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PETITIONER: SAKHARAM SHRIPATI JADHAV, DECEASED THROUGHHIS LEGAL REPRESEN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHANDRAKANT ALIAS MADHAV LAXMAN AGNIHOTRIAND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/01/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR  637            1987 SCR  (1) 913  1987 SCC  (1) 486        JT 1987 (1)    85  1987 SCALE  (1)5

ACT:     Bombay  Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act,  1948,  S.43A- Composite  purpose lease and single purpose  lease--Distinc- tion  between--Lease for composite purpose--Area where  only sugarcane cultivated--Exempted--Area where along with sugar- cane other crops cultivated--Not exempted.

HEADNOTE:     The  Bombay  Tenancy Agricultural Lands  Act,  1948,  by s.32(1)  provides that every tenant should, subject  to  the other  provisions  contained in the Act, be deemed  to  have purchased  from the landlord, free of all  encumbrances  the land  held by him as tenant, if such tenant was a  permanent tenant  and cultivated the land personally; or  such  tenant was  not a permanent tenant but cultivated the  land  leased personally; and the landlord has not given notice of  termi- nation  of his tenancy under section 31; or notice had  been given under section 31, but the landlord had not applied  to the  Mamlatdar  on or before 31st day of March,  1956  under section  29  for obtaining possession of the  land;  or  for certain  other contingencies mentioned in section 32 of  the Act. Section 43A provides that the aforesaid provisions  for the  benefit of tillers or tenants would not apply  to  land granted  to  any bodies or persons for  the  cultivation  of sugarcane  or  the growing of fruits or flowers or  for  the breeding of livestock.     The  appellant-tenant had taken the suit land  on  lease from the respondent. The lease deed was alleged to have been executed for the purpose of cultivation of chillies,  tobac- co,  sugarcane and groundnuts etc. Suo moto proceedings  for fixing the price under s.32(g) were taken on the  assumption that the appellant-tenant had become statutory purchaser  by virtue of s.32 of the Act. While the proceedings were  pend- ing,  the respondents made an application under the Act  for determination of reasonable rent on the basis that the lands were leased for growing sugarcane. The  trial court rejected the application holding  that  the lands had 914 been leased not for growing sugarcane alone, but for differ- ent  types of crops. However, the Special  Land  Acquisition

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Officer  held  that  the purpose of the lease  was  one  for cultivating sugarcane and, as such, the lands were  governed by  the  provisions  of s.43A of the Act  and  directed  the determination  of  the  rent  accordingly.  The  Maharashtra Revenue  Tribunal  as well as the High Court  confirmed  the aforesaid  order. The High Court held that though  initially there was some mention of other crops, the Kabulayat  (Lease Deed)  in  terms intended that the land would  be  used  for cultivation  of sugarcane, and when sugarcane was not  being cultivated,  the  other crops could be cultivated  till  the land  was again available for sugarcane cultivation, and  if that be not the intention, the entire document could not  be correctly and reasonably reconciled and that the predominate purpose  being  sugarcane cultivation, the  tenant  was  not entitled to the right asserted by him.     In  appeal  to the Supreme Court, it  was  contended  on behalf  of the appellant-tenant: (i) that the whole  of  the land  is not for the cultivation of sugarcane; (ii) that  in an area of 11 acres, only 1 acre was subjected to the culti- vation  of  sugarcane, and that the Kabulayat or  the  lease clearly indicated that there were other purposes; and  (iii) that  the land could not be exempted because the  lease  was not for the cultivation of the sugarcane alone. Disposing of the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  1.1  The Bombay Tenancy Agricultural  Lands  Act, 1948  was  enacted with a high purpose of  transferring  the land tilled to the tillers of the soil with the exception of the  lands which were leased out for growing  sugarcane  be- cause  of the need for protection of the industry of  sugar- cane and development of the economy. [924G-H]     1.2  Having  regard to the preamble to the Act  and  the primary purpose of the Act, it would be necessary to  remand the matter back to the High Court for further remand to  the appropriate officer to determine whether there was any  area which  was leased exclusively for sugarcane crop. If  it  is held on such enquiry that the entire area was for  sugarcane crop,  then the order of the Tribunal cannot  be  interfered with.  