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PETITIONER: SAKURU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TANAJI

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/07/1985

BENCH: ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) BENCH: ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR 1278            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 109  1985 SCC  (3) 590        1985 SCALE  (2)304

ACT:      Andhra   Pradesh    (Telangana   Area)    Tenancy   and Agricultural Lands  Act 1950,  Section 90  and 91  Appeal or revision under the Act - Condonation of delay in filing of - Section 5 Limitation Act 1963 - Whether applicable.

HEADNOTE:      The Revenue  Divisional Officer declared the Respondent to be  the owner of an extent of about 6 acres of land under section 38E  of the  Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 on the ground that he was a ’protected tenant’.  Though an  appeal lay  to the Collector against  this  order  under  section  90  of  the  Act,  the appellant-land-holder did not file an appeal but preferred a Writ Petition  to the  High Court  which was  dismissed by a learned single  Judge. The  decision of  the learned  single Judge was confirmed in writ appeal by a Division Bench.      Long thereafter,  the  appellant  preferred  an  appeal before the  District Collector  purporting to  be one  filed against  the   order  of  the  Revenue  Divisional  Officer, together with  an application for condonation of delay under section 5  of the Limitation Act, 1963. That application and the appeal were opposed by the Respondent but the objections were overruled,  the delay  was condoned  and the appeal was allowed by the Collector.      The Respondent  being aggrieved  by the aforesaid order preferred a  Revision  Petition  to  the  High  Court  under section 91  of  the  Act.  A  Single  Judge  following,  the Division  Bench  ruling  in  K.Venkaiah  and  others  v.  K. Venkateswara Rao  & Anr.  A.I.R. 1978  A.P. 166  allowed the Revision  Petition   holding  that   the  Collector  had  no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing of the appeal by invoking section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.      In the  appeal to  this Court,  the correctness  of the view taken in K. Venkaiah and Others v. K.Venkateswara Rao & Another was  challenged and  it was  further contended  that subsequent to  that  decision,  the  State  Legislature  had enacted the Andhra 110 Pradesh Tenancy  Laws (Amendment)  Act, 1979 whereby section 93 of  the Act  had been  amended and that the provisions of section 5  of the  Limitation Act,  1963 had  expressly been

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made applicable  to Appeals and Revision Petitions preferred under sections 90 and 91 of the Act.      Dismissing the Appeal. ^      HELD: 1.  The view  taken  by  the  Division  Bench  in K.Venkaiah and  Others v. K. Venkateswara Rao and Another is correct and  sound. Section  93 of  the Act did not have the effect of  rendering the  provisions of  section  5  of  the Limitation Act,  1963 applicable  to the  proceedings before the Collector. [114 A-B]      2. On  a plain  reading of  section 93 of the Act it is absolutely  clear   that  its   effect  is  only  to  render applicable to  the proceedings  before  the  Collector,  the provisions of the Limitation Act relating to ’computation of the  period  of  limitation’.  The  provisions  relating  to computation of  the period  of limitation  are contained  in section 12 to 24 included in Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with ’computation of the  period of  limitation’. It is only after the process of computation  is completed  and it is found that an appeal or application  has been  filed  after  the  expiry  of  the prescribed period  that the  question of  extension  of  the period under section 5 can arise. [113 G-H]      3. It  is well  settled  that  the  provisions  of  the Limitation Act,  1963 apply  only to proceedings in "Courts" and not  to appeals or applications before bodies other than Courts  such   as  quasi-judicial   Tribunals  or  executive authorities, notwithstanding  the fact  that such  bodies or authorities may  be vested  with  certain  specified  powers conferred on  Courts under  the Codes  of Civil  or Criminal Procedure. However, the relevant special statute may contain an express  provision conferring on the appellate authority, the power  to extend  the prescribed period of limitation on sufficient  cause  being  shown  by  laying  down  that  the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to such proceedings. [113 A-C]      4. The  provisions of  section 93  as it stood prior to its amendment  by Act 2 of 1979 were free from any ambiguity and called  for no  clarification. The  Legislature has also not given  any indication of any intention to clarify but on the other  hand what  has been  done by  it is  to amend the section with only prospective effect. The amended provisions of section 93 are of no 111 assistance to  the appellant.  This case  is governed by the section as it was originally enacted. [114 D-E]      K.Venkaiah  and   others  v.   K.Venkateswara  Rao  and Another, A.I.R. 1978 A.P. 166, approved.      Town Municipal  Council, Athani  v. Presiding  Officer, Labour Court,  Hubli and Ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51, Nityananda M.Joshi and  Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors. [1970]  1 S.C.R.  396 and  Sushila Devi  v.  Ramanandan Prasad and Ors. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 845, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1852 of 1979.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  12.4.1978  of  the Andhra Pradesh  High Court  in Civil  Revision Petition  No. 3289 of 1977.      T.S. Krishnamurthi  Iyer, K.  Ram  Kumar  and  Mrs.  J. Ramachandran for the Appellant.      S. Markandeya for the Respondent.

