive detention :-               (1)   If the Secretary of State has reasonable               cause  to believe any person to be of  hostile               origin or associations;               (2)   If the Secretary of State has reasonable               cause  to  believe  any person  to  have  been               recently "concerned in acts prejudicial to the               public  safety or the defence of the realm  or               in he preparation or instigation of such acts;               (3)   If  he has reasonable cause  to  believe               any person to have been or to be a member  of,               or  to-have  been  or  to  be  active  in  the               furtherance   of  the  objects  of  any   such               organisation mentioned; and               (4)   If  he has reasonable cause  to  believe               that the recent conduct of any person for  the               time  being in an area or any  words  recently               written or spoken by such a person  expressing               sympathy with the enemy, indicates or indicate

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             that  that  person  is likely  to  assist  the               enemy. Mahajan,  J., (as he then was), likewise,. referred  to  the classification  of the prejudicial activities set out in  R. 34(6)  of  the  Defence  of  India  Rules,  1939.   Such   a classification  of acts is also to be found in R.  36(6)  of the  Defence  of India Rules, 1971.  S. 3(2),  of  the  West Bengal  (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, 19 of  1970, similarly,  classifies certain activities as falling  within the  expression  "acting in any manner  prejudicial  to  the security of the State or the maintenance (1) [1950] SCR 88. 23       of public order." That provision runs as follows               "(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1),  the               expression acting in any manner prejudicial to               the  security of the State or the  maintenance               of public order’ means-               (a)using,  or  instigating  any  person  by               words,  either spoken or written, or by  signs               or by visible representations or otherwise, to               use, any lethal weapon-               (i)   to  promote  or propagate any  cause  or               ideology,  the  promotion  or  propagation  of               which   affects,  or  is  likely  to   affect,               adversely  the  security of the State  or  the               maintenance of public order; or               (ii)to overthrow or to overawe the  Government               established by law in India.               x        x           x          x            x               x               (b)   committing mischief, within the  meaning               of  section 425 of the Indian Penal  Code,  by               fire   or  any  explosive  substance  on   any               property of Government or any local  authority               or  any  corporation owned  or  controlled  by               Government   or   any  University   or   other               educational  institution  or  on  any   public               building,   where  the  commission   of   such               mischief  disturbs, or is likely  to  disturb,               public order; or               (c)   causing  insult to the  Indian  National               Flag   or  to  any  other  object  of   public               veneration,  whether by mutilating,  damaging,               burning, defiling, destroying or other-                     wise,  or instigating any person  to  do               so.               x            x               x               x               x               (d)   committing, or instigating any person to               commit,  any offence punishable with death  or               imprisonment  for life or imprisonment  for  a               term  extending to seven years or more or  any               offence  under  the  Arms  Act,  1959  or  the               Explosive Substances Act, 1908, where the com-               mission of such offence disturbs, or is likely               to disturb, public order; or               (e)   in  the case of a person referred to  in               clause (a) to (f) of Section 1 10 of the  Code               of  Criminal Procedure, 1898, committing  any.               offence punishable with imprisonment where the                             commission  of  such offence  disturbs ,  or  is               likely to disturb public order." These  examples  are  sufficient  to  dispel  fear  of   any

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practical  difficulty in prescribing specific  circumstances under  which and the classes of cases which need  dispensing with the intercession of an advisory board.. In our opinion, cl. (4) (a) of Art. 22 lays down it rule  to which  cl.  (4) (b) read with cl. (7) (a) is  an  exception. Upon that view cl. (7)(a) must be construed as a restriction on Parliament’s power of making preventive detention laws in the sense that it can depart from the rule laid down in  cl. (4)(a) and dispense with reference of cases 24 to an advisory board only by a law which prescribes both the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer  than three  months without obtaining the opinion of  an  advisory board  in accordance with the provisions of sub-cl.  (a)  of 61. (4).  With great respect to the distinguished judges who formed the majority in Gopalan,(1) we are notable to  concur in  their views on the construction of cl. (4) (b)  and  cl. (7) (a) of Art. 22. Sec. 17A of the Act, in our opinion, has failed to comply with the requirement of cl. (7)(a), and has therefore,  to  be declared bad as being  inconsistent  with that clause., In Gopalan(1) the majority court had held that Art. 22 was a self-contained.   Code  and therefore a  law  of  preventive detention did not have to satisfy the requirements of  Arts. 19, 14 and 21.  The view of Fazl Ali, J., on the other hand, was  that  preventive detention was a direct breach  of  the right  under  Art. 19(a) to (d) and that law  providing  for preventive detention had to be subject to such judicial  re- view as is obtainable under cl. (5) of that Article.  In  R. C. Cooper v. Union of India(2) the aforesaid premise of  the majority  in Gopalan(1) was disapproved and therefore it  no longer  holds  the field.  Though Cooper’s case (2  )  dealt with  the  inter-relationship of Art. 19 and  Art.  31,  the basic   approach  to  construing  the   fundamental   rights guaranteed  in the different provisions of the  Constitution adopted in this case held the major premise of the  majority in   Gopalan(1)   to  be  incorrect.   In   view   of   this constructional position, counsel for the petitioner and  for the  intervener  made  submissions on s. 13 of  the  Act  as amended by s. 6(6) (d) of the Defence of India Act as  being in violation of Art. 14 and also on ss. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11  and 12,of the Act even as they stood before the enactment of  s. 6(6)  (d)  of the Defence of India Act on  the  ground  that those  provisions were not reasonable restrictions and  were therefore  void and the subsequent declaration of  emergency and the enactment of s. 6(6)(d) could not breathe life  into those  provisions  which were already  void.   Counsel  also contended that the maximum period of detention prescribed by the amended s. 13 and by s. 17A(2) (d) did not satisfy  Art. 22(7)(b)  since  the period fixed by Parliament  therein  is three years or until the expiry of the Defence of India Act, whichever  is  later,  an  event uncertain  as  no  one  can anticipate when the emergency would be terminated.  However, in  the view we have taken of s. 17A of the Act we need  not go into them as in accordance with the practice followed  by this  Court we need not decide more than what is  necessary. We,  therefore,  do not express any views on  the  aforesaid contentions raised by counsel.  It is, therefore, enough for us   to  declare  s.  17A  as  not  having   satisfied   the requirements  laid  down  in  cl. (7) (a)  of  Art.  22  and therefore bad. The consequence is that the petition succeeds and we  direct that   the  petitionerable  released  forthwith   from   his detention.

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V. P. S.          Petition allowed. (1) [1950]  3 S. C. R. 88. (2) [1970]3 S. C. R 530 25