If,  on the other hand, there are  areas  which  were leased  out separately and independently of the leasing  out for sugarcane and demarcated separately, then in respect  of the  same  no exemption can be given in derogation  of  the’ rights of the Agricultural tenants in those leased areas and the appellant would be entitled to succeed. [924D-F] 915     2.1 In a lease for composite purposes, if there was  any area where sugarcane was only cultivated, that area would be exempt from the ambit of the provisions of the Act and would be  exempted. If, however, along with cultivation of  sugar- cane, other crops were cultivated in the area, such an  area would not be entitled to exemption. [924F-G]     2.2  It is not necessary that the purpose of  the  lease must  be specifically mentioned either in the instrument  of the  lease  or  that the lease must be  for  cultivation  of sugarcane  etc.  in the entire field. It would  be  for  the courts  to  reach a conclusion on the evidence  whether  the lease  was  for cultivation of any particular crop  or  not. Nothing would turn on whether the agreement was to grow that crop in the entire field or not. [922G-H; 923A-B]     In  the instant case, the area which is in dispute  com- prised  of areas leased for raising sugarcane crop  as  also for other crops. The area was covered by lease for  multiple purposes.  Some  areas were leased out for  sugarcane  where along with sugarcane other crops were grown. These  however, should  be included as areas leased for sugarcane as  ancil- lary  crops or for better utilisation of the land  in  ques-

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tion. The leases covered areas other than the areas  contem- plated  by sugarcane which could be demarcated in  terms  of the Kabulayat. [924B-D]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 20 of 1987     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  9.11.1983  of  the Bombay High Court in w.P. No. 271 of 1979. S.S. JavaIi and P.R. Ramashesh for the Appellants. A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI,  J. Special leave  granted.  Heard counsel for the parties on the appeal.      This appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment of  the  High Court of Bombay dated 9th November,  1983.  It raises  a  short and an interesting  point.  Shripati  Balla Jadhav,  father of the appellants had executed a lease  deed with  regard to the suit land in favour of the landlord  and taken  the  said land on lease. The said lease was  for  the purpose  of  cultivation of  chillies,  tobacco,  sugarcane, groundnuts etc. 916 That is the version of the petitioners/appellants,     The  question  is, whether the lease was taken  for  the aforesaid purposes or was only for the cultivation of sugar- cane alone. In deciding that question the terms of the lease will  have  to be borne in mind. Suo  moto  proceedings  for fixing  the price under section 32(G) of the Bombay  Tenancy Agricultural  Lands Act, 1948--being Act No. LXVII  of  1948 (hereinafter  called the ’Act’) was taken on the  assumption that the tenant had become statutory purchaser by virtue  of section 32 of the said Act. The proceedings were dropped  as some  of the respondents were then minors. An order as  made by  Deputy Collector in appeal from the order of  the  trial court  in  proceedings under section 3"(G) of the  said  Act remanding  the case to the trial Court on 31st March.  1973. Thereafter  on  17th  July, 1975,  the  Maharashtra  Revenue Tribunal  confirmed the order of remand made by Dy.  Collec- tor,  in revision filed by the respondents herein. The  High Court thereafter rejected the writ petition of the  landlord against the order of the Tribunal. and as such the  proceed- ings under section 32(G), according to the appellants  here- in, are still pending.     On 15th June, 1974, the respondents made an  application under  the Act for determination of reasonable rent  on  the basis that the lands were leased for growing sugarcane.  The trial court on 11th February, 1975 rejected the  application in respect of the tenancy of Aval Kankoon on the ground that the  lands had been leased not for growing sugarcane  alone. but  for  different types of crops. On or  about  31st  May. 1977.  the  Spedal  Land Acquisition  Officer.  Kolahpur  in Tenancy  Appeal No. 302 of 1975 allowed the tenancy of  Aval Kankoon  and directed the determination of the rent  on  the basis that the lands were leased for growing sugarcane.  The said  order  was confirmed on 30th November,   1978  by  the Maharashtra  Revenue Tribunal, Kolahpur, in appeal filed  by the appellants. There was a writ petition thereafter on  9th November,  1983 by the appellants under article 227  of  the Constitution and the High Court of Bombay rejected the  said writ  application. The petitioners have come up  in  special leave to this Court.     It  may  be mentioned before we deal with  the  judgment under  appeal that the said Act was an Act to amend the  law