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    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      BALAKRISHNA ERADI,  J. In  this appeal filed by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment dated April 12, 1978  of a  learned Single  Judge of  the High  Court of Andhra Pradesh,  the sole  question arising  for decision is whether the  provisions of  section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked for condoning the delay in the filing of an appeal  before the  Collector under  section  90  of  the Andhra Pradesh  (Telangana Area)  Tenancy  and  Agricultural Lands Act,  1950 -  Act 21  of 1950 (hereinafter called ’the Act’).      The facts  which have led up to the present controversy may now  be briefly set out. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Adilabad declared  the respondent- Tanaji to be the owner of an extent of 6 acres, 39 guntas comprised in Survey Nos. 289 and 290 of Hasnapur village under section 38-E of the Act on the  ground  that  he  (the  respondent)  was  a  "protected tenant". Though an appeal lay to the Collector under section 90 of  the Act  against the said order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer  the appellant land holder did not prefer an appeal but, instead, filed a Writ Petition - W.P.No. 2064 of 1976  before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the legality and correctness of the order 112 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer. That Writ Petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on July 1,  1976. Writ  Appeal No.385 of 1976 filed against the decision  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  was  subsequently dismissed by  a Division Bench of the High Court on December 6, 1976.  Long thereafter, on August 22, 1978, the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Collector purporting to be  one filed  against the  order dated  January 22, 1975 passed by  the Revenue  Divisional Officer  together with an application for  condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. That application and the appeal were opposed by the respondent herein. But his objections were overruled, the delay  was condoned  and the  appeal was  allowed by the Collector on  October 24,  1977.  The  respondent  -  Tanaji thereupon moved the High Court by filing a revision petition under section  91 of  the Act.  By the  judgment impugned in this appeal,  the learned  Single Judge  of the  High  Court allowed that  revision petition  holding that  the Collector had no  jurisdiction to  condone the  delay in the filing of the appeal  by invoking  section 5  of  the  Limitation  Act following an  earlier ruling of a Division Bench of the same High Court  reported in  K.Venkaiah & Ors. v. K.Venkateswara Rao &  Anr. A.I.R.  1978 A.P.  166.  In  that  decision  the Division Bench of the High Court had taken the view that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a Civil or Criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an appeal is filed  under section  90 of  the Act  is not  a Civil  or Criminal Court,  the provisions  of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no  application to  the proceedings  before him  unless there  is   express  provision   in  the  special  enactment whereunder   the    Collector   is    exercising   appellate jurisdiction,  making   any  particular   section   of   the Limitation Act  specifically applicable to such proceedings. It was further held by the Division Bench that section 93 of the Act,  as it  then stood,  made applicable to proceedings before the Collector only those provisions of the Limitation Act which  related to  the ’computation  of  the  period  of limitation’ and  since section  5 did  not fall  within  the group of  sections (sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act) dealing with  computation of  the period  of limitation, the provisions  of   section  5   were  not  applicable  to  the