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relating  to  tenancy of the agricultural land and  to  make certain other provisions with regard to those lands. It  may be mentioned that the purpose was to make the tillers owners of  the  land and in respect of mortgages of  certain  lands giving  the tenant the right of re-purchase of the land.  It is 917 a  social agrarian reform measure to ameliorate  the  condi- tions  of the tenants. See in this connection the  statement of Objects and Reasons of the said Act.     In  the Preamble it is stated that it was  necessary  to amend the law which governed the relations of landlords  and tenants  of agricultural lands; and further whereas  on  ac- count  of  the neglect of a landholder or  disputes  between landlord  and  tenants,  the cultivation of  an  estate  has seriously  suffered,  or for the purpose  of  improving  the economic  and social conditions of peasants or ensuring  the full  and  efficient  use of land for  agriculture,  it  was expedient to assume management of estates held by  landhold- ers and to regulate and impose restrictions on the  transfer of  agricultural  lands, dwelling houses,  sites  and  lands appurtenant thereto or occupied by agriculturists,  agricul- tural labourers and artisans in the Province of Bombay,  and to  make provisions for certain other purposes  therein  the said  Act was being passed. The Act was intended to  benefit tenants in respect of the said evils. But Chapter IlIA which was  inserted  by  Bombay Act 13 of  1956  provided  special provisions  for land held on lease by industrial or  commer- cial undertakings and by certain persons for the cultivation of sugarcane and other notified agricultural produce.  Under the  scheme of the Act under sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 9B,  9C, 10,  10A, 14, 16, 17A, 17B, 18, 27, 31 to 31D  (both  inclu- sive),  32 to 32R (both inclusive), 33A, 33B, 33C,  43,  63, 63A, 64 and 65 dealt with the various kinds of rights of the tenants  in land, including the right of repurchase as  con- templated in sections 32 to 32R. Section 32(1) provided that on  first day of April, 1957 which was called "the  tillers’ day’7  in the Act every tenant should subject to  the  other provisions of the Act and the succeeding sections be  deemed to  have  purchased from the landlord, free  of  all  encum- brances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if such tenant was a permanent tenant thereof and  cultivated  land personally; or such tenant was  not  a permanent tenant but cultivated the land leased  personally; and the landlord had not given notice of termination of  his tenancy  under  section 31; or notice had been  given  under section 31, but the landlord had not applied to the  Mamlat- dar  on or before 31st day of March, 1957 under  section  29 for  obtaining possession of the land; or for certain  other contingencies mentioned in clause (ii) and other clauses  of section 32 of the Act.     Section  43A which is in Chapter III-A, provides,  inter alia,  by clause (b) of Section 43A(1) that leases  of  land granted to any bodies or persons other than those  mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the  grow- ing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of 918 livestock, that the aforesaid provisions for the benefit  of tillers or tenants would not apply to those.     In this appeal we are concerned with a very short  ques- tion namely, whether the lease of land granted in this  case is  covered by clause (b) for the lease for the  cultivation of sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for  the breeding  of  livestock. Clause (a) of  sub-section  (1)  of section 43A deals with land leased to or held by any  indus-

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trial or commercial undertaking which in the opinion of  the State  Government bona fide carries on by any industrial  or commercial  operations  and which is approved by  the  State Government.     By  the order of the Maharashtra Revenue  Tribunal,  the tenant  had been denied that right as against the  landlord. The  Revision Petition was filed by the  respondents-tenants in proceedings under section 43B of the said Act to question the order made by the Member, Maharashtra Revenue  Tribunal, Kolahpur,  refusing to interfere with the order made by  the Special Land Acquisition Officer (II) Tulsi Project,  Kolha- pur,  holding that the purpose of the lease as far  as  suit lands  were concerned was one for cultivating sugarcane  and as such the lands were governed by the provisions of section 43A of the Act. The question is, is that finding correct?     Both the courts had interpreted the original  Kabulayat, herein  dated 24th February, 1947 to come to the  conclusion that this land was leased for raising sugarcane. Our  atten- tion was also drawn to the official translation of the  said documents which will be presently noted. It may be mentioned that initially proceedings under section 88C of the Act were filed on the basis that the lands were Jiravat lands but the said proceedings were ’withdrawn, and further that  proceed- ings  under section 32(G) of the Act were also initiated  in 1972,  which were still pending. In those  proceedings  too, the  character of the lands was stated to be Jiravat  lands. According to the learned’ counsel, this characterisation  of the  lands  as Jiravat lands was contrary  to  the  findings recorded  by the revenue authorities and there was an  error apparent  on  the face of the record, and so  was  contended before  the  High Court. Secondly, the learned  counsel  had submitted before the’ High Court that on correct reading  of the  Kabulayat there was an express mention that apart  from sugarcane no other crops could be cultivated and if that was so,  the revenue Courts were in error in holding  otherwise. The High Court noted that the proceedings before it were not proceedings  in appeal. The High Court rightly rejected  the application  under  article 227 of the Constitution  on  the view that if a 919 reasonable view of the evidence was taken by the authorities competent  to  decide the controversy, no  interference  was called  for.  Furthermore that was a fact which  had  to  be determined  on  the basis of the evidence. However,  it  was contended before the High Court with reference to the  Kabu- layat  that  it could be seen that this  Kabulayat  of  1947 conferred  a right of cultivation for five years. The  Kabu- layat specifically mentioned that possession of the lands as well  as the well was given under the document. It  provided that  the executant could take the crop in  due-consultation with  the  landholders and there the mention  or  the  crops indicated  all  sorts of crops, like  Jawar,  Tur,  Bhuimug, Mirchi,  Kapus, Oos, Tambakhoo etc. It further recited  that 1/2 of the crop would be retained by he owners and the other 1/2  would be retained by the tillers. After  these  primary recitals,  reference  was made primarily  to  the  sugarcane crop.  With regard to that aspect, it was undertaken by  the executant that everyday till jaggery was prepared, 20 sugar- canes  and  one  pot of sugarcane juice  would  have  to  be reached  to the owners. Similarly, it was provided  how  the fruits  of the mango trees would be shared. It  was  further provided with regard to the manure as well as the seeds  for raising  sugarcane  the parties were to share  1/2  and  1/2 expenditure. Similarly with regard to the maintenance of the irrigational  facilities  and also the expenditure  for  the

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preparation  of  jaggery the parties were to share  1/2  and 1/2.  It  was further provided that the land which  Was  not available for sugarcane could be subjected to cultivation of jute or chilli and no other till the land was available  for sugarcane cultivation.     It  may be instructive to refer to the material  portion of the deed which states as follows: "These two lands I have taken from you agreeing to pay. half crop  share  for a period of five years from shake  1869  to 1874  and  have taken possession today  alongwith  well  and trees. I will raise crops therein in consultation with  you. In  these lands, I will raise chillies,  Cotton,  Sugarcane, Tobacco,  etc.  but I will cut and-harvest  them  with  your approval.  I  will give you a half share in  all  the  crops raised  as  also in the fodder. I will  take  the  remaining share  as a tenant. You are to take the green grass  growing on the western hedge in R.S. No. 493. I am to take the green grass  from other hedges. In the dry fodder you are  to  get half the number of shieves."     The next clause dealt with the price and it has also  an important beating and stated as follows: 920 "The price of your share of crops and fodder is fixed at Rs. 1400.  