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proceedings before  the Collector.  The learned  counsel for the appellant has canvassed before us the correctness of the view so taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah’s case.      After hearing both sides we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that there is no substance in this appeal and that the view taken by the Division Bench in Venkaiah’s case is perfectly 113 correct and  sound. It  is well  settled by the decisions of this Court  in Town  Municipal Council,  Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour  Court, Hubli  & Ors.  [1970] 1  S.C.R.  51, Nityananda M.  Joshi & Ors. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India &  Ors. [1970]  1. S.C.R.  396  and  Sushila  Devi  v. Ramanandan Prasad  and Ors.  [1976] 2.  S.C.R. 845  that the provisions  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  apply  only  to proceedings in  "Courts" and  not to appeals or applications before bodies  other  than  Courts  such  as  quasi-judicial Tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such  bodies or  authorities may be vested with certain specified powers  conferred on  Courts under  the  Codes  of Civil or  Criminal Procedure.  The Collector before whom the appeal was  preferred by  the appellant herein under section 90 of  the Act  not being  a Court,  the Limitation  Act, as such, had  no applicability  to the  proceedings before him. But even  in such  a situation  the relevant special statute may contain an express provision conferring on the appellate authority, such  as the  Collector, the  power to extend the prescribed period  of limitation  on sufficient  cause being shown by laying down that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act  shall be  applicable  to  such  proceedings. Hence it  becomes  necessary  to  examine  whether  the  Act contains any  such  provision  entitling  the  Collector  to invoke the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of  the delay  in the  filing of the appeal. The only provision relied on by the appellant in this connection is section  93 of the Act which, as it stood at the relevant time, was in the following terms:-           "93.  Limitation   -  Every   appeal   and   every           application for  revision under  this Act shall be           filed within sixty days from the date of the order           against which  the appeal  or application is filed           and the  provisions of  the Indian Limitation Act,           1908  shall   apply  for   the  purpose   of   the           computation of the said period." On a  plain reading  of the  section it  is absolutely clear that  its  effect  is  only  to  render  applicable  to  the proceedings before  the Collector,  the  provisions  of  the Limitation Act  relating to  ’computation of  the period  of limitation. The  provisions relating  to computation  of the period of  limitation are  contained in  sections 12  to  24 included in  Part III of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 is not a provision dealing with computation of the period of limitation. It  is only  after the process of computation is completed and  it is found that an appeal or application has been filed  after the  expiry of  the prescribed period that the question 114 of extension  of the  period under  section 5  can arise. We are,  therefore,   in  complete   agreement  with  the  view expressed by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in Venkaiah’s case  that section 93 of the Act did not have the effect of  rendering the  provision  of  section  5  of  the Limitation Act,  1963 applicable  to the  proceedings before the Collector.      Our attention  was drawn to the fact that subsequent to

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the decision  of the  High Court,  the State Legislature has enacted the  Andhra Pradesh  Tenancy Laws  (Amendment)  Act, 1979 - Act 2 of 1979, whereby section 93 of the Act has been amended and  the provisions  of section  5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have now been expressly made applicable to appeals and revisions preferred under sections 90 and 91 of the Act. We see  no force in the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant  that  the  said  amendment  is  clarificatory  in nature. The  provisions of section 93 as they stood prior to this amendment  were free  from any ambiguity and called for no clarification.  The Legislature  has also  not given  any indication of  any intention  to clarify  but, on  the other hand, what  has been done by it is to amend the section with only prospective  effect. The  amended provisions of section 93 are, therefore, of no assistance to the appellant in this case which  is governed  by the Section as it was originally enacted.      The  conclusion   that  emerges   from  the   foregoing discussion is  that this  appeal is devoid of merits and has only to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 115