However I will give you the grain & fodder  and  will not ask you to take its price. Similarly I will pay you half the assessment and local fund in the month of January  every year.          Every year as long as sugar-cane crushing goes on I will  give you every day 20 good sugar-canes, and a  pitcher of sugar-cane juice. The price of the sugarcane and juice is fixed at Rs. 15.           These  are mango trees in the lands. if they  bear fruits  I will protect the same and will not pluck  any  nor will allow anyone also to do so. For protecting the fruits I will  take 1/4th and will give you 3/4th. The price of  your share in the mangoes is fixed at Rs.50." Then in the second clause the executant states as follows: "In  the land where sugar-cane is grown I will raise  either chillies  or jute as an alternate crop. I will not grow  any other crop in that plot."     Thereafter  the Kabulayat dealt with the  obligation  of the executant to supply half the manure of the land and half the  cost of fertilizer and asserted that he  would  supply. half  the  seed for sugarcane and carry the  fertilizer  and seed of sugarcane of his share at his cost. Free service  as per  usual  practice was also ensured. The  last  clause  on which reliance was placed provides as follows: "I will cultivate the lands on these terms for five years. I will hand back the land in which sugarcane is raised in  the month  of Magarshirsha of shake 1873. The remaining  land  I will  deliver  to you between Margarshirsha  and  Falgun  of shake 1876 as and when the standing crops are removed.  Thus the  lands are to remain with me till the amount of  Rs.3000 deposited by me is paid off."     According to the High Court, though initially there  was sortie  mention of other crops, the Kabulayat in  terms  in- tended that the land would be used for cultivation of sugar- cane,  and when the sugarcane was not being cultivated,  the other  crops  could be cultivated in those pieces  of  lands till the land was again available for sugarcane cultiva- 921 tion.  If that be not the intention, according to  the  High Court,  the entire document could not be correctly and  rea- sonably reconciled. It could not be forgotten that this  was a  document  reserving right of the amount  of  Rs.3000  and

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Rs.600  to be adjusted every year by giving  the  cultivated return and taking a receipt therefor. The receipt so intend- ed  to  be taken only concerns itself  with  the  sugarcane, sugarcanejuice and sugarcane-waste. Thus, the document taken as  a  whole could reasonably be read as providing  for  the purpose as it was found by the revenue authorities. Further- more, the oral evidence, according to the High Court, of the parties  clearly  went on to show that the  initial  purpose must  have  been the lease for growing sugarcane.  The  High Court  referred to the evidence of P.W. 1 who  attested  the document.  As against this evidence, there was  evidence  of D.W. 1 which was an evidence only of denial and even he  was unable to say whether in the document sugarcane, cotton  and tobacco as crops were mentioned or not. He was unable to say in how many years actually the sugarcane had been cultivated and he submitted that by rotation the land could be used for cultivating  sugarcane.  It was further admitted,  the  High Court  noted,  that in  cross-examination  that  jaggerywise taken to shops for sale.     The High Court was of the view that. once the  Kabulayat was  read  in this manner, it did not appear even  from  the 7/12 extract that in some portion. sugarcane crop was culti- vated.  The High Court found that being the position of  the record it was difficult to interfere with the finding of the lower  court. In other words the High Court was of the  view that  the predominate purpose being  sugarcane  cultivation, the  tenant was riot entitled to the right asserted by  him. The High Court also noted that the fact that the lands to be characterised  as  Jiravat lands would not be  decisive  for determining  the  purpose of the lease when  that  could  be found  from a document like the Kabulayat. In  the  premises the  High Court refused to interfere. It is the  correctness or  otherwise  of  that decision which  is  under  challenge before us.     It was submitted before us that the whole of the land is not  for the cultivation of sugarcane. It was urged that  in an area of 11 acres, only 1 acre was subjected to the culti- vation  of  sugarcane. The Kabulayat or  the  lease  clearly indicated that there were other purposes.     The  question in this case is whether the lease was  for sugarcane  or  also  for other purposes?  Was  it  composite purpose  lease  or single purpose lease? The object  of  the legislation has to be borne in mind. 922     The  entirety of the lease has to be kept in view.  Then and then only can the question be viewed properly.     Our  attention  was  drawn to a bench  decision  of  the Bombay  High  Court in Shri Usaf Usman Majawar  v.  Shrimant Yeshwantrao  Appasaheb Ghatage, [1963] Bombay  Law  Reporter Vol.  LXV 831. There the Division Bench observed that  indi- vidual  leases were not excluded from the operation of  sec- tion  43A(1)(b) of the Act. According to the bench  decision of the Bombay High Court, the determining factor in  consid- ering  whether clause (b) of section 43A(1) of the  Act  was applicable  or  not, was the purpose of the  lease.  If  the purpose  of  the lease was for cultivation of  sugarcane  or growing  of fruits or flowers or for the breeding  of  live- stock,  then it was excluded from the operation of  sections 32 to 32R of the Act whether the lessee is a body of  person or persons. The High Court further reiterated that what  was required  to be established on material evidence under  sec- tion 43A(1)(b) of the Act was whether there was a lease; and whether the lease was for cultivation of sugarcane or  grow- ing  of  fruits  or flowers. It is not  necessary  that  the purpose  of the lease must be specifically mentioned  either

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in  the  instrument of the lease or that lease must  be  for cultivation of sugarcane etc. in the entire field. It  would be  for  the courts to reach a conclusion  on  the  evidence available to it whether the lease was for cultivation of any particular  crop or not. Nothing would, turn on whether  the agreement was to grow that crop in the entire field or not.     Our attention was drawn to the observations of the Court at  page  835  of the report. It was  contended  before  the Bombay  High  Court that for attracting  the  provisions  of section  43A of the Act, it must be proved by  the  landlord that the agreement specifically provided that the lease  was for  cultivation  of  the sugarcane or for  the  growing  of fruits or flowers or for breeding of livestock, and  further it  must also be established that the agreement was to  grow sugarcane in the entire land leased out ’and not in any part thereof. The High Court was of the view that it was true  in the  language  of clause (b) that it had to  be  established that the lease was granted for the cultivation of  sugarcane or  for  growing. fruits and flowers etc.,  but  it  nowhere specifically mentioned that the purpose of the lease must be specifically mentioned either in the instrument of the lease or  that the/ease must be for cultivation of sugarcane  etc, in the entire field. (Emphasis supplied). On the other hand, according  to  the view of the Bombay High Court,  what  was required was to be established on material evidence  whether there was a lease and whether the lease was for  cultivation of 923 sugarcane or for growing of fruits or flowers. In each  case it  would depend on the evidence whether the lease had  been for cultivation of sugarcane or growing of fruits or flowers and that would depend on the nature of the cultivation.  The Bombay  High  Court noted that they were informed  that  the cultivation of sugarcane could never be on the entire  field but  the cultivation of sugarcane was always carried  on  by rotation in parts of the field. It would, therefore,  depend on  the facts of each case and if that be so, it is for  the courts of fact to reach a conclusion on the evidence  avail- able  to it whether the lease had been for cultivation of  a particular  crop or not. On behalf of the  petitionersappel- lants, learned counsel, Shri Javali contended that the lease contained in the Kabulayat had to be examined because it was not  for cultivation of sugarcane only. Shri JavaIi for  the appellants  contended  that the land could not  be  exempted because the lease was not for the cultivation of the  sugar- cane alone. He drew our attention to the findings at page 13 of  the Paper Book of the appellate court where  apart  from the  record it appeared that the crop of sugarcane  actually raised  in  the suit lands was to the extent of  1  acre  or more.  This  was continued since 1947 till 1972 and  it  was clearly stated by the tenants that they had stopped  raising sugarcane  after  1972  because of scarcity  of  water.  The entries  in  the  record of Rights  also  substantiated  the position  that  sugarcane was actually raised  in  the  suit lands.  The appellate court noted that there was a  well  in one  of  the  suit lands having sufficient  water  to  raise sugarcane.  The statement of the tenants  corroborated  this fact  when they stated that on the day of  deposition  there was 5 to 6 cubic feet water in the said well. That the court below  had actually gone for site inspection and found  that Baggayat  crops like wheat was cultivated by the tenants  on the  water course available from the well in the suit  land. But it is clear that the entire land was not used for culti- vation of sugarcane.     The  question  is if lease for multiple  cultivation  is

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permissible in the scheme of section 43A then only leases of the areas for cultivation of sugarcane or growing of  fruits or  flowers  or for breeding of livestock  could  claim  the benefit  of protection from the tenants’ claim. This has  to be  borne in mind. With respect, we cannot accept the  ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in its entirety. We are  aware  that ’sugarcane could not be cultivated  in  the entire  field for the whole year. It has to be  kept  follow and  crops had to be grown in the meantime to  increase  the fertility.  But what was primary and what was secondary  and what was to be done in such a case as we found it as a fact, has to be considered. 924     As  mentioned hereinbefore, this petition  is  concerned with the proceeding under section 43B of the said Act  which questioned  before  the  High Court the order  made  by  the Member, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, refusing to  interfere with the order made by the Special Land Acquisition  Officer (II) Tulsi Project, Kolhapur holding that the purpose of the lease  so  far as the suit land was concerned  was  one  for cultivating sugarcane and as such the lands were governed by the  provisions of section 43A of the Act. Having regard  to the facts and circumstances enumerated before, we are of the opinion  that  the  area which is in dispute  in  this  case comprised of areas leased for raising sugarcane crop as also for other crops. In view of the provisions of law  discussed above,  in so far as the High Court upheld the finding  that the  entirety of the area in question was covered  by  lease for sugarcane, it is difficult to sustain the same. The area was covered by lease for multiple purposes. Some areas  were leased  out for sugarcane where along with  sugarcane  other flops  were  grown. These, however, should  be  included  as areas leased for sugarcane as ancillary flops or for  better utilisation  of  the land in question. But here  the  leases covered areas other than the areas contemplated by sugarcane which could be demarcated in terms of the Kabulayat which we have discussed before. In our opinion, having regard to  the preamble  to the Act and the primary purpose of the Act,  it would  be  necessary to remand the matter back to  the  High Court  for remanding it back to the appropriate  officer  to determine whether there was any area which was leased exclu- sively  for  sugarcane crop. If it is held on  such  enquiry that  the entirety of the area was for sugarcane crop,  then the order of the Tribunal made in this case cannot be inter- fered  with.  If, on the other hand, there are  areas  which were leased out separately and independently of the  leasing out for sugarcane and demarcated separately, then in respect of the same, no exemption can be given in derogation of  the rights of the agricultural tenants in those leased areas and the  appellant would be entitled to succeed. In a lease  for composite  purposes, if there was any area  where  sugarcane was  only  cultivated, that area would be  exempt  from  the ambit  of the provisions of the Act and would  be  exempted. If,  however,  along with cultivation  of  sugarcane,  other crops were cultivated in the area, such an area would not be entitled  to  exemption. We therefore remand the  case  with directions that the authorities below should find the  posi- tion in light of the aforesaid. It may be observed that  the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 was enacted with a high purpose of transferring the land tilled to the  till- ers  of the soil with the exception of the lands which  were leased  out  for growing sugarcane because of the  need  for protection  of the industry of sugarcane and development  of the economy. 925

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      This appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid  direc- tions. In that view of the matter, parties will pay and bear their own costs. M.L.A                                       Appeal  disposed of. 926